

U.S. Public Diplomacy and the American Experience:

A theoretical evolution from consent to engagement

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Abstract

The rise of anti-Americanism around the world firmly suggests that current U.S. foreign policy is not being well received.¹ Success cannot simply be attributed to the creation of policy, but must include an investigation of the role of public diplomacy as well. Public diplomacy can be defined as a function of the government to promote foreign policy and to engage with the international public. U.S. public diplomacy as administered by the government and its agencies is unsuccessful because it does not fully represent the domestic population. The exploration of four tensions within this model creates the context for a full reconsideration of its application. Soft power, as the current theory by which public diplomacy is understood, is useful in its discussion of attraction, but neglects the necessity of domestic population participation for public diplomacy and international approval. For this reason, a further evolution of theory is necessary.

This essay suggests that as opposed to trapping public diplomacy within the domain of the state, only allowing a consensual role for the public, it is necessary to liberate voices from the confining hegemony of civil society. Instead the roles of the state, in this case the U.S. government, and the role of civil society, the American population, must be reflexive. Public diplomacy must participate in the debate of how knowledge and realities are created, and it must actively engage the American population to describe their experiences. Only through a domestic development of critical consciousness and a dialogical understanding of learning will public diplomacy ably communicate the complete American experience to the international world.

¹ See Appendix A.

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“We, even we here, hold the power and bear the responsibility.”

**“He who molds public sentiment goes deeper than
he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions.
He makes statutes and decisions possible or impossible
to be executed.”**

-Abraham Lincoln

Introduction

The rise of anti-Americanism around the world firmly suggests that current U.S. foreign policy is not being well received. The numbers continue to reveal that among allies and enemies alike, the foreign policies of the United States government have rubbed too hard for too long.² New achievements in technology and communication have enabled the spread of information and awareness, and have increased the international community's ability to express their dissatisfaction with the military and economic power of the United States. In the post-9/11 world, this community has grown increasingly weary and wary of the policies set forth by the current Bush administration. While the incompetence shown through various policies may indeed be classified as stunning, it is impossible to place all of the blame on the rise of anti-Americanism on one president and a few of his men.

As advancements in technology and communication have allowed populations around the world to gain access to a diversity of media and information resources, the discipline of diplomacy has been changing how it envisions its tasks and performs its functions. No longer is diplomacy strictly conceived of in the traditional sense of secretive government-to-government negotiations, and foreign policies are no longer created through a monolithic foreign service.³ In the post 9/11 world, the discipline of diplomacy realizes that "the power to inspire publics is now often the most powerful weapon in international politics," and looks to the sphere of public

² See Appendix A.

³ Stephen Johnson and Dale Helle, "How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy." *The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder*, 1645 (23 April 2003): 3.

diplomacy as a way to harness this power and to create the conditions for specific policies to prosper.⁴

Nonetheless, while noted for its value in a globalizing world, public diplomacy remains inextricably bound to notions of traditional diplomacy and is primarily employed as a function of the state.⁵ As such, public diplomacy is defined as “a governmental process of communication with the foreign public in an attempt to bring about an understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies.”⁶ As this essay will explore, public diplomacy as engaged by the U.S. has not been effective in subduing anti-American sentiment because it is still too integrated within and directed by the government. The current course of U.S. public diplomacy will only lead to greater instability and increased anti-Americanism.

Furthermore, diplomatic literature has rested on Realist views of international relations, favoring the pursuit of national security and interests over the internal components or values of a nation.⁷ George Kennan echoed this sentiment by advocating for diplomatic functions to reside within a professional corps of specialists warning that “diplomacy by dilettantism” will create instability by involving too many

⁴ Mark Leonard and Vidhya Alakeson, *Going Public: Diplomacy for the Information Society* (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2000), 38.

⁵ This essay will use the term ‘state’ in describing the role of the government or ruling political system.

⁶ Hans Tuch, *Communicating with the World* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 3. Academics and policy makers have not agreed upon a single definition for public diplomacy. Instead, most define public diplomacy it is as suited to their particular arguments. This essay prefers the definition presented by Tuch, as it correctly identifies the current application of public diplomacy as a function of the government. For varying definitions, see also G.R. Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice* (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002); Stephen Johnson and Dale Helle, “How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy”: 3; Michael McClellan, “Public Diplomacy in the Context of Traditional Diplomacy,” *Vienna Diplomatic Academy*, October 14, 2004, <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/45.htm> (accessed May 28, 2005); and Philip M. Taylor, *The Revival of PD since 9/11*, PowerPoint presentation, January 2005, <http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vf01.cfm?folder=7&outfit=pmt> (accessed June 6, 2005). For reference to public diplomacy as described in recent policy reports, refer to the citations of footnote 10.

⁷ Shaun Riordan, *The New Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 120.

inexperienced people. Hans Morgenthau further argued that diplomacy must pursue a nation's interests objectively and when possible, morally.⁸ However, as opposed to these sentiments, recent evolution of public diplomacy theory cites American popularity as important for facilitation of its foreign policies and international stability.⁹ For this reason, the Realist theories may not be the most realistic approaches for discussing public diplomacy. Starting from the latter sentiment, this essay will argue a more progressive theoretical approach.

Furthermore, a number of recent academic articles and political policy reviews emphasize particular measures to bandage U.S. public diplomacy.¹⁰ The recommendations of many of these reports continue to problem solve within the current framework of public diplomacy, and do not go far enough in their critiques to broaden the scope for understanding its possible functions. This essay will not attempt to follow in the footsteps of Realist philosophies, basic problem solving, or

⁸ George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau as cited from Glen Fisher, *Public Diplomacy and Behavioral Science* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 131. See also Sir Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy, 2nd edition* (London: Oxford University Press, 1950) for his discussion of the importance of traditional diplomatic functions based on governmental negotiation, and his hesitance toward "democratic diplomacy" and greater public participation in the international field.

⁹ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Soft Power and American Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no. 2 (2004): 261.

¹⁰ The number of recent policy reports focusing on current public diplomacy is impressive. For further inquiry see Center for Arts and Culture, *Cultural Diplomacy: Recommendations and Research* (Arlington: George Mason University, July 2004), <http://www.culturalpolicy.org> (accessed May 25, 2005); Charles Wolf, Jr. and Brian Rosen, *Public Diplomacy: How to Think About it and How to Improve it* (Washington D.C.: Rand Corporation, May 2004); Fred Coffey, Jr., Stan Silverman, William Maurer and William Rugh, "Making Public Diplomacy Effective: State Department Must Be Realigned," November 15, 2004, <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/42.htm> (accessed May 28, 2005); Council on Foreign Relations, *Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy*, Peter G. Peterson, chairman (New York: Council on Foreign Affairs, 2003); Defense Science Board Task Force, *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*, Vince Vitto, chairman (Washington D.C.: Defense Science Board Task Force, September 2004); Hady Amr, *The Need to Communicate: How to Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, January 2004), The Brookings Institute Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World, <http://www.brookings.edu> (Accessed May 28, 2005); Heritage Foundation, "Regaining America's Voice Overseas: A Conference on Public Diplomacy." *Heritage Lectures* 817 (13 January 2004); Public Diplomacy Council, *A Call for Action on Public Diplomacy* (Washington D.C.: George Washington University, January 2005); United States Government Accountability Office, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Accountability Office, September 2003); United States Government Accountability Office, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Accountability Office, April 2005).

policy suggestions. Alternatively, it will evolve the current theory and application of public diplomacy to include non-traditional forms of diplomatic inquiry, such as behavioral science, hegemonic theory, and critical pedagogy.

This essay argues that U.S. public diplomacy as administered by the government and its agencies is unsuccessful because it does not fully represent the domestic population. The exploration of four tensions within this model creates the context for a full reconsideration of its application. Soft power, as the current theory by which public diplomacy is understood, is useful in its discussion of attraction, but neglects the necessity of domestic population participation for public diplomacy and international approval. For this reason, a further evolution of theory is necessary.

This essay suggests that as opposed to trapping public diplomacy within the domain of the state, only allowing a consensual role for the public, it is necessary to liberate voices from the confining hegemony of civil society. Instead the roles of the state, in this case the U.S. government, and the role of civil society, the American population, must be reflexive. Public diplomacy must participate in the debate of how knowledge and realities are created, and it must actively engage the American population to describe their experiences. Only through a domestic development of critical consciousness and a dialogical understanding of learning will public diplomacy ably communicate the complete American experience to the international world.

In hopes of further evolving the conversation of public diplomacy, this essay is comprised of four chapters. Chapter one begins with a brief historical overview of U.S. public diplomacy. This sets the scene for discussion of four tensions hindering its current application and creates a broader context for the necessity of examining public diplomacy. Chapter two commences with the definition of soft power leading to a

discussion of the role of attraction and its application to current U.S. public diplomacy. This chapter also provides a critical view of the relationship between soft power and U.S. public diplomacy arguing that the importance of participation is neglected. It does so by exploring the government's coercive means for gaining attraction, by critiquing their attempts to amass and deploy soft power, and rejecting the role of non-state actors or increased funding as public diplomacy's final solutions. This chapter argues the need to envision public diplomacy through another lens. Chapter three discusses this new lens from a Gramscian perspective and examines the role of hegemony within society. It also looks at how public diplomacy, in its communication to the international world, perpetuates certain myths and realities created by the dominant class and reinforced by the state. It further examines the struggle for broader participation and re-conceptualizes what the results will mean for public diplomacy. Chapter four uses the previous chapter's theoretical findings to discuss the importance of a critical pedagogy, the creation of a critical consciousness within the domestic population, and a reflexive conception of learning in forwarding the application of public diplomacy. Moreover, it describes the role critical pedagogy for empowering both the state and civil society to create a new conception of public diplomacy, and it focuses on moving public diplomacy from a realm of consent to one of engagement.

1. The Fundamental Four: Current tensions within U.S. public diplomacy

“Why do they hate us?” asked President Bush at a press conference following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.¹¹ One answer involves the way that the government and its agencies administer U.S. public diplomacy, as the sole spokesperson for U.S. foreign policies. Current public diplomacy has not worked to curtail anti-American sentiment and may have contributed to its rise. This chapter begins with a brief historical explanation of U.S. public diplomacy as a context to explore the four tensions evident throughout the last century. These tensions are used not only to emphasize the fractures within U.S. public diplomacy, but also to give impetus to the fact that the whole notion of public diplomacy needs to be re-conceptualized.

