When Do Donor Endorsements Help or Hurt? Policy Advocacy and Men's Interests in Malawi

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Abstract

Development organizations seek to improve support for gender reforms, especially among populations who might undermine implementation. Yet, little is known about how policy advocates shape citizens' views. Using a framing experiment implemented among 1,704 Malawians embedded in the LGPI, we randomly assigned respondents to six groups to receive a control or endorsement of gender quotas or land reform from women's organizations (WOs) or western donors (WDs). We propose an interest theory of public opinion formation and find that, overall, WOs or WDs are as effective as the control for quotas, but cause backfire effect for land reforms—highly sensitive issues threatening men's interests. Effects vary most across respondent gender, with messengers generally causing backfire effects among men, but having either no impact or a positive impact among women. Our results extend the governance literature by disaggregating gender issues and questioning whether endorsement-based campaigns improve support among populations with entrenched interests.

Keywords: International aid and development policy, policy advocacy, experiment, women's rights, public opinion, electoral gender quotas, land reform, Malawi

Introduction

Gender based reform has long been a pillar of international development efforts, driven by an ideological commitment to women's empowerment (UN-Women, SDG, Goal 5, 2017) and the pragmatic view that gaps in education, healthcare, and political participation harm society (Duflo, 2012). Gender inequality, it is argued, has repercussions for women as well as men, whose welfare depends "to a large extent on the quality of [familial] relationships" as sons and husbands (Connell, 2005: 1812-3).

Yet, while gender equality has broad benefits for society as a whole, some citizens feel threatened by changing gender relations (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004: 761). Recognizing the need to sensitize the population to reforms, many aid and women's organizations sponsor campaigns to improve public attitudes, especially among men and others with entrenched interests, about issues such as child marriage, domestic violence, and underrepresentation of women. For example, through their "Stop Child Marriage" campaign in Malawi, western donors (WDs), international non-government organizations (NGOs), and domestic women's rights organizations (WOs) worked together to reduce public acceptance of child marriage and lobby legislators for legal reform (Muriaas, Tønnessen, and Wang, forthcoming).[1]

Yet, while common sense suggests that public campaigns should improve public support for human rights, scholars know little about whether they actually have their intended effects. This is surprising, given that there is emerging evidence that distrusted messengers can

[1] Mkandawire and Dunning, "Why Malawi's Ban on Child Marriage is a Game-Changer for Girls' Education Everywhere," 31 March, 2015. http://campaignforeducationusa.org/blog/detail/why-malawis-ban-on-child-marriage-is-a-game-changer-for-girls-education-eve (accessed 3 March, 2018).

unintentionally undermine support for reforms (Kunda, 1990; Molden and Higgins, 2005). This is especially the case when considering the wide range of gender reforms. Non-doctrinal (public) issues like electoral gender quotas are relatively more easily achieved than doctrinal (private) issues like land reform, which are sensitive and threaten entrenched interests (Htun and Weldon, 2018; Sadiqi, 2008). Nascent work looks at policy advocates' impact (Muriaas et al., Forthcoming; Bush and Jamal, 2015; Masoud et al., 2015), but does not disaggregate these theoretically distinct gender reforms in relation to how they affect entrenched interests.

To address this gap, this study employs an experiment implemented among 1,704 respondents embedded in the Local Governance Performance Index (LGPI), a survey conducted in Malawi in April 2016. To test our interest theory of public opinion formation, respondents are randomly assigned to six groups to hear about an electoral gender quota or customary land reform from Malawian women's organizations (WOs), western donors (WDs), or a control. This design allows for assessment of how endorsements affect public opinion: (1) across domestic and international advocates, (2) two gender reforms which vary in their sensitivity, and (3) population subgroups (i.e., patrilineal and matrilineal groups, gender, and views on gender equality) which have different interests with respect to reforms.

The results are intriguing. Gender is the strongest driver of endorsements' effects on attitudes. Effects are larger and typically negative for men—offering evidence for a backfire effect, or impact in the unintended direction (Kunda, 1990; Molden and Higgins, 2005)—while for women, it is small and positive. International and domestic advocates cause a backfire effect for men across both lineage systems and supporters and non-supporters of gender equality when it comes to land reform. Advocacy for gender quotas, however, can be effective among men holding positive views of gender equality across lineage type, suggesting the importance of an intersectional approach.

