Introduction

With the immense impact of globalization on today’s world, a global information and communication society is in the making. Notably, international education is a vital component of this process, since it helps healthy development of intercultural communication among students and staff in different parts of the world. Through the internationalization of education, different programs like grant schemes, traineeship, or exchange programs become prioritized by many countries. Turkey, among one of these, organized different educational services in line with the needs brought by the global developments. Mevlana exchange program that envisages the exchange of students and academic staff with the entire world except the Erasmus exchange program’s area is one of these recent initiatives of Turkey.

Mevlana program is developed by Turkey’s Council of Higher Education (Yüksek Öğretim kurumu (YÖK)) in 2011, and its implementation has started in 2013. Mevlana is an ambitious program with its broad coverage of countries and an interesting one due to its creation in a country that had already a successfully implemented exchange program with the European Union (EU). Both aspects beg for answers, especially on the whereabouts and whyabouts of the program.

Considering the afore-mentioned aspects, this article investigates whether Mevlana program is transferred from the EU level and why. Therefore, it focuses on whats, hows, whys, and wheres of the Mevlana exchange program in higher education. The analysis, first and foremost, demonstrates a process of policy transfer in developing and implementing the Mevlana program. Second, EU’s Erasmus exchange program constituted a model for transfer to a wider extent and Mevlana seems a mini-Erasmus with comprehensive geographical coverage and limited scope. Therefore, Turkish experience of Erasmus paved the way for the Mevlana program. Third, Mevlana exchange program is designed as a tool for exercising soft power in line with the changes in Turkish foreign policy of 2000s. The answer of the why question for the Mevlana program, thus, rests on the wider voluntary changes in Turkish foreign policy.

The article starts with examining the framework of policy transfer. Next, it unpacks the Mevlana exchange program, compares it with Erasmus, and locates Mevlana within variety of policy transfer degrees. Last, it focuses on the why and how transfer questions and explores the logic and motivation behind the launch of the Mevlana exchange program.

Policy transfer

Policy transfer has increasingly attracted the attention of scholars in the recent years. Therefore, it has swiftly enlarged its sphere of influence on different disciplines. Despite different conceptualizations, policy transfer can be, by and large, defined as the travel of policies, institutions, and administrative structures from one place to another (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 344). The literature on policy transfer is developed and further improved both conceptually and theoretically by various questions like why actors engage in policy transfer or what the degrees of transfer are (Benson and Jordan 2011; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 2000).

Among various questions that led to the development of policy transfer framework in the literature, the question of who transfers is answered by a long list of actors: elected politicians, political parties, bureaucrats/civil servants, policy entrepreneurs/experts, academicians, think-tanks, pressure groups, transnational advocacy networks international, and supranational organizations (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 345; Evans 2010, 7; Stone 2000, 45–46).

The question of what is transferred is also identified within the policy transfer literature comprehensively as policy goals, structure and content, policy instruments or administrative techniques, institutions, ideology, ideas, attitudes and concepts and negative lessons (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 349–350; Evans 2010, 7; Stone 2000, 45–46).

On the degrees of transfer the literature identifies different outcomes as copying, emulation, hybridization, synthesis, inspiration, non-transfer as degrees of transfer (e.g., Bulmer et al. 2007, 17; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 13; Rose 1991, 21–22). First of all, copying emerges when a model in one country is adopted by another without making any modifications. Second, emulation signifies borrowing of a model that is seen as the best standard for designing a program and adapting it to national circumstances in some degree (Bulmer et al. 2007, 17; Rose 1991, 21). Third, while hybridization refers to a combination of two program that exist in different places, synthesis is the combination of various elements of different programs (Rose 1991, 21). Fourth, inspiration denotes an intellectual stimulus or inspiration for developing a program through studying problems emerged elsewhere (Rose 1991, 22). Last, non-transfer quite simply signifies a lack of transfer.

Where transfer is from is also explored in the literature through focusing on three levels of analysis: local, national, and international (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 12). At the local level, sub-national units may draw lessons from other local peers or from the national government. At the national level, policy makers may draw lessons from both national and local level political systems or units within their own countries (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 12; Rose 1991, 13). Last, at the international level, agents of transfer may transfer from other nations (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 12). The international level, though, cannot be reduced only to states without taking other international actors into consideration. It is vital to note that policy transfer of national agents may also be sourced from international or supranational institutions (Bulmer et al. 2007, 5).

