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
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'HOLLYWOOD IN MADRID': AMERICAN FILM PRODUCERS AND THE FRANCO REGIME, 1950–1970

Neal Moses Rosendorf

The Spanish military dictator Francisco Franco was an unlikely patron of Hollywood film production. Yet from the early 1950s through the end of the 1960s, independent American film-makers would trek to Spain to enlist *El Caudillo's* cooperation in producing big-budget motion pictures. These producers and the dictatorship developed a symbiotic relationship that helped make Spain a major film center in the 1960s. Beleaguered by television and anti-trust rulings, Hollywood studios relied on independent producers who shaved costs by working outside the US. Spain, economically ailing in the early postwar years, was an attractive option, and the Franco dictatorship welcomed access to dollars, the benchmark hard currency. The dollars would flow from both production expenditures and the tourism that would be spurred by widely disseminated film depictions of Spain's history, culture, and scenery. Just as important, local American film-making efforts held a significant value to the dictatorship in helping to cultivate a positive image for a government with an image problem, through positive portrayals of Spain and Spaniards, and the imprimatur of both glamour and 'normality' conferred by Hollywood operations in the country.

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Franco Spain was a pariah state, tarred by *El Caudillo's* wartime dalliance with Hitler and Mussolini, on the verge of being drummed out of the United Nations. Spain was also in dreadful economic straits, the result of the destructive 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War and subsequent economic mismanagement under a policy of autarky. Additionally, like many

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20th century dictatorships, Franco Spain contained elements of xenophobia and paranoia, especially toward Communists, the Masons, and to a lesser extent Jews. Nevertheless, Spain would find a way out of the dark corner of 1945–1946, and over the next two decades the Franco regime successfully refashioned Spain's image into that of a 'normal' Western country, especially vis-à-vis the United States, and put the country on a dramatic economic growth trajectory.

The refashioning process was complex. Luck mattered, in the form of the Cold War. The superpower competition made the Franco regime and its vestigial ultra-nationalism seem much less threatening to the US and the West than Soviet communism. Moreover, in the pre-ICBM era, Spain provided an ideal location for American strategic air and submarine bases, which led the Truman and Eisenhower administrations pragmatically to negotiate the 1953 Madrid Pact military alliance with the Spanish dictatorship.¹ But the Franco regime developed a well-planned political and economic program, a key element of which was cultivating American and other Western tourism to Spain.² Hollywood and other foreign motion picture production in Franco Spain in the 1950s and 1960s occurred in part within this context; but these efforts also had their own unique economic and political rationale within the Franco regime's framework, with the political aspect eventually spelled out in a secret 1960 propaganda plan, 'Operación Propaganda Exterior.'³

Hollywood-sponsored productions constituted a numerical minority in postwar Spain—many more Italian films were made in Spain during the first two decades after World War II. But the Hollywood productions were generally on a far larger scale, spent concomitantly more money, trained and employed more local technicians, actors and artisans.⁴ Due to Hollywood's publicity and marketing muscle, they were more widely publicized and had the potential to reach a significantly larger viewing audience, both in the United States and worldwide, which in turn held the potential to encourage tourism from abroad, especially from a prosperous and strategically pre-eminent US. And they could portray to these audiences Spain's historic grandeur⁵ and Western normality and sophistication.⁶ Thus the Franco regime, after some initial reluctance, came to place a special significance on American film production. The Spanish government extended cooperation to Hollywood operations for almost two decades. This relationship reached a zenith, but not a conclusion, with the partnership forged between the dictatorship and producer Samuel Bronston, who established a full-scale permanent studio in Spain, where he made such epics as *El Cid*, *55 Days at Peking*, and *Fall of the Roman Empire*.

During the early postwar era, Hollywood, with its sense of spectacle and its large-scale industry production model, ironically found some common aesthetic ground with the Franco regime, even as many in the US industry did not sympathize with much of the regime's politics and internal practices.⁷ Without stretching too far, one can discern a common thread of grandiosity between, for example, the eye-popping *El Cid*, with the (literally) outsized star Charlton Heston portraying the eponymous Spanish knight, and the huge Cross and statuary looming from the peak of the mountaintop shrine to the Nationalist (right-wing) Spanish Civil War dead at the *Valle de los Caídos* (Valley of the Fallen), in the Guadarrama Mountains outside Madrid.⁸

Over the past decade there has been a considerable discussion of the international role of Hollywood, and American popular culture more generally, as an element of American 'soft power,' a now-widespread term devised by the political scientist

Joseph S. Nye. According to Nye, soft power describes a co-opting process by which '[a] country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries—admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness—want to follow it . . . Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others.'⁹ Ever since the rise of American film production to international predominance after World War I, there have been ongoing expressions of concern in many countries over the local cultural and political impact of Hollywood and the American pop culture of which it is a tribune and transmitter.¹⁰ But in fact, the American motion picture industry has long been an importer of ideas, images and indeed artists, including directors, writers, actors, and producers, as well as an exporter, and this inward flow contains a political as well as cultural potential in much the same way that the outward flow does.¹¹

The Franco regime astutely grasped the nature of this two-way soft power exchange and the potential to utilize American soft power for its own purposes. Through Hollywood productions in Spain, the dictatorship could seek to influence public attitudes both in the US and internationally. To be sure, the exchange had an unpredictable element, which meant that no matter how successfully Spain navigated its relationship with American film-makers, the dictatorship remained anxious about Hollywood's capacity to undermine its control. This anxiety would motivate *El Caudillo's* minions to exercise editorial oversight of the American and other film-making enterprises operating in Spain. With few exceptions,¹² Hollywood producers were generally quite willing to accept the Spanish government's terms in order to reap the benefits of working in the country.¹³ The result was that for close to two decades the Franco regime effectively turned the US film industry into an arm of its Ministry of Information and Tourism.

The context: independents and runaways

In the 1950s, Hollywood was in the midst of a complete breakdown of the established studio system, marked by large-scale, in-house, virtually assembly-line film production, that had been the industry's modus operandi for over four decades. Forced divestiture of highly lucrative theater operations as a result of the 1948 *Paramount* Supreme Court antitrust decision dealt a body blow to the major studios.¹⁴ The studios believed, moreover, that they needed big budget, full-color, wide-screen spectacles to win back audiences from the seductive convenience and low cost of the new scourge of television.¹⁵ Hollywood's quandary, however, was that the grander, more lavishly produced movies that the industry believed were the key to drawing crowds back into the theaters were more expensive to make, precisely as the studios were suffering from diminishing revenues due to the divorcement and divestiture of their theater chains and television. Indeed, the studios could no longer afford to maintain the physical facilities that had been the heart of their production operation.¹⁶

In Hollywood's predicament lay a singular opening for independent producers. The major studios were attracted to these unaffiliated producers' flexibility in tailoring their production operation to the specific needs of the project they were working on, their willingness to scare up much of their own funding, and their readiness to assume both the responsibilities of putting together the logistics of

production and a good deal of the financial risk. The studios in turn offered independent production operations aid in securing capital and access to their unparalleled distribution and publicity operations. The independent producers for their part were always on the lookout for any possible way to shave their costs. A solution for both the independent producers and studios was foreign production of Hollywood movies.¹⁷

Three fundamental reasons led American producers to consider shooting movies abroad. First, it was cheaper than filming in Hollywood or anywhere else in the United States. Second, it offered the opportunity for US film-makers to take advantage of official subsidies and other enticements established in some countries to spur or prop up local film production, via legal loopholes surrounding 'co-production' partnerships with companies based in those countries.¹⁸ Third, it gave producers potential access to 'frozen funds,' foreign revenues accrued in local currency by the motion picture studios, and sometimes other US businesses, that could not be removed from various countries because of restrictive economic regulations: while the frozen funds themselves could not be removed from the country, a film negative could. The trick, then, was to make movies using the blocked currency and exhibit them worldwide. If the movie was a success, profits generated in the US and elsewhere would equal or perhaps even considerably surpass the initial production investment. Britain was the number-one destination for American overseas film production because of the quality of its production facilities and the lack of a language barrier. But while there were savings and other benefits, Britain's costs were also among the highest. For much of the early postwar period, Italy followed closely behind Britain as a production facility for Hollywood expatriates. France and Mexico also hosted Hollywood production, although at much lower levels than Britain and Italy.¹⁹ And then there was Spain.

The film production climate in Spain in the early 1950s

In the early 1950s, the Franco regime was in the midst of implementing a program to promote American tourism to Spain, as a central element of the regime's efforts after World War II to improve Spain's economic and diplomatic/political circumstances. The Spanish government's overarching goal was to 'sell' Franco Spain's image abroad and particularly to the United States. The policy aimed to portray Spain as a normal Western country and anti-communist ally, and to bring into Spain desperately needed hard currency, especially dollars, and investment. The Franco regime was strongly encouraged in the years following World War II's end to look to American tourism's potential economic and propaganda benefits to Spain by prominent players within the US travel and tourism industries, including American Express, Hilton Hotels, Trans-World Airlines, and prominent American travel writers.²⁰ As a report by the Spanish Ministry of Information and Tourism (MIT) put it in 1952,

[We should consider] the multiplier effect of an efficient, well oriented official propaganda that adequately exalts our national values in all aspects, attracting the outsider toward our nation . . . [I]t is essential that the tourist who visits us not

only returns here, but that he is converted into the most active propagandist of our nation, increasing in this manner our prestige in the world.²¹

Encouraging and welcoming American motion picture production in Spain was a logical corollary to these efforts. The Ministry of Information and Tourism had control over both tourism and film production policies. Both elements were in the service of the Franco regime's propaganda program, which the MIT also controlled. But unlike the regime's enthusiastic efforts to lure in Americans as tourists, plans for how to deal with the American movie industry developed in a piecemeal way as the regime initially stumbled over its ultra-conservative ideological baggage. The devout Catholic and Falangist (fascist) Information and Tourism minister Gabriel Arias Salgado obsessed over prurience and cultural pollution flowing into Spain from the outside. As one Catalonian director described his frustrations about trying to film in the 1950s,

Our Ministry . . . functioned as two ministries that contradicted each other. One that was vigilant and one that fomented tourism. The one . . . prohibited bikinis on the screen and the other was encouraging tourism that brought bikinis. Thus one would be asking oneself, 'Which of the two should I follow?'²²

The Ministry of Information and Tourism placed a low ceiling on the number of US films allowed into the country during the 1950s, and even well into the 1960s, when the MIT was led by the aperturista, or liberalizer, Manuel Fraga Iribarne. The Ministry's ostensible ambition was to protect domestic Spanish producers from American movies, which were vastly more popular with the Spanish viewing public than local, officially sanctioned offerings. On the surface this would appear to be unexceptional—as John Trumbour details in his study *Selling Hollywood to the World: US and European struggles for mastery of the global film industry, 1920–1950*, Britain and France were also deeply concerned with protecting their domestic movie industries from Hollywood.²³

However, even France, for all its denunciations of American pop culture's assault, allowed 140 American movies into the country, while the Franco regime let in only 80.²⁴ The likely reason for this difference is that France, for all its public fulminations, did not perceive a significant potential threat to its political legitimacy from Hollywood, while the same could not be said of Franco Spain. The Ministry of Information and Tourism was congenitally suspicious of Hollywood—as late as 1960, internal MIT documents warned that the American film producers and distributors amounted to 'the sector most easily penetrated by Judaism and communism,' and that the regime had to be very wary in its dealings with them as a result.²⁵ The Franco regime had seen Hollywood's blitzkrieg of anti-Nazi movies during World War II and was itself singled. The 1943 adaptation of Ernest Hemingway's *For Whom the Bell Tolls* became something of a *cause célèbre*, occasioning rumors of official Franco regime protests and subsequent US State Department pressure on Paramount studios, the film's producer, to tone down the script's anti-fascist slant. The final product, while less pointed than the original novel, was hardly an encomium to the Franco regime. Hollywood was clearly a considerable danger if it could weather official pressure on a national security issue and still go its own way.²⁶