To our knowledge, this is the first study that contrasts how support for gender quotas is shaped by international and domestic advocacy, in contrast to another type of reform issue, land reform. Current approaches to gender and development lump gender issues together, missing important differences in their impacts and the need for tailored programs depending on the issue and target population.

These findings hold important implications for scholars studying both governance and policymaking. Consistent with Bush and Jamal's (2015) study of foreign and domestic-supported reform for women in politics in Jordan, this study shows that endorsements by WDs and WOs have similar average effects on popular support for reform, indicating that what matters is not who endorses the reform, but rather the type of policy promoted, and how policy reform triggers cooperation or resistance depending on how it impacts respondents' interests. International advocacy is most effective when addressing the underrepresentation of women in elected political office, but suppresses support for land reforms when respondents' personal interests are at stake. Just as Carothers (2006) warned that international pressure might provoke public outrage where citizens are predisposed to distrust outside donors, this study demonstrates that efforts to promote gender equality may cause negative reactions even in donor friendly environments like Malawi. Policymakers and scholars must take reform type and the target population into consideration, or policy endorsements may fail.

International and Domestic Gender Reform Advocacy in Malawi

A highly aid dependent country and one of the poorest in the world, Malawi provides a useful case in which to examine international and domestic actors' impacts on gender attitudes. With a Human Development Index (2015) ranking of 177 out of 188 countries, just over half of Malawians live below the national poverty line and more than 80% live in rural areas (United Nations Development Programme, 2008). As elsewhere in Africa, there is a strong presence of

WDs, with more than 30% of Malawi's national budget coming from foreign support (Malawi Ministry of Finance, 2012: 19).

Because of Malawi's aid dependence, international organizations like the United Nations (UN), WDs, and NGOs are important economic and political actors.[2] WDs, in collaboration with Malawian WOs, play an important role in promoting gender equality (Chiweza et al., 2016), and often have substantial leverage. Bush (2011) found, for instance, that the most important predictor of states' adoption of electoral gender quotas was reliance on foreign aid, which incentivizes national governments to introduce reforms that are consistent with international norms of gender equality. Edgell (2017: 1116) found that women's empowerment interventions from Development Assistance Committee countries encouraged states to adopt gender quotas. In Malawi, WDs and WOs fund a gender commission within the Malawi Law Commission—a constitutionally-mandated body that makes recommendations on proposed laws to ensure compliance with the constitution and international law.

Attitudes toward WD and WO Influence

Because of donors' clout—and the sensitive reforms they advocate for—not all Malawians believe that these organizations help their country. This is due in part to donor priorities, like promoting gender equality, which many citizens perceive as being "pushed" from outside. Overall, WDs and NGOs are seen more negatively than Malawian organizations, even though there is some overlap in their priorities. Malawians are at best only partially convinced that outside actors help them, with women more skeptical than men. 7% of Malawians see their

[2] Respondents are likely to see WDs and IOs like the UN as one in the same because western countries are major donors to these organizations.

local civic organizations and NGOs as too influential, while 15% see international donors/NGOs as having too much influence (Figure 1a).

Figure 1a. Perceptions of IOs' and Malawian civic organizations' influence



Afrobarometer (2008). "How much influence do international donors/NGOs have?" "How much influence Malawian civic organizations/NGOs have?"

However, there is a gender gap, with *men* more likely to view these international organizations favorably (Figure 1b). Only 43% of women and 49% of men stated in Malawi that international donors and NGOs help a lot, a statistically significant gender difference ($p<.05$).

Figure 1b. Perceptions of how much IOs and NGOs help Malawi, by gender



Afrobarometer (2008). "How much help do international donors/NGOs provide?"

Moreover, while women are more skeptical than men about how much international donors help Malawi, men are more likely to believe these organizations wield too much *influence* (Figure 1c). 22% of women and 12% of men state that these organizations have too little influence, a significant gender difference ($p<.05$). This suggests that men may be more critical and distrustful of the donor agendas than women.

Figure 1c. Perceptions of IOs' and NGOs' influence in Malawi, by gender



Afrobarometer (2008). "How much influence do international donors/NGOs have?"