Considering the whys and hows of policy transfer, different causal mechanisms and factors are identified in the literature. Before all, the starting point is the distinction between voluntary and coercive forms of transfer and different models between these two ends are identified to explain why and how policy transfer emerges (Bender et al. 2014; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 2000).

At one end of the transfer, voluntary transfer, which is equated to the lesson-drawing approach in the literature, refers to the search of policies by transfer agents for voluntary and rational policy transfer that is triggered by problems in the concerned area (Bender et al. 2014, 11; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 346–349; Evans 2010, 7–8). The model starts with the idea that rational actors choose to transfer policies due to severe policy problems or policy failures that cause policy dissatisfaction of policymakers with the status quo (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 14; Rose 1991, 12, Rose 1993, 61). In return, policymakers’ dissatisfaction leads them to learn lessons about more effective policies to remedy problems or failures (Rose 1991, 11). Therefore, being aware that current policy is not working (policy failure), policymakers search for alternative policy models to adopt voluntarily, and accordingly, solve the problems.

At the other end of the spectrum, coercive transfer denotes imposition of policies by external actors (e.g., states, international organizations) on national governments through their colonial, imperialist, or military occupation (Bulmer et al. 2007, 14; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 13). It is important to note that the literature differentiate such forced imposition of a policy as direct coercive transfer and indirect one resulting from transnational externalities and global interconnectedness driving states to cooperate and solve problems together (Benson and Jordan 2011, 370; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 348). Yet, indirect coercive transfer driven by various factors (e.g., technology, global economy, regional competition, international consensus) does not really signify an imposition of a policy, therefore not really coercion, and needs to be considered within the mixed types of transfer. At the end, it can be said that the distinction for coercive transfer in the literature is redundant.

Considering coercive and voluntary transfer as two ends of transfer, in between various forms of mixed transfer (i.e., obligated transfer, negotiated transfer, international externalities) exist and so do different models to explain policy transfer (Bender et al. 2014, 11; Bulmer et al. 2007; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 13–15; Evans 2010, 8). To start with, obligated transfer, close to the end of coercive transfer, refers to the adaptation of policies into the national system due to the obligations of a country’s membership to certain international regimes and structures (Bulmer et al. 2007, 15; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 15). Negotiated transfer as another type of mixed transfer, which is also close to the coercive forms of transfer, refers to the policy change to secure loans or credits by international actors like the EU and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Evans 2010, 8).

International externalities like international competition or international image can also play a role in the mixed transfer. States can engage transfer of policies like privatization or deregulation due to increasing importance of capital mobility and, accordingly, arising international competition (Marsh and Sharman 2009, 271). Besides, states can transfer policies to strengthen or retain their international image as well as to accord with international consensus on an issue (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 13).

In conclusion, as explored, the literature on policy transfer has gradually been systemized in the last decades and it provides a detailed road map for analysis. Besides, now it can be said that policy transfer constitutes a distinct research area as well as an approach employed within different research areas like globalization (Benson and Jordan 2011, 366–367).

Inspiration, copying or what? Mevlana exchange program and policy transfer

Considering the question-based framework of the policy transfer literature, transfer of Mevlana exchange program is analyzed in this part through different questions that leads unpacking different aspects of the process. Starting with the what-question, the sources of and reasons for the transfer are explored in detail in the following sections.

What exactly? Mevlana exchange Program in higher education

Mevlana Exchange Program was launched in 2011 for “the exchange of students and academic staff between the Turkish higher education institutions and higher education institutions of other countries” (YÖK 2017, 1). The aim of the program is detailed as

making Turkey a centre of attraction in higher education area; increasing the academic capacity of Turkish higher education institutions; contributing to the globalization process of higher education; sharing the historical and cultural heritage of Turkey in a global scale; enriching the culture of respect and tolerance to differences by increasing intercultural interaction (YÖK 2017, 3).

As seen in the declared aims, the program has been designed to open the Turkish higher education to the global arena as well as to increase cultural interaction with others that would, in return, strengthen Turkey’s recognition and attraction in the area for the outer world. Besides, the program raises attention on the issues like tolerance and respect, which is also reflected by its name, since Mevlana or Rumi is an intellectual representing tolerance and non-discrimination, which is also widely known by his famous words: “Come, come whoever you are.” In addition to this, Mevlana as a student and scholar visited various institutions in different countries for educational purposes (YÖK 2017, 2). Therefore, the name of the program, to a large extent, reflects the afore-mentioned aims of the program.

