

Best Practices for Inspiring Pro-American Sentiment

Exploring Methods of American Masters for Winning Hearts and Minds Around the Globe

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**Submitted for consideration as an
INSS Occasional Paper**

October 2004

**USAF Institute for National Security Studies
USAF Academy, Colorado**

Disclaimer

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Dedication

This research project is dedicated to my brother, Gregory Wilton Boyd (1948-1995), Lance Corporal, First Force Reconnaissance, U.S. Marine Corps, Vietnam and all American warfighters. May support for their sacrifices always be derived from our very best practices.

- CT

About the Author

Colleen Turner, Ph.D. is a recently retired U.S. Air Force Reserve officer who works as a management consultant, writer, researcher, and speaker focusing on the achievement of breakthrough results. Her client range includes Vista Disney, The California Endowment, the U.S. Army Tank Command, UCLA's interfaith University Religious Conference, and inner city gang members.

Lieutenant Colonel Turner has had a long and varied military career including over a decade of active duty followed by service spanning two more decades including the USAF Reserve as an Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) and the Air National Guard. She most recently served as a Senior Programs Advisor for the Space and Missile Systems Center in Los Angeles. In the 1980s while serving in the Mediterranean during the TWA hostage crisis, she was responsible for a team that designed, developed, and evaluated a comprehensive range of terrorist defense scenarios.

Dr. Turner earned her Ph.D. from UCLA in Social Welfare and her research efforts have included the *California Task Force on Self-Esteem and Personal Responsibility*, a major diversity project honoring the bi-centennial of the *Bill of Rights*, the U.S. Air Force's pilot empowerment program, and a cross-cultural exploration of spiritual experiences. She served on the faculty of the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the U.S. Air Force Academy and was sponsored by the Institute of National Security Studies to research methods by which the United States can enhance its image around the globe. She was also selected to represent UCLA at the Metanexus Institute's international conference hosting an interfaith dialogue for representatives from 27 countries. Along with non-Western methods of non-violent conflict resolution, her presentation on "Religion: Catalyst for War or Peace?" featured the American philosopher and psychologist William James, the author of *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902) and focused on ideas from his essay "The Moral Equivalent of War."

In the sport of volleyball, Coach Turner guided the USAF Academy women's team to a winning record. In her playing days, she helped lead UCLA to its first national championship and her #44 jersey was retired. She also represented the USA as a member of the women's national team competing in multiple World Games. As a counselor and social worker she has worked as a psychotherapist and was named Executive Director for a pilot gang and drug prevention program called Values In Practice, Inc. Despite the severe interruptions created by the Los Angeles riots, her staff exponentially increased the rates of youth group involvement, the best research-supported alternative to gangs and drugs for young people.

Turner composed a small book entitled *Communication for Transforming "No Way" into "Way to Go!"* that blends proven winning methods from a variety of arenas. She has been invited to speak for organizations such as the *American Society of Training and Development*, the *Institute of Management Consultants*, and the *World Business Academy* on topics that include *Transformational Communication and Leadership* and *What To Do When "They" Don't Get It*. Her presentation entitled *Life is a Team Sport and Winners Don't Play Games* shares how to get and stay on top of life and work without putting others down.

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Executive Summary

October, 2004

Best Practices for Inspiring Pro-American Sentiment Exploring Methods of American Masters for Winning Hearts and Minds Around the Globe

Occasional Paper submitted for consideration to the Institute for National Security Studies, US Air Force Academy

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This exploratory research of best practices for inspiring pro-American sentiment suggests that valuable, cost-effective strategic and tactical thinking, communications, and behaviors can be derived from a variety of related successful models. The 9/11 Commission Report considered promotion of democratic values and the image of the United States around the world vital in dealing with terrorism. Yet since the U.S. invasion of Iraq, polls indicate anti-American sentiment has significantly increased in the Middle East and around the globe. Casualties, cost containment, and exit strategies are also causing increasing concern on the home front. To address these issues, the Pentagon's Middle East Planning Office posed the following question for DoD research: *How should the U.S. attempt to shape regional perceptions through strategic information and other efforts?* Subsequently, the Institute for National Security Studies with special interest and support from the Pentagon Offices of Net Assessment and Counter-Proliferation sponsored the project: *Best Practices for Inspiring Pro-American Sentiment – Exploring Methods of American Masters for Winning Hearts and Minds Around the Globe*. The report analyzed how related practices from a wide array of disciplines might help guide U.S. policies and enhance foreign relations.

“Best practices” is a concept popularized within manufacturing in the 1980s for inspiring breakthrough achievements in industry. The process involves looking at a set of operations outside of a particular discipline yet closely associated with a problem to find new clues for solutions. This form of thinking outside of the box requires looking inside a wide variety of other boxes. Useful insights often emerge for companies when they search beyond the purview of their own industries, e.g. hand grenade technology to develop car air bags or tampon applicators for designing air-to-air refueling mechanisms. For example, Motorola's General Systems division dramatically improved delivery times by adopting processes used by Domino's Pizza and Federal Express. Mobil Corporation enhanced its speed of operations, customer service and loyalty by applying processes used by the Ritz Carlton hotel chain.

This research explored how a sample of six extremely successful Americans from diverse fields think, communicate, plan, and behave when faced with challenges. These approaches were then considered for their potential transferability to enhancing pro-American sentiment, increasing foreign support for U.S. agendas, and reducing the threat of terrorism. The sample included: a champion international athlete, a priest renowned for success with reducing gang violence, a world class business negotiator, an esteemed member of a high IQ society, a top U.S. college sport coach, and an internationally acclaimed design architect. An organization was also included for review to evaluate practices proving successful in turning around its image recently tarnished by a well-publicized sexual assault scandal.

The research results illustrated how clues for developing innovative and effective new U.S. policies, strategies, and behaviors can emerge from very diverse fields like sports, marketing, mental health, management, entertainment, and communications. Prominent themes emerged for American image enhancement, e.g., reframing language for minimizing problems and increasing desired outcomes, seeing ourselves as others see us for planning effective responses, developing policies that work for all involved and matching behaviors with purported values to create widely shared successes and ensure credibility, focusing on objective data and feedback to facilitate problem-solving, and emphasizing the optimization of positive effects rather than managing negative results for reducing resistances.

The research also revealed that many potential solutions exist in our own DoD and USA “backyards.” For instance, preemptive non-violent approaches for positively influencing cultures already developed by DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, could be drawn upon. Benchmark

communications training developed for junior Army officers by the Institute for Creative Technologies could be used to enhance how our nation's leaders approach international relations. Creative writers from our entertainment industry could apply their keen problem-solving skills to real-life international dilemmas. And similar to what has already occurred for other minority groups, U.S. media moguls could proactively address resentments created by condemning Middle Eastern stereotypes.

The U.S. Air Force Academy incident and image turnaround related to the sexual assault scandal there provided valuable lessons for cultivating environments where personnel feel safe about elevating problematic information. The prominent changes implemented by the new leadership related to organizational structure, leadership style, and communication skills training. If adopted DoD-wide, it is likely incidents like the Abu Ghraib prison scandal and the subsequent damage it caused to the reputation of the U.S. would be minimized or altogether prevented. Similar systems dynamics also appear related to problems within the intelligence communities and NASA. The Academy is now modeling practices required for addressing problems well before blow ups occur.

Before finalizing the report's recommendations, interviews regarding their merits were conducted with representatives from the State Department, the Defense Department, and Majority and Minority Congressional liaisons from the Senate and House of Representatives in Foreign and International Relations, Armed Services, Intelligence, and various related sub-committees. Resounding support emerged for the recommendations which were subsequently only slightly altered. Furthermore, solutions derived in this manner succeeded in avoiding objections related to partisan biases and negative associations with more traditional approaches. Discussions with the various liaisons, however, also revealed a number of obstacles to the adoption of this approach.

The value of best practices is derived through a pragmatic problem-solving attitude, the frequent use of data and feedback in decision-making, and a willingness to be open to experimentation. While on the surface these requisites might not appear problematic, real world issues quickly illustrate impediments. For instance, an approach associated with an image of weakness or pandering to the enemy, as forms of non-confrontive communication are often perceived, would likely result in their rejection before their potential effectiveness could be adequately assessed. Also, belief systems that discount the possibility of achieving results in new and innovative ways can prevent thinking that goes beyond conventional methods and the discovery of those solutions. A lack of familiarity and practice with skill sets from varied disciplines also hinders the application of those skills to international arenas.

For instance, experienced mental health professionals faced with volatile and potentially violent psychotics (as defined by Western cultural standards) know not to: argue with their client's world view, strive to be right or win, feel offended, or become righteously indignant about their differences. They calmly proceed to apply well-honed techniques for achieving results that work for all involved. The use of physical force, while available, is considered a last resort. While potentially valuable in a number of arenas, these skills are not broadly taught and are unlikely to be covered in political science courses. Thus a diplomat, military officer, or national leader may never be exposed to them much less gain experience using them in their professional international arenas. Awareness of alternative responses is also only a first step towards their application. Someone used to feeling confident and appearing masterful may avoid the uncomfortable process of learning new behaviors. And even if impressive approaches to international problems are realized, they might create other problems for politicians needing to satisfy well-organized bases of constituents at home. However, a commitment to a best practices approach would likely result in innovative methods for overcoming these obstacles.

In conclusion, the 9/11 Commission Report declared it "crucial to find a way of routinizing, even bureaucratizing the exercise of imagination." Best practices represent an already well developed method for stretching our ability to think outside of traditional political, military, and diplomatic "boxes" and consequently enhancing our reputation abroad as well as safety at home. In 2003, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld prompted his staff by asking: "Are there things we aren't doing that we might be doing?" This research indicates the answer is a resounding "Yes, Sir!"

Introduction

Exploring masterful methods for winning hearts and minds around the globe

It sure would be a lot easier if they were helpful, instead of harmful.

- Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (Oct, 2003)

Impossible Dreams?

- Consider a world where U.S. influence universally inspires pro-American sentiment.
- Consider a world where fears of terrorism are only vague memories of the past.
- Consider a world where freedom, democracy, and trade flourish around the globe.

Impossible? The experiment called the United States of America was built upon impossible dreams conceived by a handful of visionaries. In only two centuries, the USA has grown to become the most powerful nation on the planet. Spirit and opportunity abound along with an abundance of ideas...ideas limited only by imagination. Yet significant obstacles to the positive influence of American ideals have emerged around the globe, especially since September 11th, 2001. By taking advantage of the tremendously developed imaginations and plethora of ideas found in the practices of many American masters today, as yet unrealized solutions can emerge. These modern visionaries may not only render how current challenges facing the U.S. can be effectively managed, they may even reveal how these obstacles can become transformed into the eventual realization of the dreams reflected above.

Why Do They Hate Us? Many Americans seem sincerely puzzled since 9/11 about why our earnest and costly efforts in the Middle East and around the world haven't been more appreciated. *The U.S. regards itself as a benevolent hegemon, guided by not only its national interest, but also by the desire to see countries free, secure, and prosperous* (Air War College, p. 29, 2003). Americans try hard and sacrifice a great deal to do good in the world yet now even many long term allies whose loyalty was previously undisputed are refusing to support our efforts. Without allies "on the street" within the nations the U.S. is directly striving to positively influence as well as internationally, cost containment, exit strategies, and ultimate effectiveness in defeating terrorism can be undermined. The loss of lives and dollars to sustain U.S. war efforts may become prohibitive on a number of levels, especially if we find ourselves "going it alone." More international support for U.S. agendas is clearly desired.

How might this situation be transformed in a positive direction? Last fall, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked: *Are there things we aren't doing that we might be doing?* (Gertz, 2003). The Institute of National Security Studies 5.2 research question sponsored by J-5 Joint Middle East Planning asked: *How should the U.S. attempt to shape regional perceptions through strategic information and other efforts?* This research is intended to serve as a response to both questions and provide direction for future efforts.

“Beautifying” Americans Nearly 50 years ago, *The Ugly American* (1958) became a bestseller for its expose’ of American arrogance, incompetence, and corruption in Southeast Asia. In 2003, similar claims abounded, only the waves of criticism rippled loudly around the globe and its epicenter became the Middle East. Last year, the Pew Research Center (2003) revealed: *...opinions of the U.S. are markedly lower...The war...widened the rift between Americans and Western Europeans, further inflamed the Muslim world, softened support for the war on terrorism, and significantly weakened global public support for the pillars of the post-World War II era – the U.N. and North Atlantic alliance.* The title of this year’s Pew study speaks for itself: *A Year After Iraq War - Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists* (2004). One might cry “foul” and dismiss these reports given the organization’s liberal affiliations. Further light on this issue, however, is shed about the gap between U.S. policies and international perceptions by a passage in the reputedly conservative Hoover Foundation article *War and Aftermath* (Kagan, p. 20, 2003):

It is a fundamental mistake to see the enemy as a set of targets. The enemy in war is a group of people. Some of them will have to be killed. Others will have to be captured or driven into hiding. The overwhelming majority, however, have to be persuaded...To effect regime change, U.S. forces must be positively in control of the enemy’s territory and population as rapidly and continuously as possible. That control cannot be achieved by machines, still less by bombs. Only human beings intersecting with other human beings can achieve it. The only hope for future success in the extension of politics that is war is to restore the human element to the transformation equation.