The Spanish government's anxieties about Hollywood were not only manifested by the Ministry of Information and Tourism. In 1950, Spain's Royal Academy of Medicine inveighed against American 'psychological' films, as well as the American theories of psychiatry that ostensibly underpinned them, as a threat to Spain's mental and moral health. The Academy declared that American psychoanalytical principles were 'reprehensible both theologically and morally.' Hollywood depictions of mental illness and its treatment 'could provoke mass crises of hysteria' in Spain and should be censored by a 'mental specialist.' Among their other transgressions, films like *The Snake Pit* (1948), which starred Olivia de Havilland as a woman confined to a mental hospital, 'are contrary to Catholic dogma, may eventually damage the mental health of individuals or groups and by bringing up the idea a madman is not responsible for criminal actions they may encourage crime.'²⁷

But the inescapable reality was that the United States dominated the international film market, and the Franco regime felt compelled to try to come terms with this supremacy and seek a useful accommodation with it. Franco himself was keenly aware of the potential propaganda power of cinema—he had actually written a screenplay in 1940, *Raza* ('Race'), which was filmed in Spain that same year.²⁸ After World War II, the MIT's initial interest in Hollywood as a means of spreading propaganda was to use the Motion Picture Export Association of America (MPEA), the international distribution organization composed of most of the major US film corporations, to help finance Spanish films and disseminate them in the US and worldwide via the prodigious US film distribution system. From the American studios' standpoint, however, the critical issue was quality and salability in the United States and elsewhere. In 1950, the MIT helped finance an uncharacteristically (for Spain) big-budget epic film, *Cristobel Colon*, about the exploits of Columbus in his exploration of the New World. The movie had sumptuous production values and was attractively photographed. But the script was larded with heavy-handed references to the glory of Spain and its leadership, and the film's acting and direction were pedestrian at best. The MPEA refused to distribute *Cristobel Colon* in the United States, and the film even flopped in Spain.²⁹ Another MIT-blessed Spanish film, *Bienvenido, Mr. Marshall*, did gain a limited art house release after it garnered a Cannes film festival award as best comedy of 1953. The film deals with a small Spanish village's speedy makeover by its inhabitants, who have heard rumors of forthcoming Marshall Plan aid. But if the movie was not without its charms, it still contained some rather vicious anti-American propaganda, such as a scene depicting the village priest's nightmare, in which he is set upon by hooded monks who transmogrify into Ku Klux Klansmen. With 'USA' emblazoned on the monk/Klansmen's white robes, it is easy to see why the film did not do very well in the United States.

US-Spanish film tensions were not limited to content. The Franco regime's policies concerning domestic American film distribution were a source of friction throughout the 1950s. The MIT had devised an arcane system that limited import film distribution permits, which were given to favored Spanish producer/distributors as a means of subsidizing their production. This system soaked American studios to subsidize unprofitable Spanish films. The MIT attempted to pressure US studios, through its negotiations with the MPEA, to distribute one Spanish movie in the US for every four US movies imported into Spain. Between 1955 and 1959, the MPEA organized a boycott of exports to the Spanish market that proved debilitating even

though incomplete.³⁰ These struggles between the Franco regime and MIT would hinder, but not prevent, American film production efforts during this period.

During most of the 1950s, the Spanish film industry's production infrastructure left much to be desired. A report by the American Embassy in Madrid stated bluntly that the 'principal dilemma of the Spanish motion picture industry is the low quality of production . . . There are many producers but moderate output, and the quality runs a poor second in the competitive race with foreign films.'³¹ Pushed by the MIT, Spanish film-makers offered an outpouring of 'religious subjects, Spanish songs of the last century, bullfighting, military glory . . .'³² Such fare was unlikely to capture the attention of American moviegoers. The Embassy report additionally quoted a *Variety* correspondent's report from Madrid that '[u]nlike England, France and Italy, Spain cannot furnish raw stock [that is, film], cameras, sound equipment and lights as required by U.S. moviemakers.'³³ In short, the Spanish film industry in the 1950s was maladapted to the business of producing movies that would find a mass American audience.³⁴

Hollywood's first foothold in Spain: United Artists

Despite these formidable disincentives, in the feverish atmosphere of Hollywood in the 1950s, the search by independent producers for the cheapest production costs rose virtually to the level of a holy quest. Thus, Spain's reputation as a poor nation with cheap prices was bound to attract attention. United Artists (UA) in particular had been assiduously cultivating friendly relations with the Franco regime through its distribution operation in Spain. The company's representative in the country was George Ornstein, who happened to be the son-in-law of UA majority shareholder Mary Pickford. As a result of his familial connection, Ornstein had a patina of celebrity and corporate authority that sat well with the dictatorship. In the 1960s he would be awarded both the 'Merito Civil' and Spain's highest civilian honor, the 'Order of Isabel la Catolica.'³⁵

UA was ideally suited to accommodate independent productions. In 1951, two New York lawyers bought the debt-ridden company, and they concentrated the company's efforts on aiding producers in motion picture finance and distribution.³⁶ The studio without a back lot became something of a mecca for independent producers, including such luminaries as Robert Rossen, Stanley Kramer and King Vidor, all of whom were both directors and producers. As a result, between 1955 and 1958 UA was able to strike favorable deals to facilitate several mega-productions made wholly in Spain.

As it turns out, the first beneficiary of UA's efforts to legitimate American motion picture production in Spain was the modest 1953 period film *Decameron Nights*, which was nominally American in provenance through its producer, Mike Frankovich, co-star Joan Fontaine, and its distributor, the soon-to-be defunct RKO Pictures. The director, Hugo Fregonese, was an Argentine expatriate who had worked for some years in Hollywood and was fluent in Spanish.³⁷ The Franco regime did not make difficulties for the production, and the project made efficient use of 'frozen funds,' the combination of which offered encouragement to other prospective independent producers.³⁸ Indeed, Hugo Fregonese was so pleased at the result that in 1954 he

declared that Spain 'offered the fullest cooperation and the most liberal inducements to American interests shooting there.'³⁹ To be sure, though, the Ministry of Information and Culture likely viewed the Latin American director as an Hispanic cultural fellow traveler, not a typical Hollywood personage, which in turn likely colored Fregonese's treatment by the Spanish authorities.

The first of the massive UA-sponsored independent productions was Robert Rossen's *Alexander the Great*. The King of Greece had lobbied Rossen, the director of the Academy Award-winning *All the King's Men*, to shoot his biography of the Macedonian conqueror in Greece itself. 'Ten days ago,' Rossen reported at one point, 'I had a stimulating one-hour session with the King and Queen of Greece... Both are quite film-conscious and they encouraged me to shoot the picture there. The King in particular seemed interested in the character of Alexander, who, in some parts of Greece, is mentioned almost as though he were alive today.'⁴⁰ But Greece's movie-making infrastructure lagged far behind even that of Spain, and with George Ornstein urging him on, Rossen decided to film the entire production in the latter country.⁴¹ The Spanish authorities were in fact not unalloyed in their enthusiasm when the producers petitioned for permission to operate in Spain as a co-production, which was a prerequisite for filming in the country. One MIT official complained that the local co-producer, C.B. Films, was to be short-changed on sharing in the profits of the film's worldwide distribution, a serious matter to the cash-strapped Franco regime. While the official's analysis of the proposed contract's terms 'oblige us to hold a low opinion' of the proposition,

Clearly, 'Alexander the Great' will be a grand cinematic super-production, the first of importance to be made in Spain. And... especially noteworthy, as we will be able to represent that a production that will undoubtedly be of global transcendence will be brought to a successful conclusion with the participation of a Spanish producer, this [organization] thinks that we should make an exception... to be able to authorize the making of the film 'Alexander the Great' as a co-production... [while] drawing attention to the Spanish co-producer that we will not authorize any additional co-productions that do not adhere to the basic principles of an authentic co-production.⁴²

Having overcome the Franco regime's ambivalence, Robert Rossen flew to Spain in the winter of 1955, where he was met at the airport by the indefatigable, and undoubtedly relieved, George Ornstein.⁴³ UA trumpeted the start of filming in a full-page advertisement in the February 25, 1955 issue of *Variety* that stressed the Spanish location shooting.⁴⁴ The unprecedented magnitude of the production for Spain's film industry was encapsulated by a Spanish correspondent in the journal *Film Culture* who reported,

The event in Spanish cinema which is at present of greatest importance, at least financially speaking, is the filming of the Hispano-United States *Alejandro Magno* (*Alexander the Great*), which was initiated the other day in the Madrid studios of Sevilla Film, one of the three largest producers in the country...⁴⁵

Life magazine did a full-page photo-article on the 'Alexander the Great' production, prominently featuring its Spanish locale.⁴⁶

Significantly, six major Spanish film stars had signed on to play minor roles in this international production. Attacked in some Spanish circles for 'degrading' themselves, one of them retorted, 'Why not? We have small parts, true, but as Alexander's companions we are seen throughout the film. We are learning new techniques, we are meeting new film people, and it might lead to something else in the international field.'⁴⁷ Spanish film artists were clearly champing at the bit to be seen by a wider audience and improve their technical skills. And the money was not bad, either: Spanish actors, craftsmen and technicians would pocket more than three-quarters of *Alexander the Great's* four-million-dollar budget.⁴⁸

The Franco regime could not have been displeased with the media coverage of the *Alexander the Great* production, including its own modest contribution in the form of several hundred horse-mounted Army and Madrid police troops (including the chief of the Madrid mounted police, who had a role in the film as a high priest traveling with Alexander).⁴⁹ Indeed, by late 1955, Vicenti Salgado, the president of the Spanish film production and distribution organization CEA, declared on a visit to Hollywood that '[p]olitical and economic conditions in Spain are now excellent for American production.'⁵⁰ In this atmosphere of enhanced governmental enthusiasm to facilitate Hollywood projects, UA's next film production in Spain would garner a significantly greater degree of the Franco regime's attention and involvement.

The Pride and the Passion, produced and directed by Stanley Kramer, was of particular importance to the Franco regime. The film, which starred Cary Grant, Sophia Loren, and Frank Sinatra, dealt with Spanish resistance to Napoleon's invasion of the country in 1808. A key reason that Kramer decided to make the Spanish-themed *The Pride and the Passion* is that *Alexander the Great* had dramatically demonstrated Spain's cost-effectiveness for grand-scale motion picture production. Kramer's film cost 3.5 million dollars to make, but as he noted in an interview during production, 'It would have cost twice that much if we'd made it anywhere else . . . The country has almost no facilities for making movies. That sounds expensive at first. But in the long run we saved money—big money.'⁵¹

Stanley Kramer was one of Hollywood's most noted liberals—during his two-decade long career he made, among other films, *High Noon*, *Judgment at Nuremberg*, *On the Beach* and *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner*. But whatever private reservations the producer-director may have had about Francisco Franco, they did not prevent him from establishing a cordial personal relationship with the Spanish dictator or providing his regime with a major public relations coup. Moreover, Kramer's project undoubtedly helped to nudge the Franco regime toward a generally more receptive attitude to Hollywood production in Spain, assuming projects were congenial to the regime. Perhaps most important in the long run, Kramer's *modus operandi* equally undoubtedly provided a template for the long-term Spanish-based production efforts of Samuel Bronston that commenced a couple of years later.

From the time that Kramer first proposed his project to the Franco regime in September 1955, the Spanish authorities were supportive of the idea, although they would continually monitor the production to make sure it served the regime's political purposes. After offering his initial pitch to the Ministry of Information

and Tourism, Kramer wrote to the Director General of Cinema and Theater to express

... our most sincere gratitude for your kind reception and the attention given to our project to produce in Spain, in VistaVision and in color, the film titled "Pride and Passion" the synopsis of which we have had the honor to deliver ... We wish to reiterate ... that we are determined to produce a film in every respect worthy of Spain and we are sparing no artistic and technical expense ...⁵²

Clearly, Kramer sought to gain support from the very highest levels of the regime. To this end, in October 1955 he met with Gabriel Arias Salgado, the ultra-right-wing Minister of Information and Tourism, to whom he laid out his plan, 'based on the heroic resistance of the Spanish people to the invasion of Napoleon during the War of Independence.' Kramer then went on to have a special interview with Francisco Franco himself, in which he 'explained in detail the project and the effort needed to realize this grand production.' *El Caudillo* was 'profoundly interested in the project and ... promised that he would provide all manner of facilities and aid that would permit the attainment of this most ambitious film.'⁵³ Unlike the rather tepid authorization of *Alexander the Great*, the Spanish government quickly granted permission to *The Pride and the Passion* enterprise to begin filming.⁵⁴

Kramer's bid for full cooperation from the Franco regime was a smashing success. Information and Tourism minister Arias Salgado wrote to the minister of the Spanish Army in March 1956,

Soon filming will begin in Spain for an American motion picture entitled 'Pride and Passion,' based on the War of Independence, and the heroic resistance offered by the Spanish people against the invaders. This film is being made by the the American citizen Mr. Stanley Kramer, the famous cinema producer, who was granted an audience with His Excellency the Chief of State [Franco] in order to inform him about his project.