Data from the Afrobarometer (2008) suggest similar patterns of distrust in other African countries, and generally more skeptical views among men.[3] Yet Malawi has the most significant *gender gap* in Africa on both questions, with women feeling that WDs do not offer enough help and are not influential enough. Aid dependency alone cannot explain Malawians' views toward international organizations, but aid dependency may lead to a gender gap in attitudes about outside influence, since many of the reforms set out to change fundamental gender relations in a highly patriarchal society. Men in particular seem to harbor underlying unease or anger toward the influence of outside actors. Therefore, gender reform endorsement by WDs and WOs can be expected to have different effects across genders, as well as across citizens from different lineage traditions and view on women's empowerment.

[3] See Appendix Table A1.1 and Table A1.2.

Electoral Gender Quotas and Land Reform

Two areas in which WDs and WOs have consistently worked to affect change in Malawi are electoral gender quotas and land reform. Yet, these reforms, while lumped together as "gender issues," vary in their sensitivity and impact on entrenched, patriarchal interests. Studies in political science, sociology, and women's studies demonstrate this complexity. Htun and Weldon (2018) distinguish between more sensitive doctrinal and less sensitive nondoctrinal gender rights. Land rights (i.e., property rights) can be regarded as a private right in patrilineal or matrilineal societies in Africa because land is allocated by customary law (Hudson, Bowen, and Nielsen, 2015). In contrast, non-doctrinal issues like electoral gender quotas, issues which presumably are less threatening to men's interests, have been achieved more readily than doctrinal issues like land reform or banning child marriage (Htun and Weldon, 2018). Writing on Morocco, Sadiqi (2008) terms these 'public' and 'provide' rights, and like other scholars, notes that while women have achieved political rights in many Arab countries (e.g., voting), family law, which is based on Shari'a law, remains deeply resistant to reform. In other regions, reforms addressing family law are more difficult to pass than parliamentary quotas and need elaborate and carefully thought out strategies to avoid resistance (Tripp et al., 2009; Htun and Weldon, 2018; Muriaas et al., 2017). Gender quotas are sensitive issues, but land reform cuts to the heart of established power relations and economic interests.

The case of Malawi illustrates that while distinct in their impact on interests, both quotas as well as gender-sensitive land reform have been difficult to achieve. In 2013, a provision on quotas for women in politics was removed from the Gender Equality Bill prior to its tabling in parliament. Instead, international organizations supported the 50/50 campaign, which trained and funded female candidates (Wang, Muriaas, and Kayuni, Forthcoming). Even though gender quotas are often seen as a *relatively* less sensitive reform, many men in particular saw their

interests as threatened. In interviews conducted by the author, an officer in the Ministry of Gender explained that male MPs strongly opposed the bill, arguing that it is discriminatory. "Male MPs were so loud on this [quotas in the gender equality bill]. They argued that everyone should compete on equal footing" (Interview Peter Yelesani 03.02.2014). The quota provision did not pass and women won just 16% of seats in parliament in 2016.

So too, WDs and WOs advocate for reforms that secure women's access to land, but their efforts have been mixed (Chiweza et al. 2017). Land reform is complex, and many citizens—patrilineal and matrilineal and men and women—are apprehensive about WDs and WOs' role shaping these reforms which impact Malawians' basic livelihoods.

Resistance to land reform has also been deeply linked to patrilocal and patrilineal lineage customs. In Malawi, ethnic groups that follow matrilineal and matrilocal customs pass land to women, while those that adhere to patrilineal and patrilocal customs pass land to men.[4] The lineage-based smallholder system is insecure for both genders, as rapid population growth has dramatically reduced per capita landholding sizes (Chinsinga, 2011). Land owned by female-headed households in Malawi are generally smaller, produce less maize, and have fewer

[4] The main distinction is where newly married families and their offspring identify as home. In patrilineal traditions, land is inherited through the male lineage, while in matrilineal families, land is passed through the female offspring (Kishindo, 2004). However, even if matrilineality is significantly associated with smaller gender gaps in civic and political engagement (Gottlieb and Robinson, 2018) and higher prevalence of women leaders (Muriaas et al., 2018), even in matrilineal systems, paternal authority over offspring rests with uncles, not the father (Arnfred, 2011: 46). Most of Malawi's population lives in matrilineal ethnic groups, including the Chewa, Yao, and Lomwe. Patrilineal areas include the Tumbuka, North Ngoni, and Sena.

livestock. Yet, while international groups worked to ensure that the proposed formalization of the landholding system would not hurt women, proposed reforms will not automatically benefit women (Berge et al., 2014: 61).