These tensions, identified through exploration of primary and secondary research, relate to U.S. public diplomacy policies from World War I through the present. The four tensions include 1) the division of purposes in the government’s administration of public diplomacy, 2) the continuing conception of public diplomacy as the a new diplomacy while old problems continue to hinder its advancement 3) the decreased legitimacy and credibility of U.S. public diplomacy resulting from incorporation into the State Department, and 4) the domestic dissemination ban and its role in keeping the U.S. domestic population uninformed of the government’s international messages.

1.1 A historical overview of U.S. public diplomacy

During World War I and prior to World War II, U.S. public diplomacy was primarily directed at influencing public opinion within other countries in order to

¹¹ George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People.” *United States Capitol Address*, September 20, 2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html> (accessed September 1, 2005).

influence the policies of those governments.¹² Early public diplomacy invoked the phrase “battle for hearts and minds”¹³ to describe these activities. With the creation of the Division of Cultural Relations, the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, and the Office of War Information in the early 1940’s, the United States targeted the hearts and minds of people living under communist regimes and saw potential benefits of foreign information and exchange.¹⁴ The Presidential Committee on Information Activities Abroad noted, “unless governments effectively communicate their policies and actions to all politically influential elements of foreign population, their programs can be impeded and their security placed in jeopardy.”¹⁵ The role of these foreign information programs came to be accepted in the post World War II era as necessary to maintaining national security and international stability.

In the early days of the Cold War and due to the potentially conflicting purposes of previous department’s communication functions, the United States Information Agency (USIA) was created as an independent foreign affairs agency. The USIA was an autonomous agency, but with guidance from the guidance of the executive branch of the federal government. Its mandate was to handle U.S. information programs.¹⁶ Under Reorganization Plan No. 8 (1953) all information programs, which were previously under responsibility of the State Department, were

¹² Congressional Quarterly Service, *Congress and the Nation: 1945-1964: A Review of Government and Politics in the Post War Years* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1965).

¹³ Use of the phrase originated with a quote of John Adams, an American Revolutionary War patriot, who said that the revolution was won not on the battlefield, but in the "hearts and minds" of the American people. During the Vietnam War, it became a reference for the “disingenuous and misguided attempts to use a military to make a subjugated population behave more like its conquerors.” Wikipedia, “Hearts and Minds,” <http://en.wikipedia.org> (accessed August 28, 2005).

¹⁴ Congressional Quarterly Service, 208.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 208.

¹⁶ United States Information Agency, *USIA: A Commemoration* (Washington, D.C.: USIA, 1999), 15.

delegated to the authority of USIA. Only the educational exchange program component remained within the State Department. This separation was seen as a way to insulate the exchange programs from political contamination.¹⁷ Moving the foreign information programs outside of the State Department increased the credibility and legitimacy in the U.S. government's attempt to sway hearts and minds, and USIA began to "tell America's story to the world".¹⁸

The actual term, public diplomacy, was coined and defined in 1965 as the "cause and effect of public attitudes and opinions which influence the formulation and execution of foreign policy."¹⁹ Defining public diplomacy acknowledged its existence and highlighted its uniqueness as a factor of diplomatic relations. However, this definition did not effectively elaborate on the actual cause and effect role of the government's creation and dissemination of public diplomacy, nor did it address how broad or narrow to make the U.S. government's role. The definition did not exclude the involvement of actors outside of the government, but was too broad and all encompassing to clearly delineate the precise roles of public diplomacy.

During the 1990's after the success of the Cold War, but with pressure by Republican members of Congress to decrease spending and in hopes of streamlining U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy, the USIA and its programs were rolled back into the

¹⁷ Ibid, 15.

¹⁸ The phrase was used to describe the USIA's primary mandate of influencing foreign audiences about the U.S. style democracy and markets. Nancy Snow, "United States Information Agency." *Foreign Policy In Focus* 2, no. 40 (August 1997).

¹⁹ Edmund Gullion of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University first coined the term during the establishment of the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy. The term was first used in the 1965 Fletcher School catalogue. United States Information Agency, *USIA: A Commemoration*, 26.

State Department apparatus.²⁰ At the time of the formal merger, former Secretary of State Madeline Albright emphasized, “in our era public diplomacy is not simply nice to have. It must be a core element in our foreign policy.”²¹ These sentiments stand in stark contrast to the budgetary allowances for the 2006 fiscal year. The discrepancy between the \$441.6 billion Department of Defense budget versus the \$1.40 billion State Department’s public diplomacy and public affairs budget solicits question as to how seriously the government takes public diplomacy.²² In context of the post 9/11 world and with the continuing increase of anti-American sentiment around the world, advocates of public diplomacy note that more, not less public diplomacy is needed.²³

1.2 Tension one: a divide between purposes

The first tension underlying U.S. public diplomacy is the division between the functions it serves. Former diplomat, John Brown describes U.S. public diplomacy as involving three roles: information dissemination (including propagandistic messages), education, and cultural exchange. Brown notes that these roles have often conflicted, but are nonetheless valuable and exceptional in their own right. As part of information dissemination, Joseph Nye describes how a government’s daily communication and strategic messages reinforce one another by clarifying a nation’s policies and images.

²⁰ President Clinton signed the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 that abolished the USIA as of October 1, 1999 and integrated all of the agencies elements, except the International Broadcasting Bureau into the State Department. United States Information Agency, *USIA: A Commemoration*, 69.

²¹ Madeline Albright as cited from Dell Pendergrast, “State and USIA: Blending a Dysfunctional Family,” *Foreign Service Journal* (March 2000), <http://publicdiplomacy.org/3.htm> (accessed May 28, 2005).

²² The FY 2006 budget for the Department of Defense is exclusive of U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as, the operations of the Department of Homeland Security. Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, “Highlights of House Armed Services Committee Action on the Fiscal Year 2006 Defense Authorization Bill HR 1815,” May 24, 2005, <http://www.armscontrol.org/archives/001658.php> (accessed August 15, 2005); United States Department of State, “2006 Department of State Fact Sheet (International Relations Budgets),” February 7, 2005, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ps/prs/ps/2005/41898> (accessed August 15, 2005).

²³ Mark Leonard, “Britain Must Fund ‘Strategy for Hearts and Minds’ in Middle East,” *Foreign Policy Centre Press Release*, 26 February 2003; Nancy Snow, “How to Build an Effective Public Diplomacy: Ten Steps for Change,” *Vital Speeches of the Day* 70, no. 12 (2003): 369-374.

In contrast to these two information dissemination roles, he further discusses the role of long-term relationship building through exchanges, conferences, and scholarships.²⁴ While three functions are defined, a closer look will show the most apparent fault line occurs between the functions of information dissemination/propaganda versus those of education and cultural exchange.

Information dissemination and propaganda

As Brown and Nye point out, one of the most important functions of public diplomacy is in the dissemination of daily information and strategic messages. Philip Taylor uses the overarching term “perception management” to describe the information roles of public diplomacy, but discusses the distinctions between public affairs, public interest, international broadcasting, psychological operations, media management, and public diplomacy.²⁵ The fine line of differentiation between these terms create confusion in application, but these roles invoke the purpose of public diplomacy as attempting to sway the public opinion of other countries’ populations.²⁶

While public diplomacy practitioners prefer the more benign term of information dissemination, others stress that is just another term for propaganda. Nancy Snow, a former Fulbright scholar and Presidential Management Intern at USIA from 1992-94, describes the goal of propaganda as spreading a particular doctrine or system of principles through an intentional message strategically aimed to incite a particular reaction from an audience.²⁷ Former U.S. Ambassador, Richard Holbrooke

²⁴ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 107-09.

²⁵ Taylor, *The Revival of Public Diplomacy since 9/11*, slide 15. For specific distinctions between these specific terms see also Stephen Johnson and Dale Helle, “How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy”: 3 and Michael McClellan, “Public Diplomacy in the Context of Traditional Diplomacy.”

²⁶ Nancy Snow, *Information War: American Propaganda, Free Speech, and Opinion Control Since 9/11* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003), 61-64.

²⁷ Snow describes a current example of this type of communication as evidenced by the Bush administration’s “War

concedes, “you can call it public diplomacy, or public affairs, or psychological warfare or, if you really want to be blunt – propaganda.”²⁸ In sum, propaganda can be defined as a communicative process, but governments shy away from a self-application of the term only to enthusiastically apply it to discredit their opponents’ information strategies²⁹.

Education and cultural exchange

While the debate over information dissemination versus propaganda remains unresolved, public diplomacy enthusiasts point out the importance of the education and cultural purposes of public diplomacy. As a part of public diplomacy, the roles of education and culture are defined as “the exchange of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding.”³⁰ U.S. governmental public diplomacy programs focusing on these elements include the International Visitors Program, Fulbright Program, performing and visual arts exchanges, and American libraries and information centers abroad.³¹ Edward R. Murrow, former director of USIA, highlighted the importance of education and culture as being “the last three feet”, the crucial link of the international

on Terror” campaign as it crafts the image that this “war” is about defending freedom and democracy, instead of based on the real issues of reevaluating bad policy. Whether one construes this as information dissemination or propaganda, the goal is the same – persuading the public opinion of international audiences. Ibid, 61-64.

²⁸ Richard Holbrooke quote cited from John Brown, “The Purposes and Cross-Purposes of American Public Diplomacy.” *American Diplomacy*, August 15, 2002, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2002_07-09/brown_pubdip.htm (accessed May 25, 2005).

²⁹ Susan Carruthers, *Winning the Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media and Colonial Counter-Insurgency 1944-1960* (London: Leicester University Press, 1995), 3.

³⁰ Center for Arts and Culture, 2.

³¹ The Fulbright Program began in 1946 following legislation of the Fulbright Act that allowed for the exchange of students, researchers, and academic professionals. The International Visitors Program began with the USIA and invited world leaders and professionals to visit the United States to learn about the country, its policies, and its people. United States Information Agency, 6 and 63.

communication chain. Under his direction, USIA advocated a form of U.S. public diplomacy that focused on personal contact, rather than on just propaganda.³²

Cultural diplomacy authors such as Kevin Mulcahy and Harvey Feigenbaum, emphasize the distinction between public and cultural diplomacy in that the former focuses too much on the short-term information dissemination and promotion of policies while the latter involves long-term relationship building.³³ Feigenbaum further asserts that if U.S. public diplomacy programs can be construed as propaganda, cultural diplomacy must remain distinct. It must involve the free exchange of ideas and peoples, must be less political, and must be rooted in education and culture.³⁴ Both authors see cultural diplomacy as not just telling America's stories to the world, but telling the world's story to America.³⁵

This separation between information dissemination and education and cultural diplomacy complicate the notion of what constitutes the functions of public diplomacy. Mulcahy and Feigenbaum believe that the three functions are distinct, yet fundamentally compatible. Their concern is that all three functions, currently operating within the State Department, is further cause for confusion between each of their individual purposes.³⁶ If public diplomacy should include all three functions, as Brown and Nye point out, the question remains as to whether a government can successfully manage the distinct goals of each.