Given the magnitude of producing this film, and that the film emphasizes the heroic comportment of the Spanish people against Napoleon's troops, this producer requests to the greatest extent possible as determined by the Army Ministry, facilities of troops and matériel in order to achieve the ambition of this film.

Permit me, General, to state that this Ministry finds itself extremely interested that the realization of the film under discussion will achieve the most brilliant result, in order to emphasize to the world these facets of our history.⁵⁵

Kramer's production company was given virtual *carte blanche* to film where they wished throughout the country, even if that meant disrupting daily activities. For example, as *Variety* reported, 'For climactic scenes, involving the blowing of a hole through the old wall of a city, telephone and electric wires were removed from a section of the town so that they would not show up on film.' Authorities blocked off residents' access to another city's central plaza for several days to aid filming efforts.⁵⁶

However, despite the general air of enthusiastic cooperation, the dictatorship kept close tabs on the script, which was being written and revised during production itself.

Early in the filming process, the director-general of Cinema and Theater reported to his boss Arias Salgado that the script would be acceptable once it made explicit reference ‘to the Spanish Army that fought the war, to their valor and the martial virtues and to their definitive victory, to the patriotism that motivated the Spanish guerrillas . . . [and] presents the Spanish people with corresponding nobility, dignity and valor.’⁵⁷ Subsequent close readings by the MIT expressed non-negotiable concerns over aspects of the portrayal both of Spaniards and the British officer played by Cary Grant. ‘The English captain will not be presented as the exponent of culture and civilization in the midst of a semi-savage people,’ was one comment. Another was, ‘Miguel, the leader of the Spanish guerrillas [played by Frank Sinatra], will be endowed with humane virtues of a degree not inferior to that demonstrated by the English official.’⁵⁸ And while it was well and good to exalt the ‘guerrilla spirit,’ it would not happen at the expense of the Spanish army of which Franco was of course supreme commander:

... [T]he script depicts the regular army in defeat and totally demoralized, and in retreat they have completely abandoned jurisdiction and leadership in the guerrilla’s zone. This inappropriate presentation is completely false . . . [this is incompatible with] a request for the cooperation of that same army.⁵⁹

In response to the Franco regime’s demands, Stanley Kramer would order the necessary changes made to the script.⁶⁰

Francisco Franco’s and Gabriel Arias Salgado’s ongoing personal interest kept the Spanish Government cooperative with Stanley Kramer throughout the production of *The Pride and the Passion*, which was released in the United States late in 1957, and subsequently around the world. In a report to Madrid, Spain’s ambassador to India offered telling evidence of the Spanish government’s take on the film’s international reception. The diplomat declared from his vantage point in Delhi that while the film was not being especially well-reviewed in Indian newspapers, critics without exception ‘salute the reproduction of Goya paintings and the magnificent Technicolor vistas of the Spanish scenery. In this they are completely unanimous, stating that these shots are magnificent and represent the panoramic character of our country.’ The film’s reception, claimed the ambassador, demonstrated that interest in Spanish-themed films would ‘begin to produce an effective propaganda about our country that . . . with the already existing interest [in Spain] would be exceptionally welcome.’⁶¹

Stanley Kramer was not the only well-known Hollywood liberal in the 1950s to take a fundamentally apolitical, bottom-line position on filming in Spain. Kirk Douglas, whose production company, Bryna, made *Spartacus* partly on location in Spain, told this author through an intermediary in 1996 (he was recovering from his stroke at the time) that his production had simply relied on location scouts to provide appropriate shooting sites at the budget target, with no consideration of Spain’s politics one way or the other.⁶² Ironically, Spanish politics evidently came close to scotching plans to film in Spain. The film’s left-wing screenwriter, Dalton Trumbo,⁶³ had constructed his protagonist as a hero of the proletariat, which was unlikely to sit well with the Franco regime. As UA’s George Ornstein would note in a letter from Spain to his aunt-in-law Mary Pickford, ‘Tony Mann may do a picture for us here.

He just returned from London . . . the script is great but big problem politically here. I return to Madrid Wednesday to see him again on it as Picker told him if anyone could solve it I could—which I doubt.⁶⁴ Presumably as a result of this political unease, much of the filming of *Spartacus* was done in the US (and Universal, not UA, would release the picture). However, the Franco regime eventually relented over allowing filming of the less controversial passages of the film concerned with battle-fighting. Moreover, likely as the result of the ultimate cooperation between the production and the Ministry of Information and Tourism, promotional materials for *Spartacus* made clear precisely where in Spain filming took place, which would be a spur to American tourism.⁶⁵

UA would sustain a black eye with the Franco regime over its plans to film *The Naked Maja*, a romance depicting one of Spain's greatest artists, Francisco Goya. The film's script unambiguously identified the provocatively posed nude of Goya's famous painting as the Duchess of Alba. The Albas, one of Spain's most distinguished and powerful families, prevailed on Franco to lock the production out of Spain—it was in fact filmed in Italy.⁶⁶ Nonetheless, even though suspicions against Hollywood's intentions would continue to linger, pragmatism and cordial relations with UA were the order of the day for the Franco regime, and UA continued in the late 1950s to produce motion pictures in Spain, including King Vidor's epic *Solomon and Sheba* and Mike Todd, Jr.'s comedy thriller *Scent of Mystery*.

With *Solomon and Sheba*, a UA super-production once again gained the cooperation not only of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, but of the Spanish Army ministry as well. The production company promised that the film would be shot entirely in Spain and 60% of the filming would consist of the exterior shots coveted by the MIT.⁶⁷ And of course, the Biblical theme would have sat well with the Franco regime in its role as defender of the Church (even if the regime must not have been especially happy with co-star Gina Lollobrigida's seductive dance in a cleavage-emphasizing, navel-baring costume). With the support of the Franco regime, the production weathered the fatal heart attack of star Tyrone Power, who was succeeded in mid-shooting of the film by a bewigged Yul Brynner. Indeed, after absorbing the costs of this tragedy, producer Ted Richmond averred that *Solomon and Sheba's* screen values would have cost twice as much to achieve in Britain or Italy. Attesting to the financial advantages of Spain, Richmond stated, 'I know that if we had finished "Solomon and Sheba" with Ty Power, we would have been \$300,000 under budget and the film would have been just as great.'⁶⁸ George Ornstein declared his appreciation to the Spanish Director General of Cinema and Theater:

As the success of the production of this film depended to a great extent on your cooperation, I am taking this occasion to express to you . . . the sincere gratitude on the part of the producer and United Artists Corp. for your help in the making of this great film.⁶⁹

The Film Daily would report in 1960 that UA had risen since the early 1950s to be the number-one American film production and distribution operation in Spain.⁷⁰ UA's Spanish activities, including the emollient approach of George Ornstein and especially the actions surrounding the production of *The Pride and the Passion*, would pave the way

for the enterprise that would supplant UA at the apex of American film enterprise in Spain: the establishment in Spain of a full-scale Hollywood studio operation by the ambitious independent producer Samuel Bronston.

Samuel Bronston in Spain

Born in Bessarabia, Samuel Bronston was an American independent film producer who was exceptionally skilled at cultivating ties and business relationships with the wealthy and the well-connected—an early film production partner was James Roosevelt (FDR's son).⁷¹ Bronston used this ability to resurrect a near-moribund career in the mid-1950s with a large-scale project, *John Paul Jones*. Bronston gained the cooperation of the United States Navy and struck up a limited partnership with the old-money financier J. Stuyvesant Pierrepont, Jr.⁷² Through this contact he eventually brought in a dozen other prestigious limited partners, including Nelson and Laurence Rockefeller and, most significantly for Bronston's future production endeavors, Pierre S. du Pont III. Companies represented as investors included DuPont, General Motors, Eastman Kodak, and Firestone Tire and Rubber Company.⁷³ For many of these limited partners a combination of patriotic subject matter and the opportunity to free up millions of dollars in frozen overseas earnings was irresistible.

Bronston's choice as director of *John Paul Jones* was the passionately Catholic John Villiers Farrow. Farrow's ecclesiastical writings had earned him high honors from the Church. Since the late 1940s Farrow had dreamt of filming a life of Christ.⁷⁴ Bronston took note, for future reference, of Farrow's ambition. But in 1957 the pressing issue was where to shoot *John Paul Jones*. The answer was simple in its broad outlines: outside the United States, wherever Bronston's tiny roster of investors had funds from their investments or local subsidiaries frozen in place by local currency restrictions. Initially, John Paul Jones Productions announced that filming would take place in Scotland.⁷⁵ But Bronston's dozen backers had money frozen elsewhere as well, and hence Bronston scouted locations in Italy, France, and Spain.

From the investors' perspective, Spain was ultimately the most attractive destination of all. Bronston had at one point decided to do most of the filming in Italy and purchased two sailing ships there for use in the film,⁷⁶ but Iberia beckoned. He had received strong encouragement to shoot there from the Spanish Ambassador to the United States when the two were seated together at a dinner party in Washington, D.C.⁷⁷ Moreover, at a point when he had run out of funding, the producer gained a \$500,000 infusion from an investor whose money was tied up in pesetas, which tipped the scales decisively in Spain's favor.⁷⁸ When Bronston arrived in Madrid he found not only promises of official support, but a country that was even by European standards fantastically cheap to work and live in. In short order, Spain was designated as the primary locale for all of the proposed shooting for *John Paul Jones*.

At the urging of Technicolor technician John Cabrera, who had been seconded to the Bronston outfit, the production virtually took over the sleepy Mediterranean town of Denia, from which Cabrera's family hailed, using it for location shooting.⁷⁹ The production's greatest coup was gaining permission from

the Franco regime to film key sequences in the lavishly appointed halls and throne room of the Royal Palace in Madrid.⁸⁰ Minor filming was done on location in England and France, but Spain was the star, as reported in, among other publications, the *New York Times* and the *Los Angeles Times*.⁸¹ Even before *John Paul Jones* had premiered, Bronston had delivered a glorious advertisement for Spain as a tourist destination; he had also managed to at least indirectly associate Franco Spain with the American Revolution.