Research-Driven Recommendations Along the lines of restoring the human element to this transformation process, a number of recent studies recommend how the international image of the U.S. along with security might be enhanced. Democracy emerges as a strategic solution to a post 9/11 world in terms of the U.S. approach to international policy. Yet it also highlights how the image of the U.S. has been tarnished by a selective approach towards the enhancement of democracy. Past support of corrupt, authoritarian, and anti-democratic regimes when it has served U.S. interests to ignore these practices has created a view of the U.S. as hypocritical (Beilter and Jeb, 2003). Their research supports: 1) an Islamic-driven push for democracy that includes involvement by the middle class and professionals, 2) an increase in employment efforts, 3) efforts to emphasize the sacred side of U.S. values, and 4) a mutually supported Palestinian-Israeli peace process (p. 29-33). Along parallel lines, the research of Talbot and Meyer (2003) promotes: 1) increases in financial aid and 2) an aggressive expansion of diplomatic efforts (p. 68).

Regarding non-combative strategies for countering radical Islam, recommendations by a team of Department of Defense Fellows at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government emphasized: 1) an open acknowledgement of the threat of radical Islam (distinguishing it from the majority of moderate non-violent Muslims), 2) a significant increase in the funding allotted to counter radical Islam along with an increase in efforts to 3) empower and reorganize the Department of State (Cottrell et al, 2003).

These relatively traditional methods of diplomacy have not been emphasized. For instance, if training is any indication of the value of diplomacy, then the U.S. has severely undervalued it:

...only one hour of the seven-week course for new Foreign Service officers is dedicated to public diplomacy training...military attaches also receive little training in presenting the U.S. perspective on events (Talbot and Meyer, 2003, p. 77). While clearly deserving of attention, an exploration of the reasons behind this lack of emphasis upon and funding for more diplomatic efforts lies outside the scope of this project. It appears these methods have been devalued with a preference for military might. Regardless, current results suggest some kind of breakthrough in the thinking that is driving the U.S. approach to international relations is warranted.

How Breakthroughs Happen Helpful clues about catalysts for breakthroughs have been outlined in a recent analysis of the process. Over a 10-year period, Harvard researchers (Hargadon and Esenhardt, 2003) looked at how breakthroughs occur in the field of technology. They were surprised to find that discoveries were not the outcome of lone, creative, geniuses working from a blank slate. Breakthroughs invariably occur when a network of people, ideas, and objects interact in new ways and factors in their environment support the development of the discoveries. Breakthroughs turn out to be less about thinking outside of the box than thinking inside of boxes of which others are unaware. Astute connectors who bridge different worlds by working in a range of industries and markets see how the ways within one world can be combined in new ways to solve the problems of another. This process requires innovators and their sponsors to be pragmatic, flexible, and willing to give up ownership or excessive attachments to the way things have been done in the past. This is especially the case because conventional ideas from one arena are often considered radical in another.

Benchmarking Best Practices is a concept popularized in the 1980s within the manufacturing arena to facilitate new developments that lead to superior performance (Camp, 1986). It represents the formal application of the breakthrough process. By looking at a set of operations outside of a particular discipline yet closely associated with a problem, one might find clues to a solution. Motorola's General Systems division dramatically improved delivery times by adopting processes used by Domino's Pizza and Federal Express. Mobil Corporation successfully turned to Ritz Carlton hotels to find examples of how to improve its customer service, speed of operations, and customer loyalty. Experts advise those striving to benchmark for innovative practices to stretch their vision because the most useful insights often emerge when companies search far outside of their own industries. The farther away from a field a company looks, the greater the potential to surpass the competition. For instance, hand grenade technology could have served to guide the approach of air bag developers and tampon applicators could provide a model for air-to-air refueling. Also, involving people with limited experience in the practice being benchmarked increases the likelihood of fresh questions, thinking, and approaches.

A Breakthrough Strategy Since methods already exist for achieving breakthrough results with intractable problems outside of government, why not explore them to see what ideas might emerge and what new discoveries could possibly be made? Perhaps these discoveries would be better received and more inclined to be implemented because they are based on proven successes untainted by any traditional bias against them. They might prove useful for guiding our leaders, policymakers, and planners towards new methods for achieving successful outcomes with difficult situations, personalities, and groups. Consequently, support for discovering and employing best practices from "outside of the box" disciplines might enhance U.S. interests.

The U.S. is teeming with profound success stories from a wide range of disciplines. By exploring processes not normally considered for political and international arenas, innovative, effective, and cost-effective methods can emerge. Ideas about how U.S. policies are developed, communicated, implemented, and viewed by those intended to be positively influenced can consequently be improved by gleaning from those who have already accomplished indisputable successes in arenas outside of government such as: sports coaching, mediation, family therapy, domestic violence, substance abuse, business management, advertising, street gang violence prevention, neurosciences, communications, architectural design, and religious practices, etc.

The 9/11 Commission Report The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) considered promotion of democratic values and the image of the United States around the world vital in dealing with terrorism. In addition, they declared it “crucial to find a way of routinizing, even bureaucratizing the exercise of imagination” (p. 344). Best practices represent an already well developed method that can stretch thinking outside of traditional political, military, and diplomatic “boxes”. And it is a method that readily lends itself to discovering practices with the potential for enhancing our reputation abroad as well as safety at home

Research Methodology This breakthrough benchmarking strategy became the basis for a literature review and content analysis conducted on publications and interview transcripts. It was applied to an exploratory sample of individuals who have achieved distinguished successes in their various disciplines and whose work seemed likely to lend itself to ideas that might enhance pro-American sentiment. The six masters who served as the subjects for this study represented a range of fields and included an international champion cyclist, a street gang violence prevention expert, a world class negotiator, a top of the class Mensan, an outstanding team sport coach, and an internationally sought breakthrough architectural designer. How these individuals think, communicate, plan, and behave when faced with challenges was reviewed. In addition, when possible, ideas about the current U.S. approach to international relations were solicited or extrapolated. This research effort was thus intended to distill potentially transferable best practices strategies that might be applied to enhancing pro-American sentiment, increasing foreign national’s support for U.S. agendas, and reducing the threat of terrorism.

The Oprah Objection Finally, before proceeding to the case studies, it is important to address a common sentiment related to the difference between what the American people can do and what the American government does. This issue is often expressed in the following way:

*Oprah may get her message across international boundaries,
but Oprah isn't dropping bombs on people.*

A statement like this implies proof of the conclusion that there is no point in considering “best practices” from outside of the military realm because they are too different to have any potential transferable value. The discussion then ends with a sense of satisfaction since one need look no further in this direction. Unfortunately, this form of thinking can prevent the discovery of ideas that might otherwise emerge and prove to be extremely useful.

Upon closer examination, a number of different ways of approaching this issue can invalidate this kind of implication. For example, Oprah’s “best practices” could potentially be effectively employed immediately following the use of military might similar to the follow-on efforts of young Americans in Japan after World War II. Or Oprah’s techniques might prove useful as a part of on-going diplomatic efforts in conjunction with military operations. Perhaps if American leaders and policy makers made a serious study of and learned to effectively model Oprah’s methods, fewer bombs might need dropping in the first place. In other words, masterful skills for inspiring people and the dropping of bombs are not necessarily mutually exclusive concepts.

While it may also be true that Oprah’s approach may not be able to be duplicated or may have no potential relevance to the way the U.S. government attempts to win hearts and minds around the globe, this remains an opinion, not a fact. Until it is actually tried out and then evaluated in some kind of systematic fashion, it remains an unknown. Consequently, using data-driven conclusions rather than opinions and interpretations for decision-making enables a more accurate assessment of the usefulness of various tools. The following expression points to the need for more tools:

If all you have is a hammer, then everything looks like a nail.

A “best practices” approach can potentially increase the number of tools available for application to the “hearts and minds” campaign challenging the U.S. today.

Chapter 1

Lance Armstrong - International Champion Cyclist

Shifting from "I can do!" to "We can do!" for making impossibles possible

Preview Several critical components to success emerge from an analysis of Lance Armstrong's story. A "Can do!" attitude definitely formed the basis for his against the odds achievements. Over time, however, it was extremely tempered by a number of other lessons related to making honest assessments, humility, teamwork, and collaboration. *It's Not About The Bike* (2000/2001) suggests a number of ways the U.S. can prevail when facing difficult situations and what it takes to turn enemies into allies.

Background Lance Armstrong is a national and world champion cyclist, two-time Olympian, and six-time winner of the Tour De France, the world's premier three week cycling road race. In 1996, at the age of 25 he was diagnosed with cancer and given less than a five percent chance of recovery. Upon hearing this news, he took on cancer like a long distance bike race and, grueling as it was, he and his "team" won a full remission. Lance went on to make world headlines by winning The Tour de France with the most stunning comeback ever in the history of sport. He is a self-admitted brash and arrogant Texan who, in his younger days, inspired the Italians to throw tacks and glass on the road in hopes of causing one of his tires to pop. He's become one of the most respected heroes of "old Europe" as well as a household name to Americans, who prior to his first Tour de France victory, barely knew about the sport of cycling.

Can Do! An unwavering positive attitude emerged as an important foundation for Lance Armstrong's success in his quest to win at both cycling and defeating cancer. Lance's mother was 17 when he was born and everyone told her he wouldn't amount to anything. She believed differently, and raised him with an unbending rule: *Make an obstacle an opportunity, make a negative a positive* (p.37)...*Don't let anybody intimidate you---you put your head down, and you race* (p. 21). So when it came to dealing with his horrific stage three cancer, he was already programmed to say to himself: *I'm determined to fight this disease...and I will win* (p. 82). He later claimed that the lessons learned in his fight and victory over cancer prepared him to go on to win "The Tour."

Dealing With Naysayers Lance's journey helped him see that when attempting to overcome odds in sport or health, the naysayers were always there with their negative, spirit-killing messages that severely tested the mettle of one's will.

...The very same ones who, when I was sick, had said, "He's finished. He'll never race again" ... They were the same ones who, when I wanted to come back, said, "No, we don't want to give him a chance. He'll never amount to anything." Now that I was in the lead of the Tour de France, wearing the yellow jersey, and looking more and more like the eventual winner, the very same people sent the very same message. "It's not possible," they said. "Can't be done. He can't do it"...It's a good thing I didn't listen to them when I was sick (p. 247).

Realizing Value In Fears Even the bravest of “can do” personalities who take on naysayers with conviction can still find themselves sabotaged by fears: *...I was very fearful and without much hope, but as I sat there and absorbed the full extent of my illness, I refused to let the fear completely blot out my optimism. Something told me that fear should never fully rule the heart, and I decided not to be afraid* (p. 96). Without denying the fear, he found a way to directly face it and change his attitude. But another fear, the fear of the unknown, the discomfort of uncertainty severely challenged him because it was new: *For most of my life I had operated under a simple schematic of winning and losing, but cancer was teaching me a tolerance for ambiguities* (p. 95).

Arrogance Lance Armstrong started out strong in performance and attitude...a bad one, and he paid a high price for it:

I was called “brash” in my early days, and that tag has followed me ever since, maybe deservedly. I was very young and I had a lot to learn, and I said and did some things that maybe I shouldn’t have, but I wasn’t trying to be a jerk, I was just Texan. The “Toro de Texas,” the Spanish press named me...I was an unpopular leader...I raced with no respect. Absolutely none. I paraded, mouthed off, shoved my fists in the air. I never backed down...I was colorful...but I was making enemies (p. 52).

Denial, Excuses, and Quick Fixes Lance was ill for quite a long time and yet his symptoms had to become extremely severe for him to seek the physical help he needed. *Of course I should have known that something was wrong with me. But athletes, especially cyclists, are in the business of denial. You deny all the aches and pains because you have to in order to finish the race. It’s a sport of self-abuse...and you do not give in to pain...I realized that my vision was a little blurry...I must be getting old, I thought. Maybe I need glasses. I had an excuse for everything* (p. 8). Even when he finally admitted he was sick, his immaturity prevailed at first *...I jumped at the suggestion that it wasn’t serious, and left it at that* (p. 9). *I wanted to cure it instantly. Right away* (p. 13).