³² United States Information Agency, *USIA: A Commemoration*, 30.

³³ Kevin Mulcahy, "Cultural Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World," *Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society* 29, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 3-7; Harvey B. Feigenbaum, *Art, Culture, and the National Agenda: Globalization and Cultural Diplomacy* (Arlington: George Mason University and Center for Arts and Culture, 2001), 8-10.

³⁴ Feigenbaum, 30-31.

³⁵ Mulcahy, 3. Feigenbaum, 30-31.

³⁶ Mulcahy, 4. Feigenbaum, 8-9.

1.3 Tension two: old problems for the new diplomacy

The second tension of public diplomacy relates to the stunted progression of U.S. governmental programs since their inception. In 1962, then director of USIA, Edward R. Murrow called the USIA “the new dimension of new diplomacy,” and the redevelopment of USIA set the tone for distinguishing the old, traditional diplomacy from a new, public diplomacy.³⁷ Mark Leonard of the UK-based Foreign Policy Centre has drawn clear distinctions between traditional and public diplomacy in that former is based on the coercive action of states imposing ideas through power plays and propaganda. Whereas, the latter emphasizes an attraction based on people working in partnership for mutual benefit.³⁸ While the specific attributes are debatable, political and academic reports continue to use the idea that public diplomacy is indeed a new diplomacy, one for the 21st century and the technological age, with continual emphasis on its public nature and its connection to the globalizing world.³⁹ The distinction between traditional and public diplomacy is relevant, but what is striking is that the new diplomacy has been dealing with the same problems since being incorporated within the governmental schema.

Throughout the years, U.S. public diplomacy agencies have advocated that their programs could only flourish from increased funding, autonomy of agencies, benefits of using new technology, people to people exchanges, and dissemination of more accurate information. These exact recommendations were made in the first annual report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy in 1953.⁴⁰ Since

³⁷ United States Information Agency, *USIA: A Commemoration*, 30.

³⁸ Leonard and Alakeson, 60.

³⁹ For further reference see policy reports as listed in footnote 10.

⁴⁰ “The United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy is a Presidential commission created by Congress to provide bipartisan oversight of United States Government Activities intended to understand, inform, and

that time, the Commission has echoed similar recommendations in reports entitled “Diplomacy in the Information Age,” “A New Diplomacy for the Information Age,” and “Public Diplomacy for the 21st Century.”⁴¹ While reports and policy makers may gush over the importance of public diplomacy, the reality is that budgets and programs continue to be cut. Examples include the closure of the American Library in Belgrade, the closure of the Center for Democracy in the Amerika Haus which was a neutral territory for reconciliation between Croats, Serbs, and Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the sponsoring of an “American Jazz Festival” in Ankara, Turkey by the French Embassy, and the closure and downgrading of numerous Information Research Centers around the world which once held meetings, lectures, and were available for academic research.⁴²

In 1993, six years before he closed the USIA due to budgetary pressures, President Clinton noted, “that one of the most effective things we can do in international affairs is what is called public diplomacy.”⁴³ In October 2001, President Bush showed amazement at the international misunderstanding of “what our country is about” and emphasized, “that we’ve got to do a better job of making our case.”⁴⁴ If American popularity is crucial to foreign policy and winning the “War on Terror”, it

influence foreign publics. Reports are made annually to the President, Congress, Secretary of State, the USIA Director (pre-1999), and the American People.” U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *USIA Annual Report* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 1953), back cover.

⁴¹ U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Diplomacy in the Information Age* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 1993); U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Public Diplomacy for the 21st Century* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, March 1995); U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *A New Diplomacy for the Information Age* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, November 1996). For access to all U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy since 1953 reports see United States Embassy in London, Information Resource Center.

⁴² Helena Kane Finn, “Arts and Minds: A Conference on Cultural Diplomacy amid Global Tensions,” *National Arts Journalism Program and Center for the Art and Culture Keynote Address* (New York: Columbia University, 14 April 2003).

⁴³ U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Diplomacy in the Information Age*, 1.

⁴⁴ George W. Bush as cited from Council on Foreign Relations, “Public Diplomacy,” *Terrorism: Questions and Answers*. 2005, <http://cfrterrorism.org/responses/diplomacy.html> (accessed July 15, 2005).

seems that public diplomacy would be given highest priority. Yet, if the proposed 2006 budget is any example, that is simply not the case. U.S. public diplomacy programs may continue to be hailed as the new diplomacy, but they continue to be plagued by the same old problems.

1.4 Tension three: a lack of autonomy creates a lack of legitimacy

The 1999 merger of the USIA into the State Department is the third factor hindering the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy. As previously noted, when the USIA was first organized it brought together all the information programs of the U.S. under the umbrella of one independent agency, outside of the direct reach of the State Department.⁴⁵ This was important because even if the functions of policymakers and public diplomacy were not completely autonomous, the USIA gained legitimacy from being seen as such. As a new ‘cone’ in the State Department, there is question as to whether the State Department will simply pursue a propagandistic tone to push their policies and ignore the education and cultural functions of public diplomacy.⁴⁶

The question is exemplified by the State Department’s understanding of public diplomacy:

The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs helps ensure that public diplomacy (engaging, informing, and influencing key international audiences) is practiced in harmony with public affairs (outreach to Americans) and traditional diplomacy to advance U.S. interests and security and to provide the moral basis for U.S. leadership in the world.⁴⁷

The goals of the State Department clearly emphasize the need for the U.S. government to communicate its ideas and ideals, goals and policies. In contrast to the emphasis of

⁴⁵ United States Information Agency, 15.

⁴⁶ Leonard H. Marks, Charles Z Wick, Bruce Gelb, and Henry E Catto, “America Needs a Voice Abroad,” *Washington Post*, 26 February 2005, A19.

⁴⁷ United States Department of State, “From the Undersecretary.” *Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs* 2005, <http://www.state.gov/r> (accessed September 1, 2005).

the USIA, there is no mention of the role of education and cultural functions, and public diplomacy is simply regarded as a corollary of traditional diplomacy. Once again, the emphasis is on national security and U.S. interests. In addition, through the creation of the Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee in 2002 and the more recent establishment of Office of Global Communications (OGC), the White House has shown its interest in increasing its role within public diplomacy. Both of these initiatives attempted to coordinate public diplomacy efforts between governmental departments and tried to create a national strategic communication plan, but both are criticized for their inefficiency and lack of effect.⁴⁸

There is some question as to whether the hierarchical, top down management style of the State Department and White House are flexible enough to deal with the more open and publicly oriented style of programs that were associated with the USIA.⁴⁹ Moreover, the merging of public diplomacy functions creates the question of whether U.S. government efforts can be construed as legitimate and credible. As compared with the U.K., the autonomous British Council and British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) find “more sincere and unprejudiced welcome abroad than if it was merely a subordinate section of the Foreign Office”⁵⁰, but U.S. public diplomacy programs may simply be another mouthpiece for the government. The incorporation of public diplomacy efforts into the upper reaches of government can be seen as a contradiction to the term “public”. Without a major rethinking in strategy and

⁴⁸ United States General Accountability Office, U.S. *Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy* (Washington D.C.: U.S. GAO, April 2005).

⁴⁹ For further discussion see Pendergrast. See Also Fred Coffey, Jr., Stan Silverman, William Maurer and William Rugh, “Making Public Diplomacy Effective: State Department Must Be Realigned,” November 15, 2004, <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/42.htm> (accessed May 28, 2005).

⁵⁰ The British Council and BBC are public entities operating independently of the British Foreign Office. John Henderson, *The United States Information Agency* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1969), 13.

structure, U.S. public diplomacy will continue to face critiques regarding its autonomy and legitimacy.

1.5 Tension four: the domestic dissemination ban

The fourth tension resides in the fact that in the near future Americans may have the opportunity to view an English-language version of al-Jazeera, the Arabic news channel, from the comfort of their own homes. However, at the same time the population will be unable to view domestic broadcasts of Al Hurrah, the U.S. sponsored news channel broadcasting in the Middle East.⁵¹ This seemingly paradoxical situation is due to the continuance of the domestic dissemination ban. In 1948, Congress established the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act (commonly known as the Smith-Mundt Act) as the legislative basis for America's foreign communication and cultural exchange programs.⁵² The Act was implemented to encourage reciprocity between America and the world, but remains hindered by inclusion of the domestic dissemination ban.

Created at a time when Nazi propaganda efforts were fresh on the mind of policy makers, the U.S. government did not want to be seen as propagandizing its population. As such, the ban prohibits the domestic dissemination of public diplomacy programs, including former USIA and State Department information and programs, prepared for foreign audiences from being distributed within the United States.⁵³ It further

⁵¹ Al Hurrah is the U.S. sponsored news channel broadcasting in the Middle East and soon to be broadcast in Europe. William Fisher, "International broadcasting channel are protected by a "firewall" from the State Department," July 27, 2005, http://www.gnn.tv/headlines/3977/Airwaves_Off_Limits_to_New_Propaganda_Tsar (accessed August 10, 2005).

⁵² Also known as Public Law 80-402, the Smith-Mundt Act was named after its sponsors Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-NJ) and Representative Karl E. Mundt (R-SD). The Act also served as the legal basis for developing the USIA in 1953. Stephen Johnson, "Improving U.S. Public Diplomacy Toward the Middle East." *Heritage Lectures* 838 (24 May 2004): 5.

⁵³ The ban states that "the Secretary is authorized, when he finds it appropriate, to provide for the preparation, and dissemination abroad, of information about the United States, its people, and its policies, through press,

stipulates that material prepared for international dissemination may only become available for domestic distribution twelve years after its initial creation or dissemination.⁵⁴ Current policy makers continue to rationalize the effectiveness of the ban by asserting that the American people should not be subjected to government controlled news broadcasts and propaganda. Additionally, commercial broadcasters have lobbied to keep the Act in place because of their fear of competition from a free, governmental source of news.⁵⁵

However, the continuance of the ban keeps U.S. public diplomacy efforts invisible to the American public. The secretiveness of information is contrary to the notion of checks and balances within the U.S. governmental framework. One reason the American people elect officials is to represent their interests, but the dissemination ban takes away any option for the American public to be involved. Eliminating the ban would increase the population's ability to do more to understand their government's public diplomacy programs. Moreover, as international programs included under the ban are funded by U.S. taxpayers' dollars, the American public has

publications, radio, motion pictures, and other information media, and through information centers and instructors abroad...Any such information (other than "Problems of Communism" and the "English Teaching Forum"...) shall not be disseminated with the United States, its territories, or possessions." United States Code, "Title 22, Chapter 18, Subchapter V, #1461 General Authorization," *US Public Law 80-402*, <http://straylight.law.cornell.edu/uscode> (accessed August 10, 2005); "Precursors of the US Information Agency," *Washington File* EUR, no. 208 (25 August 1982).