The interesting point in the program is its comprehensive framework that covers countries from all around the world without imposing any geographical limits. Therefore, it includes the exchange of student and academic staff in any higher education institution of Turkey and countries that sign the Program’s protocol in any part of the world (Official Gazette 2011). Such inclusive feature is also stressed by the Turkish authorities with an emphasis on the difference of Mevlana from other exchange programs (YÖK 2017, 1). Moreover, other regional or international exchange programs are criticized by Turkish authorities because of their limited geographical coverage and, in consequence limited contribution to the globalization of Higher education (YÖK 2017, 5).

Despite stressing no geographical limits within the program, EU countries that are part of Erasmus scheme are excluded from the Mevlana program (YÖK 2017, 1). The exclusion leads to questions like whether Mevlana stands as an alternative or complementary of Eramus program. Yet, the president of YÖK, Gökhan Çetinsaya, clarified this in one of his speeches by emphasizing Mevlana as a complementary program covering where Erasmus does not, and therefore, not an alternative to the Erasmus (Hürriyet 2013).

Notably, the implementation of the Mevlana has begun in 2013 with a fast-start as can be seen in the Table 1. Besides many universities in various countries (e.g., the USA, China, Azerbaijan, Japan) participated to the program in a short period of time (YÖK 2017). By and large, the Mevlana program is in progress of implementation and its implementation can only be evaluated in the upcoming years.

Table 1 Incoming and outgoing students and staff within the Mevlana exchange program—2013–2014
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All in all, Mevlana exchange program is a geographically comprehensive program focusing exclusively on mobility of students and academic staff. Yet, the fundamental features of Mevlana resembles very much to the Erasmus exchange program of the EU that will be explored in the next sections in detail.

Transfer from where? EU’s Erasmus program

As a widely known and successful program, EU’s Erasmus comes to mind at once regarding student and academic staff exchange in higher institutions. Erasmus has been implemented for some time now in Turkey, as a participating EU candidate country to the program. Therefore, the implementation of the program before the launch of Turkey’s own initiative necessitates an analysis of Erasmus to question possible policy transfer of the EU model.

Erasmus was first launched in 1987 as a stand-alone exchange project, and it has evolved through the years constituting a best practice for European higher education (EU 2012). In 1990s, Erasmus became a part of a comprehensive program (i.e., Socrates) that brought different education programs together under the same umbrella and of the Bologno process.Footnote 1 In 2007, Socrates program was turned into Lifelong Learning Programme, in which Erasmus became a sub-program. In 2014–2020, Erasmus + replaced all and began to be implemented as an education, training, youth, and sport program.

While mostly referred with its mobility dimension, Erasmus has been a comprehensive initiative including different areas (e.g., curricular development and integration) (Maiworm 2001, 460). Over time, the program widened its scope and it was also integrated with other developments in the European education sphere like the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS), which improved degree of recognition through calculation of credits in Erasmus (Maiworm 2001, 466). Therefore, without losing its focus on mobility, much got changed and improved from Erasmus to Erasmus +.

The name of the program comes from the Dutch philosopher Desiderius Erasmus, an influential humanist of the fifteenth and sixteenth century. He was a leading intellectual and a reformist in education, who traveled to many countries for educational purposes and focused on humanist educational theory. He represents the quest for knowledge, experience, and insight through interacting with people in other countries thanks to his mobility in Europe to gather such experience (Feyen and Krzaklewska 2013, 10). Importantly, Erasmus program is not a coincidence that the EU chose this name for its exchange program.

For 30 years, Erasmus has been implemented in Europe to enhance student mobility and the quality of higher education; promote intra-European cooperation in higher education as well as cooperation with the Third Countries in the field, strengthen interaction among the EU citizens and the understanding of the EU citizenship, and increase intercultural understanding (European Commission 2017; Maiworm 2001). Therefore, it has a wider aim of strengthening the quality of higher education with increasing the European dimension within it.

Despite the afore-mentioned broader aims, the primary motivation behind Erasmus had two dimensions: European identity and European labor market. First of all, Erasmus has a strategic aim to instill “a feeling of European identity among its future elites” (Kuhn 2012, 997). Therefore, Erasmus has been seen as a tool for pushing Europeans to see what they have in common and develop a supranational European identity through providing opportunities for cultural exchange. Second, in 1990s, through advanced changes in different sectors and globalization, education in general and Erasmus program specifically have been perceived as “an economic commodity to be used to foster Europeans’ employability and to advance the EU as a knowledge based society” and therefore, seen as a tool for contributing to the European labor market (Kuhn 2012, 997).