Passive-Aggressive Cycling Ignoring the culture mores of competitive cycling, requires a high price to pay. Passive-aggressive behaviors [indirect methods of interfering with the success of others] are highly developed in this sport:

...other riders can totally mess you up, just to keep you from winning. If you flick somebody in the peloton, it means to screw him, just to get him. There’s a lot of flicking in the peloton. Guys would flick me just to flick me. They would race to see that I didn’t win, simply because they didn’t like me. They could cut me off. They could isolate me, and make me ride slower, or they could surge and push the pace, making me work harder than I wanted to, weakening me. Fortunately, I was surrounded by some protective teammates...who tried to gently explain that I wasn’t doing myself any good, or them either (p. 52 & 53).

Political Cycling A big part of effectively dealing with the cycling culture and facilitating one’s own winning was learning to share the glory *...it is a mistake to try to win too many stages*

of the tour... There is an unwritten code against individual greed in the peloton and I respect it. You help other riders if you can, and you don't take stages you don't need. To Americans that probably sounds like tanking, but there is a strange honor in it. I had the yellow jersey...it seemed greedy to go for a stage win. ...as the overall leader, to win stages needlessly would have been an affront to the other riders and potentially harmful to their careers (p. 279).

Root Cause Fear When Lance Armstrong reflected upon his immature behavior, he grasped the issues behind it:

When I look back at the raw young rider and person I was, I feel impatient with him, but I also feel some sympathy. Underneath the tough talk and the combativeness and bitching, I was afraid. I was afraid of everything. I was afraid of the train schedules and the airports and the roads. I was afraid of the phones, because I didn't know how to dial them. I was afraid of the menus, because I couldn't read them (p. 57) ...A road is only so wide. Riders are constantly moving around, fighting for position, and often the smart and diplomatic thing to do is to let a fellow rider in. In a long stage race, you give a little to make a friend, because you might need one later. Give an inch, make a friend. But I wouldn't do it...I was insecure and defensive, not totally confident of how strong I was. I was still the kid from Plano with the chip on my shoulder, riding headlong, pedaling out of anger. I didn't think I could afford to give up inches (p.52).

Fears Allayed His experiences abroad finally tempered his fear-driven bravado because he took the time to learn about the values and culture of the countries he had previously ignored:

...living in Europe began to polish me. I rented an apartment in...Lake Como, Italy, and was charmed by that misty, dusty town...learning to recognize fine food and fine wine... I was beginning to speak bits of Spanish, Italian, and French...I window-shopped through Milan, where I learned what a really handsome suit looked like. One afternoon I walked into the Duomo [Florence's cathedral dome], and in that instant all of my ideas about art changed forever. I was overwhelmed by the color and proportion of it, by the gray stillness in the archways, the warm parchment glow of the candles and the soaring stained glass, the eloquence of the sculptures...I was growing up (p. 57-58).

And later as he continued to mature he said: *It was an awakening. I felt like I had never seen Europe before, and the truth is, maybe I hadn't. I had seen it from a bike, at 40 miles an hour, but I hadn't seen it as a tourist, and I hadn't seen it in love (p. 169).*

Humility When Lance Armstrong was diagnosed with the most severe level of cancer he said: *My illness was humbling and starkly revealing, and it forced me to survey life with an unforgiving eye...I found that I had a lot of growing to do as a man (p. 4).* And adding insult to injury, besides the devastating illness he noted: *I had just gone from making \$2 million a year, to nothing (p. 87).* His cancer taught him many lessons about cycling with humility:

...you don't fly up a hill. You struggle slowly and painfully up a hill, and maybe, if you work very hard, you get to the top ahead of everybody else (p. 3)...Sometimes I would yell at other riders... in frustration: "Pull or get out of the way!" I didn't understand

yet that for various reasons a guy might sit on the back, maybe because his team leader told him to, or because he was tired and hurting. It wasn't his job to move out of my way, or to work harder so I could ride at a faster pace. I don't get so riled up about those things anymore, and often I'm the one who sits on the back, hurting (p.52).

Teamwork Lance was slow to realize the importance of teamwork in cycling but he finally did: *You don't win a road race all on your own. You need your teammates---and you need the goodwill and cooperation of your competitors, too. People had to want to ride for you and with you. But in those first months, a couple of my competitors literally wanted to punch me out. I would insult great European champions...(p. 53).* Grasping the "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours" issues of cultural liaisons were ultimately the key to his winning. Cycling was a team sport in a way he had not been willing to appreciate and the senior cyclists from the other countries gave his teammates a clear message that roughly translated as ...*You need to teach him some manners (p. 54).*

Knowledge is Power *I became a student of cancer. I went to the biggest bookstore in Austin and bought everything there on the subject.I was willing to consider any option, no matter how goofy ...The more research I did, the better I felt my chances were---even though what I was reading suggested that they weren't very good. But knowledge was more reassuring than ignorance: at least I knew what I was dealing with, or thought I did anyway (p. 88 & 89).*

Alternative Methods The most prominent turning point in his illness occurred when he was told: *You should note that there are equally effective chemotherapy treatments that could minimize possible side effects to not compromise your racing capabilities (p. 90).* He was realizing he had options. A second opinion doctor showed him how he could still competently treat his cancer without creating the irreversible damage to his body that the first doctor's approach would entail. The second opinion doctor also had some standout characteristics: *The more I talked to him, the better I liked him; he was all gray matter and good sense, with no ego (p.100).* It's ironic that for someone who had been perceived as so egotistical, he would be drawn to someone who distinctively lacked that characteristic. Yet going with the more humble, well-informed, optimal approach proved to be exactly the right decision.

Collaboration Lance Armstrong went through a paradigm shift when it came to roles and relationships in medicine:

Previously, I thought of medicine as something practiced by individual doctors on individual patients. The doctor was all-knowing and all-powerful, the patient was helpless. But it was beginning to dawn on me that there was nothing wrong with seeking a cure from a combination of people and sources, and that the patient was as important as the doctor ...Each doctor involved played a crucial role. No one person could take sole responsibility for the state of my health, and most important, I began to share the responsibility with them (p. 90).

Potentially Transferable Applications In cycling, Lance Armstrong's initial fear-driven bravado, brashness, and egotistical attitude due to his lack of exposure and ease with foreign cultures created severe barriers to his success. Many Americans who have not spent much

time outside of U.S. borders might feel similarly. Yet ultimately, winning meant learning to work with both his teammates and competitors from other cultures. He had to give more in certain ways to get what he needed:

- When Lance Armstrong made the effort and took the time to learn about and explore the value of the cultures associated with his success, both his attitude and his ability to win markedly improved. Perhaps the form of “giving” the U.S. is currently overlooking relates to taking in and more fully appreciating the contributions offered by other cultures.
- In his struggle with cancer, Lance Armstrong became aware of medical options he had not realized existed before that would allow for both his recovery and not create damage that would end his cycling career. Perhaps the U.S. has options currently outside of mainstream awareness about how to constructively influence other cultures without creating physical, social, or other collateral damage.
- Lessons about the value of teamwork and collaboration also emerged that proved critical in facilitating his remarkable recovery. It was significantly enhanced by being open to learning, sharing information, seeking solutions from a variety of sources, and playing an active role in his own recovery. Perhaps the U.S. could similarly benefit from a greater teamwork and collaboration with other countries.

Lance Armstrong’s story lends weight to the concept of diversity as capacity and the value of team decision-making in terms of international relations. It also points towards an elevated role for the people of the cultures one desires to influence.

Chapter 2

Father Gregory J. Boyle, S.J.

“Smart on Crime” street gang priest helping at-risk youth plan their futures not funerals

Preview Parallels between a violence ridden urban area filled with hostile gangs in the U.S. and conflicting religious groups in the Middle East make Father Boyle’s lessons learned an interesting study. In addition, lessons regarding the most useful methods of community policing prove worthy of serious consideration.

Background Father Gregory J. Boyle, S. J. is a Jesuit priest who is the founder and director of *Homeboy Industries / Jobs For A Future*. He has spent decades working with violent street gangs and is credited with facilitating the longest held gang ceasefire in Los Angeles. Father Boyle’s center hosts 1,000 gang members a month, directing them towards jobs and away from violence with one another. He created these organizations in 1988 in a grassroots effort to address the root causes of gang violence. Given the escalating problems and unmet needs of gang-involved youth, he sought to develop viable and constructive alternatives for them. Previously Father Boyle was the pastor of the Dolores Mission Church from 1986-1992, the poorest parish in the Los Angeles Catholic Archdiocese. The parish was comprised of the largest public housing developments west of the Mississippi (Pico Gardens and Aliso Village) with the highest concentration of gang activity and one of the highest areas of violent crimes in the city. Before becoming pastor of Dolores Mission, Father Boyle taught at Loyola High School and worked with the Christian Base Communities in Cochabamba, Bolivia. He also served as chaplain of the Islas Marias Penal Colony in Mexico and Folsom State Prison. Father Boyle’s work has been featured in numerous articles, television specials, and in books like *Father Greg and the Homeboys: The Extraordinary Journey of Father Boyle and His Work* (Fremon, 1995). During an interview on November 17th, 2003, Father Boyle shared the following:

Nothing Stops A Bullet Like A Job Father Boyle’s approach to dealing with gangs has evolved over the years. He now emphasizes finding a common self-interest and a job for the gang youth he serves. He’s discovered how well employment serves this purpose. *Jobs For A Future* creates opportunities so that at-risk youth can plan their futures instead of their all too common funerals. His center’s job programs range from a bakery and silk screening operation to landscaping and graffiti removal. When he tells his protégées they are going to have to work with their enemies from the street, at first they balk declaring they won’t talk to them. He stresses to them that they don’t have to talk to one another, they just need to work together. In time, a bond of friendship always develops in the service of their common interest. This approach creates a disconnect on the street because they find that they cannot demonize the enemy in the community who has become their teammate at work. Although it is outside of the scope of this project, how Father Boyle entices these young people to come to his center in the first place seems quite worthy of further assessment. In the words of one of his teenage charges:

Father Boyle just kinda has a way of getting atcha!

Group Re-Cohesion While Father Boyle is credited with remarkable effectiveness in terms of achieving extended non-violence between hostile groups, he no longer puts his energy into truces, cease-fires, talking things out, or treaties, etc. He's realized that this form of intervention serves to increase cohesion of groups with an identity and values that create problems for these young people. He now puts his efforts into processes that increase the cohesion of groups with constructive life-enhancing rather than life-destroying outcomes. Therefore, he no longer works with gangs or gang leaders, but rather only with gang members. This distinction is critical to redirecting the energy towards work and sports teams. In other words, he takes the gang members and puts them into new "gangs," like Team Silk Screeners, Team T-Shirt Makers, and Team Landscapers and reinforces this by having them play sports competitions like baseball.

Community Policing After so many years in the same area, Father Boyle points out that it would seem since he is so well known in the community, he would be well known to the local police. Yet his experience with the community police on the beat has been just the opposite. On the way to give Mass at his church, he might be stopped by a patrol car for what seems to be a trumped up concern about rolling a stop sign. He stands out because he's a white male in a predominately Latino community and to the unaware, this makes him a suspect as an illegal drug buyer. If he sends one of his young program participants on an errand, the police are likely to stop the young man and accuse him of using illegal drugs. Upon finding out the teen is working with Father Boyle, they might then ask if Father Boyle is using illegal drugs. This type of questioning can damage not only this young man's view of the police, but also the view of his friends with whom he might share the story. It could also undermine their progress towards their new goals. After all, why bother to change your life for the better if the police are just going to see you, your new friends, and your inspiring leader as criminals anyway? Good rapport could develop if the police would make a point of becoming familiar with operations and leaders like Father Boyle's who are helping these young people. They would then be able to distinguish the "good guys" from the "bad guys" and treat them accordingly. They could also serve as important role models in encouraging those who have made a commitment to improving their lives. While the senior leaders of the police department recognize the importance of community policing and becoming familiar with the local populations they serve, the police rewards system encourages moving out of areas like his rather than staying in them for the length of time it would take to gain the needed familiarity.