⁵⁴ Ibid. It should be briefly noted that the Smith-Mundt Act does not qualify for exemption under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of 1966, and that while dissemination is against the law, discourse of information is still required under the FOIA. The American public is not prohibited from receiving this information from overseas locations, collecting pamphlets, or watching videos while aboard. This distinction was addressed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, "Essential Information, INC, et. al, versus United States Information Agency," *Reply Brief for Appellants*, http://www.citizen.org/print_article.cfm?ID=803 (accessed August 10, 2005).

⁵⁵ The Annenberg Washington Program in Communications Policy Studies of Northwestern University, *U.S. Foreign Affairs in the New Information Age: Charting a Course for the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: The Annenberg Washington Program in Communications Policy Studies of Northwestern University, 1994); James Love, "The US Information Agency on the Internet Not for American Citizens?" *TAP Info*, April 26, 1995, <http://lists.essential.org/1995/info-policy-notes/msg00135.html> (accessed August 10, 2005); See also Snow, "United States Information Agency."

the right to know how their government is portraying their country, culture, and lifestyle.⁵⁶

Examining the fundamental four tensions hindering U.S. public diplomacy creates relevance for understanding the rise of anti-Americanism and for critiquing how public diplomacy is conceived. The tensions regarding the division of function, the continuation of old problems within the rhetoric of new diplomacy, the lack of institutional autonomy, and the secrecy of the domestic dissemination ban highlight the fundamental flaws of U.S. public diplomacy as employed as a function of government and create the context for discussing why the application and theory behind public diplomacy needs to be examined. The following chapter will explore the relevance of soft power and will serve as the starting point for evaluating the theoretical foundations of public diplomacy.

⁵⁶ The Annenberg Washington Program in Communications Policy Studies of Northwestern University, part two.

2. Critiquing Soft Power: Envisioning a participatory dimension

Current scholarship follows the idea that public diplomacy is a tool of soft power.⁵⁷ Soft power envisions a role for public diplomacy, but it focuses too much on the role of attraction and not enough on participation. Where public diplomacy is discussed it assumes government involvement, but neglects the importance of exploring what interests underlie the messages created for public diplomacy. Moreover, it does not describe thoroughly social participation effects of creating the American experience. For these reasons, more critical inquiry of the relationship between soft power and public diplomacy is needed.⁵⁸ This essay begins this inquiry from the basis of the crisis of American image and in three sections, discusses the relation of public diplomacy to soft power.

The first section of this chapter examines Joseph Nye's application of soft power as it relates to attraction and public diplomacy. The definition of soft power is set in the context of the "Shared Values Initiative," another Bush administration public diplomacy attempt, and its relation to present American attractiveness. The second section of this chapter provides a critical view of the relationship between soft power and U.S. public diplomacy arguing that the importance of participation is neglected. It does so by exploring the government's coercive means for gaining attraction, by critiquing their attempts to amass and deploy soft power, and rejecting the role of non-state actors or increased funding as public diplomacy's final solutions. Instead, this

⁵⁷ Nye, *Soft Power*.

⁵⁸ For further critiques of soft power see Stephen Lukes, "Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33, no. 3 (2005) regarding the lack of distinction between persuasion and ways of 'shaping preferences', 487. See also Janice Bially Mattern, "Why 'Soft Power' Isn't So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33, no.3 (2005) for a discussion of how soft power is a continuation of hard power by different means, 583.

critique asks whether U.S. public diplomacy can continue to be understood in terms of Nye's soft power, or whether another theory might better serve to broaden the basis for envisioning its current and future functions.

2.1 Defining soft power

Soft power is the primary theory through which policy makers and academics understand the effects of public diplomacy.⁵⁹ Joseph Nye elucidates on the difference between hard power, as seen in military and economic power, and soft power as having “ability to achieve its goals through attraction rather than coercion.”⁶⁰ Nye notes that within democratic politics, soft power emanates from a country's attractive personality, cultural and political values, foreign policy, and its institutions. Mark Leonard adds to this list by including how consumer products, media and information providers, outward orientation and inward openness, and education all increase the attractiveness of a country.⁶¹ The result is that when a country is attractive, its policies are seen as legitimate and its soft power is enhanced. The effects of soft power and legitimacy convince others to follow or agree to norms by use of the carrot rather than the stick.⁶² Public diplomacy is a tool that can create legitimacy, capture the attention of international audiences, and help to further the goals of a state or government transmitting its information.⁶³

⁵⁹ A number of authors make reference to the connection between public diplomacy and Nye's consideration of soft power. For inquiry see Leonard and Alakeson, 36; Riordan, 120; Snow, “How to Build and Effective Public Diplomacy: Ten Steps for Change,” section 6, and Taylor, slide 11-12.

⁶⁰ Nye, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” 256. Nye was not the first to acknowledge the role of power outside the use of coercion or threats. For other suggestions of softer forms of power see also Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1980*. Colin Gordon, ed (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980); Antonio Gramsci, *The Modern Prince and Other Writings* (New York: International Publishers, 2000); and Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*, 2nd ed (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2005).

⁶¹ Leonard and Alakeson, 41-44.

⁶² Nye, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” 256.

⁶³ Ibid, 266-70.

Contrasting these potential benefits is the current usage of public diplomacy by the Bush administration. Threatening rhetoric and the arrogance of unilateralism has undercut the images of reason, democracy, and open dialogue that the U.S. once used to its advantage. The sharp drop in American attractiveness occurred because U.S. public diplomacy is not being used to develop mutual relations, but is primarily focused on information dissemination and propaganda.⁶⁴ Evidence of this misuse is the \$15 million “Shared Values Initiative” branding campaign spearheaded by Charlotte Beers, former Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and Madison Avenue advertising executive.

The branding technique, based on a marketing concept used to create a particular, recognizable image, advertised life in the United States. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell introduced the use of branding as:

bringing in people into the public diplomacy function of the (State) department who are going to change from just selling us in the old USIA way to really branding foreign policy, branding the department, marketing the department, marketing American values to the world, not just putting out pamphlets.⁶⁵

The outcome of this technique was the “The Shared Values Initiative” which attempted to portray life in America to audiences in the Middle East. Ironically, opposed to Powell’s statement, the message was relayed by the use of pamphlets, brochures, a four-minute video of the events of 9/11, and a State Department website targeting non-Americans.⁶⁶ Particular emphasis was placed on depicting “Muslim Life in America” by showing American mosques and smiling families. The campaign also

⁶⁴ Nancy Snow, “How to Build an Effective Public Diplomacy: 369-374.

⁶⁵ Secretary of State Colin Powell to House Budget Committee, March 2001 as cited from Snow, *Information War*, 84.

⁶⁶ Snow, *Information War*, 85

included the use of Bush administration members appearing on Al-Jazeera, Radio Free Afghanistan, and the Voice of America.⁶⁷

However, the branding technique did not reach its goal of portraying life. Instead it was heavily criticized for perpetuating the idea that U.S. foreign policy is merely propaganda for American corporations and wealthy Westerners and for portraying American life as monolithic.⁶⁸ Furthermore, in its attempts to brand a country and its ideologies, the campaign merely advertised American life and values in a way that attempted to simplify the entire experience.⁶⁹ As a one-way transmission of information, there were no real attempts to explain U.S. foreign policy regarding the Middle East, nor were there any attempts to show the reality of life in America behind the advertised images. The controversy forced the government to pull the ads and led to the resignation of Beers.⁷⁰

2.2 Soft power and public diplomacy: a lack of participation

Attraction via coercion

One possible explanation for the loss of American attractiveness is because the U.S. public diplomacy message is being received as a coercive form of communication.⁷¹ Attraction is not occurring through consensual interactions, but is attempting to be achieved through the dominance of realities. As seen by the previous example, the coercive tactics of the Bush administration in promoting the “Shared Values Initiative” campaigns focus purely on information dissemination and neglect

⁶⁷ Ibid, 85.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 87.

⁶⁹ Snow, *Information War*, 194.

⁷⁰ Lawrence Pintak, “Effective Advertising or Dangerous Delusions?” August 27, 2004, www.publicdiplomacy.org/32.htm (accessed May 25, 2005).

⁷¹ Various reasons may contribute, however the decline of American attractiveness must be considered in terms government controlled public diplomacy.

the education and cultural functions of public diplomacy. Janet Bially Mattern terms this harder, more coercive aspect of attraction as representational force, “a form of power that operates through the structure of a speaker’s narrative representation of ‘reality’”, and discusses that this force is found in the communication between the two parties, during a process called verbal fighting.⁷²

Verbal fighting takes place when each of the parties attempts to construct their reality and influences the reality of the other party.⁷³ Mattern explains that this exchange of verbal fighting leads to attraction by convincing each party that one particular reality contains more truth. This view of attraction, as occurring through representational force and verbal fighting, contrasts with Nye’s theory that public diplomacy created attractiveness by portraying universal values such as democracy and peace or through a persuasive argument.⁷⁴ Instead, legitimacy is created because one party has been convinced of another’s creation of reality.⁷⁵

After 9/11, the view of the international landscape broadcasted by the Bush administration was taken as truth by much of the world. A narrative was created that separated the world into good and evil realities, and situated the American population within a war-psychology⁷⁶. The war-psychology reality based itself on the notion that the U.S. could be attacked on any day, at any time, and must be prepared. The public diplomacy messages attached to this psychology painted 9/11 as the new Pearl Harbor, linking the two with a common conception of invasion. This further set the scene that

⁷² Janice Bially Mattern, “Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33, no.3 (2005): 586.

⁷³ Ibid, 596

⁷⁴ Ibid, 591.

⁷⁵ Ibid, 595.

⁷⁶ Walter Russell Mead, “U.S. Foreign Policy and the Middle East,” *The Next Century Foundation Working Group Meeting* (London: The Next Century Foundation, 20 May 2005).

the U.S. military operations within Afghanistan and Iraq were operations to specifically defend democracy, liberty, and freedom.⁷⁷ This rhetoric created a particular image of the world and forced international parties to choose sides based on this U.S. construction of reality.

U.S. allies and critics alike were given little room to maneuver in their praises and critiques of the campaign. The dialectic was created that if one didn't support the war, then neither did they support the ideas of democracy, liberty, and freedom.