In 2016, the parliament passed four land-related bills that the opposition claimed would disadvantage poor landowners (The Nation, July 20, 2016). Domestic WOs, including the leading NGO Gender Coordination Network, also expressed concern about the gender implications of the land reform: "The laws that are there governing land are not as gender sensitive as one would want them to be, and…they [the Customary Land Bill and the Land Bill] may not improve things in favor of women as we want them to" (Interview Victor Maulidi 12.08.2014).

Theory and Hypotheses

WDs and WOs operate under the assumption that campaigns will improve support for reforms equally across citizens and reform type. This assumption is based on the belief that messages presented by an expert source, such as western donors and NGOs, will be convincing and have straightforward effects (Muriaas et al., 2018; Benstead, Kao, and Lust, 2017).[5] This should especially be the case for WOs, whose members are likely be seen as having stereotyped competencies in gender policy (Muriaas et al. Forthcoming; Eagly and Karau 2002; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993). Consistently with this expectation, Clayton et al. (Forthcoming) find that gender-balanced judicial panels are seen as having greater substantive legitimacy than all male panels on sexual harassment decisions.

[5] At least two types of authority can be distilled: structural power and gendered policy competence. WOs are expected to have policy expertise in areas consistent with traditional gender roles, such as women and child's issues. WDs are likely have both forms of authority.

One expectation, therefore, is that citizens will regard quota and land reform endorsements as authoritative and be positively affected by the statements, due to the perceived qualifications of WDs and WOs on development and women's issues and their ability to deliver aid in exchange for reforms. The conventional wisdom, or naïve approach, thus assumes a positive and homogenous effect. Both authority types will positively impact citizens' attitudes and that they will do so equally across respondent groups and both gender reform types.

Conventional Wisdom:

H1: WDs and WOs will increase support across all recipients and gender reform types.

Yet, political communication literature demonstrates that people process information consistently with their preexisting beliefs (Kunda, 1990; Molden and Higgins, 2005). The Malawian case leads us to expect that the endorsements' impact will depend on how the recipients' perceived interests would be impacted by the reforms, which in turn are related to the type of receiver and whether it is a more sensitive reform. Thus, we propose an interest theory of public opinion formation.

Expectations across Population Subgroup

Endorsements shape attitudes according to two mechanisms—biased assimilation and backfire effects—which can operate simultaneously. Biased assimilation occurs when respondents accept information that confirms what they already believe, leading to even stronger views, while they discount and are unaffected by evidence that they disagree with, or which comes from a messenger they distrust or see as working against their interests. The first to show this empirically, Lord et al. (1979) demonstrated that participants interpreted studies more positively when the results supported their existing attitudes. Laboratory (Edwards & Smith,

1996; Miller et al., 1993; Zuwerink & Devine, 1996) and field studies (e.g. Ahluwalia, 2000; Munro et al., 2002) confirm this bias. If biased assimilation is operating, individuals in this study will listen to the messages they agree with and see as supporting their interests, leading to stronger views in the direction of the message. Individuals who do not agree with the message will simply ignore and be unaffected by it. Biased assimilation expects that campaigners' impact is limited because their policy endorsement mostly affects those who already support gender equality.

But, there is another, more nefarious possibility. Ditto and Lopez (1992), who first identified backfire effects, find that individuals who receive unwelcome information that runs counter to their prior beliefs or from a distrusted messenger may not only disagree, but may also come to *support* their original conviction more strongly than before. In three experiments, Ditto and Lopez identified motivated skepticism—i.e., participants requiring more information and longer cognitive processing time to reach a preference-inconsistent conclusion than a preference-consistent conclusion. Petty and Briñol (2010: 228) nicely sums up the logic: "...any time a message takes a position opposed to an existing attitude, people are likely to be biased against it - wanting to reject it. And when a message takes a position in favour of your attitudes, you likely will be biased in favor of it - wanting to accept it." If backfire effects are operating, those whose interests are threatened by the message will develop even deeper opposition, while those who agree with the message will be unaffected. Bush and Jamal (2015) show that an American endorsement of women's political leadership in Jordan has no average effect on popular support for women's representation. Yet, foreign *and* domestic endorsements of gender equality depress support among Jordanians who oppose their regime. This is due to citizens' perceptions that western support for their regime is detrimental to their interests.

