Analysts trying to find an explanation for an event such as the tragedy that struck the offices of Charlie Hebdo this week would usually start with some relevant data sources. The problem is, France’s census asks no questions of religious adherence, political affiliation and ethnicity, making any analysis of French society that wants to be based on these metrics extremely difficult.
According to estimates though, 8% of France’s population is Muslim.
In a poll by Ifop, 75% of individuals from Muslim families described themselves as “believers”. The same level as in 1989.
Below the topline, the figures are less static. One in five attended Friday prayers in 2011, up from 16% in 1989. A similar shift is present among those practicing Ramadan - 71% did so in 2011, up from 60% in 1994. The proportion that had never fasted dropped from 30% to 20% over the same period. The change in behaviour is even more acute among younger people.
On the other hand though, on issues ranging from diet to attitudes towards women and mixed marriage, younger people are more open relative to older generations.
In May 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy’s popularity among voters stood at 60%. By June 2011, that figure had halved. A relatively similar trajectory is present within the Muslim vote, with the level of confidence dropping from 39% to 16%.
On the whole, there aren’t any glaring trends in any of these behavioural changes and differences that can be explained by religious factors.
Demographics is a far more significant starting point.
Figures from 2011 showed that the demographic composition of the Muslim community is rather different to the country as a whole. More than 60% of France’s Muslims are aged between 18 and 34, compared to less than 30% of the French population viewed as a totality. Nearly one in two Muslims are in low-paying jobs, as opposed to 30% of the country as whole.
Following the financial crisis, France has experienced record high levels of unemployment - and as elsewhere in Europe this has been felt most strongly by young people, with one in five youths unemployed - and at the same time a growing sense of negativity towards institutions and pessimism about the future.
More than one in three voters at last year’s European parliament elections said anger with government motivated how they cast their ballot. An Ipsos study on France’s “new fractures” released in January last year found that only 8% of voters have confidence in political parties, fewer than one in five trust MPs and only 28% the institution of parliament.
Nearly eight in 10 agreed that the system of democracy malfunctions in France as it isn’t representative of voters’ ideas - this particular figure was up six points over the course of 12 months.
Seven in 10 feel that French culture is in decline and 90% view the country’s economic influence as moving in the wrong direction.
France’s decline is irreversible was a belief held by 20%, compared to 65% who said the downward spiral could be reversed.
Globalisation was a threat to France for 61% of respondents and 78% said they drew inspiration from the values of the past.
Every single one of these figures is more acute among the lower paid, the unemployed and the young - this critical context becomes a fertile environment that can evolve into a toxic recruitment ground for extremism.
A second critical aspect of this debate is the fundamental distinction between immigration and integration.
A poll released in France by Ifop on 5 January revealed that 80% of French people judged the risk of terrorism in the country as high - a record level. Greater than figures post- 9/11, the London bombings, the killing of Osama bin Laden and the Boston marathon attack.
Ifop : @atlantico_fr 80% des Français jugent la menace terroriste élevée en France pic.twitter.com/0BXHI8h2ri
— Ifop (@IfopOpinion) January 5, 2015
A global survey by Pew in October last year, found that 32% of people in France felt that religious hatred posed the greatest threat to the world - tied with inequality as the issue of upmost concern.
Pew also found that 27% in France admitted to having an unfavourable view of Muslims. Less than in Germany and Spain and significantly below the 63% seen in Italy.
As an issue of concern for voters, immigration ranks well below unemployment and economic issue.
The reality though is a lot more complex than these topline figures may initially suggest.
Since 2011, immigration is the fastest rising issue of concern among voters. It is also the issue voters least trust the country’s two main parties to handle effectively.
Seven out of ten voters believe that parts of the immigrant community have failed to integrate into France over the past 30 years. Half of these respondents think this applies to the majority of immigrants living in the country, and nearly all (85%) blame immigrants for not making the required effort needed to integrate.
Racism is widespread in France according to 75% (with more than one in ten even claiming that it is acceptable). Some 70% think it is wrong to serve food adhering to religious beliefs in school canteens, and 65% find immigration levels in the country to be out of control.
Looking at the Muslim community specifically, 63% of French voters in the Ipsos study said that Islam isn’t compatible with the values of French society. Looking at other religious beliefs, 24% said the same for Judaism and 9% for Catholicism. Almost three-quarters, 74%, said Muslims want to impose their values on others.
Overall, just under 70% of respondents said that religious fundamentalism is a worrying problem that needs to be seriously dealt with.
These views are probably not helped by a noticeable gap between perception and reality.
A different poll, carried out by Ifop in 2012, found that 42% of the population felt that Islam threatened French identity, only one in three thought that Muslims were integrated in society - and a majority blamed Muslims for this.
And in a more recent survey, released by CSA at the end of 2014, 75% of French voters associated negative connotations with Islam.
Reducing all this as a rise of intolerance would though be simplistic. In 1991, the French electorate was split between discriminating between immigrants and natives when it came to employment.
While recent trends are tilting towards more discriminatory views, more than 70% remain against the idea that French workers should be prioritised.
The change in mood has been primarily in the acceptance of ideas that previously were considered dangerous - in other words, not simply a greater polarisation but at the same time, the values of previously marginalised ideas now compete with the mainstream. A mainstream that has increasingly lost trust.
Between the mid-80s and the beginning of the current decade, 70% to 80% of French people were in complete disagreement with the ideas of the far-right Front National. This figure has now dropped to below 60%. 20 years ago 65% to 75% felt the ideas of the party were dangerous. Today only one in two do.
Even among those that don’t vote for the Front National, a majority agrees with many of the party’s policies: the need to defend traditional French values, increase police powers, cut immigration - and believe “muslims in France have been granted too many rights and freedoms”.
Last year, for the first time ever, the Front National was the largest party in a nationwide election, and topped a presidential poll.
The tragedy in Paris is not about religion, or economic crisis, intolerance, integration, or the views of a single political party - and numbers will not tell us what it is about. Data without humanity is often meaningless. Numbers alone cannot explain a tragedy, but they can help provide a few of the threads, and the context and clarity needed to better understand complexity. What the figures do tell us is the story of a society that has changed - and has done so rapidly in a relatively short period of time - and the inability of too many to fully grasp the significance and meaning of these changes.