The 'nonchoice' was either to accept the U.S. articulated 'reality' of its own attractiveness and preserve the 'reality' of their own moral righteousness; or deny it and contradict the logic and integrity of the narratives that inscribed their 'goodness'. By forging a link between the phrase 'war on terrorism' and that of 'with us or with the terrorists' the U.S. used the structure of their narrative to coerce.⁷⁸

The good versus evil narrative created by the U.S. did not simply seek to attract international support through consensual methods. Alternatively, it used a more coercive form of constructing reality to urge allies to its cause.

Practitioners of public diplomacy may cling to the notion that they seek to create attraction through consensual methods to increase their soft power, but the current U.S. governmental messages include fluctuating levels of coercion. Government sponsored public diplomacy programs are not innocently attempting to cultivate attraction by communicating who 'we' are, offering information about 'our' values and cultures, and by listening to 'who they are'⁷⁹. If today's public diplomacy focuses completely on the role of information dissemination in a coercive form, then Nye's conception of soft power is not a completely accurate concept in describing how

⁷⁷ Snow, *Information War*, 64.

⁷⁸ Mattern, 606.

⁷⁹ Nye, *Soft Power*, 111.

attraction is created. For soft power to once again explain public diplomacy's role in creating attraction, the government must not be the only voice involved. Attraction created by consensual methods will only occur when the true American experience can be portrayed and when new voices can be heard.

Amassing and deploying soft power

A public diplomacy process that emanates from top-down directives and that is caught within traditional diplomacy misses the essence its public nature. Instead, it becomes a tool for national security rather than a mode of communication. The "Shared Values Initiative" and the "War on Terror" were both conceived of as strategic messages deployed at a calculated time to garner support for U.S. operations in the Middle East. While both campaigns may have caused initial sensation with certain audiences, they did little to increase American popularity or stability. Both examples show how strategy does not always ensure a success. Indeed, public diplomacy is not a magic bullet for communication.⁸⁰ The government's deployment strategy backfired because the use of soft power to deliver messages is not as precise as a laser guided missile.⁸¹ There is nothing to ensure a direct hit, no easy way to abort the mission, and no way to guard against retaliation.

Even when a government is using soft power sub-optimally, the flow does not cease. Rather all images, messages, and realities from all parts of society continue to be created. What hinders current U.S. public diplomacy is that these voices are not being heard internationally. Since its inception, official public diplomacy for all of its

⁸⁰ Kim Andrew Elliot, "Voices of America: Public diplomacy is not the magic bullet," *Radio Netherlands*, August 24, 2004, <http://www2.rnw.nl/rnw/en/features/media/features/us040824.html> (accessed September 11, 2005).

⁸¹ Nye's use of phrases such as "stockpiling soft power", "selling a soft power message", and "wielding soft power" perpetuate the notion that both public diplomacy and soft power are tangible items that can be strategically amassed and deployed. See also Mattern, 611 for her critique of Nye's usage of soft power as similar to a military weapon. Nye, *Soft Power*, chapter four and various phrases.

functions and messages has rested within the power of the state. It cannot actually communicate the entirety of the American experience simply because the government cannot occupy every area of the American experience. For public diplomacy to truly be conceived of as using a softer power it must be an effort that grows from the entire American experience; it must be an organic attempt at creating reality.

Nye does not discuss the broad participation necessary for soft power. His primary conception of soft power relates to its contrast to military and economic power. He discusses the government's role in connection to these forms of power, but does not thoroughly examine how power flows throughout all of the sectors of society. Simply trying to amass and deploy power does not take into account that power is always flowing. Michel Foucault better describes the way in which power can be seen as “capillary” or in terms of networks. In this way, power is seen as something that circulates and is never confined within anyone’s hands⁸². It is a set of relations and strategies circulated throughout society and passed on at every moment of interaction⁸³. The U.S. government, or any government, even while seeming supreme cannot inhabit the whole field of power relations that are dispersed throughout society⁸⁴.

Unaccountable solutions

Correcting the problems of public diplomacy and the loss of American attractiveness is a daunting challenge. Nye correctly points out that public diplomacy

⁸² Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, 98.

⁸³ Sara Mills, *Michel Foucault*. (London: Routledge, 2003), 30.

⁸⁴ Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, 122. For a more complete discussion on the role of power and Foucault’s notion of governmentality see also Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds, *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), chapter four; Jack Z. Bratich, Jeremy Packer, Cameron Mc. Carthy, eds, *Foucault, Cultural Studies, and Governmentality*. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), chapter one.

needs to be considered in terms of the power that it uses, and can be praised for envisioning soft power as uniquely distinct from hard power. However, he focuses primarily on the government as using different levels of military, economic, and social power to garner full legitimacy and attractiveness.⁸⁵ In terms of public diplomacy, he consistently refers to the role of the government to use more, to use better, and to increase their support of soft power programs.⁸⁶ From this view, soft power becomes another power to be used by the government versus a power that is used at the citizen level.

Whereas Nye calls for greater government spending for public diplomacy, he does not call for greater participation in the creation of public diplomacy.⁸⁷ He notes that non-governmental organizations, popular culture, and Hollywood images are also involved in creating soft power, but does not discuss how certain interests influence their funding or how their agendas shape the messages they create.⁸⁸ Non-state actors, in the form of organizations or corporations, may have varying interests or messages from the government, but their messages may be just as biased. The issue of increased funding does not solve this dilemma. Where government spending is advocated as one solution, it is important to note that while the UK spends less on international broadcasting than the United States, its BBC World Service, with autonomy from the government, has more listeners than the US-funded Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Asia combined.⁸⁹ Solutions aimed at resolving

⁸⁵ Nye, "Soft Power and American Foreign Policy," 262-3.

⁸⁶ Ibid, 267.

⁸⁷ Nye, *Soft Power*, 124.

⁸⁸ Nye, *Soft Power*, 15-17.

⁸⁹ Kim Andrew Elliot, "Voices of America: Public diplomacy is not the magic bullet."

the tensions of public diplomacy through the use of non-state actors or by increasing funding need to be abandoned in favor of increasing participation at the public levels.

Current government public diplomacy through coercive methods of attraction and strategic deployment cannot be conceived of as using soft power. As this chapter has shown, Nye has not gone far enough to envision public diplomacy in a broad participatory context, where soft power is created at individual levels. In addition, soft power will not rectify the current problems of U.S. public diplomacy by promoting the use of non-state actors or increased funding. The following chapter promotes the idea that to be effective public diplomacy must reside less in the hands of the state and more in the realm of the public. This involves examining the hegemonic structures of society, the interests of the dominant group, the role of the state, and the consent given by the general population. This critical shift of theory facilitates a discussion for how public diplomacy can better serve and be served by the public.

3. Deconstructing Consent: Moving toward public participation

It is not enough to see public diplomacy only as a function of a government and its leadership. U.S. public diplomacy fails because the creators and orators of the messages are not actually representing the realities of the entire population. The realities of foreign affairs are found less in the formal dimensions of embassies and governments and increasingly in “the dimensions which involve the knowledges, prejudices, attitudes, and opinions of the participating masses of people.”⁹⁰ As the previous chapter has addressed, public diplomacy cannot be thoroughly understood by soft power because it does not thoroughly address a broad participatory role. For this reason, it is important to understand the role of public diplomacy in the way in that hegemony is created, sustained, and perpetuated throughout society and to ask how broadening the role for participation will change the way public diplomacy programs are envisioned.⁹¹

The first section of this chapter illuminates how facets of hegemony work in the creation of societal myths, with a particular look at the current American experience. The second section discusses the role that critical consciousness will play in creating space for the participation of the subaltern groups to create their own myths and realities. The final section begins to re-conceptualize public diplomacy

⁹⁰ Fisher, *Public Diplomacy and Behavioral Science*, 5.

⁹¹ Both Gramscian and Foucauldian theories of power, consent, and coercion are relevant to this essay’s discussion, because they conceive of power as operating in complex ways, at micro levels, and within everyone’s lives. In this essay, Gramscian theory was preferred over Foucauldian for the fact that it placed more emphasis on how social action can alter the systematic inequality and lead to more equal power relations. Whereas, both articulate the competition for control and influence among the dominant groups and the consent of the less powerful, a Foucauldian notion of capillary power for the topic of public diplomacy does not aptly describe the striking power differentials between the role of the U.S. government and the American population. Therefore, a Gramscian perspective is used to describe the complexity of power and its production of consent. However, in other sections of this essay, Foucauldian notions of networks of power, as power circulating throughout society, are useful to envision the role of the public in creating discourse and knowledges. See Ives, 140-4.

through this framework, creating the context for an in-depth discussion in the following chapter on the new roles for the state and civil society.

3.1 Creation of the American experience

The facets of hegemony

The creation of the American experience, of identities and realities, within the domestic population are of prime consideration in the examination of how this experience is portrayed internationally. Looking at the construction of reality in terms of a Gramscian notion of hegemony, two facets are encountered.⁹² The first facet of hegemony is seen in the way in which it works on a consensual, ideological basis to achieve its goals and downplays the effectiveness of political coercion as a way of furthering its aims. This approach stresses the central role of ideas in the achievement of hegemony, “occurring when the worldview, social principles and practices, and intellectual and moral leadership of the ruling group are deeply internalized by subordinates that the order in which hegemony is exercised appears natural or inevitable”.⁹³ The ruling group persuades subordinate classes to accept certain moral, political, and cultural values, assuming that a majority of the population will give consent. The ruling group enjoys this type of dominance usually because of its historical or economic position, and through societal institutions, such as schools, media, churches, trade unions, and political parties, the majority of the population gives consent to the ideas that the ruling group perpetuates.⁹⁴

⁹² Richard Bellamy and Darrow Schecter, *Gramsci and the Italian State*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 112.

⁹³ Stephen Gill, “Hegemony,” in *The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World, 2e*, ed. Joel Krieger (Oxford: Oxford University Press Inc, 2001), *Oxford Reference Online*, <http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t121.e0315> (accessed August 9, 2005).

⁹⁴ Dominic Strinati, *An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture* (London: Routledge, 1995), 168-169.

The second facet is seen in the task of the state to form moral awareness and political spirit among the subordinate classes.⁹⁵ Stress is placed on the fact that consent may not always be given peacefully, but it may combine with physical force or coercion induced intellectually, morally, or culturally. The role of the state, through the forces of law, order, judiciary, police, and military, provides the legal assurance that consent will be given and the discipline for those groups who do not actively nor passively consent.⁹⁶ The state's role seeks not only to justify and maintain the ruling group's dominance, but also to obtain the active consent of the governed.