Once *John Paul Jones* was completed, Bronston was ready to move on to bringing to the screen John Farrow's life of Christ project, while establishing an American motion-picture production empire in Iberia (as it turns out, Farrow left the production and was replaced by the brilliant if mercurial Nicholas Ray). His plan to found a full-scale movie outfit in Madrid was grandiose, but it was no pipe dream. Bronston had gained access to more funding than most top producers at the time could secure over an entire career via his newest and biggest partner ever, Pierre S. du Pont III. Du Pont, a scion of one of America's wealthiest and most notable families, had been one of *John Paul Jones*'s investors.⁸² As the producer's limited partner, between 1959 and 1964 Pierre du Pont would sign guarantee notes on Bronston's behalf totaling approximately \$35 million (around \$220 million in 2005 dollars).⁸³

Bronston's wielding of the august du Pont name and proposed Christian subject matter convinced the Franco regime to welcome him.⁸⁴ Bronston faced no significant criticism in the US over his developing ties with the Franco regime, which contrasted sharply with the ferocious outcry that producers Walter Wanger and Hal Roach had earlier encountered when they sought to forge production arrangements with Italian dictator Benito Mussolini in the mid-1930s.⁸⁵ While fascism was still reprehensible to most Americans in the late 1950s, it was clearly a spent force on the world scene; communism was by far the greater perceived threat. Moreover, the Franco regime had since 1953 been a de facto ally of the US with the signing of the Madrid Pact.⁸⁶

Samuel Bronston Productions' request to begin filming was quickly approved,⁸⁷ and the producer moved his family from New York to Madrid.⁸⁸ In March 1960, Bronston used his inimitable skills to garner an audience with the liberal Pope John XXIII.⁸⁹ The reforming Pontiff, pleased with the script's refocusing of blame for the Crucifixion on the Romans, gave *King of Kings* his blessing and pledged the Vatican's full cooperation in the film's production.⁹⁰ His policies did not sit especially well with the Franco regime,⁹¹ but he was nonetheless the Pope, and his imprimatur upon Bronston would have enhanced the producer's standing in Spain all the more. While some in the Franco regime had reservations about *King of Kings*'s scriptural liberties,⁹² Bronston's organization was bringing publicity and millions of dollars in currency and jobs into Spain, with the promise of more to follow. Indeed, to drive home that he was keeping his part of the bargain, Bronston's publicity materials for *King of Kings* pointedly emphasized that he had produced the film in Spain.⁹³

Moreover, even as *King of Kings* was still in the early stages of production, planning began on the film that would be Bronston's greatest commercial and critical success, *El Cid*, a subject tailor-made to endear Bronston utterly to the Franco regime. Don Rodrigo de Bivar, the 11th-century Spanish hero who began the centuries-long process of defeating the Moors in Spain, is the Iberian legendary equivalent of Roland or King Arthur. Francisco Franco fancied himself the Cid's latter-day incarnation,

an image the regime's propaganda drove home incessantly.⁹⁴ The dictatorship extended privileges to Bronston at every turn. Charlton Heston, who starred as Don Rodrigo, was met at the airport by the producer and marveled at 'the immigration and customs clearance [Bronston had] arranged... My bags were off-loaded directly into the trunk of his Rolls, and we whirled away to the best suite in one of Madrid's grandest hotels.'⁹⁵ As screenwriter Philip Yordan, Bronston's script supervisor from 1959 through 1964, recalled, Samuel Bronston Productions was consistently given V.I.P. treatment by the Franco regime: whenever he arrived in Spain, 'I breezed through customs, and a government car met me at the airport.'⁹⁶

Bronston was able to mount an exceptionally lavish production for *El Cid*, beyond what even the production's substantial \$7.5 million budget would allow, because the Franco regime granted him *carte blanche* access to any and all of Spain's 1500 castles, walled medieval towns, and countryside locations. For his part, Bronston had made clear his willingness to aid the Franco regime in any way he could. Tadeo Villalba, who worked as a film technician on *El Cid* and other Bronston productions, declared some two decades later, '*El Cid* was to be Heston and Donã Jimena was Sophia [Loren]... [The Franco Regime] understood the unique form of power to have "El Cid" [sic] seen by the world... it was El Cid who greatly reflected the Spanish character...'⁹⁷

What Villalba could not know was that Bronston's film fit perfectly into a top-secret plan the Spanish Ministry of Information and Tourism put together in 1960 for an international propaganda campaign. 'Operación Propaganda Exterior,' as the plan was called, was initiated in 1960 under the direct orders of Minister of Information and Tourism Gabriel Arias Salgado. A key objective of the plan was '[t]o impart an understanding of the foundations on which our political system are based.'⁹⁸ The study declared that 'an artistic film, apparently ideologically neutral, has a greater influence on opinion than those which leave it possible to guess a definite and concrete purpose.'⁹⁹ With this fact stated, it then noted the value of foreign motion picture production in Spain, of which Samuel Bronston's enterprise was the ultimate example, declaring,

Collaboration with foreign countries produces results, in the case of Operación PE, that are extremely valuable. [Films that] a foreigner produces in Spain, about any facet of the national life, present to the foreign public a character of objectivity and dispassion that is not always conceded to nationals... Co-production means... for the most part the guarantee of a world-wide distribution of the film, leaving the public unaware of the actual origin, obviating all possible suspicion of propaganda.¹⁰⁰

Samuel Bronston Productions, and especially the *El Cid* project, fit Operación PE almost as though they had been expressly designed by the Ministry of Information and Tourism.

Additionally, and related to the Franco regime's political goals, Samuel Bronston Productions and the raft of independent movie projects attracted to Spain in its wake were helping give Madrid an unprecedented air of glamour as movie stars, famous directors, writers, and musicians descended on Spain's capital.¹⁰¹ Along with movie production and movie stars came more of the tourism that the Franco regime valued.

As *Variety* reported in March 1961 when thousands of Americans and Europeans converged on Pensicola to watch the filming of one of *El Cid's* battle scenes, 'Film producer Samuel Bronston has done for Spain's Orange Blossom Coast what travel groups and government tourism in Barcelona and Valencia have been aiming to do for years—to kick up a tourist storm during sun-kissed winter months.'¹⁰²

The Franco regime bolstered Bronston in ways great and small. Bronston and his cohorts were permitted to bring in foreign consumer and other goods that were ordinarily restricted.¹⁰³ Bronston would attend frequent meetings at the Ministry of Information and Tourism to discuss issues of common interest.¹⁰⁴ The Spanish Army provided thousands of troops to serve as extras for only two dollars per day, horses included, as had earlier been the case with Stanley Kramer and *The Pride and the Passion*.

Also similar to Kramer's experience, the Franco regime kept a close eye on script-related issues. Some officials were concerned that an American movie about Spain's icon of romantic heroism would be fundamentally inaccurate or even injurious. The Spanish Ambassador in Washington worriedly wrote to the Foreign Ministry in Madrid, inquiring about 'la verdad histórica' of Bronston's film, 'with the object of deciding the position that should be adopted in the future in relation to this film.'¹⁰⁵ However, since Bronston had hired as his technical advisor the 90-year-old Dr. Ramon Menendez Pidal, Spain's pre-eminent authority at the time on Don Rodrigo de Bivar, the Spanish Director General of Cinema and Theater could inform the Ambassador reassuringly that "'El Cid" [sic] will be respectful not only toward the figure of El Cid, but also of the milieu and the other historical personages who figure into the work.'¹⁰⁶ Bronston further insulated himself from potential problems by hiring as consultants regime officials such as Enrique Llovet, the First Secretary of the Instituto de Cultura Hispanica within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Llovet would work on several of Bronston's productions, including *El Cid*.¹⁰⁷ The capstone of the Franco regime's approbation was its certification that *El Cid* was officially a film in the 'Spanish National Interest'; only two films in all of Spanish motion picture history had been awarded this classification.¹⁰⁸ In evaluating *El Cid* for this honor, which brought with it a substantial subsidy from the Ministry of Information and Tourism, Government censors lauded the portrayal of *El Cid* as a paragon of Spanish rectitude.¹⁰⁹

El Cid was an unqualified hit both in the United States and around the world. Garnering positive reviews and three Academy Award nominations, it became one of the top-grossing movies of 1962. In the wake of this success, Bronston purchased a studio he had been renting and leased a huge tract of land outside Madrid to use for the construction of his trademark Brobdingnagian outdoor sets. Bronston's prestige in Spain reached a new high with the worldwide success of *El Cid*. Both the Franco regime and the Spanish public revered the movie as a perfect encapsulation of the Spanish heroic sensibility.¹¹⁰

Bronston's already singular position was enhanced when Dr. Manuel Fraga Iribarne took over as minister of the MIT in 1962. Fraga, a noted legal scholar and fluent English speaker, had few of the departed Arias Salgado's anxieties about the impact of America and the West on Spain. A leading figure among the self-styled *aperturistas*, or modernizers, his goal was to preserve Francoism by streamlining it, portraying the regime to outsiders as a normal Western government, and creating an environment that allowed for the introduction of ideas from the democratic world.¹¹¹

Under Fraga, the Ministry of Information and Tourism and the Bronston organization worked more closely together than ever before; indeed, Bronston and his aides met weekly with the dynamic young minister. As Philip Yordan later declared, the Bronston organization received ‘one hundred percent support from Fraga.’¹¹² The value of this collaboration to the dictatorship was certified by Fraga’s personal presentation to Bronston in October 1963 of the Order of Isabel La Católica, Spain’s highest civilian honor, for his ‘work in establishing closer cultural ties between the United States and Spain.’¹¹³

Bronston added to his gilt-edged stock with Franco and his minions by producing, in quick succession, several pro-government films. *Valle de los Caídos* [‘Valley of the Fallen’], was a drama that lionized the gigantic monument-cum-cathedral dedicated to the Nationalist (Right-wing) dead of the Spanish Civil War that Franco had built in a mountainside outside Madrid, with labor for the 20-year project supplied by imprisoned Spanish Republicans. *Sinfonia Española* was a travelogue designed to entice foreign tourists to Spain. *Objetivos 67* outlined the Franco regime’s economic goals for Spain over the next several years. *Camino Real* chronicled the exploits of Father Junipero Serra, the 18th-century Spanish cleric who established a string of missions in California. The film underlined the longstanding cultural ties between the US and Spain. In a publicity coup for both Samuel Bronston and the Franco regime, US Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren, a former California governor, attended the premiere of *Camino Real* in Mallorca.¹¹⁴

Underwritten by Pierre du Pont’s loan guarantees, Samuel Bronston would go on to produce in Spain the extravaganzas *55 Days at Peking* (1963) and *Fall of the Roman Empire* (1964), as well as the adventure film *Circus World* (1966). The gigantic sets built for *55 Days* and *Fall* became part of the propaganda apparatus of the Franco regime. For example, Information and Tourism Minister Fraga would bring domestic and foreign dignitaries to Bronston’s outdoor studio tract at Las Matas for VIP tours of *55 Days*’ stunningly recreated Forbidden City set, as part of his ongoing campaign to demonstrate the new Spanish glamour. The US Embassy also brought visitors to Las Matas to show off Bronston’s Spanish-crafted handiwork. Tourists and passers-by would gape at the imposing and incongruous Asian spires that rose in the distance from the Castilian plains.¹¹⁵ Francisco Franco would have been pleased by the fact that Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius, portrayed in *Fall* by Alec Guinness, was in fact Spanish-born;¹¹⁶ and the style of the ‘Roman salute’ given by Guinness’s Marcus uncannily resembled Franco’s version of the fascist stiff-arm extension.

Issues of questionable financial practices arose in 1964, which caused Pierre du Pont to cease funding Bronston’s projects and institute a series of lawsuits that kept him from ever producing another film.¹¹⁷ But as a result of the singular contribution that ‘Don Samuel’ had made to the dictatorship’s goals, a grateful Franco regime would continue to extend aid to the American producer in meeting his financial obligations for almost a decade after du Pont stopped him in his tracks. The regime’s aid included a moratorium on Bronston’s debts and a generous crude oil import license, which continued until the authorities, under changed political circumstances, finally turned on Bronston and drove him out of Spain in 1973, his bills still unpaid.¹¹⁸

American film production in Franco Spain, B.B. (Beyond Bronston)

The collapse of the Bronston film empire, while a blow to Hollywood production in Spain, did not by any means mark the end of American motion picture projects. For example, over the next several years Bronston's script chief Philip Yordan, in his own low-key way, filled some of the vacuum in foreign production in Spain. Yordan, an extremely savvy producer in his own right who lacked Bronston's expensive showmanship habits, used his Spanish connections to make minor science fiction classics such as *Crack in the World* and big-budget films such as *Battle of the Bulge* and *Custer of the West*.¹¹⁹ 'For a brief moment early last year,' *Variety* declared in 1965, 'shuttered gates at Bronston Studios dampened Madrid's growing role as a European film capital.' But big-budget American studio productions such as David Lean's *Doctor Zhivago*, Mark Robson's *The Centurians* (released as *The Lost Command*), Richard Lester's comedy *A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Forum*, and Yordan's *Bulge* quickly helped Hollywood-sponsored film-making bounce back in Spain.¹²⁰

