Syria: destruction and a dearth of diplomacy

President Obama's decision last year to call for the fall of the Assad regime, in which he was followed by Britain and other allies, was, it can be argued, a mistake. The reasons were understandable. First, the regime was behaving appallingly. Second, the US did not want to be behind the curve in another phase of the Arab spring, particularly as the Damascus government was, unlike the Mubarak government in Egypt, one which it had always disliked and which was tied to regional foes of America in the shape of Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Third, Israel welcomed anything that would undermine Syria and discomfit Iran, and so did Saudi Arabia and some other Gulf states. Fourth, Obama and his advisers probably believed that Assad had gone beyond the point where he could be part of any solution. Yet it was one thing to believe that Bashar al-Assad and his relatives and associates would at some point have to go, and another thing to say so in an irrevocably public way.

The unfortunate result has been to cut off any possibility of negotiations between the antagonists as well as to slam the door to close co-operation between the US and Russia, the two countries which could, if they acted together, conceivably make a difference to the outcome in Syria. It can be argued, of course, that the Syrian government has repudiated all suggestions that it should engage with those it terms terrorists, and that it undermined the Annan plan from the start. But time, and desperation, could have changed that. The Assad government is in a different, and worse, situation now than it was few months ago. Yet why would the regime ever agree to talks if its own liquidation is bound to be the first item on the agenda? Equally, why would insurgent groups contemplate any compromise when they feel the western powers, as well as many regional governments, are behind them? Finally, why should Russia go along with a policy of regime change in Syria when it would be open to a charge of dumping an ally, and would be making itself complicit in a scheme, as Vladimir Putin almost certainly sees it, to reduce Russia's own influence and reputation in the Middle East?

Because nobody can move diplomatically, the fires of war have been stoked up to the point where they threaten the ruination of a country of 24 million people. Now Aleppo, a handsome and historic city which had been largely spared until now, may be about to be smashed up. The conflict is, one can be certain, also rending Syria's social fabric. Not only relations between sects and faiths, but those between the classes, as a militarised rural peasantry joins, and often leads, the fighting. The possibility that extremists, al-Qaida and others, will try to move in, is obvious. The grim news from Iraq, where a new wave of bombings has taken many lives, suggests that Sunni extremists may now envisage a common front aimed at restoring Sunni dominance in both countries. All this bodes ill for the future, including any post-Assad future.

There are still those, like the small and brave non-violent Syrian opposition, who think there is another way, as a statement after a recent Sant'Egidio meeting in Rome reminds us. There are two options for outside powers now. One is to stand by as Syria burns, with some governments sustaining the rebels with arms supplies, and waiting for defections, assassinations, or mutinies in the armed forces to bring down the regime. If we could be sure it would happen quickly, that would be one thing. But what if Assad continues to hold on? For weeks, for months, even longer? That is why the second option, a return to diplomacy and, in particular, a new start by America and Russia in dealing with this terrible problem, cries out for consideration. Are they too entrenched, or too haplessly caught up in the consequences of their own decisions, to even try? If so, they will bear a heavy responsibility.