The struggle for hegemony takes place within the civil society, within the American population. As the hegemony of the dominant group's values, ideologies, and social relations may begin to be undermined; they increasingly resort to the resources of the state to maintain their power⁹⁷. In this way, the state becomes the equilibrium between the political and civil society. This continual struggle forms general knowledges that are fashioned from the ruling group's realities and ideologies, practiced by the population, and spread by the legal assurances of the state.⁹⁸

The role of myth as reality

The creation of the American experience involves this process of passive and active consent in its creation of myths. Defined by the *American Heritage Dictionary*, a myth is "a real or fictional story, recurring theme or character type that appeals to the consciousness of a people by embodying its cultural ideals or by giving expression to

⁹⁵ Bellamy and Schecter, 112.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 119.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 123.

⁹⁸ Monica Stillo, "Concept of Hegemony," *Gramsci*, <http://www.theory.org.uk/ctr-gram.htm#hege> (accessed August 25, 2005).

deep, commonly felt emotions.”⁹⁹ Emile Durkheim further explains that a myth serves to provide a collective identity and an emotional bond among people. They are collective representations of the way society understands the world around them and the events that affect it. These myths, in turn, create an understanding of reality. It is through these myths and realities that society is suffused with value¹⁰⁰.

We see the use of myths in the creation of the past and present American experience. Stephen Twing identifies three historically American myths that have created a collective representation of identity. First, the early American Puritans saw themselves as the prime example of a godly community and sought to Puritanize the world in their image. As this myth grew among Americans, it encompassed the democratic ideal. This “city on the hill” myth became popular in the 20th century to illustrate America as the main promoter of democracy and its responsibility to spread it throughout the world. Second, the depiction of the U.S. as an ongoing and successful democratic experiment paved the way for the creation of the “realpolitik” myth. This myth furthered that notion that the U.S. should promote its interests around world in the most effective way possible, regardless of moral or ethical concerns. Third, the glorification of the U.S. as the ideal arena for economic competition, gave rise to the “market” myth. This myth created the foundation for the use of neo-liberal economic policies for promoting globalization¹⁰¹.

Currently the creation of a new American myth is underway. Walter Russell Mead, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, describes it as the

⁹⁹ *American Heritage Dictionary 2nd college edition* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), 827.

¹⁰⁰ Stephen Twing, *Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Cultural Shaping of Three Cold Warriors* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 2-3.

¹⁰¹ Twing, 7-9.

“American revival” myth, and it is seen in the way the American evangelical (“born again”) religions and religious establishments are seeking to shape American foreign policy to reflect their own values.¹⁰² Marginalized for a number of years as being too extreme and too conservative, the “religious right”¹⁰³ group have increasingly made their way into mainstream ideologies and are now within the political process, finding ways to shape U.S. policy.¹⁰⁴ Domestically they have pursued their interests in regards to same-sex marriage and a pro-life stance on abortion, while their interests regarding religious fundamentalism in the Middle East have promoted the superiority of Christian ideals.¹⁰⁵ The role that conservative religious leadership will play both in civil society and within the state apparatus will be of crucial importance in the near future. The ideologies and the myths that they create will represent the values “for which many Americans will be willing to fight”.¹⁰⁶ The question to be answered is how will these myths be disseminated using U.S. public diplomacy programs and what effect will their reception have on American attractiveness?

The construction of myths and realities alternate over time, but their creation continues to provide collective identities and emotional bonds among Americans.

¹⁰² Mead defines American Revivalists as “those who support the shift towards millennial capitalism, are not only attempting to revive the individualism and other values of pre-New Deal America, they believe that the new freedoms and policies they support will lead to a revival of American power (and American values around the world.” Mead discusses the religious groups in terms of a revival of American Wilsonian traditions based Christian rather than liberal secular values. Walter Russell Mead, *Power, Terror, Peace, and War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Publishers, 2004), 83-105.

¹⁰³ The religious right is defined as “a group of very conservative, politically active organizations within Fundamentalist Christianity which is attempting to implement conservative changes to society and its laws. The American Family Association, Christian Coalition, Concerned Women for America, Family Research Council, Focus on the Family form part of the religious right. Their main areas of activity are in reducing choice in abortion access, homosexual rights, same-sex marriage, physician assisted suicide, and prayer in the public school.” B.A. Robinson, “Religious Right,” *ReligiousTolerance.org*, June 13, 2005, http://www.religioustolerance.org/gl_r.htm (accessed September 5, 2005).

¹⁰⁴ Mead, 96.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 95.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 95.

Each myth tells a particular story about America and what it means to be an American¹⁰⁷. Through the creation of certain myths, the politically active and articulate fractions of the population influence the personality, content, and organization of the nation¹⁰⁸. The content of these myths do not just effect the development of a national character and domestic affairs. It is important to understand that it is not necessarily the state that creates these myths; rather it is the dominant group's interests that seek to perpetuate various myths. Through public diplomacy in the apparatus of the state, certain chosen myths are selected for dissemination abroad.¹⁰⁹ The chosen myths and messages, in turn, shape the landscape of international relations.

3.2 The rise of civil society

In U.S. public diplomacy it is the state that seems to be the main creator of messages, but it may very well be the interests of the dominant groups within civil society that are pursuing their own interests through these messages. Through the process of gathering consent of the masses, the dominant group resorts to the resources of the state to ensure that the images are promoted throughout the world. State-sponsored public diplomacy programs perpetuate a certain aspect of the American experience, but by no means incorporate the whole realm of realities. For the full spectrum of voices to be heard, reliance on the state needs to be abandoned in favor of a variety of voices stemming not just from the ruling group, but also throughout civil society.

¹⁰⁷ Twing,13.

¹⁰⁸ Fisher, *Public Diplomacy and the Behavioral Sciences*, 43.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, 37. For an earlier discussion on how the transfer of interests occurs, see also Walter Lippman, *Public Opinion* (New York: Free Press Paperbacks, 1922), chapter 13.

The silence of the subaltern

Dominant interests present in the creation and narration of American myths only represent a small percentage of the actual population. The question then becomes, how is the rest of society represented? How does the subaltern group become engaged in this process?¹¹⁰ In this context, the subaltern represents that portion of American society that has no articulation in the perpetuation of certain myths or in how they are represented internationally.¹¹¹ The subaltern social group accepts the hegemony of the ruling class, but may have very different interests of their own. Instead of assuming that intellectual activity or the creation of awareness is beyond the ability of average people, Gramsci advocates the importance for subalterns to develop a critical consciousness of their own. This consciousness will originate from within the group instead of being imposed from outside.¹¹²

In current U.S. public diplomacy, the state disseminates the ideologies of the ruling classes. The American population is left without the structures necessary to develop and disseminate their own coherent worldviews. The lack of structure leads to a lack of populations. Ultimately, lack of participation locks the group into consenting to the ideological domination and prevents them from effectively resisting

¹¹⁰ The term “subaltern” is drawn from Gramsci “On the Margins of History: history of the subaltern social” group”(1934). It is a collective description for those dominated and exploited groups lacking class-consciousness. As a discipline, subaltern studies seek to reclaim history and offer a theory of consciousness and change. The agency of change is located with the insurgent or subaltern group. However, while subaltern studies is centered around post-colonial history and rejecting Western domination, the application of the American population is useful in this example as the goal of public diplomacy becomes “to unearth, investigate, and describe the contribution made by the people on their own, independently of the elite and to establish a subaltern or peasant consciousness.” Ziauddin Sardar and Borin Van Loon, *Introducing Cultural Studies* (Cambridge: Icon Books, 1999), 79-81.

¹¹¹ This essay uses both the references the subaltern, subordinate, and submissive groups as being the American population.

¹¹² Gramsci, 121; Peter Ives, *Language and Hegemony in Gramsci* (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 78-79.

the power of the ruling group and that State.¹¹³ The task is to emancipate the subaltern group, the American public, from this submissive position.

The revolution for participation

If the subaltern group can revolt against the ideological dominance opposed upon it, it does not mean that they will simply overthrow the current hegemonic structure and establish their own dominant control. The goal is to combine their interests with those of various groups. Gramsci describes this as a ‘war of position’.¹¹⁴ The subaltern group, through networks and alliances with various social minorities must strive to preserve the idea of autonomy within the civil society movement. As the subalterns develop their own hegemony, they must take into account all of the interests of the other groups and social forces. The goal is to develop a more reciprocal exchange throughout civil society, one that involves interaction among the various ways of understanding the world, institutions, and languages of the different groups.¹¹⁵

This struggle will not be a rapid and revolutionary action to simply topple the dominant group or the state.¹¹⁶ Instead, it will take place throughout civil society, at the heart of the ideological and cultural struggle.¹¹⁷ The struggle will be a diffused assault on the whole range of institutions well beyond the traditional center of power. It will not only include the local governments, mass parties, schools, the media, and

¹¹³ Ives, 78-79.

¹¹⁴ Bellamy and Schecter, 130.

¹¹⁵ Ives, 125.

¹¹⁶ Gramsci refers to this action as the “war of maneuver” (or “war of movement”), and contrasts it to the “war of position” in that it is a rapid and violent revolutionary action with the expressed purpose of toppling the leaders when they resort to coercive methods to remain in control. The “war of maneuver” is necessary at some point within the struggle to remove the leaders, but without first conducting a “war of position”, it will result in the defeat of civil society. Bellamy and Schecter, 130-135; Ives, 125.

¹¹⁷ Bellamy and Schecter, 166.

trade unions, as these institutions socialized the population into supporting the prevailing system, but also the international organizations, multinational corporations, and foreign governments which are responsible for socialization.¹¹⁸ “The revolutionary forces have to take the civil society before they take the state and therefore have to build a coalition of opposition groups united under a hegemonic banner that usurps the dominant or prevailing hegemony.”¹¹⁹ For public diplomacy, this means that while the state may continue creating images and message and while the previously dominant groups will continue to have their interests, the whole of civil society will begin their active participation in articulating the American experience to foreign audiences.

3.3 A Re-conceptualization of public diplomacy

What this new paradigm does for public diplomacy is to give voice to the residents of the inner cities or rural villages, the middle class adolescents of the Midwest, or the recently arrived immigrants to Los Angeles to describe their own realities and ideologies to the world. Misconceptions regarding the American experience are a result of the insufficient knowledge base of public diplomacy’s creators and orators. The result is seen by the existence of too many decision-makers, who have limited knowledge about the complexities of the American experience, crafting realities based on their own interests and sending out interest-infused messages.¹²⁰ Opening up public diplomacy roles for domestic population participation would avoid these misconceptions by allowing Americans to become their own

¹¹⁸ Ibid, 129.