This consolidation, which ultimately became an upturn, would continue for the rest of the 1960s. Bronston's productions had greatly expanded Spanish studio facilities; further expansion took place in the aftermath of Bronston's withdrawal from film-making.¹²¹ In 1965, the Franco regime added a new incentive to entice foreign production: responding to entreaties from the Motion Picture Export Association of America, the MIT established free licensing arrangements for foreign film production in Spain that exceeded \$1.65 million per project, a figure that favored big-spending Hollywood productions, and which offered many thousands of dollars per film. According to *Variety*, 'Increasing evidence of [Spanish] government cooperation with American and other pix producers on specific production problems suggests that the bonus award edict is a unilateral move to keep Spain in the forefront as a major filmmaking site.'¹²²

And if there was any lingering doubt that political issues were central in the Franco regime's conception of the role of foreign and especially American film production in Spain, a pair of mid-1960s controversies indicated otherwise. Manuel Fraga Iribarne was certainly sincere in his desire to open Spain up more to the outside world.¹²³ But the Information and Tourism minister, while not at all an arch-conservative like his predecessor, was still a functionary of the Franco dictatorship and prepared to be ruthless in protecting its interests, as evidenced by his banning of all Columbia Pictures films from Spain in 1963 over a film produced by the studio which he found (not inaccurately) to be anti-Franco. In 1963, Fraga slammed Columbia over *Behold a Pale Horse*, which was produced and directed by Fred Zinnemann (director of *High Noon* and *From Here to Eternity*) and starred Gregory Peck, Anthony Quinn, and Omar Sharif. The movie, based on a true story, portrayed an aging left-wing Spanish anarchist's one-man guerrilla campaign in the Basque region against Franco's repressive rule. *Behold a Pale Horse* ran afoul of Fraga over its unflattering depiction of the notorious Guardia Civil paramilitary force and over Zinnemann's pre-production contacts with anti-Franco exiles in France, as well as with the American left-liberal political activist Allard K. Lowenstein. Lowenstein served for a period as an informal advisor to Zinnemann on the film and helped bring the producer and exiled anti-Francoites together.¹²⁴ During the film's pre-production, Zinnemann submitted

a copy of the script to the MIT in an attempt to get permission to film part of the movie on location in the Basque region. When Fraga read the script, he became apoplectic and immediately issued an ultimatum to Columbia: if *Behold a Pale Horse* was made—anywhere—it would be banned in Spain, all Columbia pictures would be refused a Spanish release, and Columbia's Spanish subsidiary would be permanently shut down.¹²⁵ However, to its credit, Columbia did not capitulate. Zinnemann made his movie in France, and Fraga duly followed through on his threat to kick the studio out of Spain. Columbia sacrificed millions in lost revenue as a result over the next several years. Ironically, *Behold a Pale Horse* was a box-office failure that was quickly withdrawn from release.¹²⁶

To Manuel Fraga Iribarne, American films made in Spain, Spanish films distributed by Hollywood, and American tourism were all integral elements in creating a positive image—and avoiding deepening a negative one—for Spain in the US and throughout the world. In 1964, Fraga put in place an MIT ruling demanding that all films co-produced between foreign film outfits and Spanish concerns, regardless of the degree of participation, explicitly list the Spanish contribution on the screen credits, with severe financial repercussions for transgressors.¹²⁷ Along the same lines, Fraga pushed to make the links between Hollywood production in Spain and tourism as explicit as possible: in 1965, he issued an edict that required all foreign movies made in Spain to list prominently in their credits exactly where, down to the town or village, in Spain they were made, a move which the producers of films such as *Doctor Zhivago* opposed on the grounds that they would spoil the illusion of authenticity of films not actually set in Spain. As *Films and Filming* wryly noted, 'Audiences are supposed to believe that most of [*Doctor Zhivago*] takes place in Russia. Madridski, San Sebastianov, Toledograd and the like.'¹²⁸

There was a dual coda to the aftermath of Columbia's battle with Fraga over *Behold a Pale Horse*. In early 1966 MGM, fresh from filming most of *Doctor Zhivago* in Spain, was quietly but firmly warned that the MIT was offended by an epic then in production about Francisco Pizarro and the conquest of the Incas, *The Royal Hunt of the Sun*. The warning alluded ominously to Columbia's punishment. MGM took the hint and stopped production on the Pizarro movie. On the other hand, Spain too was experiencing its own considerable financial pressure due to the *Behold a Pale Horse* conflict. Columbia had been making such big-budget movies as *Lawrence of Arabia* on location there, which pumped millions of dollars into the Spanish economy (\$6 million from *Lawrence* alone). Spain could not afford to turn this lucrative revenue source away for good. Indeed, in 1964, Fraga had met with representatives of the Motion Picture Export Association in New York to shore up relations with Hollywood, and during these meetings both he and the MPEA representatives had sedulously avoided any mention of the contretemps with Columbia Pictures.¹²⁹ Only a few months after MGM's hasty capitulation in 1966, Fraga rescinded the ban against Columbia. Nonetheless, it was MGM's behavior, rather than Columbia's, that was the rule in Hollywood's dealings with the dictatorship, as evidenced by the unwillingness in 1964 of Columbia's sister studios to protest in any way the Franco regime's boycott.¹³⁰

By 1968, the *Hollywood Reporter* noted that the Spanish city of Almeria was proclaiming itself, not entirely without justification, the 'Movie Capital of

the World': 'With principal photography rolling on Euan Lloyd's production of "Shalako" starring Sean Connery, Brigitte Bardot, and Stephen Boyd, this Costa Del Sol resort is bulging with eight motion pictures filming simultaneously—one more than is currently shooting in Hollywood.'¹³¹ Another Hollywood production, *Play Dirty*, starring Michael Caine, was to be added to the Almeria roster in a week's time, bringing the total to nine films in the works. And to underline the confluence of economic and political concerns for the Spanish authorities, Francisco Franco made a personal appearance to dedicate Almeria's new jet airport in the midst of this spate of film productions.¹³²

Conclusion

By the late 1960s, Franco Spain had reached the culmination of a nearly two-decade-long process in which Hollywood producers operated cooperatively and without any evident moral or political qualms with a far-right military dictatorship. While this relationship developed gradually and was plagued by periodic frictions, in general both sides benefited. The American independent producers received the low costs and official assistance they needed to make attractive films. In turn, the Franco regime accrued the economic and political benefits of large-scale Hollywood production. These benefits included millions of dollars in direct expenditures; a boost to tourism efforts, which played both economic and propaganda roles; with certain films, a positive portrayal of Spain's heroic history; and the imprimatur of glamour and Western 'normality,' both via on-screen depictions and the nearly non-stop presence of Hollywood production operations and movie stars in Franco Spain. The Franco regime had effectively manipulated a sinew of American 'soft power' for its own purposes.

However, in the following decade this state of affairs would not endure, for a number of reasons. Structural factors contributed significantly to a tapering off of large-scale American production. As the developing Spanish economy reached a plateau, costs rose in turn, and there were new, cheaper venues for overseas filming, including Israel, Morocco, Hungary and Yugoslavia (save for the first, autocracies all).¹³³ Many in the Spanish film industry, including numerous American expatriates, pined for the heyday a decade earlier when Samuel Bronston's super-productions provided lucrative employment for all.¹³⁴

But just as important, as Francisco Franco sank into senescence and gradually approached death (he would finally die in 1975), fascist hard-liners sought to turn back the *aperturistas'* trend toward political moderation.¹³⁵ The dynamic, strategically visionary Manuel Fraga Iribarne was ousted in 1969 from the Ministry of Information and Tourism and sent into a golden exile as Spain's ambassador to Great Britain. Now the more sclerotic tendencies of the Franco regime came to the fore in Spain's dealings with Hollywood.¹³⁶ Incentives for large-scale production dried up, and in their place were the sorts of taxes that had led in the 1950s to the MPEA-Spain imbroglio.¹³⁷ There were increasing complaints about government censorship of foreign production and distribution in Spain. 'There are no film pros [as opposed to cons] as long as the present situation continues,' declared one Madrid-based American producer in 1973; 'you can work here, but [you can't] do anything that has worldwide repercussions.'¹³⁸

A month before his death, Franco underlined the regime's overall retrogression as he revived the old bogeymen of Spanish fascism: he declared that Spain's central problem was 'a Masonic left-wing conspiracy within the political class in indecent concubinage with Communist-terrorist subversion in society.'¹³⁹

The era of 'Hollywood in Madrid' had drawn to a close just ahead of the end of the Franco era. There would be occasional American productions in the post-Franco era of Spanish democracy, but the context would be fundamentally different: they would simply be business endeavors, devoid of the political implications of helping either to prop up a dictatorship or nudge it toward greater engagement with the outside world.¹⁴⁰

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Notes

- 1 See for example Fernando Termis Soto, *Renunciando a todo: El Régimen franquista y los Estados Unidos desde 1945 hasta 1963* (Madrid, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, Biblioteca Nueva, 2005); Boris N. Liedtke, *Embracing a Dictatorship: U.S. relations with Spain, 1945–1953* (New York, St. Martin's, 1998); Arturo Jarque Íñiguez, *Queremos esas Bases: El Acercamiento de Estados Unidos a la España de Franco* (Alcalá de Henares, Centro de Estudios Norteamericanos, Universidad de Alcalá, 1998); Antonio Marquina Barrio, *España en la Política de Seguridad Occidental: 1939–1986* (Madrid, Servicio de Publicaciones del E.M.E., 1986); R. Richard Rubottom and J. Carter Murphy, *Spain and the United States: since World War II* (New York, Praeger, 1984); Arthur P. Whitaker, *Spain and the Defense of the West: ally and liability* (New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1961).

- 2 This will be briefly described below. For an in-depth examination, see Neal Moses Rosendorf, 'Be El Caudillo's guest: the Franco regime's quest for rehabilitation and dollars after World War II via the promotion of U.S. tourism to Spain,' *Diplomatic History*, 30(3), June 2006.
- 3 See below in text.
- 4 For example, the future Spanish cult film auteurs Jess Franco and Paul Naschy. Jess Franco was an uncredited extra in Mike Todd's mammoth production *Around the World in 80 Days* (1956), served as an uncredited production assistant on King Vidor's *Solomon and Sheba* (1959), and was a second-unit director on Orson Welles' *Chimes at Midnight* (1966). Paul Naschy had a bit role in Nicholas Ray's films *King of Kings* (1961) and *55 Days at Peking* (1963). (See entries for Jesus Franco and Paul Naschy at the *Encyclopedia of Fantastic Film and Television* Website at http://www.eofftv.com/names/f/fra/franco_jesus_main.htm, as well as the *Internet Movie Database* entries on Franco and Naschy at <http://www.imdb.com>).
- 5 Most notably in Anthony Mann's *El Cid*, 1961, produced by Samuel Bronston (see below in text).
- 6 For example in Jean Negulesco's *The Pleasure Seekers*, 1964.
- 7 This gigantism ran counter to the period's most forward-looking European cinema trends, the minimalist, low-budget Neo-Realist movement and its more-polished aesthetic successors in Italy and France's Nouvelle Vague. N.B. the late S. Frederick Gronich, the former vice-president of the Motion Picture Export Association of America [MPEA], was insistent that both the Neo-Realist and New Wave movements were underwritten by Hollywood funding, as part of the MPEA's program to meet Italian and French domestic film production quotas. Author interview with S. Frederick Gronich, Los Angeles, CA, 1996.
- 8 This point is the product of an ongoing colloquy between cultural historian John Trumbour and the author. To be sure, plenty of grand-scale film-making took place during the early postwar period elsewhere in Europe, especially Britain and Italy. In the latter country, not only were there US epic productions like *Quo Vadis*, *Ben Hur*, and *Cleopatra*; there were also the more modestly budgeted but still visually sumptuous 'peplum' films, such as the two Steve Reeves *Hercules* film and *The 300 Spartans*. But the crucial difference was that, as far as we currently know, there was no official government political propaganda agenda at work in Britain or Italy concerning encouraging the production of certain cinematic subject matter. (N.B. I have had a hypothesis lingering in the background of my research for years concerning the British government in particular over some cinematic subject matter: World War II-themed and espionage films (such as those featuring super-spy James Bond) could have been seen by officials as good propaganda to place regularly before American audiences to remind them who their staunchest and most indispensable ally was, especially after the debacle of the Anglo-French-Israeli Suez Canal invasion in 1956, which placed the US and Britain at loggerheads. But I have not had the time to go on the research expedition to London to explore this possibility.)
- 9 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: the means to success in world politics* (New York, Public Affairs, 2004), 5.
- 10 For a discussion of these anxieties, especially as they pertain to Europe, see for example Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's advance through 20th-century*