Accordingly, the statements' impact may vary across population sub-groups. If biased assimilation occurs, women (H2a), matrilineal citizens (H2b), and those who support gender equality (H2c) will be positively affected by the statements. Those whose interests are relatively more threatened (i.e., men, patrilineal citizens, and those with negative views of gender equality) would be unaffected. But, if backfire effects occur, men (H3a), patrilineal citizens (H3b), and those with negative gender views (H3c) will come to hold anti-reform views more strongly, while women, matrilineal citizens, and those with positive a priori views of equality will be unaffected.

Expectations across Messengers

Consistently with these studies, related literature leads us to expect large backfire effects among those whose interests are threatened, especially men. Because the actors—especially women's groups—are not members of men's social in-groups, they may be less trusting than women would be. Based on a study of wartime victimization in Afghanistan, Lyall et al. (2013: 629) showed a systematic tendency to interpret the actions of one's own in-group more favorably than those of the out-group. In-group harm from domestic combatants does not suppress support in the same way as harm inflicted by foreign troops. Men might be more critical of endorsement from women and WOs, which are their social out-group with regard to gender.[6] Accordingly, not only should large backfire effects among men be expected, but also that the size of those effects may be greater for WOs than WDs. Differences in the extent of biased assimilation across

[6] It is thus plausible that the opposite could be true, with WDs causing greater backfire effects than Malawian WOs.

endorsements from WOs and WDs are not expected because women, matrilineal citizens, and those with feminist views already agree with the agenda (H2d).[7]

Expectations across Reform Type

Although both reform types advance women's rights as a status group, promotion of women's political leadership is more impersonal as it does not directly regulate kinship and family matters. This is particularly the case in African and Asian countries with both matrilineal and patrilineal lineage systems as well as a mix of private, state, and customary land holding systems. The likelihood that subgroups start questioning expert authorities' knowledge and

[7] Backfire effects may be large among men because they have relatively less information than women, who are more likely to have an opinion on gender issues. In a survey experiment, Masoud et al. (2015) show that men are more responsive than women when presented with Qur'anic arguments in favor of female leadership. They argue that the additive effect of the treatment is minimal for women, who already hold positive views. Based on Mansbridge's (1999) interest crystallization, Clayton et al. (Forthcoming), argue that men have less crystallized views on gender related topics, since they have encountered fewer situations requiring them to reflect on sexual harassment. The gender make-up of sexual harassment panels affects men's attitudes depending on their priori views; women's presence may provide a cognitive shortcut for feminist-leaning men searching for the correct answer, but give permission to anti-feminist men to be against women's rights. Like Clayton et al., we segregate respondents by gender views, but unlike them, we do not ask how important the issue is to respondents. Thus we do not test interest crystallization. Following a Bayesian updating model of public opinion formation, Bush and Prather (Forthcoming) argue that citizens with limited prior knowledge of electoral monitoring statements are more swayed by expert endorsements, but are not able to directly test this model.

competence increases when respondents disagree with the agenda but also fear that law reform is detrimental to their interests. Thus, backfire effects among men, patrilineal citizens, and those who do not support gender equality are expected to be larger for sensitive gender issues than less sensitive ones (H3e), but biased assimilation is not expected to be stronger for one reform as opposed the other (H2e).