Problem-Solution Perspective During an interview with a representative from the California Wellness Foundation (2003), Father Boyle emphasized an accurate problem analysis:

I think we need to have a high degree of reverence for how complex this is...from parents to the economy to a sense of despair, to a lack of hope...My concern always is what problem you think you're addressing. When we do something superficially or from the outside in, we should never be surprised when the symptom hasn't gone away – gang violence...if your analysis is these kids aren't scared enough, then what you propose are tactics and laws....to address a problem that we don't have. We don't have kids who just aren't scared enough. We have kids who aren't hopeful enough. So you can enhance sentences forever and it won't ever fill a kid with hope for tomorrow. Never! I think politicians and people who govern are really behind the curve on this

one...once they're presented with "Smart on Crime," [they] will never embrace "Tough on Crime" again.

Potentially Transferable Applications Although hardly comparable, Los Angeles's street gangs like the Crips, Bloods, and the Snakes seem to offer at least a hint of some useful parallels in dealing with the Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds in Iraq in that they are groups in frequent conflict with one another. Father Boyle's decades of successful work with these kinds of groups provides valuable clues about how to deal with them. The main lesson appears to be to get them working together on anything that will move them away from identities that keep them in conflict. Those in charge of this process need to be familiar and respectful of the needs of those within each distinctive culture they are attempting to motivate in new directions. In addition, it is not hard to see the parallels between the role the community police play in Los Angeles and that of U.S. troops in the Middle East. If Coalition troops falsely accuse, roughly treat, or ignore cultural sensitivities of those who are trying to help them because they don't know who they can trust, it stands to reason their valuable support might be lost and negative sentiment towards the Coalition forces would invariably increase. Yet unless they stay in one place long enough and make a point of becoming familiar with the locals, including learning the language and cultural ways of life, they won't be able to effectively discern the good guys from the bad. While few would see stamping out "bad guys" and being "Tough on Terror" as undesirable, perhaps becoming "Smart on Terror" could achieve even more desirable outcomes.

Chapter 3

Herb Cohen “World’s Best Negotiator”

Humble, beseeching, bumbling receptivity for increasing information, cooperation, and allies.

Preview Methods used by a highly skilled negotiator debunk a great deal of common thinking about how to succeed in winning friends and influencing people. Herb Cohen stresses listening, helping, and the avoidance of a “cool” image.

Background Herb Cohen was declared by *Time* magazine and a number of other prestigious publications as the “World's Best Negotiator.” He has spent four decades as a practicing negotiator including dealing with some of the world's major dramas from hostile takeovers to hostage negotiations. While serving as an adviser to Presidents Carter and Reagan on combating terrorism, he was involved in the Iranian hostage crisis. He is also credited with helping to shape the government's response to the skyjacking of TWA Flight 847 and the seizure of the *Achille Lauro*. More recently, his input and advice has been sought on a variety of problems from domestic political strategy to international terrorism. He is the author of *You Can Negotiate Anything* (1980), a *New York Times* bestseller that has been translated into twenty-one languages. Although his work has already influenced U.S. conduct in terms of international relations, the ideas that emerged from a June 2000 radio interview with Jack McLendon on KKSM AM 1320 contained compelling concepts of potential applicability given post 9/11 issues.

Calculated Incompetence Mr. Cohen explained that when your reputation is “the world’s greatest negotiator,” it can work against you: *...People expect you to do miracles. What you’ve got to do is combat that with what I call a low-key pose of calculated incompetence. I seem not to understand things that quickly...You want to train yourself to say, “I don’t know, I don’t understand...”*

Vulnerable Willingness Coming across as real instead of as the “top dog” pays big dividends:

...the key thing when you deal with other people is to make yourself appear as a human being, a vulnerable being instead of someone who appears to be patronizing and perfect...no one wants to be spoken down to, no one wants to be treated in a patronizing way ...I often try to make people feel superior to me...Instead of trying to make yourself seem smart and bright and showing the other side what a better grasp you have, you’re better off saying...: “You know I’m young here and this is the first time I’m meeting you, maybe you could help me?” Or “I’m a woman and I feel awkward in this male environment, maybe you could help me?”...ninety percent of the people respond favorably to that...When you say “Help me” to people, they want to help you...They actually mentor you in those situations and that’s really helpful, that’s how you succeed.

Looking Bad Can Be Good Herb Cohen busts the myth that being a stickler in terms of appearance or behavior is what reaps optimum results:

You see people going about and they believe in this dress for success nonsense. They are immaculately attired...I don't dress for success. When I'm negotiating, I don't even look that good. You know I've never been in a situation where you walk in and people say "Oh my God, the way that guy's put together, the matching assemble, the power tie, the cut of the fabric of his garment. I want to make concessions to that guy." The opposite is true. If you look that good they expect you to make the concessions and so my strategy is to...make yourself a human being... You get pen on the palm of your hand and instead of thinking this will make me look less professional, look and say, "Gee, look what I did, I'm sorry." Anything like that is good.

Information Is Power Controlling the discussion rather than trying to find out what the customer's underlying interests, needs, problems, priorities, and worries are prevents you from getting the information you need to help the other side to solve their problems. In the end, it's that process that inspires them to help you solve your problems.

... in negotiations and life, not just business dealings but even in dealing with your children, what you want to try to do is get information... Information is power and that enables you to get to the heart of problems quickly and come up with a creative solution that provides for joint gain and...a solution which the other side feels that they were part of and that they are committed to the outcome...In business...people tell me things [and other] people ask me, "How come he told you that? He never told me that!" A lot of it is the way you approach people, you seem to be interested in what they are saying...find out what their problems are.

Interest Not Argument Passive exploration is so out of the ordinary, it opens doors:

It's a good idea to spend a lot of time asking questions, active listening, nodding your head, displaying empathy and understanding, let them tell their story. Take notes! If you do that, people believe you respect them because you are writing down what they say and they tend to talk to you and tell you more...I listen to people tell their story and say "huh," and "wha?" People are waiting for you to argue with them. They never get their story out...People so often interrupt another person. They don't let them tell their story... You don't argue with them... show them where they're wrong, foolish, stupid, [or] misinformed. That doesn't necessarily result in the other side wanting to tell you more things.

It's About You! Herb Cohen makes a point about how hard truthful feedback is to get from others. When things don't work out most people will not state the real reason and this leaves one with erroneous conclusions:

So many times people don't make sales and they don't know why...Usually behind your back what the other side says is that they don't like you for a lot of reasons. They don't trust you. You come on too strong, you seem to be obnoxious, they don't want to be in business with you. And so you say to them, "Why didn't I make the deal?" To your face they'll say things like: "The price was too high." You accept that but it was not the price. It's you and the way you approach people. That's why...in selling there are

some who are outstanding and there are some people who are terrible and it's the same product, the same service. What makes the difference? The difference is you and how you approach people... you've got to build more trust... you've got to change the climate, change the environment.

Potentially Transferable Applications The Colombo approach to resolving conflicts merits consideration. Is the U.S. so focused on looking good, being the top dog, and letting everyone else know it that other nations are expecting concessions instead of making them? A cursory review of U.S. leaders and policy makers does not highlight asking for help or admitting vulnerability in any way. Yet this is exactly what Herb Cohen has found to work most effectively for getting critical information and assistance. Listening, taking an interest in them and helping them to solve their problems reaps the greatest benefits for the helper. Imagine a headline in an edition of *Al Jazeera*:

**Americans Show Genuine Concern for Middle Eastern “Street”
Negotiations indicate U.S. striving to better understand Muslim needs**

Then imagine their reaction:

You mean they're finally listening, addressing our concerns, and even asking for our help!

Herb Cohen's suggestions appear uniquely poised for shifting a perception of “occupiers” to the stated goal of “liberators” if we would only consider them.

Chapter 4

Bill - A Mensan's Mensan

A random inquiry into the thoughts of a very bright person from a group of very smart people

Preview While Bill is hardly an everyday American, in January of 2004, without any particular credentials in this arena, he offered remarkable insights and some innovative methods worth considering for a “hearts and minds campaign.” For instance, distinguishing heretical Muslims and scandalous clerics from the respectful majority and using a pragmatic marketing approach to “sell” U.S. values represent some of his standout ideas.

Background Mensa is an international society with one qualification for membership: a score in the top two percent of the population on a standardized intelligence test. Mensa groups around the world hold meetings, conferences, and all manner of gatherings to provide a forum for intellectual exchange among members (Allen, 2001). They are probably best known as the “brains” behind the American Airlines in-flight magazine’s Mensa quiz puzzler. A meeting of Mensans seemed a likely possibility for finding bright ideas from unusual sources. The group chosen for this project had been rated by the national organization as the top Mensa chapter in the U.S. on numerous occasions. Within this group, the researcher asked to be referred to the person or persons perceived as the brightest member of their chapter. The fairly unanimous decision turned out to be a past president of the chapter, a professional military historian who had been an aerospace manager. He requested to be known only as Bill and the following are some of his ideas about the U.S. and its approach to current international efforts.

Art Of War In *The Art Of War*, Sun Tzu (1998) says *If you know both the enemy and yourself, you will never suffer a defeat. If you know yourself and not the enemy, then you will suffer defeat half the time. If you know neither, you will lose.* While we know our own military capabilities very well, we do not know the exportability of our political institutions and ideas to foreign soil very well. As a result, having won the war, we are fairly well into the process of losing the peace. We know virtually nothing about the average Iraqi’s ideals, goals, motivations, etc. We have no capability to change them in any substantial way. However, with a campaign carefully tailored to the Iraqi “man on the street” and with a limited set of purely tactical objectives, we can *nudge* a few opinions a few degrees away from where they now are. If the opinions and objectives are carefully chosen, that could be enough.

Lessons From Vietnam Mao Ze Dong said: *The guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.* The most conspicuous failure of the United States in the Vietnam War was the debacle of the “hearts and minds” campaign. A guerrilla war can only be won by depriving the “fish” of the friendly “sea” that sustains, nourishes, and conceals them. The hearts and minds campaign was supposed to achieve that objective. We wished to send the Vietnamese a good picture of America and its objectives and we wished to receive in return vital intelligence about the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces. We failed in both directions. Though intent upon communicating a positive image of America to the Vietnamese, its goals and intentions in Vietnam, the U.S. military and civilian hierarchy never bothered to *first* gather the essential intelligence of what the Vietnamese people thought about what *their* goals and intentions were.

The Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese never made that mistake. Their message was always carefully tailored to Vietnamese nationalism, patriotism, and the goals of the individual Vietnamese. It was always a clear, simple message, and had clear, simple, and specific goals in mind. A brutal summary might say that the American hierarchy in Vietnam never really knew the people their message was intended to reach. From a marketing point of view, we never knew our customers. Having done little market research, the messages we created were bound to miss their target. [See last section: A Marketing Approach]. Adequate, accurate and timely intelligence is the *sine qua non* of defeating a guerilla force. We desperately needed intelligence of the guerrilla's plans, bases, etc. We failed to receive this because we failed to convince the Vietnamese people as a whole that supporting the Americans (and, incidentally, the South Vietnamese government – an organ virtually all Vietnamese saw as an American puppet) was in their own interests and would meet their needs.

False Assumptions We erroneously assume that we know Iraqi public opinion about the Coalition, what changes we want to make in that opinion, and that our task is to correct *all* (or some undefined number) of “errors” in that opinion. We further assume that once we correct these “errors,” the Iraqis will inevitably support us and share our goals. In short, we assume that we know what our “message” is and all we have to do is figure out the best way to communicate it. If there is one thing we should have learned in Iraq, it is that our original ideas about the Iraqi people, how they would perceive and receive us were simply wrong. The attitude that caused our pre-war intelligence failures still persists. It has to be corrected if we are to have a hope of winning the peace. At this moment we have abandoned the average Iraqi to sources of information that are hardly friendly to us: the mosque, the street, and the guerrillas. We not only have no methods to reach the average Iraqi, we have no idea what would be the most *effective* thing to say to him once we have reached him. All we know for certain is that our assumptions about how he thinks and what he wants have proven disastrously wrong. This has allowed the situation to deteriorate on a daily basis. As conditions exist right now, we can predict that whenever we finally pull out, we can expect something of a repetition of South Vietnam: a temporary survival of the regime we leave in place, followed fairly soon by its overthrow and replacement by a theocratic, Baathist, nationalist, or something else rabidly hostile to our goals.

What's in it for them? While it is an operational necessity that the people respect us, they do not need to: love us, admire our culture, desire to substitute our system for their own, share our definition of freedom or even of who is a terrorist. Clearly, an alien military presence cannot be everywhere at once. Equally clearly, the common people *are* everywhere. Hence an alien army (such as the Coalition forces in Iraq) is dependent upon the local population's *desire* to report the movements and intentions of the guerrillas. This can only be gained by that public's perceiving the defeat of the guerrillas as being in their own interest. That is the real goal of a “hearts and minds” campaign.