- Europe* (Cambridge, MA, Belknap Harvard, 2005), Richard H. Pells, *Not Like Us: how Europeans have loved, hated, and transformed American culture since World War II* (New York, Basic Books, 1997), Geoffrey Nowell-Smith and Stephen Ricci (eds) *Hollywood and Europe: economics, culture, national identity 1945–95* (London, British Film Institute Press, 1998); John Trumbour, *Selling Hollywood to the World: U.S. and European struggles for mastery of the global film industry, 1920–1950* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002); Ian Jarvie, *Hollywood's Overseas Campaign: the North Atlantic movie trade, 1920–1950* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992). For a general discussion of 'cultural imperialism,' the standard point of entry is John Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism: a critical introduction* (Baltimore, MA, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).
- 11 For example, Fritz Lang, David Lean, Milos Forman, and John Woo, who brought with them to Hollywood such cinematic traditions as German Expressionism, English Romanticism, post-war Eastern European anti-authoritarianism, and Hong Kong's hyperkinetic ballets of stylized action. See Neal M. Rosendorf, 'Social and cultural globalization: concepts, history, and America's Role,' in Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue (eds) *Governance in a Globalizing World* (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 118–119.
 - 12 Most notably that of Columbia Pictures in its defense of Fred Zinnemann's controversial film *Behold a Pale Horse* (1964). See below in text for a discussion of this episode.
 - 13 One can perceive recent analogous behavior by American media toward the People's Republic of China, including Rupert Murdoch's blocking of the BBC in the mid-1990s from his Star satellite television network, which was being beamed into China, and the aid software companies Cisco Systems, Microsoft, Google and Yahoo have provided to the PRC in its efforts to control domestic access to reading and posting online content. See for example Zhao, *ibid.*; William Shawcross, 'Rupert Murdoch,' *Time*, October 25, 1999, online at <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/intl/article/0,9171,1107991025-33716-1,00.html>; OpenNet Initiative, *Internet Filtering in China in 2004–2005: a country study*, online at <http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/china/>; Clive Thompson, 'Google's China Problem (and China's Google Problem),' *New York Times Magazine*, April 23, 2006.
 - 14 The divorcement decrees were designed to strip the major studios outright of approximately half of the more than 3100 theaters they controlled as of 1945. Michael Conant, 'The impact of the Paramount decrees,' in Tino Balio (ed.) *The American Film Industry* (Madison, WI, University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), 347–348, 362–363.
 - 15 As *Business Week* noted sardonically about potential movie-goers' viewing options, 'Set owners, millions of them, were not going to pay to see mediocre films; they could watch similar entertainment at home for nothing.' ('A Turn for the Bigger,' *Business Week*, November 14, 1953, p. 149.) This is not to say that inexpensively produced films, or films about modest subjects, were abandoned by Hollywood. For example, *Marty*, the story of a lonely Bronx butcher, filmed on a shoestring budget in black and white and scripted by television writer Paddy Chayefsky, won the 1955 Academy Awards for Best Picture, Best Actor, and Best Screenplay. Tino Balio, *United Artists: the company that changed the film industry* (Madison, WI, University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 79–82.

- 16 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer attempted to carry on its in-house production into the mid-1950s but ultimately had to bow to Hollywood's changed economic climate. Thomas Schatz, *The Genius of the System: Hollywood filmmaking in the studio era* (New York, Pantheon, 1988), 462.
- 17 Domestic critics decried the practice as 'runaway production.'
- 18 Britain's Eady Plan was perhaps the best-known and most lucrative of these schemes.
- 19 For a full discussion of the respective merits and programs of these overseas destinations for Hollywood production, see Neal Moses Rosendorf, *The life and times of Samuel Bronston, builder of 'Hollywood in Madrid'; a study in the international scope and influence of American popular culture*, Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 2000, chapter 5: 'Runaways, independents and blockbusters: Hollywood's shift toward foreign movie production in the 1950's and 1960's.'
- 20 See Rosendorf, 'Be *El Caudillo's* Guest,' *passim*.
- 21 'Anteproyecto de Plan Nacional de Turismo,' July 1952, p. 2, section 49.02, box 14415, general heading 'Cultura,' General Archive of the Civil Administration of the State, Alcalá de Henares, Spain [General Archive Alcalá].
- 22 Carlos F. Heredero, *Las Huellas del Tiempo: Cine español, 1951-1961* (Valencia, Archivo de la Filmoteca de la Generalitat Valenciana, 1993), 29.
- 23 Trumpbour, *passim*.
- 24 US Embassy, Madrid to State Department, January 8, 1963, 'Efforts of Motion Picture Export Association of America to Persuade Spanish Government to Liberalize Restrictions on Distribution of United States Motion Pictures,' 852.452/1-863, Record Group 59, US Department of State Central Files [RG 59], US National Archives, College Park, Maryland [NA].
- 25 'Borrador Previo para un Estudio Sobre Fines y Medios de la Propaganda de España en el Exterior,' 'Borrador Previo para un Estudio Sobre Fines y Medios de la Propaganda de España en el Exterior,' dated August 1960, p. 12, in box 28353, section 49.06, heading 'Cultura,' General Archive Alcalá.
- 26 Paramount vigorously denied both the rumors and that it had subsequently pulled its punches in the final version—all the studio would admit to was that it had given a script draft to the Spanish Consul in San Francisco, whose suggestions for revisions, Paramount claimed, had been ignored utterly. ('Off the Hollywood Wire,' *New York Times*, February 14, 1943, in 'For Whom the Bell Tolls' clipping file, MHL. However, while there is no archival substantiation to date of State Department pressure on the producers, one reviewer offered this assessment at the time of the film's release: 'How about the fascists—there was all that talk about Franco interference with the script—do the fascists ever get mentioned? Ans[wer:] Never; every place the word 'fascist' appeared in [screenwriter] Dudley Nichols' script, Paramount substituted the word 'Nationalist.' Furthermore, they call the Loyalists 'Republicans' all the way through it, too so it's all pretty confusing.' Still, even with evident tampering, 'The net effect of 'For Whom the Bell Tolls' can scarcely be called pro-Franco,' the reviewer conceded. (John T. McManus, 'The Tongue-Tied 'Bell' Tolls Dully,' *PM Reviews*, July 15, 1943, in 'For Whom the Bell Tolls' clipping file, MHL.) In an ironic coda, when Hilton Hotels opened the Castellana Hilton in Madrid in 1953, one of the American celebrities on hand for the dedication festivities was Gary Cooper, who had portrayed the anti-fascist Robert Jordan in *For Whom the Bell Tolls* a decade earlier. See 'Old Cowhand,' *Time*, July 27, 1953, p. 17.

- 27 ‘Spanish Censure Hollywood Films: Academy of Medicine Also Finds Variety of Faults in American Psychiatry Methods,’ *Los Angeles Times*, January 23, 1950, p. 28, in ‘Spain—Motion Picture Industry 1950s’ file, Margaret Herrick Library of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences [MHL], Beverly Hills, CA.
- 28 Paul Preston, *Franco: a biography* (New York, Basic Books, 1994), 417–418; Aurora Bosch and M. Fernanda del Rincón, *Dreams in a dictatorship: Hollywood and Franco’s Spain, 1939–1956*, in Reinhold Wagnleitner and Elaine Tyler May (eds) *‘Here, There and Everywhere’: the foreign politics of American popular culture* (Hanover, NH, and London, University Press of New England, 2000), 100. N.B. While the chapter cited in the latter volume contains some useful information on the Franco regime’s policy concerning Hollywood films that sought Spanish distribution, it says nothing about Hollywood productions in Spain or the regime’s policies toward them.
- 29 Heredero, 20.
- 30 See for example memorandum from the US Embassy, Madrid to the State Department, ‘Motion Picture Association of America: Distribution of American Films in Spain,’ dated November 14, 1957; memorandum from US Embassy, Madrid to State Department, ‘MOTION PICTURES [sic]; Government Measures to Support Spanish Motion Picture Industry’, dated March 11, 1958; memorandum from US Embassy, Madrid to State Department, ‘New Agreement Between the Spanish Government and the Motion Picture Export Association of America, Inc. (MPEAA),’ dated March 26, 1959, all in folder, 852.452/1-3056, box 4621, RG 59, NA; Antonio Valles Copeiro del Villar, *Historia de la Política de Fomento del Cine español* (Valencia, Filmoteca, Generalitat Valenciana, Institut Valencia d’Arts Esceniques, Cinematografia i Musica, Conselleria de Cultura, Educacio i Ciencia, 1992), 72.
- 31 Report from American Embassy, Madrid, to US Department of State, ‘The Motion Picture Industry in Spain,’ dated February 8, 1960, p. 4, in folder 852.44/2-2660, Box 2583, RG 59, NA.
- 32 Report from American Embassy, Madrid, to US Department of State, ‘The Motion Picture Industry in Spain,’ dated February 8, 1960, p. 22.
- 33 Report from American Embassy, Madrid, to US Department of State, ‘The Motion Picture Industry in Spain,’ dated February 8, 1960, p. 34.
- 34 The one unalloyed masterpiece of Spanish cinema during this period was Luis Bunuel’s *Viridiana* (1960), in which the Franco regime got far more than it had bargained for when it momentarily welcomed back the renowned director from his Mexican exile and received a brilliant exercise in anti-Catholic blasphemy in return. The film, which among other things depicts the repeated rape of a saintly nun, would win the Palm d’Or at Cannes, which theoretically might burnish Spain’s reputation as the source of quality motion pictures. The regime, which fashioned itself as the defender of the Catholic Church, did not see it that way and banned the film and banished the film-maker.
- 35 Letter from Gwynne Ornstein (wife of George Ornstein and daughter of Mary Pickford) to Mary Pickford, January 11, 1961, in folder, ‘Family: Gwynne and Bud Ornstein, #1’, Mary Pickford Collection, Herrick Special Collections, MHL; ‘Bud Ornstein Gets Honor From Spain,’ *Hollywood Reporter*, May 9, 1968, ‘George Ornstein’ clipping file, MHL. Ornstein would later transfer to London, where, as UA’s head of European operations, he would help shepherd both the early James Bond films and the Beatles’ *A Hard Day’s Night* into production.

- 36 For the history of United Artists, see Balio, *United Artists*.
- 37 John Cabrera, an Anglo-Spanish cinematographer who was then employed by Technicolor in the UK and assigned to *Decameron Nights*, recalls that the film crew was overwhelmingly British, with a few Spaniards working in minor technical positions; Spanish production facilities in the early 1950s were of a low quality, and Spanish technicians 'were behind the times.' Author interview via telephone with John Cabrera, Jan. 2006.
- 38 Ibid.
- 39 'Spanish Film Market Expanding—Fregonese,' *Hollywood Reporter*, April 1, 1954, in 'Spain—Motion Picture Industry' file, MHL.
- 40 Untitled clipping, *New York Times*, August 1, 1954, in 'Alexander the Great' clipping file, MHL.
- 41 'Angles on "Alex": Greece Couldn't Handle Filming,' *Variety*, December 21, 1955. Indeed, in an interesting sideline, another dictatorship, Yugoslavia, was under consideration, and Marshall Tito had even offered Rossen the services of his army for battle scenes. But Rossen still decided on Spain. 'Alexander Conquers a New World,' *This Week Magazine*, September 4, 1955, both cites in 'Alexander the Great' clipping file, MHL.
- 42 Memorandum from Chief of Service, Cinematographic Economic Order Service, Ministries of Industry and Commerce, to the Director-General of Cinema and Theater, Ministry of Information and Tourism, January 17, 1955, in 'Alexander the Great' file, Ministry of Culture, Madrid. [Note: all Spanish government documents are in Spanish; translations by author.]
- 43 Photograph of Rossen being met in Spain by Ornstein (untitled), in 'Alexander the Great' folder, Robert Rossen Collection, UCLA Arts Special Collections, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA.
- 44 'On February 17th, 1955 there was placed before the CinemaScope cameras at the Sevilla Studio, Madrid, the production of Robert Rossen's 'Alexander the Great.' Shooting will continue later in Manzanares, El Molar, Rascafría, Segovia and Malaga in Spain . . .' (Advertisement, *Variety*, February 25, 1955, in 'Alexander the Great' clipping file, MHL).
- 45 Jose Clemente, 'Film in Spain,' *Film Culture*, summer 1955, in Spain—'Motion Picture Industry' clipping file, MHL.
- 46 'Film's Campaign Boon for Spain', *Life*, November 14, 1955, in 'Alexander the Great' clipping file, MHL.
- 47 "'Alexander" Band,' *New York Times*, April 24, 1955.
- 48 'Film's Campaign Boon for Spain', *Life*, November 14, 1955.
- 49 'Film's Campaign Boon for Spain', *Life*, November 14, 1955.
- 50 'Conditions in Spain Now Favorable for American Producers,' *Hollywood Reporter*, November 22, 1955, in 'Spain—Motion Picture Industry file 1950s,' MHL.
- 51 Draft of newspaper article by Vernon Scott [syndicated columnist], 'For AM's of Wednesday, Oct 24 [1956],' in folder, 'Publicity: Blowitz-Markel,' box 14, Stanley Kramer Collection, UCLA Library Special Collections, Young Library, University of California, Los Angeles, Westwood, CA.
- 52 Letter (in Spanish) from Stanley Kramer to Don Manuel Torres Lopez, Director General of Cinema and Theater, Ministry of Information and Tourism, September 16, 1955, in 'Pride and Passion' file, Ministry of Culture, Madrid.