Considering Turkey as a party of Erasmus, the country has officially become a party of the Erasmus in 2004 and the implementation started in the country for the first time in the 2004–2005 academic year with a pilot implementation in the previous year. In regard to the mobility of students and staff, the number of student and staff exchange notably shows increasing implementation of the program in Turkey (see Table 2). It cannot be denied that such increasing trend of implementation brings a learning process with itself for both the implementers and the target groups.

Table 2 Incoming and outgoing students and staff within the Erasmus exchange program—2004–2014
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As seen, Erasmus is a comprehensive program that has actively contributed to the European integration process. As a success story and “the best-known and largest exchange program in the world,” Erasmus has even become a “brand and a symbol,” therefore, not only an educational initiative (Feyen and Krzaklewska 2013, 9,11). As a result, it represents a strong sample and a model for any country to develop exchange programs in higher education.

Transfer of what? Mevlana emulating Erasmus

Turkey’s experience of Erasmus seems an influential reference or model for the Mevlana program, since similarities between the two exchange programs are noteworthy. Nevertheless, in order to demonstrate whether there is a policy transfer from the EU level, it is necessary to unpack both of the programs and compare them in detail.

To start with comparing Mevlana with Erasmus (see Table 3), both programs are named after intellectuals, who traveled many countries for educational purposes and represented values like tolerance. Regarding actions within the programs, Mevlana seems more limited version of Erasmus, since it has only covered student and academic staff mobility. Besides the target groups of Mevlana and Erasmus differ slightly considering Erasmus’ inclusive character of different groups like youth workers.

Table 3 Erasmus vs. Mevlana
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The geographical coverage of the programs also differs. While EU member states and non-EU states resided in Europe are the main program countries in Erasmus, the program also includes partner countries all around the world that may participate to Erasmus in a limited fashion. Mevlana, on the other, has a contra-Erasmus geographical coverage, including countries in the entire world with geographical limitation only to the primary Erasmus program countries.

While institutions to implement the programs are in the same format, Erasmus is a more institutionalized program including different institutions for implementation like national agencies. Regarding the operational frameworks of the two, again they have the same road map: bilateral agreements with the parties. The timeline of the programs, terms of application, financing, and accreditation are also very much similar in both programs. Considering the limitations in the programs, while Mevlana limits mobility once for students during their studies and once for academic staff in an academic year, Erasmus allows mobility multiple times for students up to 12 months per study cycle and for academic staff for a maximum duration of 60 days.

To conclude, the comparison of Mevlana and Erasmus exchange programs signifies that Mevlana is emulated by the Turkish authorities from Erasmus. While Erasmus is a more comprehensive and institutionalized exchange program regarding its target group and actions, Mevlana seems a more limited version of Erasmus. Therefore, Mevlana exchange program represents an instance of emulation (i.e., borrowing of a model and adopting it more or less the same of the original) within the policy transfer framework. Yet, the reasons and ways of emulation need to be analyzed to grasp the whole transfer process and the next section focuses on this.

Why and how policy transfer? The transfer process and the logic behind

The process of policy transfer regarding Mevlana demonstrates a voluntary path. Before all, it is necessary to stress that none of the other policy transfer mechanisms were at play to drive the launch of Mevlana program. There was no coercive imposition by any external actors on the Turkish government for adopting the program; no obligations of Turkey to any international regimes and structures to create such a program (i.e., obligated transfer); no necessity to have the program for securing loans or credits from international actors (i.e., negotiated transfer) and no push by international competition or image as international externalities.

To begin with, if it is voluntary, it is the domestic; therefore, the reasons for the launch of Mevlana program can be found within the domestic arena. In essence, the motivation behind the voluntary emulation of Mevlana from Erasmus is related to the increasing importance of soft power for Turkey in line with its changing foreign policy. Notably, Turkey has experienced a drastic change in its foreign policy in 2000s with the AKP’s consecutive governments through Ahmet Davutoğlu, the advisor of the Prime Minister in 2002–2009 and the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2009–2014, as the architect of the policy (Doğan 2014, 265).