Listen-Plan-Execute-Evaluate If we limit our goals to only those that can help us win the guerrilla war, we should be able to create a short list of goals that, based on the actual psychological profile of the average Iraqi, his prejudices and opinions that we might successfully influence with a series of narrowly targeted propaganda, publicity, and educational efforts. Properly done, this should be an iterative process: First we should listen, then we should plan, then we should execute, then we should evaluate the results, then we should go back to the first

step with improved ideas. As Americans, we tend to skip step one, give inadequate attention to step two, want to jump directly to step three, and ignore step four. Steps one and two should have been executed before we began the actual occupation of Iraq. Since we didn't do our homework in the first place, it may seem like going backwards to now start listening and planning. Yet an evaluation of our current results shows that without these, our execution remains extremely vulnerable to errors.

The Street vs. Elites It is the custom of the United States (as, indeed, it is for almost all countries) to deal with foreign nations exclusively through their elites. The complexity and expense of trying to deal directly with the "common people" is normally prohibitive, to say nothing of the simple fact that the resources to do so are usually lacking and foreign governments might object to our directly addressing their people. In the case of Iraq, the problem is particularly daunting. America has few Arabic linguists, fewer specialists on the nuances of Iraqi culture, demographic relations, and history. As an added complexity, native speakers of Iraqi accented Arabic, whether naturalized citizens of the United States or not, are perceived as presenting a security problem based on divided loyalties. The closer the individual is to Iraq, the more devout the person is to Islam, the stronger that perception becomes. In short, the more that person possesses the attributes necessary for identifying with the needs and desires of the Iraqi people and being a useful intelligence source or operative, the less he or she is likely to be trusted by the U.S. This is a generic problem. Here it need only be said that America must cull *all* of its resources in this field in order to make up even a minimum cadre of effective analysts and operatives. To date, we have not done so, preferring to use only established "trustworthy" groups and individuals (i.e. those "elites"). Unfortunately, to date these have proven to be relatively out of touch with the day-to-day situation in the streets and villages. Even were these individuals fully informed about the opinions and desires of the Iraqi "man on the street," we have not organized them or their information into a coherent campaign to perform the intelligence and operational tasks that we need.

A Few Examples: If we narrowly target campaigns on matters of tactical use to us and build them on the existing elements of the Iraqi psyche and Iraqi public opinion, we can achieve goals that are tactically useful to us in our war against the guerrillas. Collaterally, they will increase the probability that the regime we leave behind is both stable and (at least) not overtly anti-American. While simplistic, these are examples of the *kind* of thing that might work.

- 1) **Their World View** The Iraqis (and the majority of people in Islamic countries) see the Israelis as a racist, anti-Islamic, militaristic and imperialistic nation conducting an active campaign of state-sponsored terrorism against their co-religionists, the Palestinians. They see us as supporting this campaign, supplying the Israelis with arms and intelligence, and standing behind them no matter what they do. It is clearly impossible to "correct" the Iraqi perception of Israel. Equally, it is clearly impossible to convince them that we do not support the Israelis pretty much across the board. The question is what *can* we convince them of *within their own context*?

The Extended Family Suppose you lived in Baghdad and were accused of supporting someone widely perceived as bad: irreligious, corrupt, dishonest, a real low life. Someone comes up to you and demands to know how you, who portend to be a good,

upright, and moral person, can possibly stand behind this dreadful person? You do not try to defend him. Instead, you simply say, “I know, but he is my nephew.” Within the Western context, what you have said is almost irrelevant. In an Arab context, it explains everything. You have said that, given the overwhelming importance and irrevocable nature of the ties of family, you clearly have no choice but to continue to support your nephew in all public settings. Privately, you may rail against him. You are even *expected* to privately remonstrate with him and try to correct his conduct. But in public, you really have no choice and must stand behind him. If we were able to construct a public relations campaign that said vis-à-vis Israel, “I know, but he is my nephew,” it would do a great deal to disassociate us from Israel’s actions and even from the consequences of our own support of Israel.

- 2) **Heretical Islam** The overwhelming majority of Muslims take pride in Islam as a benevolent, brotherly, and noble faith. The killing of innocent civilians is repeatedly condemned in the Koran. Yet there are extremist schools within Islam that justify the killing of those whom they condemn as opposed to Islam whether they are formal combatants or not (i.e. *no one* is innocent). I think we would have been very smart back on September 12th, 2001 (and perhaps it is still not too late) to sit down with some friendly Islamic theologians and figure out how we could brand al Qaeda and its entire kin with the Arabic word for *heretic*. We should have been relentless in our repeated use of the term. We should have encouraged our allies (especially those in the Islamic world) and everyone in the media to use the term/idea exclusively. Properly fitted into an Islamic context, we should have been able, given the great surge of sympathy after 9/11, to have forced them into an ideological and theological defensive. Would it have won a war for us? No. But it would have made it hard for them to successfully label us as “haters of Islam” and even “Crusaders.” Instead, we locked upon the word “terrorists,” forgetting that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. We chose an ambiguous Western word instead of an irrevocably condemnatory Islamic one.
- 3) **Iranian Clerical Corruption** The likely future of Iraq is that after we leave, a theocracy (or a nominal republic with Islam’s state influence enshrined in the constitution) will be installed, either through election or revolution. Given the demographics, it will be a Shiite theocracy, which bodes no good for us or for the West in general. However, a situation exists in Iran that could, with luck and skill, be useful. It has become something of a scandal in the Shiite world: After the revolution, certain clerics were placed in charge of enterprises and areas of business as part of the theocratic re-organization of the government and economy. Now those clerics are virtual satraps and the richest men in Iran. They are locally regarded as arrogant, greedy, and corrupt. How much publicity this has gotten in Shiite Iraq is unknown, but it would be smart of us to make sure it is widely known.

A Marketing Approach The first thing a good marketing campaign does is identify the perceived needs of the customer. The second is to identify a limited set of those needs and convince the customer that your products can fulfill those needs. An effective “hearts and minds” campaign is a marketing campaign.

Using the tools of marketing, it is possible to identify a limited set of narrow, specific tasks with measurable goals that we can achieve. Each must be designed to convince the Iraqi people that it is in their self-interest to defeat the guerrillas. To outline those tasks, it might be useful to look at the problem as a marketing challenge. If we brought in an experienced marketing professional and told him it was our job to change the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people to favor the Coalition and its goals, he would immediately tell us that we are proposing an impossible task. On the other hand, if we told him that we wanted to sell some American product, say Coke, to the Iraqi people, he would probably see that as an achievable goal and would outline a campaign to achieve it.

As mentioned above, the typical process involved in marketing and sales is fairly simple. First, you analyze the needs, hopes, and desires of your target customer. Second, you make them aware of some specific need or desire they possess. Third, you convince them that your product will satisfy that need or desire. This has a direct analog in the process that we wish to occur in Iraq. Our marketing manager's first task would be to make a list of those factors that would be likely to influence an Iraqi in his decision to buy or not to buy. His second task would be to design a market survey to determine how his target audience already feels about Coke and about each of those factors affecting the buy/don't buy decision. Note that his sole goal at this point is to gather information. He is not *selling* anything. He is *listening*.

If he is a good professional, he would assume that, not being a native Iraqi, he could not possibly be fully accurate in his preliminary list of factors. He would consequently, in the course of his survey, be trying to prove or disprove the accuracy of each of the factors on his preliminary list and to add any that he left off his preliminary list. He would tell you that it was absolutely vital to obtain a clear picture of how his "man in the street" really feels and thinks. If his survey indicated that people have heard a rumor that Coke tastes like "camel piss," he would not attempt to "correct" that notion. At this point he is solely after accurate data. The fact of the existence of a rumor of Coke's flavor is itself valid data, independent of the rumor's accuracy or inaccuracy.

The hardest problem at this stage is how to create and execute an accurate survey. What is the real status quo we have to deal with? That is, how do we select an accurate sample group, design the questions, train the questioners, and evaluate the errors/accuracy of the result. If any polling companies or advertising agencies existed in Iraq, our marketing expert might propose we make at least partial use of them. After all, whatever their feelings towards Americans (or Coke), they should have the contacts, training, and methods that might be useful. Above all, they should be able to give him culturally specific warnings about Iraqi factors that might make his information gathering more or less accurate. Only after gathering as complete and accurate a picture as possible of those factors in the Iraqi mind-set that might affect the purchase of Coke, would our imaginary marketing guru begin to design a campaign to sell Cokes.

Being a professional, he would make sure that nothing else would be allowed to intrude on his design that is not directly related to selling Coke and that all factors that do affect selling Coke are included. For instance, if he determined that the Arabic version of the word "Coke" would serve as a handy acronym for "The Israelis are dogs," and that an ad campaign built around that idea would sell a heck of a lot of Coke, he would at the very least be tempted to recommend that

course. His goal is to sell Coke, not to correct Iraqi ideas about Israel, or America, or democracy, or anything else. It is to sell Coke.

The point of the analogy to a marketing guru commissioned to improve the sale of Coke and our position in Iraq is this: Any grandiose plan that involves “correcting” the Iraqis basic viewpoint is doomed to failure. However, it is possible to imagine a limited set of highly specific goals that, given the existing worldview of the Iraqis, is achievable. If we narrowly confine ourselves to defining a campaign to convince the average Iraqi that the victory of the guerrillas would be harmful to him or that the victory of the Coalition over the guerrillas would be good for him, such a campaign might succeed. We would have to keep it simple and purely tactically driven.

The fact that we may feel their perception of the Coalition, the U.S., Jews, or Israel is inaccurate is, from a purely pragmatic point of view, irrelevant. If we were doing a marketing operation, we would simply accept that perception as simply one of the factors we had to deal with. Recognizing it as deep-seated and constantly reinforced from a thousand sources (sermons in the mosques, lectures at school, television shows, rumors, etc.) we would know that perception was beyond changing in the short term. Most importantly, we would know that trying to change it would undercut our efforts to change the few opinions we actually *can* change. In other words, it would be tactically harmful to try. A good marketing campaign is narrow, focused and intensely pragmatic. If we want to win the peace in Iraq, we must be all three.

Potentially Transferable Applications Bill offers a traditional American marketing approach for positively influencing international relations that’s distinctive in its pragmatism. It looks at what might work best to achieve stated goals without getting bogged down in illogical or emotional arguments. When the focus is on “What’s in it for them?” a plethora of useful strategies follow like: moving towards “the street” and away from elites, treating our provocative allies as problematic extended family members, distinguishing between non-violent moderate Islam and the terrorist’s heretical version, and exposing the corruption and greed of certain Islamic clerics.

Chapter 5

Al Scates – UCLA Volleyball Coach

A tradition of winning through creating and maintaining a championship environment

Preview This coach has guided a top team program for decades. He shares what he knows not only about winning in the first place, but how to keep winning over the long haul. His contractual agreement involving minimal rules for his players effectively serves the needs of all. For the most part, the players handle their own discipline issues. This leaves the coach able to concentrate on what he does best: coaching rather than policing players.

Background Coach Al Scates has earned more NCAA Championships (18) than any other coach in any sport in the U.S. He's been named National Coach of the Year five times. When asked about Coach Scates, the late Jim Murray, a Pulitzer Prize winning columnist for the Los Angeles Times responded: "*Al Scates?! Precisely! The one and only! The man who is to volleyball what [John] Wooden was to basketball, [Red] Sanders was to football, Napoleon to artillery...*" Coach Scates has had decades to develop and hone his ideas about transforming individuals into a peak functioning team.

Coaching Advise When it comes to winning at coaching, Coach Scates had the following to offer:

- Commit to winning and celebrate the wins
- Find the right people to work with
- Give all your resources a chance to contribute
- Be passionate about your career and have some fun

Excerpts from a presentation Coach Scates offers called *Creating and Maintaining A Championship Environment* (2003) further illustrates what is behind his ability to keep his teams on a winning track:

The harder you work the luckier you get. Practices are even more intense than games.

I am willing to concede to the talents and decisions of my assistants, and I welcome any suggestion that might help further the team in some way. I am not afraid to solicit opinions and to listen to other viewpoints.

...when the team loses, there is normally a shake up and different methods are tried or there are personnel changes. I am not afraid to experiment or correct the problems...the videotape is reviewed with the players very shortly after a loss and unacceptable plays are scrutinized and players are held accountable...

No guarantees that they will not sit on the bench. Those on the bench who are not happy to be there are removed.

Surround yourself with intelligent assistants, look for people who live, breathe and dream about your goal, be fearless and willing to make drastic changes to meet your goal, be a visionary leader, do whatever it takes to win with the rules, mold your raw materials into the right combination. With players be objective, with staff, welcome input and communication and with the public display confidence that your program merits. Ask what are my weaknesses and my strengths?