¹¹⁹ Strinati, 169.

¹²⁰ Glen Fisher, *American Communication in a Global Society* (Norwood: Ablex Publishing, 1987), 129.

senders and receivers, in charge of creating accurate images versus favorable imagined realities, and enlarging the diversity of voices to reflect the diversity of Americans.¹²¹

This new paradigm is not simply a band-aid for past and present public diplomacy tensions, but it provides a way to understand how public diplomacy can truly embrace the word 'public'. This paradigm departs from the traditional views of diplomacy based on governments, embassies, and ambassadors, and it shows that soft power has not gone far enough to imagine a broad participatory role for the creation of public diplomacy. By looking at a number of political and behavioral science issues, public diplomacy moves from being a purely practitioners topic into the realm of being understood based on critical theory. This paradigm shift opens up the discipline for further exploration of how participation can create more comprehensive public diplomacy. The following chapter will look at what this paradigm will mean for the participation of the state and civil society in mending the American image.

¹²¹ Ibid, 117.

4. Creating Engagement: Empowering public diplomacy

Emancipating the voices from civil society broadens the realm of how public diplomacy can be conceived. The dominant groups no longer hold the sole power in creating reality, and the state is no longer the sole administrator of message creation. The state does not disappear from this new system, but its roles are changed. Emerging from the struggle a more reflexive relationship is formed between the parties, one that emphasizes the unique possibility for each as both creator and receiver of knowledge. This chapter discusses how this new dynamic, seen through the application of critical pedagogy, helps to explain how to empower the transformation of public diplomacy.

Rather than focusing on specific policy recommendations to improve U.S. public diplomacy, this chapter envisions new roles for the state and civil society. Divided into three sections, this chapter first discusses the key elements of critical pedagogy and how they relate to U.S. public diplomacy. Second, the role of the state is re-imagined in a way that moves it from administrator to coordinator. Third, this chapter considers the new roles for civil society with emphasis on the active engagement of the population both domestically and internationally. This active engagement liberates public diplomacy from its old tensions and empowers it as the new diplomacy.

4.1 Incorporating critical pedagogy

In freeing the voices from civil society, public diplomacy becomes a space for active learning. No longer is there simply just state/public dynamic reflecting a traditional teacher/student relationship. Critical pedagogy allows us to understand how both groups can become reflexive, mutual and coequal in their roles of teacher

and learner.¹²² Instead of relying on the banking concept of education, in which the teacher is the active participant and the sole agent of information while the students are merely empty vessels waiting to be filled, critical pedagogy advocates the use of a dialogical method. It is a method where knowledge is created through dialogue and grounded in the experiences of both the teacher and the student.¹²³ The significance for the public, who once occupied the role of the student, is their emancipation from the knowledge-creating role of the state and their active engagement in creating the American experience.

Liberation from the oppressive social, political, and economic conditions is the first step in developing critical consciousness.¹²⁴ The development of critical consciousness abandons the notion that the world is a static conception, created by knowledge produced and passed on, and abandoned favors a view of that world that enables learners to reflect on their own experiences. This reflection, in turn, creates the momentum for social change.¹²⁵ Viewing public diplomacy in this way moves the heavy hand of the state from directing public diplomacy allowing the rest of the population to begin their own liberation and creation of consciousness. It destroys the notion that public diplomacy is something that can be controlled by the state or by dominant interests within society and allows a more reflexive approach to the creation

¹²²Abby Wolk, "Social Action and Critical Pedagogy," *All Kids Grieve*, 2000, <http://www.allkidsgrieve.org/Classroom/class4.html> (accessed September 2, 2005). Critical pedagogy as it applies to knowledge creation aptly fits with this essay's treatment of public diplomacy. For more on the development of critical pedagogy as an understanding of post colonial theories of learning see also Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: Seabury, 1974); Henry Giroux, "Paulo Freire and the Politics of Post colonialism," *JAC* 12, no.1 (1992): 15-26.

¹²³"What is Critical Pedagogy?" *Critical Pedagogy on the Web*, <http://www.mingo.info-science.uiowa.edu/~stevens/critped/definitions.htm> (accessed September 2, 2005); Henry Giroux, "What is Critical Pedagogy?" *Rage and Hope*, November 22, 1999, <http://www.perfectfit.org/CT/giroux2.html> (accessed September 2, 2005).

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Abby Wolk.

of realities, where the state, domestic society, and international world can all participate. For the American image crisis, it creates a way for public diplomacy to combat anti-Americanism by empowering the population to actively participate.

4.2 Re-defining the role of the state

The historical role for U.S. public diplomacy has historically resided within the apparatus of the government. From the State Department to the USIA and back again, the U.S. government has attempted to balance the roles of information dissemination and cultural and educational relationship building. Debating the importance of these roles and whether emphasis should be placed on short or long term goals leaves public diplomacy's true potential unrealized. Rather than thinking of public diplomacy as trapped within a hierarchical, reactive, bureaucratic structure driven purely by national security and foreign policy objectives, it should be seen based on the flexible, proactive, and agile dimensions of knowledge creation. With this shift of thinking, the state's role is no longer that of message creator, propaganda disseminator, or advertising executive, but alternatively, one of coordinator and facilitator.¹²⁶ This change of responsibility is possible in four ways.

Firstly, distinct organizational structure and identity for public diplomacy must be established. It is not enough to attempt to fix current budgetary and functional problems by creating new White House or State Department agencies to address old problems. Policy reports advocating better training of diplomats and ambassadors, issuing Presidential directives supporting public diplomacy, or increasing budgetary

¹²⁶ Riordan, 127. A further look at Jean Francois Lyotard's post-modern distinction between grand narratives versus micro narratives is useful at this point. It is possible to re-imagine the role of the state from constructing a grand narrative, containing seemingly universal truths regarding the American experience, to a role that facilitates the expression of a number of different experiences and stories all explaining certain realities, created through micro narratives. Jean Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A report on knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984).

funding are only working within the existing framework.¹²⁷ Even the recommendation to create the U.S. Agency for Public Diplomacy, which would be linked to the State Department, but with an autonomous structure and budget, needs to be questioned in terms of its distinct functions and how it will be differentiated from previous public diplomacy attempts.¹²⁸ Likewise, it is also not enough for the state to simply outsource official functions of public diplomacy in a competitive bidding process to business, academic, research, and non-governmental organizations.¹²⁹ As opposed to these suggestions, public diplomacy must be allowed to prosper outside of the direct control of the state.

If a new organization is to thrive, it must be independent of the government apparatus and must focus on ensuring that the most important practitioners of U.S. public diplomacy are the American people. This new organization would focus on tapping into the spheres of everyday life of the American people, and opening up their opportunities for expressing themselves to the international world. Using new technologies including web logs and Internet broadcasting, a whole new realm of communication can be established. The function of these communications would be to facilitate public diplomacy through debate and dialogue versus with the typical monologue transference of a message.

¹²⁷ Various policy review reports highlight these recommendations, for specific reference see the Council on Foreign Relations, the Heritage Foundation, the Council on Public Diplomacy, and the Government Accountability Office. For further inquiry, see references noted in footnote 10.

¹²⁸ The current recommendations for this organization continues to follow the suggestions of past public diplomacy solutions including increasing the number of staff and program budgets, providing better international broadcasting, establishing Presidential directives to coordinate functions, and creating public-private partnerships for funding the organization. Public Diplomacy Council, *A Call for Action on Public Diplomacy*, 3; Leonard H. Marks, Charles Z Wick, Bruce Gelb, and Henry E Catto, A19.

¹²⁹ This is in contrast to policy recommendations made by Charles Wolf, Jr. and Brian Rosen, *Public Diplomacy: How to Think About it and How to Improve it* that advocate outsourcing public diplomacy functions as a way to decrease the role of the state.

Secondly, connecting with a variety of private and non-governmental organizations to collaborate could emphasize a strong role in relationship building and two-way communication. It is not simply about sending more government-sponsored Fulbright Scholars abroad, but increasing number and types of exchanges opportunities. Based on the idea of education and cultural exchange, new methods, virtual and actual, can be created between different organizations of society. Bringing together students with clergy, government officials with teachers, or journalists with cultural performers would increase the diversity of interaction and add a new distinctness to the meaning of foreign exchange. The crucial part of the new structure for public diplomacy is ensuring that the support and engagement of the American public is steady and that their participation in informing the international arena is ensured.¹³⁰ If the perception returns that public diplomacy is something that can be politicized and subordinated to short-term imperatives then its legitimacy will be, once again, undermined.

Thirdly, even as U.S. public diplomacy is opened up to civil society, the State Department will continue to send American images abroad as they construct foreign policies. Traditional diplomacy, between government and embassies, will continue to negotiate their interests and policies around the world. In addition, governments will continue to communicate messages to communicate their foreign policies and to promote their short-term national security interests around the world. It will be important to make distinct the difference between what can be considered public diplomacy versus what will be construed as the voice of the government.

¹³⁰ Public Diplomacy Council, *Public Diplomacy in a Restructured Foreign Affairs Community* (Washington D.C.: George Washington University, December 1999).

Furthermore, the interests of non-state actors, including non-governmental organization, popular culture, and Hollywood images, must not be seen as benign message creators. Where some have messages conflicting with the government, other may simply be perpetuating the same messages under different guises. Moreover, a lack of accountability plagues these non-state actors and there is no system of checks and balances to ensure that broad population participation is occurring in the creation of their messages. For these reasons, it is not about eliminating the state or non-state actors, but about finely distinguishing between their voices and interests from those found among general population.

Finally, the aim of public diplomacy should focus on promoting debates and exchanges on the range of cultural and political values, with civil society becoming a central component. Instead of public diplomacy programs focusing on high impact and low reach methods, only targeting the upper echelons of society, broader participation is required to reach wider ranges of audiences.¹³¹ As the public diplomacy agenda seeks to engage all aspects of Western civil society, domestically and internationally, it will be necessary to include voices from government to educators, from churches to schools, from NGOs to business, and from informal groups to individual citizens.¹³² The state must retool its structures not simply absorb the messages and interests of the dominant groups in society. On the contrary, it must work as a link between interests and debates in order to encourage a more intellectual and political climate, a climate more conducive for their policies to thrive.

¹³¹ Leonard and Alakeson, 70.

¹³² Riordan, 126.