- 53 Memorandum (in Spanish) from Stanley Kramer Films, March 9, 1956, in ‘Pride and Passion’ file, Ministry of Culture, Madrid.
- 54 Memorandum from Chief of Service, Ministry of Industry and Commerce, to the Director General of Cinema and Theater, Ministry of Information and Tourism, January 17, 1956, in ‘Pride and Passion’ file, Ministry of Culture, Madrid.
- 55 Letter from the Minister of Information and Tourism (Gabriel Arias Salgado) to the Minister of the Army (Agustín Muñoz Grande), March 15, 1956, in ‘Pride and Passion’ file, Ministry of Culture, Madrid.
- 56 ‘Stan Kramer Takes Pride in \$3,000,000 Saving Achieved by Shooting Pic in Spain,’ *Variety*, October 18, 1956, in ‘Pride and the Passion’ clipping file, MHL.
- 57 Memorandum from the Director General of Cinema and Theater to the Minister of Information and Tourism, April 27, 1956, in ‘Pride and Passion’ file, Ministry of Culture, Madrid.
- 58 Memorandum, “‘Orgullo y Passion’—Informe sobre el guión y propuestas de modificación,” undated [probably April 1956], in ‘Pride and Passion’ file, Ministry of Culture, Madrid.
- 59 Memorandum, ‘Informe sobre “Orgullo y Passion”,’ undated [probably April 1956], in ‘Pride and Passion’ file, Ministry of Culture, Madrid.
- 60 Memorandum (in Spanish), “‘Orgulla y Passion”,’ from the Director General of Cinema and Theater to the managing director, Stanley Kramer Films Inc., May 25, 1956, in ‘Pride and Passion’ file, Ministry of Culture, Madrid. Kramer would similarly be willing to make script changes on one of his most notable subsequent ‘message’ films, *On the Beach* (1959), in order to meet with the Franco regime’s approval. This motion picture, which was filmed on location in Australia, depicts the residents of Melbourne waiting to die from a radiation cloud released by a full-scale US-Soviet nuclear exchange. In order to gain a Spanish release for the film, Kramer significantly toned down in Spanish prints references to characters committing suicide, which the regime opposed on the grounds that it violated Catholic Church dogma. Memorandum, ‘The Motion Picture Industry in Spain,’ from US Embassy, Madrid, to the US Department of State, February 8, 1960, in folder 852.452/2-860, box 2583, RG 59, NA.
- 61 Memorandum from Spanish ambassador, Delhi (Conde de Artaza), June 17, 1958, in ‘Pride and Passion’ file, Ministry of Culture, Madrid.
- 62 Author’s telephone conversation with representative of the Bryna Company, 1996.
- 63 Producer-star Kirk Douglas famously used the occasion of his film to break the Hollywood blacklist by giving writer Dalton Trumbo his first screen credit in almost a decade.
- 64 Letter from George Ornstein to Mary Pickford, May 3, 1959, in folder, ‘Family: Gwynne and Bud Ornstein, #1’, Mary Pickford Collection, Special Collections, MHL. N.B. Anthony Mann was the original director of *Spartacus*, until executive producer Kirk Douglas replaced him with Stanley Kubrick.
- 65 ‘For six weeks, the legions of Rome marched where they had not trod for nearly 2,000 years, across Spain . . . Subsequent location sites included Guadajajara, Colmenar, Viejo, Alcazarde Hernandez (Cervantes’ birthplace), Navacerrada, Taracena, and Iriepal.’ (‘Behind the Scenes With “Spartacus”’ promotional pamphlet, 1960, p. 4, in ‘Spartacus’ file, MHL).

- 66 Film review, *Time*, April 6, 1959, p. 90.
- 67 Note (in Spanish) from George Ornstein to the Ministry of Information and Tourism, undated (mid-1958), in 'Solomon and Sheba' file, Ministry of Culture, Madrid.
- 68 'Aim "Solomon and Sheba" For Christmas Release; Richmond Due in N.Y.,' *Variety*, May 27, 1959, attached to letter from George Ornstein, United Artists Corporation, to José Muñoz Fontán, Director General of Cinema and Theater, June 30, 1959, in 'Solomon and Sheba' file, Ministry of Culture, Madrid.
- 69 Letter from George Ornstein, United Artists Corporation, to José Muñoz Fontán, Director General of Cinema and Theater, June 30, 1959, in 'Solomon and Sheba' file, Ministry of Culture, Madrid.
- 70 'Who's Who Overseas: George "Bud" Ornstein,' *The Film Daily*, June 9, 1960, in 'George Ornstein' file, MHL.
- 71 'The Return of the Peep Show,' *New York Times*, April 21, 1940, in 'Martin Eden' clipping file, MHL. James Roosevelt personally petitioned the US State Department on Bronston's behalf in 1939 when the producer sought permanent residency in the United States. (Letter from James Roosevelt to W.R. Blocker, American Counsel [sic] General, Juarez, Mexico, June 28, 1939, in 'Bronston, Samuel' folder, container 534 'Br', James Roosevelt Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, NY).
- 72 'Sam Bronston to Biopic "John Paul Jones" for WB,' *Variety*, December 23, 1955, in 'John Paul Jones' clipping file, MH.
- 73 Ibid.; 'Bronston . . . Shot Biopic Abroad,' *Hollywood Reporter*, November 3, 1958; 'Bronston, Farrow to Repeat Abroad,' *Los Angeles Times*, October 27, 1958, all in 'John Paul Jones' clipping file, MHL; Affidavit of Irwin Margulies [vice-president and treasurer, John Paul Jones Productions, Inc.], October 30, 1958, in *John Paul Jones Productions, Inc. v. Barnett Glassman and Thomas J. Todarelli*, US District Court, Southern District of New York [USDC-SDNY], case file CIV 138-205, filed November 3, 1958, National Archives and Records Administration [NARA] facility, Lee's Summit, MO [LS].
- 74 'Filming Life of Christ as Written by Ex-Chief Rabbi,' *Variety*, September 23, 1953, in 'King of Kings' clipping file, MHL.
- 75 Aside from the maritime protagonist's Scottish heritage, as noted earlier much 'runaway production' took place within Great Britain, which combined currency repatriation restrictions with a film subsidy plan of which foreign producers could easily take advantage.
- 76 John Cabrera interview.
- 77 Author interview with Paul Lazarus, Jr., former senior vice-president of Samuel Bronston Productions, Santa Barbara, CA, 1996; Paul Lazarus, Jr., 'The Madrid Movie Caper,' *Focus* (University of California Santa Barbara), 16 (1995), 45–47.
- 78 Direct examination of Rudolph M. Littauer, December 1, 1958, pp. 156–158; affidavit of Frederick M. Stern, October 30, 1958, both in *John Paul Jones Productions, Inc. v. Barnett Glassman and Thomas J. Todarelli*, USDC-SDNY, case file CIV 138-205, filed November 3, 1958, NARA facility, LS.
- 79 John Cabrera interview.

- 80 Franco undoubtedly intended this gesture at least in part as a slap against the Bourbon pretender to the Spanish throne Don Juan, whom he detested. John Cabrera interview; Preston, *Franco*, 552–53; 685–86.
- 81 ‘Film “Armada” in Spain: “John Paul Jones” Movie Unit Takes Small Iberian Village by Storm,’ *New York Times*, August 17, 1958; “John Paul Jones”—Historic Epic,’ *Los Angeles Times* Sunday Entertainment supplement, cover story, September 21, 1958, both in ‘John Paul Jones’ film clipping collection, MHL.
- 82 ‘Bronston Raps His Ex-Accountant; Repeats “Harassment” by Glassman Can’t Halt “John Paul Jones” Dates,’ *Variety*, December 17, 1958, in ‘John Paul Jones’ film clipping collection, MHL.
- 83 ‘Total Bronston Operation Liabilities About \$35 Mil, Court Documents Show,’ *Variety*, August 9, 1965, ‘Samuel Bronston’ clipping file, *Variety* Editorial Offices, Los Angeles, CA (My thanks to Paul G. Nagle of the William Morris Agency, with whom I am co-authoring a biography of Samuel Bronston (University of Texas Press, in contract), for his instrumental aid in obtaining *Variety*’s ‘Samuel Bronston’ clipping files). Dollar conversion courtesy of John J. McCusker, ‘Comparing the Purchasing Power of Money in the United States (or Colonies) from 1665 to 2005’, Economic History Services, 2006, at <http://www.eh.net/hmit/pppowerus/>.
- 84 ‘Pierre S. DuPont: High-Flyin’ Angel,’ *Variety*, January 20, 1960, in ‘Samuel Bronston’ clipping file, *Variety* Editorial Offices.
- 85 On criticism of Wanger see Marcia Reed, ‘Wanger, Love and Mussolini,’ *New Theatre*, August 1936, p. 23; see as well ‘Mussolini Sends Agent to U.S. for Aid for Italian Production,’ *Motion Picture Herald*, August 29, 1936, p. 17, which describes the Italian follow-up to Wanger’s trip to Rome. Both located in ‘Italy-MP Industry [pre-WW II]’ clipping folder, MHL.) On Roach see ‘Hollywood Closed Down for a Year . . . Would be Blessed,’ *Motion Picture Herald*, October 2, 1937, p. 21; ‘Mussolini Deal Off: Duce’s Son Departs Chilled by Reception; Roach Out 12 Grand,’ *Variety*, October 7, 1937, both in ‘Italy-MP Industry [pre-WW II]’ clipping folder, MHL.
- 86 See note 1. Indeed, in 1959 President Dwight D. Eisenhower would travel to Spain and be photographed exchanging a warm *abrazo* with Franco.
- 87 See documents contained in ‘El Rey de Reyes’ file folder, Archives of the Ministry of Culture, Madrid. Both
- 88 Author interviews: Irene Bronston (Samuel Bronston’s daughter), Berkeley, CA, 1996; Dr. William Bronston (Samuel Bronston’s son), Sacramento, CA, 1995–96; and Dorothea Bronston (Samuel Bronston’s ex-wife), London, 1996.
- 89 John XXIII would soon set in motion, through the ‘Vatican II’ deliberations, the most extensive changes in Catholic doctrine in four centuries, among them the absolution of the Jews for the death of Christ (this would be codified in 1965 by John’s successor, Paul VI, in *Nostra Aetate: Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions*, available online at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en.html). The *King of Kings* script portrayed Barabbas and Judas as Jewish revolutionaries committed to freeing Judea from Roman rule, which, while Scripturally problematic, was in fact historically plausible (the ancient Jewish historian Josephus describes the religio-political radicalism of the Zealots,