Davutoğlu’s foreign policy relied on the “strategic depth” that envisages increasing Turkey’s influence as a regional power in the Middle East via its soft power and Ottoman legacy (Cop and Zihnioğlu 2017, 29; Müftüler-Bac 2011, 281–282). Davutoğlu was critical of the previous foreign policy practices and adopted a new vision in foreign policy-making on the basis of five principles: zero problem policy towards neighbors, developing relations with the neighbor regions and beyond; a balance between security and democracy, adherence to the multidimensional foreign policy, and rhythmic diplomacy (Davutoğlu 2008; Doğan 2014, 265; Turan 2012, 75). To exercise these principles, a more confident, conciliatory, dynamic and proactive foreign policy was adopted by Davutoğlu (Aras 2014, 405; Müftüler-Bac 2011, 281).

Until the Arab Spring in 2011, Davutoğlu’s envisaged foreign policy was exercised and the Arab Spring shifted the balances in the Middle East complicating Turkey’s relations with its neighbors (i.e., Russia, Iran) (Aras 2014, 408). While Turkey welcome the developments out of the Arab Spring, even “Davutoğlu himself interpreted the Arab uprisings as an honourable act of ending the old order […]” (Aras 2014, 408). A number of events like the intensified Russian military involvement in Syrian civil war, massive refugee flows to Turkey or the Daesh problem after the Arab Spring challenged Turkish foreign policy and led to critiques of failure in Davutoğlu’s foreign policy vision (Keyman 2016, 2280; Oğuzlu 2016, 60, 64). At the end, “Turkey was unable to recalibrate its foreign policy” in line with the increasing challenges in especially the Middle East (Keyman 2016, 2283).

No matter what, Davutoğlu’s principles reflect a dramatic change in Turkish foreign policy in many aspects: Turkey as a the bridge in between the East and the West argument is replaced by Turkey as a problem-solving country; the implementation of the foreign policy has become proactive; the unidimensional policy focusing exclusively on the West is replaced by a multi-dimensional one; one-dimensional use of Turkey’s historical luggage/assets is strengthened with history, strategic thinking and political will; the security-based understanding of foreign policy focusing on hard power is replaced by the cooperative understanding of the policy with increasing application of soft power and emphasis on zero problems with the neighbors (Doğan 2014, 265; Hale and Özbudun 2010, 120–212, 144; Turan 2012, 75).

As mentioned, Turkey’s new vision in the foreign policy includes a new emphasis on the soft dimension of power. In today’s global information age, soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather coercion or payments” has become relevant day to day and Turkey has also adjusted its foreign policy in line with the necessities of the global time (Nye 2005, 34, 56). Public diplomacy is an arena for the application of soft power, including cultural diplomacy as “a state’s endeavour to promote and facilitate the international diffusion of its culture” (Angey-Sentuc and Molho 2015, 4). Therefore, culture “in places where it is attractive to others” is one among many sources of the soft power and culture “is transmitted through personal contacts, visits, and exchanges” (Nye 2005, 41, 42). At the end, within the framework of cultural diplomacy, education and international exchange programs constitute a vital place.

When it comes to the Turkish case, the literature heavily focuses on the Turkish model merging Islam with democracy rather than exploring various sources of soft power (e.g., Altunışık 2008; Oğuzlu 2016). Angey-Sentuc and Molho (2015, 6) rightfully ascertain this tendency in the literature as follows:

In the majority of these works, soft power tends to be used in a normative manner: it is regarded as the power of a democratised, economically open Turkey whose ability to combine Islam and democracy is regarded as an inspiration to Arab countries […] These academic productions propose to investigate the degree of compatibility between Islam and democracy or explain the difficulties of anchoring democratic values in the region […]

Rather, Turkish soft power relies on different sources like Turkey’s active involvement in conflict mediation, global donors, international education programs including exchange programs, and Turkish soap operas transmitting the Turkish culture out of Turkey’s borders (Aras 2014; Demiryol 2013). Therefore, for a systematic analysis of the Turkish soft power, one needs to explore the sources of the soft power, among which the Mevlana program exist, in detail without sticking one dimension only.

Considering concrete developments regarding Turkish exercise of soft power, increasing activities of the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı (TİKA)), Yunus Emre Institutes and the Turkish Red Crescent Society (Kızılay) in different parts of the world, the expansion of routes in Turkish Airlines that improved Turkey’s international image through providing good quality service with wider coverage of regions are only few of them (Altınay 2008, 63; Aras 2014, 411; Kalın 2011, 21).

Most importantly and relevant here, exchange programs in higher education constitute an important vehicle for soft power, due to their role in the internationalization of the higher education through creating international contacts, cultural exchange and host country-friendly generations abroad being the future elites of their countries as well as improving international image of the countries (Hukil 2015, 20; Nye 2005, 42, 45; Peterson 2014, 2–3; Riordan 2005, 185). Mevlana exchange program, therefore, constitutes a vital source and a tool for the Turkish exercise of soft power.