4.3 Emancipating civil society

The goal is not simply to change what people believe to be true; instead the emphasis must be on changing the whole construction of truth within society. There is no need to emancipate a hidden truth, but rather to “detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic, and cultural, within which it operates at the present time.”¹³³ The public diplomacy agenda should harness the idea of working through a broad range of agencies and individuals, not to create new values or truths, but instead to represent every possible value embedded within our society. This can be achieved by the creation of “network diplomacy”.¹³⁴ This type of diplomacy will emphasize the learning about, engaging in, and accommodating of alternative views, contradictory opinions, and evidences.¹³⁵ The involvement of civil society will create an American population that is actively, rather than passively, involved in their country’s foreign policy and foreign image. As America’s foreign and domestic politics are inextricably intertwined, healthy participation at home will help to bring back the lost legitimacy abroad.¹³⁶ The result for public diplomacy holds importance for both the domestic and international levels.

Firstly, moving to an active level of domestic participation is not simply about every American becoming a citizen diplomat. Whereas, citizen diplomacy relates to each individual having the right and responsibility to help shape U.S. foreign relations, active participation does not necessarily insist on pushing the U.S agenda.¹³⁷ Michael McClellan describes the shift of activity of the population from a basis of awareness to

¹³³ Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, 133.

¹³⁴ Riordan, 124

¹³⁵ Ibid, 124. See also Leonard and Alakeson, 69.

¹³⁶ Snow, “How to Build and Effective Public Diplomacy: Ten Steps for Change”: 369-374.

¹³⁷ Heritage Foundation: 14.

one of action.¹³⁸ In his pyramid, the population moves from a basis of simply being aware about the international world, based on what the media or the government has told them, to a place interest and knowledge of the world. This level then allows for participation by allowing the population to actively seek knowledge regarding other countries, peoples, and lifestyles. The progression leads to levels of advocacy and action where the public is completely engaged in a dialogical and reflexive form of learning. It is a place where the population, based on their creation of knowledges and experiences, combine with domestic and international voices to create international exchange.¹³⁹

While McClellan envisions this transformation, he limits public participation at the top levels by noting that actual policy creation and diplomatic negotiation will continue to be done at a traditional government-to-government level.¹⁴⁰ The scope of this essay does not address the future possibility of full public participation at traditional diplomatic levels, but sees increased participation in public diplomacy as a possible first step. While this limitation hinders the full application of McClellan's model, it is nonetheless a useful way to conceive of the steps of progression, from awareness to action, to engage the population within public diplomacy. The domestic effect this progression will engage the population within America to become conscious, active, and participative.

Secondly, while engaging American citizens is valuable it will not change the tide of anti-American sentiment on its own. To truly see the results from public diplomacy, it will be crucial to work among interests internationally. Further research

¹³⁸ McClellan, 1-8.

¹³⁹ Ibid, 3-4.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, 3.

must envision actual strategies for allowing for reflexive learning to occur at the international level, but Hady Amr's concept of "jointedness" holds two relevant aspects for engaging both the domestic and international populations in public diplomacy.¹⁴¹ Firstly, Amr describes that a joint identification of mutual interests must occur both domestically and internationally. His example stems from the identification of common values and ideologies between the U.S. and Middle Eastern societies. One of his positive points is that core values regarding family, quality of work, job security, leisure time, and marriage, are not as different as one may initially expect.¹⁴² He suggests that in identifying commonalities it will be possible to create greater mutual understanding.

Additionally, Amr foresees a broadened dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their international equivalent, and sees the results of these reflexive dialogues leading back into the realm of policymaking and government negotiations.¹⁴³ This collaboration has effects for the whole discipline of public diplomacy. Not only must U.S. public diplomacy be reconstructed to engage in mutual understanding, but also other countries must reconsider their own administration of public diplomacy to allow for this jointed perspective to flourish.

Secondly, Amr describes the necessity of joint planning and implementation of particular campaigns and policies based on the identification of these mutual interests.¹⁴⁴ In his opinion, countries should work together to create similar structures and modes of exchange, and Amr foresees the government as taking the predominant

¹⁴¹ Amr, 19. Hady Amr is the Managing Director of the Amr Group, a consulting firm specializing in Economic and Political Development and U.S.-Arab Relations.

¹⁴² Ibid, 14-17.

¹⁴³ Ibid, 47.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, 19-23.

role to implement this notion of jointedness. He discusses this in relation to the planning and implementation of foreign exchange programs, in which governments offer similar programs, methods for selection, and funding opportunities for academic and professional exchanges.¹⁴⁵

While this model of jointedness is useful and this essay agrees that joint planning and implementation of programs is essential to creating a more reflexive public diplomacy, it disagrees that the government assume primary position. The facilitation of planning and implementation will include the government, but the state's main role should occur in facilitating open arenas for dialogues to commence. Where new modes of exchanges are imagined, further application and research of this concept may enlighten ways for it to occur at the citizen level. The communication of mutual interests and the plans for implementation must occur within the civil society.

Understanding the interests of the international audience will come as American groups within civil society begin to understand the questions that circulate around foreign relations. Envisioning public diplomacy as a dialogical process increases the opportunity for reflexivity. Not only is the reflexive dynamic seen between the state and the population or between individual American citizens, but it can also be seen between the American population and international world. As the questions become known, dialogues and relationships can be built to further mutual interests and engage in debates. The empowerment of public diplomacy comes by developing strategies and implementing campaigns that promote joint interests, both domestically and internationally. When Americans begin to understand the world, the world will begin to understand the American experience.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, 23.

Conclusion

Through a brief historical overview and by illuminating the four tensions, this essay contextualized the problems facing U.S. public diplomacy and set the impetus for its re-conception. As highlighted by the rise of anti-Americanism, public diplomacy programs that emanate from and are administered by the state do little to truly sway the hearts and minds of the international world. Soft power, while importantly noting the power of public diplomacy, focuses too intently on the role of attraction neglecting of the role of participation. By discussing the facets of hegemony that create and perpetuate certain interests and realities, this essay has given the role of participation in public diplomacy prime consideration.

Rather than keeping public diplomacy trapped within the realm of the state and dominant interests, it is necessary to liberate the voices from within civil society and actively engage the American population in describing their realities. Advocating the development of a critical consciousness and application of a dialogical learning approach, this essay elucidated on how a more reflexive view of public diplomacy can be developed for both domestic and international participation. Evolving the debate, this essay moved public diplomacy from simply regarding national security and foreign policy to engaging the population in the creation of knowledge and realities.

Further studies must be undertaken to look at specific measures for how this evolving paradigm of public diplomacy can be applied. Firstly, as related to the discussion of hegemony, practitioners of public diplomacy will surely question the specifics as to how the transfer of functions from State Department to American populations will occur. While the step-by-step course of action was not given

treatment in this essay, its application is crucial for the success of re-conceptualizing public diplomacy and requires thorough consideration.

Secondly, while this essay discussed the experience of the United States, recent academic papers and policy reports in the United Kingdom have also called for a review of their public diplomacy programs.¹⁴⁶ It was outside the confines of this essay to discuss the specifics of various countries' public diplomacy programs, but the call for reviews are a promising trend that may further encourage the evolution of public diplomacy.

Finally, the movement of public diplomacy away from Realist theoretical perspectives to conceptions based upon critical theory is not a seamless endeavor. This essay does not claim to be comprehensive in its discussion, but seeks only to be a departure point for the theoretical evolution and advanced application of public diplomacy. Supplementing this essay's general overview of the evolution, further in-depth applications of presented theory are required for a comprehensive understanding and critique of public diplomacy. The success of the public diplomacy evolution rests upon their applicability.

In the context of a technologically and communicatively globalizing world, the international population will increasingly grow less tolerant of a U.S. public diplomacy system that continues to be sheltered within the structures of traditional diplomacy. Where public diplomacy has been seen as a primarily practical field, this essay sought to add a critical perspective to the conversation and a fresh approach to the discipline. A movement from consent to engagement will undoubtedly re-create the role of U.S.

¹⁴⁶ Recent reports by the Foreign Policy Centre and the British Council have called for a revision of U.K. public diplomacy programs and administration. "Leading International Think Tanks call for Major Rethink of UK Public Diplomacy Policy," *British Council*, 10 March 2005; "Britain Must Fund 'Strategy for Hearts and Minds' in Middle East," *Foreign Policy Centre*, 26 February 2003.

public diplomacy in communicating the American experience. In this way, re-conceptualizing public diplomacy moves from a battle for the hearts and minds of foreign audiences to one that also engages the hearts and minds of the American people.

Appendix A

2005 16-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey¹⁴⁷

Favorable Opinion of the U.S.					
	'99/'00	2002	2003	2004	2005
	%	%	%	%	%
Canada	71	72	63	--	59
Britain	83	75	70	58	55
Netherlands	--	--	--	--	45
France	62	63	43	37	43
Germany	78	61	45	38	41
Spain	50	--	38	--	41
Poland	--	79	--	--	62
Russia	37	61	36	47	52
Indonesia	75	61	15	--	38
Turkey	52	30	15	30	23
Pakistan	23	10	13	21	23
Lebanon	--	35	27	--	42
Jordan	--	25	1	5	21
Morocco	77	--	27	27	N/A ¹
India	--	54	--	--	71
China	--	N/A	--	--	42

1999/2000 survey trends provided by the Office of Research, U.S. Department of State (Canadian 99/00 data by Environics).

Does U.S. Foreign Policy Consider Others' Interests?				
	2003	2004	2005	03-05 change
	%	%	%	
United States	73	70	67	-6
Canada	28	--	19	-9
Great Britain	41	36	37	-4
France	14	14	18	+4
Germany	37	29	38	+6
Spain	22	--	19	-3
Netherlands	--	--	20	N/A
Russia	22	20	21	-1
Poland	--	--	13	N/A
Turkey	9	14	14	+5
Pakistan	23	18	39	+16
Indonesia	25	--	59	+34
Lebanon	18	--	35	+17
Jordan	19	16	17	-2
India	--	--	63	N/A
China	--	--	53	N/A

Percent saying U.S. takes into account the interests of countries like yours a great deal or a fair amount. U.S. respondents asked if America takes into account the interest of other countries.

While some of the statistics show modest signs of a waning anti-Americanism, it is also clear that the U.S. remains generally disliked in most countries and the image of America is not as positive as it was once. Even foreign policies that may be received positively, for example the Presidential Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in Africa and the donation of U.S. aid to tsunami victims in Asia, have done little to boost America's image abroad. With such a deficiency in positive opinion, a few well-received policies cannot be expected to change the entire dynamic. This is further momentum for re-imagining how public diplomacy can help to curb anti-Americanism.

¹⁴⁷ "American Character Gets Mixed Reviews: U.S. Image Up Slightly, but Still Negative." *The Pew Global Attitudes Project*, June 23, 2005, <http://www.pewglobal.org/reports> (accessed August 10, 2005).

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