- who were a rising force in Judea at the time of Jesus' Ministry (see H.H. Ben-Sasson, ed., *A History of the Jewish People* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985) 272–76.
- 90 “‘King of Kings’ Distribution to be Sold Country by Country,’ *Hollywood Reporter*, April 1, 1960, in ‘King Of Kings’ clipping file, MHL; Pete Hebblethwaite, *Pope John XXIII: shepherd of the modern world* (Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1985).
- 91 Although John XXIII would consecrate Franco’s gargantuan mountaintop war monument-cum-cathedral at the ‘Valley of the Fallen’ in 1962, the Vatican would ultimately officially disassociate itself from the regime.
- 92 ‘Rey de Reyes’ file, Spanish Ministry of Culture, Madrid.
- 93 The brochure made a point of describing the exact location of scene shooting, such as the following: ‘[The director] chose a site in the gentle, rolling hills near Venta de Frascuela, a tiny pueblo some 50 kilometers southeast of Madrid.’ ‘King of Kings’ publicity brochure, in ‘King of Kings’ clipping file, MHL.
- 94 Preston, xvii, 9, 52, 181, 329, 641–642.
- 95 Charlton Heston, *In The Arena: an autobiography* (New York, Berkley Publishing Group, 1997), 240.
- 96 Philip Yordan interview, 1996.
- 97 Transcript of Tadeo Villalba interview by Peter Besas, Madrid, undated [probably 1983–84]. My thanks to Peter Besas for graciously providing me with a copy of this transcript. I should note as well my seminal debt to Besas’s book *Behind the Spanish Lens: Spanish cinema under fascism and democracy* (Denver, CO, Alden Press, 1985), which contains a chapter on Samuel Bronston (pp. 53–64) that was for many years the most comprehensive treatment of the subject.
- 98 ‘Preliminary Study: Operación Política Exterior: “PE,”’ dated August 1960, in box 28353, section 49.06, heading ‘Cultura,’ General Archives Alcalá.
- 99 ‘Operación Política Exterior: “PE,”’ dated August 1960, annex, ‘Cinematografía.’
- 100 ‘Operación Política Exterior: “PE,”’ dated August 1960, annex, ‘Cinematografía.’
- 101 Author interview with Don Antonio Recoder (Representative in Spain of the Motion Picture Export Association of America), July 1996; Philip Yordan interview.
- 102 “‘El Cid’ Battle Scenes Prove biggest Come-on for Spain’s Orange Coast,’ *Variety*, March 22, 1961, in ‘Samuel Bronston’ clipping file, *Variety* Editorial Offices; see as well Rosendorf, ‘Be *El Caudillo*’s Guest.’
- 103 Interviews with Charlton Heston, Philip Yordan, 1996.
- 104 Interview with Leon Patlach, 1996.
- 105 ‘ASUNTO: Solicita información sobre película “El Cid,”’ October 25, 1961, in Box 327, ‘El Cid’ file, Ministerio de Cultura, Madrid.
- 106 Letter concerning ‘El Cid’ from Director General of Film and Theater to Director General of Cultural Relations, November 2, 1961, in Box 327, ‘El Cid’ file, Ministerio de Cultura, Madrid; see Heston, 245–46, for the actor’s recounting of his meeting with Pidal.
- 107 Deposition of Enrique Llovet [former First Secretary of the Spanish Institute of Hispanic Culture], January 13, 1971, in *United States v. Samuel Bronston*, file number 69 CR 696, filed 1969, USDC-NY, NARA facility, LS.
- 108 Proclamation by the Minister of Information and Tourism, January 30, 1962, in Box 327, ‘El Cid’ file, Ministerio de Cultura, Madrid.

- 109 See censors' reports in Box 327, 'El Cid' file, Ministerio de Cultura, Madrid.
- 110 Antonio Recoder interview.
- 111 See John Gilmour, *Manuel Fraga Iribarne and the Rebirth of Spanish Conservatism, 1939–1990* (Queenston, Canada, Edwin Mellon Press, 1999).
- 112 Philip Yordan also met independently on a regular basis with Fraga. Leon Patlach, Paul Lazarus, Philip Yordan interviews, 1996.
- 113 'Spain Medals Bronston,' *Variety*, October 30, 1963; 'Spain Honors Bronston Work on Cultural Ties,' *The Film Daily*, October 28, 1963, both cites in 'Samuel Bronston' clipping file, MHL.
- 114 Depositions of Carlos Robles Piquer [former Director General at the Spanish MIT], Enrique Llovet [former First Secretary of the Spanish Institute of Hispanic Culture], and Angel Sagaz [former Director General of United States Affairs in the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs], March 12–14, 1971, in *United States v. Samuel Bronston*, file number 69 CR 696, filed 1969, USDC-NY, NARA facility, LS; Tadeo Villalba interview transcript, pp. 24–27; for an encapsulation of Villalba's comments, see Besas, 60–61; 'The Brain in Spain,' *Time*, July 12, 1963, p. 57.
- 115 'Oriental War on Plains of Spain,' *New York Times*, December 9, 1962, in '55 Days at Peking' clipping file, MHL; 'China Sets are Made of Concrete,' *Los Angeles Herald-Examiner*, May 25, 1963, same location; 'Bronston's Workshop...' *55 Days at Peking*, *The Film Daily*, September 21, 1962, same location. One wide-eyed visitor was Wallis Simpson, the Duchess of Windsor, who glimpsed the Forbidden City in the distance while riding a train toward Madrid, recognized it from a sojourn there in the 1920s, and arranged a personal tour of the gargantuan set. Author interview with Paul Lazarus, former senior vice-president of Samuel Bronston Productions (who escorted Her Grace on the tour), Santa Barbara, CA, 1996.
- 116 Anthony R. Birley, *Marcus Aurelius: a biography* (London, Routledge, 2000).
- 117 See *Pierre S. du Pont v. Samuel Bronston*, New York State Supreme Court, New York County, index number 5679-69, filed 1969, New York State Supreme Court Building, New York City, which details the bitter legal battle between du Pont and Bronston that had raged since 1964.
- 118 'The Reign of Spain,' *Time*, February 26, 1965, in 'Spain—Motion Picture Industry' clipping file, MHL; Peter Besas, 'Samuel Bronston, Who Pulled Spanish Pic Industry Out of Doldrums, Now Facing Arrest,' *Variety*, August 6, 1973, in 'Samuel Bronston' clipping file, *Variety* Editorial Offices. For more on Spain's political situation in the early 1970s, see below in text, pp. 48–49.
- 119 Philip Yordan interview.
- 120 'Foreign Producers Pep Spain,' *Variety*, May 19, 1965; 'American Production on the Rise in Spain,' Box Office, December 13, 1965, both in 'Spain—Motion Picture Industry' clipping file, MHL.
- 121 'Madrid Expands Studio Facilities,' *Hollywood Reporter*, May 11, 1965, in 'Spain—Motion Picture Industry' clipping file, MHL.
- 122 'Spain Moves to Aid Foreign Production,' *Variety*, November 2, 1965, in 'Spain—Motion Picture Industry' clipping file, MHL.
- 123 See Gilmour, chapters 2–3.
- 124 For details on Lowenstein's political career, see William H. Chafe, *Never Stop Running: Allard Lowenstein and the struggle to save American liberalism* (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1998).

- 125 Memorandum from US Embassy in Madrid to the Secretary of State, dated March 27, 1963, 6 p.m., in folder, 'Pol-Political Affairs and Rel, Sp-A,' box 4046, RG 59, NA.
- 126 See 13-pp. memorandum of Fred Zinneman's meetings with Spanish expatriate anarchists and socialists living in France, June 1963, in folder, 'Behold a Pale Horse # 34,' Fred Zinneman Collection, Herrick Special Collections, MHL; Zinneman's handwritten notes of three meetings with Allard Lowenstein, in folder, 'Behold a Pale Horse # 39,' same location as previous cite (Lowenstein described Fraga to Zinneman as 'genteel, but mailed fist if they feel crossed. Fully but smartly protective of Franco.');
- 'Spain Displeasure Over "Pale Horse" results in Total ban of Col. Films, Shooting Affected Too,' *Variety*, September 4, 1963; 'Country Keeps Bars Up After Viewing Film,' *Variety*, August 11, 1964, both in 'Behold A Pale Horse' clipping file, MHL; author interview with S. Frederick Gronich, former MPEA vice-president, 1996. In a faxed response to this author's query, Gregory Peck blamed much of Behold a Pale Horse's poor box-office showing on Zinneman's equivocating over the films political perspective—that it was not explicit enough in establishing Peck's character's motivation for decades of violent opposition. (Faxed note from Gregory Peck's personal assistant to the author, 1996).
- 127 'Spain Gets Tough On Title Credits,' *Variety*, June 2, 1965, in 'Spain—Motion Picture Industry' clipping file, MHL.
- 128 'In a Little Spanish Town . . .,' *Films and Filming*, June 1965; 'Foreign Producers Pep Spain,' *Variety*, May 19, 1965, both in 'Spain—Motion Picture Industry' clipping file, MHL. Fraga backed away from the controversial ruling in response to the outpouring of opposition in Hollywood. But it is clear his gesture was based in part on MGM representative Stan Goldsmith's ability to point, in a letter he sent to Fraga, to reams of publicity for the film that stressed its use of Spanish locations and studios. Untitled article, *Variety*, August 4, 1965, in 'Spain—Motion Picture Industry' clipping file, MHL. See as well the *Doctor Zhivago* souvenir book; "'Zhivago" Started in Spain,' *Los Angeles Times*, January 2, 1965; and "'Doctor Zhivago" Moves to Spain,' *New York Times*, February 28, 1965, all in 'Doctor Zhivago' clipping file, MHL. *Doctor Zhivago's* penchant for generating controversy with the Franco regime extended to the MIT's ban on the singing of the Socialist Internationale during a battle sequence. 'The Reign of Spain,' *Time*, February 26, 1965, in 'Spain—Motion Picture Industry' clipping file, MHL. The ban would ultimately be lifted as the result of a special dispensation given the production by the regime.
- 129 'Fraga's Formula For Good Will,' *Variety*, October 21, 1964, in 'Spain—Motion Picture Industry' clipping file, MHL.
- 130 'Spain "Forgives" Columbia,' *Variety*, January 26, 1966, in 'Behold A Pale Horse' clipping file, MHL.
- 131 'Almeria—Movie Capital of the World: Says Here,' *Hollywood Reporter*, February 15, 1968, in 'Spain—Motion Picture Industry' clipping file, MHL.
- 132 Ibid.
- 133 Peter Besas, 'Top Pix Roll in "Safe" Almeria,' *Variety*, November 15, 1972, in 'Spain—Motion Picture Industry 1970s' file, MHL; Besas, 'Spain Misses U.S. Gold-Rush Days.'

- 134 Ibid.; ‘Specialists Rate Filming, Living in Spain; Main Flaw is Hiring Originates in London, Hollywood,’ *Variety*, May 9, 1973, in ‘Spain—Motion Picture Industry 1970s’ file, MHL.
- 135 See Preston, *Franco: a biography*, 765–775; Paul Preston, *Juan Carlos: steering Spain from dictatorship to democracy* (New York, W. W. Norton, 2004), chapter 6.
- 136 Preston, *Franco: a biography*, 744–748.
- 137 Peter Besas, ‘Spain Misses U.S. Gold-Rush Days,’ *Variety*, undated clipping (1973), in ‘Spain—Motion Picture Industry 1970s’ file, MHL; Preston, *Franco: a biography*, 744–748.
- 138 ‘Specialists Rate Filming, Living in Spain; Main Flaw is Hiring, Originates in London, Hollywood,’ *Variety*, May 9, 1973.
- 139 Preston, *Franco: a biography*, 776.
- 140 It is an open question as to whether American film production helped to undermine the Franco regime and facilitate the transition from dictatorship to democracy in Spain, although outside observers in the 1960s noted that American and Western European tourism was bringing fresh, and potentially subversive, ideas into the country; and Hollywood productions had a salutary impact on this tourism. See Rosendorf, ‘Be El Caudillo’s Guest,’ conclusion and passim.

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