Staying On Top Coach Scates noted the difficulties of being the team everyone wants to beat: *...We need new plays and tactics to stay ahead. When one team continuously and successfully wins, they become the focus of every opponent.* He's constantly looking for new methods to help continually develop his players. For instance, when Korea won the World University Games in Sicily in 1997, he took his team to Korea to play matches during the off-season that helped develop new scoring ideas and win the 1998 NAAs.

Two Rules Coach Scates instills self-discipline in his players early on. He requires his players to abide by only the following two rules and anything else is left open to each individual's personal sense of responsibility:

1. Don't do anything to embarrass UCLA.
2. Don't do anything to embarrass the team.

Because we give the players so much individual responsibility, each player develops his own level of maturity based on his own commitment. The program is strict but one that is not so rigidly regimented as to determine what each player will do at every single moment of his life.

In terms of his views on what needs to happen in Iraq, Coach Scates offered the following:

- Find the right people to work with. The best, brightest, and most influential need to be on your side; others will follow.
- Create an environment that enables the local recruits to be rewarded quickly. Promote the locals who show initiative and do it quickly.
- Listen to what the locals recommend. In Iraq that means included Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds etc. If there is progress, factions will unite.
- Eliminate the terrorists by convincing the people the country cannot be fixed until they are turned in.
- The religious leaders are the key to all the changes that you want to see happen.
- If the program isn't working – change it.

Potentially Transferable Applications Coach Scates has experience with being the “top dog” team and what it takes to stay on top. He realizes the importance of cultivating new methods to keep a lead because he knows his opponents are studying his old methods and will soon find a

way to effectively defeat them. Thus he keeps on the lookout for and is constantly willing to experiment with developing new methods. Transformation programs in the DoD similarly acknowledge this issue, but the emphasis appears to be on technology issues rather than on the human element and how to deal with other cultures. Also, it seems ironic that such a successfully disciplined program as UCLA's would have minimal rules. Responsibility rests with the group's buy-in and is no doubt enforced by peer commitment. In this way, the coach is freed up to focus on coaching instead of discipline problems as they emerge only occasionally. Quality people, earned rewards that come quickly, on-going evaluation of results and flexibility about making changes reflect the key ingredients of his team's successes.

Note: This researcher noticed that qualities Coach Scates did not describe as important [probably because he takes them for granted] were some of the most compelling he models. In working with Coach Scates, one soon discovers his strong sense of accountability, responsibility, and integrity. If he says he'll have a fax to you by 5 pm, it's there or he's contacted you to tell you why not. He doesn't let you down, you know you can trust him, and consequently, you can't help but want to be on his team.

Chapter 6

William McDonough - Architect

Intelligent designs to create comprehensive positives instead of minimizing negatives

Preview When outcomes are problematic, the fault lies in the design according to William McDonough. Yet optimizing positives first and foremost requires the belief that solutions to previously intractable problems are possible. Then a commitment to finding them and the persistence to stay the course makes for the successful realizations of *Cradle to Cradle* designs.

Background Mr. William McDonough is the founding principal of *William McDonough + Partners, Architecture and Community Design*, an internationally recognized design firm practicing ecologically, socially, and economically intelligent architecture and planning. His clients include Ford Motor Company, Nike, Herman Miller and BASF. *Time* magazine recognized him as a “Hero for the Planet” (Feb 22, 1999), stating that [he] “is changing the design of the world.” During both the Clinton and recent Bush Administrations he received the nation's highest environmental honors: The Presidential Award for Sustainable Development (1996), and the Presidential Green Chemistry Challenge Award (2003). In restoring Ford Motor Company’s river plant in Michigan, he saved the company \$35 million with a design that filtered storm water run-off making expensive technical controls and regulations obsolete. By eliminating 7,962 of 8,000 chemicals, he and his partner Michael Braungart developed a fabric line that won three gold medals, was 20 percent cheaper to make, and was so safe it could be eaten. His best-selling book entitled *Cradle to Cradle* (2002) is printed on a recyclable, waterproof, rugged, synthetic polymer designed to look and feel like top quality paper. Mayor Richard Daley requested Mr. McDonough make Chicago “the greenest city in America” and in 2002, Madame Deng Nan, Vice Minister of Science and Technology declared China would develop industries and products based on his cradle-to-cradle principles.

Cradle To Cradle Design Mr. McDonough purports that the destructive qualities of today’s systems are fundamentally a deeply ingrained design problem, not an inevitable outcome of human activity. He claims that intelligent design can transform the making of things—from products to buildings to community plans—into a positive, regenerative force. Based on principles derived from the laws of nature, this new design goes beyond simply reducing harm to generating wholly positive effects...systems that purify air, land and water; use current solar income and generate no toxic waste using materials that replenish the earth or can be perpetually recycled and whose benefits enhance all life (McDonough, in press).

Triple Top Line Business leaders often measure performance against the triple bottom line: economic growth, environmental protection, and social equity. Unfortunately, the concept tends to yield strategies that merely minimize environmental or social liabilities. These are strategies for managing negative effects. When good design drives the business agenda, a shift from the triple bottom line to *the triple top line* occurs. If one approaches the design process asking right from the start, “*How can I grow prosperity, celebrate my community, and enhance the health of all species?*” the results are likely to be far more positive and enriching. Mr. McDonough asks,

“Why lament our creations? Why not celebrate the things we make?” with designs that allow industry to enhance the well being of nature and culture while generating economic value. By following the laws of nature to create products, processes and facilities, they can leave vital, delightful footprints instead of damage. Materials can become food for the soil after their useful commercial lives and enormously productive factories can purify water and restore the landscape rather than be waste management headaches (McDonough and Braungart, 2003).

New Questions Triple top line thinkers tap these opportunities by honoring the needs of ecology, economy, and equity rather than trying to balance them. In an infinitely interconnected world, they see rich relationships rather than inherent conflicts. Their goal is to *maximize* value in all areas through intelligent design. When designing a manufacturing facility, for example, they would ask: *“How can this project restore more landscape and purify more water? How much social interaction and joy can I create? How do I generate more safety and health? How much prosperity can I grow?”* Questions such as these allow us to remake the way we make things. In terms of economy, we ask *“Can I make my product at a profit?”* The equity sector raises social questions: *“Are we finding ways to honor all stakeholders, regardless of race, sex, nationality or religion?”* The ecology corner emphasizes: *“Do our designs create habitat or nourish the landscape?”* (McDonough and Braungart, 2003)

Current Military Model When intelligent design focuses on our approach to national interests and international issues, a number of concerns arise. In an effort to make Colombia safe for ongoing oil exploration and meet one of the Bush Administration’s national security goals—diversifying the sources of America’s oil—U.S. military personnel will train 4,000 Colombian troops and supply them with high-tech surveillance equipment and combat helicopters. The Colombian army, in turn, will use this array of American technology and know-how to defend the nation’s oil fields and take the offensive in its decades-old civil war...Teaching counter-insurgency is not a new strategy in the search for security. For many, it echoes an American tradition of strategic intervention. In the midst of a civil conflict that has cost more than 35,000 lives and displaced nearly 2 million people, perhaps there’s a more secure approach. What if we waged peace as fiercely as we are prepared to wage war? (McDonough and Braungart, 2002)

Security and Oil Dependence Oil dependence disguises the weak spots in the design of the American economy. From the viewpoint of both sustainability and international relations, reliance on a single, non-renewable resource to fuel economic growth is a signal of a design problem. In Saudi Arabia and Nigeria, for example, oil generates wealthy elites but no democratic institutions and no emerging intellectual infrastructure to support long-term social well-being or economic growth. The U.S. spends up to \$50 billion annually, as well as lots of international goodwill, to protect the oil fields of the Persian Gulf. South America is now emerging as the new, unstable oil arena (McDonough and Braungart, 2002).

Security and Manufacturing A business cycle inextricably linked to a single, non-renewable resource screams vulnerability and so does the far-flung assembly line. As supply chains span the globe, many U.S. manufacturers are importing materials and product components that are causing health problems for American workers and for their customers as well. This increases health care expenses for U.S. companies, drives up costs for waste management, squanders material assets, and ultimately leads to more outsourcing for cheap materials—a toxic flow of

losses and liabilities that threatens long-term economic strength. Even when materials have been defined as safe and beneficial, the energy required to illuminate and run the assembly line is likely to depend on fossil fuels. Many corporations with manufacturing operations overseas have seen their bottom lines grow as they have reaped the advantages of cheap labor and a less strict regulatory environment. But the increasing dispersal of supply and manufacturing has proved to be a double-edged sword. Many businesses are increasingly reliant on factories and supply chains they do not own or manage and this issue has begun to draw concern. As the business journalist Barry Lynn writes, *Cisco Systems became the largest manufacturer of communications equipment in the 1990s by becoming a “virtual company,” relying almost exclusively on outsourced production, much of it offshore...post-national manufacturing has created new forms of foreign dependence for the United States that may soon leave us gazing fondly back to the days when our nation was joined at the aorta only to such dear fellow citizens of the world as Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Why, he wonders, did we so grievously fail to understand that running our ever more delicate assembly lines across so many fault lines, political and tectonic, might endanger our power and our well-being?* (Lynn, 2002). Given the powerful influence of the United States on the global economy, these become security concerns and design questions not only for Americans, but also for the entire world.

Waging Peace With Intelligent Design This, too, is an American tradition—There is no denying that the outcome of World War II was achieved with military power. But immediately after the war, American might was harnessed to build democratic values and institutions. The Marshall Plan, for example, distributed \$12 billion over four years to revitalize European nations, including West Germany. There, aid fed hungry children, rebuilt the industrial infrastructure, supported civil society and demonstrated the attractiveness of democracy. In Japan, the military occupation was conducted in part by young American couples—unarmed and disarmingly cheerful—who visited even the smallest Japanese communities, all in the spirit of peacemaking, goodwill and respect. Along with an infusion of monetary aid, this intentional honoring of Japanese individuals and cultural traditions yielded an ally and an economic partner. The same was true in Europe. Where dictators had reigned, democratic values emerged and Japan and Germany became two of the world’s most vital nations. Who were the architects of their recovery plans?: George C. Marshall and Douglas MacArthur, American generals bent on waging peace. Today, we might try waging peace on the scale of the Marshall Plan with the widespread application of intelligent design, a concerted international effort to develop products, industrial processes and social systems that support sustainable economic strength, cultural diversity and environmental health. From this perspective, sustainable design can be seen as one of the essential paths to peace and security (McDonough and Braungart, 2002).

The Good News By developing commercial enterprises around cradle-to-cradle design protocols, the U.S. can become a world leader in intelligent design and resource recovery rather than competing on uneven and unhealthy terms within the old industrial system. This would not only protect the health and well being of American consumers, it would nourish the American economy and land. It would also yield exceedingly profitable, effective benchmarks to export to developing nations, rather than exporting harm. And as we renew product quality, we will also be developing an intellectual infrastructure supporting the making of things that will give us long-term security and prosperity rather than the tenuous promise offered by the policing of distant oil fields. By teaching intelligent design, by fiercely waging peace, we can take the

future into our own hands and shape a world in which our children and our children's children find prosperity, security and health along with all the world's citizens (McDonough and Braungart, 2002).

Potentially Transferable Applications When democracy is spliced with life-giving energy sources and manufacturing that creates environmental and health contributions, many resistances to it would likely be lessened or fall away entirely. It's difficult to oppose an offering that contributes so much good. By asking questions about how to comprehensively optimize influences instead of managing their negative effects, ways of influencing other cultures could develop that do not create physical, environmental or cultural collateral damage. Those at home and abroad couldn't help but want what the U.S. has to offer. Inspired motivation makes force and coercion unwarranted. Despite its obvious potential contribution, however, these methods could create problems for those who benefit from weapons systems and force as the U.S.'s primary means of influence.

Chapter 7

Real World Considerations

Success is to be measured not so much by the position that one has reached in life as by the obstacles which he has overcome.

- Booker T. Washington

Preview In developing the proposal for this project, a number of “real world” considerations emerged. While most of them were outside the scope of this study, two could be addressed through this research process. First, most international issues involve complex organizational systems interactions yet only individuals were considered by the preliminary sample. Thus it appeared constructive to review the processes of an organization successful in overcoming an image problem. The U.S. Air Force Academy after its sexual assault scandal was chosen for a review of their practices and how their lessons learned might be applied to U.S. foreign relations. In addition, recommendations regarding critical international relations issues need assessment by experts involved with those issues. Consequently, the proposal included interviews with State, Defense and Congressional liaisons to determine the validity and viability of the preliminary recommendations. Interviews regarding their merits were conducted with relevant personnel in Washington DC before finalizing them.