The afore-mentioned dimension is also reflected in many YÖK documents and statements by both Çetinsaya as the President of YÖK and Davutoğlu as the architect of the Turkish foreign policy at that time. To illustrate, Çetinsaya wrote in a document published by YÖK providing a roadmap to the Turkish Higher Education regarding its growth, quality standards and internationalization: “Turkish higher education has become a component of Turkish soft power” (Çetinsaya 2014, 187). Therefore, a direct link has been established between Turkish soft power and internationalization in Turkish higher education also stated as follows:

Turkey has recently increased its regional and global efficiency and our country has taken more responsibility in providing solutions to the international problems. Within this context, internationalization is consistent with the aim of establishing political and cultural proximity through acquiring soft power, of which the importance has multiplied (Bakanlığı 2014, 3).

In addition, Çetinsaya stresses such argument of higher education as a tool for the soft power of Turkey considering Turkish multiculturalism and its geographical location in different speeches (Anadolu Agency 2014). Another statement of Çetinsaya emphasizes the consistency of internationalization of Turkish Higher Education in the twenty-first century with the Turkish foreign policy and Turkish aims within the century (Hürriyet 2013). Moreover, Davutoğlu stresses the importance of Mevlana exchange program for creating Turkish-friendly generations abroad as: “we need to plant a new generation in Africa, Asia and Latin America like seeds that are influenced by the philosophy of Mevlana and Turkish-friendly when they are back in their countries” (Hürriyet 2013).

Considering the how transfer question finds its answer in the implementation of Erasmus for years by Turkey. As Radaelli (2000) stresses, the EU represents a “massive transfer platform” for both its member states and candidate states. It is not a coincidence that Erasmus as a highly institutionalized program was seen as a successful model for Turkey in designing Mevlana program and the experience acquired by the implementation of Erasmus helped the development of the Mevlana. This perspective is also reflected by Çetinsaya with a number of statements by stressing the already institutionalized and successfully implemented structure of Erasmus and the contribution of the Turkish experience from Erasmus and FarabiFootnote 2 exchange programs to the development of Mevlana program (Daily Sabah Politics 2014; Hürriyet 2013). Therefore, the experience from the Erasmus paved the ways for developing Mevlana as seen within the content of it being very much similar with Erasmus.

In conclusion, the reasons behind developing the Mevlana exchange program rest on the changing Turkish foreign policy that aims exercising, to a great extent, soft power tools, of which Mevlana is among one of them. Therefore, the process signifies voluntary ways of transfer through emulating Erasmus exchange program.

Conclusion

International exchange programs are quite popular worldwide due to their win-win character, especially contributing to the internationalization of education in a globalizing world and improving the positive image of the partner countries. Within this context, launching an exchange program covering almost the entire world is vital and quite an ambitious project for Turkey.

As seen from the analysis, the case of Turkey’s Mevlana exchange program in the higher education constitutes an example of policy transfer by taking the EU model (i.e., Erasmus). To demonstrate the process in detail, the article unpacked the Mevlana program through focusing on different questions that are posed within the policy transfer literature. At the end, the article demonstrated that Turkish authorities created Mevlana through drawing on the Erasmus experience; Mevlana was designed as a geographically inclusive but content wise limited version of Erasmus. This was also confirmed in a speech by the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, asking YÖK president to turn the Mevlana exchange program into an Erasmus-like and even more advanced program for the Muslim countries’ higher education (T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı 2017).

Considering the logic and motivation behind the program, Mevlana was in line with the global and domestic developments. With the change in Turkish foreign policy of 2000s, progressive exercise of soft power and its tools step forward within the area in the last decade. As widely known now, hard power (i.e., “the ability to get what you want through coercion or payments”) is not the only game in today’s world and among the sources of soft power, international exchange programs have a significant place as they increase cultural interaction and contribute to the positive image of the country (Nye 2005). Within this context, the launch of Mevlana is in line with the increasing importance of soft power in the Turkish foreign policy.

All in all, Mevlana exchange program denotes a process of policy transfer that resulted with emulation of the Erasmus exchange program. Though, the success and implementation of the program can only be evaluated in the upcoming years, since Mevlana is a very young initiative. Nevertheless, even the launch of the program is alone a very ambitious and important step to catch the global trends for Turkey.