PART I: Academy Falcon Rising From the Ashes The U.S. Air Force Academy provided a unique living laboratory of clues about how an organization can best address and turn around a tarnished image. Last year Air Force leaders were compelled to ensure constructive changes occurred at the Academy after sexual assault complaints by cadets were made to Congressional representatives and the scandal became widely publicized. The Academy represented a highly controlled environment where a variety of objective measures were already built into their system, variables could be isolated, and the impact of systems changes readily evaluated. After reviewing various related reports and conducting on-site interviews with key personnel there, this researcher concluded that the Air Force Academy is in the process of becoming a benchmark of best practices for solving not only problems related to sexual assault, but also a broad array of systemic institutional problems generally shared by most hierarchical organizations.

Transformation Underway Preliminary objective data indicated substantial progress was well underway towards lowering the incidence of sexual assaults, improving the reporting system, and enhancing their severely tarnished image. And it was not hard to see how the practices employed to resolve the Academy problems could relate to international issues. This was especially obvious since the news of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal resulting in so much damage to the international image of the U.S. broke just prior to the researcher’s visit.

Highlights Revealed Some highlights from the lessons learned at the Academy follow. It is interesting to note how many of the “tips” obtained through the interviews dovetail with the individual practices offered in earlier chapters. It is also interesting to consider how they might be applied to our approach to international relations.

Structure

- Develop a long term strategy with a personal touch.
- Develop systems that integrate team inputs especially in a crisis.
- Develop a road map evaluated by experts, periodically assess it, and act upon it.
- Clearly define the chain of command and processes for dealing with problems.
- Make sure someone is identified as specifically responsible.

Leadership

- Recruit the right people for the job.
- Keep the emphasis on what is working while dealing with problems.
- Pro-actively solicit information because unless it is requested, it is rarely offered.
- Reward leaders who listen to their subordinates and take appropriate action.
- Acknowledge that you cannot solve a problem you don't admit you have.
- Take full responsibility for actions that contribute to problems.
- Be completely truthful.

Communications

- Ensure frequent interactive communication sessions occur.
- Do everything possible to keep channels of information flow open.
- Ensure coherency, consistency, and minimize hypocrisy in messages.
- Encourage suggestions, experiment, act upon useful inputs, and provide feedback regarding results.

Upward Communication Flow The Academy scandal resulted in especially valuable lessons for cultivating environments where personnel feel safe about elevating problematic information. The prominent changes implemented by the new leadership related to organizational structure, leadership style, and communication skills training for officers responsible for cadets. If these measures had been adopted DoD-wide, it is likely that what occurred in the now infamous prison in Iraq would have been minimized or altogether prevented. Similar systems dynamics also appear related to problems within the intelligence communities, cost overrun issues identified by the Defense Science Board, and NASA's Challenger program. The Academy is now modeling practices whereby leadership solicits, attends to, and appropriately acts upon undesirable information well before blow ups occur. These practices appear worthy of widespread sharing.

PART II: Expert's Reactions from State, Defense, and "The Hill" A "reality check" regarding the "real world" advisability of the preliminary best practices recommendations for international relations was needed. Consequently, liaisons from the Defense and State Departments as well as those working with Congress were contacted to offer their practice wisdom. The sample included representatives from the State Department, the Defense Department, and Majority and Minority Congressional liaisons from the Senate and the House of Representatives in Foreign and International Relations, Armed Services, Intelligence, and various related sub-committees. The primary focus was on reactions to the recommendations and perceived impediments to having them become championed and implemented.

Recommendations Valued Regardless of party or institutional affiliation, reactions to the recommendations derived or inspired by the American best practices success models were overwhelmingly positive. There was resounding agreement that they might prove useful if applied to international relations concerns. Suggestions were mostly about clarifying meaning or avoiding misunderstandings and thus they were subsequently only slightly altered. Furthermore, solutions derived in this manner succeeded in avoiding objections related to partisan biases and negative associations with more traditional approaches. The receptivity of this approach was supported by the fact that most of the interviews were relatively easy to obtain. Often after reading the report an offer from a liaison would be made for an in-person meeting. Return visits were requested by personnel instrumental in dealing with foreign relations. The following sample comments attest to the report's originality and potential value:

- “These are some really good ideas.”
- “This approach is definitely outside of the box thinking at its best.”
- “I have been through hundreds of interviews like this and I have never heard of or thought about applying some of these approaches. It's brilliant!”
- “We ought to be willing to take good ideas from all sources and give many of them a try. Goodness knows we haven't been terribly successful with traditional approaches.”

The Downside Discussions with the various liaisons, however, also revealed a number of obstacles to the adoption of this approach. The value of best practices is derived through a pragmatic problem-solving attitude, the frequent use of data and feedback in decision-making, and a willingness to be open to experimentation. While on the surface these requisites might not appear problematic, real world issues quickly illustrate impediments. For instance, an approach associated with an image of weakness or pandering to the enemy, as forms of non-confrontive communications (*Soft Power*, Nye, 2004) are often perceived, would likely result in their rejection before their potential effectiveness could be adequately assessed. Also, belief systems that discount the possibility of achieving results in new and innovative ways can prevent thinking that goes beyond conventional methods and the discovery of those solutions. A lack of familiarity and practice with skill sets from varied disciplines also hinders the application of those skills within international arenas.

“Crazy” Is Relative...A Mental Health Example For instance, experienced mental health professionals faced with volatile and potentially violent psychotics (as defined by Western cultural standards) know to avoid: arguing with their client's world view, striving to be right or win, feeling offended by their behaviors, or becoming righteously indignant about their differences. They calmly proceed to apply well-honed techniques for achieving results that emphasize desired outcomes for everyone involved. The use of physical force, while available, is considered a last resort. While potentially valuable in a number of other arenas, these skills are not broadly taught and are unlikely to be covered in political science courses. Thus a diplomat, military officer, or our national leaders may never be exposed to them much less gain experience using them in their professional international arenas.

Up “Hill” Battle In the process of striving to obtain feedback from the various government liaisons representing very different viewpoints and political perspectives, it became apparent how information flows or does not flow between and within those organizations (*Crucial Conversations*, Patterson, 2002). State Department and members of Congress might be completely unaware of relevant unclassified DoD information and visa versa. And at times, it was apparent that useful information was not being shared between sub-directorates within the same organization. Turf issues, guardedness, partisan viewpoints, implementation concerns, and unfounded discounts of various methods limited willingness to champion new ideas. Although members of Congress do not need a superior’s permission to voice their opinion, they may lack access to information regarding available best practices alternatives and thus might not know what questions to ask of other government institutions. Staffer gatekeepers who lack adequate knowledge for determining the value of new ideas may not pass on useful information. And if the member or leader of any government organization behaves in ways that discourages upward flow of information, because of the power they wield over the livelihoods of their subordinates, it is unlikely they will be told what they don’t ask for, especially if the information reflects unfavorably upon them. “Bosses get what bosses want.” Unadvisable actions may not be challenged and positive alternatives not shared if raising those issues causes a subordinate concern for his or her job. Like the former senior Air Force Academy staff, our government’s leaders may at times inadvertently cultivate environments where eventual blow ups become inevitable. By pro-actively soliciting information from subordinates and across organizational boundaries, disasters can be averted and innovative ideas cultivated. Secretary Rumsfeld modeled a critical best practices leadership quality in asking: “Are there things we aren't doing that we might be doing?” What we do not know is what kinds of answers he got, how they were processed, or what happened to personnel offering ideas such as those contained in this report.

Step By Step Awareness of alternatives represents a critical first step towards their application. Leadership able to encourage, reward, and not feel threatened by thinking derived from other “boxes” provides a good start. A willingness to accept some awkwardness in becoming masterful with new behaviors can also contribute. And when impressive approaches to international conundrums do emerge yet run counter to well-organized bases of constituents at home, politicians can appreciate the fact that a quality best practices process can provide solutions for satisfying their stateside supporters as well.

Bottoms Up! Currently best practices, when solicited at all, seem to be randomly dealt with, derived only from the highest organizational levels, and rarely shared across institutional boundaries. A systematic means of evaluating and sharing best practices ideas represents a major gap in our government. As with the myriad of intelligence communities, someone needs to be in charge of ensuring innovative ideas are solicited from all available sources. Then they need to be screened and evaluated for appropriate dissemination with effectiveness measures developed and built into our systems. After agreeing upon innovative recommendations, how to best champion their implementation needs to be addressed. Despite the obstacles these concerns represent, a commitment to a best practices approach would likely result in the emergence of solutions for overcoming them. Finally, as with substance abusers, some people need to “hit bottom” before they become open to new ideas. Yet masterful substance abuse intervention specialists know just how to bring “bottoms” up for inspiring those abusers to desire the possibilities of new approaches over their old ways. It may be time to consult them.

Chapter 8

Conclusions

....I had opened up a gap on the field. I knew that if I was going to be cured, that was the way it would go, with a big surging attack, just like in a race.

- Lance Armstrong

It's A Go! All considered, there are many things we could be doing that we are not currently doing to inspire pro-American sentiment around the globe. This exploratory effort to seek breakthrough best practices towards this goal has been heartily effective and rewarding in turns of highlighting some of those things. It has also provided many clues for enhancing the discovery of others in the future. For negligible resource output, profound innovative and high quality ideas readily emerged. Although none of the individual participants had Ph.D.s, worked in think tanks, or worked primarily in international relations arenas, their input proved highly relevant. And those who became personally involved were eager to contribute.

Stovepipe Blind Spots A myriad of untapped best practices from within a variety of fields could be applied to inspiring pro-American sentiment yet they appear to be virtually unknown to our political leaders and policymakers. Valuable ideas could be readily solicited from those who have already accomplished indisputable successes in arenas quite different from government. Stovepipe organizational structures with limited cross feed prevent experts in one discipline from becoming aware of techniques successfully used within other disciplines. Members of particular professions have an acute awareness that the results they get in winning over difficult people and/or difficult situations critically depend upon particular skills. And they know that when they do not do this, the results can be disastrous. Thus methods used by winning sports coaches, successful street gang workers, or mental health professionals who somehow manage to coax un-medicated and volatile psychotics into treatment programs could have tremendous applicability in terms of dealing with difficult personalities and groups in the international arena.

Just Getting It Secretary Rumsfeld's comments and questions about a war of ideas and what we might do better deserve profound consideration with so many lives at stake, increasing costs, and difficulties with securing a successful exit strategy from our current Middle East efforts. U.S. leaders and policymakers are increasingly realizing the importance of allies in terms of the U.S. achieving its national objectives. We can tell ourselves "They just don't get it!" and pay the high price of losing important support and assistance or we can dig deep and explore methods that will enhance their ability to understand our sincere contributions. And just perhaps, in this process we can do a better job of understanding and appreciating their value to us as well.

Surging Attack When Lance Armstrong finally came to terms with cancer, committed to the best treatment methods collaboration could provide, and the feedback showed indications it was working, he approached his recovery in the same way he approached a cycling race:

...I had opened up a gap on the field. I knew that if I was going to be cured, that was the way it would go, with a big surging attack, just like in a race (Armstrong, p. 141).

No less an effort needs to be applied to our goals of inspiring pro-American sentiment. By pulling out all the stops, learning all we can possibly do in this regard, exploring every option “no matter how goofy” (Armstrong, p. 88), the U.S. can prevail against terrorism and global despots. Unless U.S. leaders are willing to do this, there appears little point in risking the lives of more American troops. If we are not inspiring pro-American sentiment, then we are fueling the recruiting efforts of our enemies. There will never be enough troops unless their efforts are combined with a critical mass of friends on every street of the countries we strive to liberate. Increasing ally support enhances critical support for our goals.

In conclusion, seeking out “best practices” for inspiring pro-American sentiment is what is called for to provide comprehensive support for American warfighters, our national interests, and the well-being of other countries and cultures. It provides a form of cross-breeding of ideas that can increase our strength and make full use of our diversity that is ultimately our greatest capacity. It is a method that answers the 2004 9/11 Commission Report’s call for the promotion of democratic values and the image of the United States around the world in dealing with terrorism. It can also help to develop the crucial creative abilities called for in the report’s 11.1 Imagination clause (p. 339). Best practices represent an already well developed method that can stretch thinking outside of traditional political, military, and diplomatic “boxes”. It is a method that readily lends itself to discovering means for enhancing our reputation abroad as well as safety at home. Not only can these methods enable us to recover our international reputation, they can also guide us towards transformative behaviors and a new inspirational vision for citizens all around the globe.

Chapter 9

Recommendations

We are in a war of ideas... the ideas are important...

- Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (Oct, 2003)

This research suggests a plethora of ideas that could be explored, supported by resources and personnel, and/or immediately implemented to make a powerful difference in the effectiveness of our peace efforts and success with defeating terrorism. This section includes recommendations derived primarily from the research and possibilities indirectly inspired the project.

RESEARCH - DERIVED RECOMMENDATIONS

Linguistic Reframing How words are used can make a critical positive or negative difference. E.g. One sound bite by a national leader can instantly enhance or undermine tremendous in-country efforts and millions of dollars allocated towards inspiring pro-American sentiment. Also, the term “war on terror” (like the war on drugs or poverty) can set up an adversarial viewpoint that may actually undermine success in dealing with the situation. Linguistic reframing might provide innovative, breakthrough solutions to cultural influence.

- Make expert training available for every American spokesperson featured on international media that enables them to understand the impact of their words on the audiences they seek to inspire before they speak.
- Bring together experts from a variety of different disciplines to develop a communication matrix that can screen speeches and messages for their potential impact. Drawing upon the wisdom of a range of disciplines and taking into account the perspective of those desiring to be influenced could transform problematic statements before they are offered.
- Assess the actual impact towards desired outcomes that demands for justice or calling the enemy terms like thugs, criminals, cold-blooded killers, evildoers, or barbarians. Negative labels can provide emotional satisfaction, yet may not work to win over hearts and minds. Expert negotiators and mediators tend not to recommend these exclamations because they can fuel righteous indignation and problems creating obstacles to solutions.
- Learn the value of reframing language in terms of its contribution towards breakthrough results. E.g. The phrase “one way to deal with...” instead of “the only way to deal with...” keeps possibilities open. Evaluate expressions like “can do” “help me,” “smart on terror” and “waging peace” for their potential in reaping positive results.
- Research how language can create shifts in thinking that pave the way for outcomes previously not consider, considered unlikely, or considered altogether unattainable.

Middle Eastern Policies Credible to Arab and Muslim Middle Easterners

- Strive to make U.S. dealings related to Israel and Palestine as well as other Middle Eastern countries impartial and fair to counter the current perception of a one-sided and hypocritical approach. Tolerance of unacceptable behaviors by say, elites in Saudi Arabia or Egypt and especially Israel at the expense of non-elites and Palestinians backfires by creating a strong negative ripple throughout the Muslim world.
- Reenergize, revisit, and increase funding for State Department and United Nations methodologies that have proven most effective. Revitalizing these organizations could create a powerful synergy for more successful international outcomes. The concept of transformation that the DoD has embraced especially in terms of its technology could be applied to all human relations, communications, diplomacy, and cultural issues.
- Support methods of giving to other countries that have been demonstrated to garner long-term goodwill from their perspective such as opening our markets to their agriculture or manufactured products. Too often our financial generosity is perceived as a bribe that suggests we need to buy friends or our money is used to buy the “wrong” friends.
- Treat provocative allies as problematic extended family members who may behave in unacceptable ways, but because they are family, they are understandably not abandoned or rejected.

What’s In It for THEM?

- Decide who the “them” is (e.g. the street, elites, moderates) that we need to reach and make “What’s in it for them?” a top priority.
- Strive for solutions proven to work with an emphasis on what works for them. Adopting win-win approaches with others ultimately serves our own best U.S. interests.
- Seek out ways conflicting groups can work together towards common goals they value.
- Emphasize respect and education regarding the cultures we are attempting to influence in ways that the people of those cultures value.
- Use the utmost possible respect in dealing with apparent enemies to avoid the tremendous cost of being wrong.
- Make listening to their viewpoints a priority and base action on exhaustive broadly based research.
- Make collaborative solutions a priority. Respect and view diverse opinions as capacity rather than problematic. Shift “my way” to “our way” or even “your way.”

Doing What Works!

- Seek out methods of dealing with terrorism that have proven effective basing decisions on tested data and solid logic. Be cautious about assumptions and methods that merely sound good, have emotional appeal, or seem right.
- Approach solutions as much as possible from a position of humility and help-seeking rather than telling, directing, and controlling.
- Emphasize what's working rather than what's not and reward it quickly and well. Seek out and ensure rewards have maximum appeal to the receiver.
- Strive for buy-in from those impacted by plans before implementing them.
- Distinguish between non-violent moderate Islam and terrorist's heretical version as we disassociate from our own fundamentalists who profess violence in the name of religion.
- Expose the corruption and greed of certain Islamic clerics while also acknowledging similar traits in some of our own clerics and typical failings found in all humankind.
- Benchmark methods for supporting U.S. power and influence that cultivate respect over resentment from those less successful. (E.g. Coach Wooden's superior basketball teams.)
- Enhance our credibility by modeling our ideals regardless of the behavior of others. Reneging on promises and engaging in behaviors perceived as hypocritical can resolve immediate difficulties yet cost far more in the long run in terms of engendering global international respect and support.
- Acknowledge our own contribution to our increased negative reputation and make cultivating a more positive impression a priority.
- Reevaluate how our goals might be combined with helping others to achieve theirs.

Commit To Process For Optimizing Positives

- Adopt "triple top line thinking" that optimizes social-cultural, environmental, and financial outcomes instead of settling for managing negatives considered inevitable.
- Support policies, programs, and personnel that actively seek positive methods of influence and avoid those that reap downside, ill will, or negative effects.
- Experiment with methods of inspirational power vs. coercion, manipulation and force.
- Ramp up support for our commitment for winning the peace (e.g. human resources, budget, technology, research and development, etc.) until it becomes comparable to our commitment to winning wars.

RESEARCH-INSPIRED RECOMMENDATIONS

Military and Government Resources Closer to home and readily accessible are various DoD and other government organizations and associates currently conducting potentially applicable operations that too often remain within their own organizational stovepipes.

- Aggressively explore the potential of valuable lessons that already exist or could readily emerge from organizations with cross-cultural or pre-conflict intervention interests such as the Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense University, and the military Academies' Behavioral Science Departments. Especially noteworthy may be the highly sophisticated preemptive non-violence systems for positively dealing with other cultures available within the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
- Adapt the management and communication training developed at the Institute of Creative Technologies (ICT) to develop our nation's leader's skills in dealing with international difficulties. ICT combines academic research, Hollywood entertainment techniques, and military methodologies providing state of the art leadership skills to U.S. Army company grade officers. These young Army officers have the benefit of training that gives immediate quality feedback regarding their approach in simulations (akin to pilot training) that could also give our nation's leaders a tremendous advantage.
- Review practices recently implemented at the U.S. Air Force Academy in terms of how broader military culture benefits could be realized by their system-wide DoD application. For instance, the newly required training of Air Officer Commanders, structural changes in terms of the chain of command, and pro-active efforts to solicit problematic feedback before crises occur might prevent or at least minimized future incidents that negatively impact attitudes about Americans like the Iraqi prison scandal.
- Retool psychological operations now primarily geared towards "breaking the enemy" to turn at least a portion of their resources towards methods that win over hearts and minds or at least ensure they do not actively work with the enemy.
- Explore the potential value-added that could be derived from the cross-cultural expertise at the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI).
- Actively solicit ideas from the various intelligence communities about their best practices related to positive impacts they've made around the globe.

Lessons from the Field of Management

- There's a saying in organizational cultural transformation circles: "You can't change a system without changing its rewards" and "You get more of what you reward." If peace and self-direction by other countries is sincerely desired, reward it in every possible way.
- Effective management empowerment programs require solid training and structure before letting employees loose to work out their own issues. But it's just as imperative to let go of control and trust even when mistakes occur. Buy-in for fixing those problems and commitment to finding solutions skyrockets when employees feel a sense of ownership. Similarly, foreign nationals need to own the solutions for their own country's problems.
- Ritz-Carlton hotels have long been a notable benchmark for customer service. They go out of their way to make good for a customer that has had any kind of problem because they know their customers tend to tell their friends (potential future customers) about problems at many times the frequency than they share stories of good news. We need to be similarly committed to our process of international "customer service."

A Contribution from the Mental Health Profession In the mental health field, when someone with a mental illness attempts to harm themselves or others, they may be hospitalized against their will and put into five point restraints. Since they are seen as difficult and out of control because they are mentally ill, an effort is made to view them compassionately, constrain their behaviors, and provide treatment. Instead of fueling aggression, this attitude on the part of the staff combined with specific techniques serves to de-escalate violence. Terrorists are often described as "crazies" yet they are then expected to behave logically according to a Western worldview they do not share. As hard as it is for Americans and especially our troops to harbor a compassionate attitude towards those who are clearly striving to kill them, while simultaneously maintaining appropriate defenses, this higher order attitude may help shift spiraling reciprocal violence towards peaceful resolutions. Even a patronizing rather than condemning attitude towards those who feel justified in sacrificing innocent lives could minimize potentially supportive reactions from those who might be tempted to side with them.

Calling Upon the Service of Hollywood's Best Also worthy of exploration are the ideas of writers like Tom Clancy (*Patriot Games*), John Grisham (*Pelican Brief*), Chris Carter (*X-Files*), Steven Spielberg (*ET*), and George Lucas (*Star Wars*) who've developed some of the most creative work on the planet. These Hollywood successes already have a well-informed handle on many issues that have created or exacerbated our current national and international dilemmas. Although it was clearly not their intent, some say they even provided inspiration for ideas used by terrorists. Their work already implies awareness of thoughtful considerations of international dynamics. Addressing these underlying factors might find us well on our way to ending terrorism by rooting out its root causes. We have already turned to Hollywood to compose defense scenarios. By going the extra step of asking the best of the best to provide long-term solutions, we could be well on our way to achieving them.

Other Celebrity and Highly Regarded Candidates Potentially valuable ideas abound if only sought and there are plenty of other candidates available. A variety of constraints related mostly

to time and space available prevented using inputs from John Wooden, the epic basketball coach; Ruth Simmons, the twelfth child of a Texas sharecropper who became the first African-American president of an Ivy League university; George Gallup, Jr., the international pollster; Bill Cosby, the comedian and actor who successfully inspired pro African-American sentiment; Phil Jackson, the multi-titled NBA Coach; Tiger Woods, the breakthrough golfer; Oprah Winfrey, whose success defies not only odds but even comprehension; Reverend Robert Schuller, the possibility preacher; Scott Peck, M.D., psychiatrist author of the all-time bestseller *The Road Less Traveled*; and Peter F. Drucker, the internationally respected management guru. In addition to individuals, groups could also be solicited for input. For example, a request could be made for a national virtual SIG (Mensan special interest group) or Harvard Divinity School's Center for the Study of World Religions to brainstorm ideas and suggest solutions. Ideas from experts in powerful techniques such as Appreciative Inquiry or Neuro-Linguistic Programming could also be solicited.

Transformation Begins With U.S. This research report began with Secretary Rumsfeld's quote last year regarding other countries and citizens around the globe: *It sure would be a lot easier if they were helpful, instead of harmful.* Since he said this, the issue of increasing pro-American sentiment and allies has become nothing short of critical. Unfortunately, efforts to consider and take responsibility for our own contributions to the sentiment experienced by other countries towards the U.S. often gets lost in a "blame America" protest that discounts, minimizes, or completely denies our part in problems. When without hedging, we are able to seek out and take stock of our own behaviors that relate to how other countries view us and why, we can most effectively devise approaches that will work to alter this sentiment. If we know we can catch more flies with honey than vinegar but refuse to notice that what looks like honey to us may taste like vinegar to them, we fail. And it may just be that citizens of other countries know far better from their personal experiences with our troops and intelligence communities, for instance, what everyday Americans are only just beginning to find out. If our overriding emphasis is indisputably positive, then methods of coercion and manipulation become unnecessary because they are ineffective and/or counter-productive. Therefore, to inspire pro-American sentiment, we need to start with a transformation in our thinking that inspires transformative behaviors. Our current way of thinking is preventing breakthroughs we desperately need right now. By shifting our thinking in a direction that indisputably values their interests, that seeks to better understand and appreciate what's valuable about their cultures and worldviews, and unequivocally demonstrates our commitment to peace with the same emphasis we currently wage war, we can effectively inspire them to view us differently. Finally, this research also demonstrates how many possible solutions merely await discovery right in front of us. Everyday American citizens can be taught how they can contribute by identifying and sharing relevant potential best practices from their own varied arenas. We can achieve the breakthrough results we are seeking if only we will unleash the power available to us by looking more broadly...at home and abroad. We need to do this now, for ourselves, for the world, and for the warfighters who are bearing such a great burden for all of us.

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