Interests Hypotheses:

H2: Endorsements will increase support for reforms relative to the control for recipients whose interests are not threatened, such that:

Endorsements will increase support among (a) women, (b) matrilineal citizens, and (c) those with supportive views of gender equality, and will do so equally for (d) WDs and WOs, as well as (e) quotas and land issues. (Biased assimilation)

H3: Endorsements will decrease support when the respondents' interests are threatened by the reform or the messenger, such that:

Endorsements will decrease support among (a) men, (b) patrilineal citizens, and (c) those with unsupportive views of gender equality, and will be larger for (d) WOs than WDs and (e) land rights than quotas. (Backfire effects)

Data and Methods

These hypotheses are tested utilizing an experiment implemented among 1,704 respondents. The experiment was embedded in the LGPI, which was conducted in Malawi in April 2016. The LGPI is a household survey using Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) and random within-household sampling and is representative of the Malawian population as a whole (Lust et al., 2016). The survey was administered by a team of trained Malawian interviewers managed by Dr. Boniface Dulani, was conducted face-to-face in three languages, and lasted about an hour. The response rate was 94.5% (AAPOR Response Rate 1). Post-stratification

weights were added to correct for differential response rates, especially the under-representation of men, many of whom were working in neighboring villages or South Africa. The experiment wording, including the actors and policies, was developed through qualitative interviews conducted by Vibeke Wang (January 2014-January 2015) and focus groups in three regions (December 2015).[8]

Survey Experiment

The treatments were effectively randomized across sampling units and response rates were constant across frames. Because the treatment was significantly related to gender and education level, the models control for respondent gender, interviewer gender (Benstead, 2014), lineage, gender attitudes, rural residence, education, income, and age, and also include post-stratification weights. (See Appendix 2).

As shown in Table 1, half of the sample was asked how likely they would be to support quotas and half about reforms guaranteeing equal land rights. Respondents were read a statement indicating that the reform was supported by WDs, Malawian WOs, or a control. Respondents were then asked, "Would you be not at all likely[=1], somewhat unlikely[=2], somewhat likely[=3], or very likely to support this policy[=4]?"

[8] 40 semi-structured interviews on gender reforms were conducted mainly in Blantyre, Lilongwe, and Zomba with politicians, development partners, civil society actors, civil servants, and academics.

Table 1. Experimental design

Quotas	1. WDs: A group of WESTERN DONORS are supporting a new law to increase the number of women elected to parliament. They say that reserving a set number of seats for women will result in a higher number of women being elected.
	2. WOs: Malawian WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS are supporting a new law to increase the number of women elected to parliament. They say that reserving a set number of seats for women will result in a higher number of women being elected.
	3. Control: There are discussions of a new law to increase the number of women elected to parliament. Reserving a set number of seats for women will result in a higher number of women being elected.
Land Rights	4. WDs: A group of WESTERN DONORS are supporting a new law to ensure that all Malawian women have and can exercise equal rights to own and control land. They say that changing the law will make women more economically independent.
	5. WOs: Malawian WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS are supporting a new law to ensure all Malawian women have and can exercise equal rights to own and control land. They say that changing the law will make women more economically independent.
	6. Control: There are discussions of a new law to ensure all Malawian women have and can exercise equal rights to own and control land. Changing the law will make women more economically independent.

These statements were carefully crafted, utilizing a neutral control taking the same amount of time to read as the treatment prompts. The control statement refers simply to discussions of a new law—the closest approximation to a control statement feasible in this context.

Measurement and Descriptive Statistics

Several independent variables are used to test these hypotheses: sex, lineage customs, and a priori views on gender equality (Table 2). Lineage system is measured by whether the

respondent's family pays lobola (i.e., bride price), a patrilineal custom. To measure a priori views regarding gender equality, an item is included measuring whether the respondent is more, less, or equally likely to vote for a female in a parliamentary election, which is then dichotomized to maximize group size. While there could be other ways to measure gender views, this item was selected because it was already present in the survey form that included the experiment.

Table 2. Measurement of independent variables

Theoretical mechanism			**Survey item**
Expert authority	N.a. (homogenous effects only)		
Interests and a priori views	More likely to support reform	Less likely to support reform	
	Women(=1)	Men(=0)	Respondent sex
	Supports gender equality(=1)	Opposes gender equality(=0)	How likely would you be to vote for a female candidate in a parliamentary election? Would you be more likely to vote for her than a male (=1/Supports), less likely to vote for her (=0/Opposes), or would you say that there is no difference (=0/Opposes)?
	Matrilineal(=1)	Patrilineal(=0)	In your family, is Lobola (bride price/dowry) paid when people get married? Yes (=0/Patrilineal). No (=1/Matrilineal).

The sample is made up of 37% male and 63% female citizens. 50% following each lineage system, respectively, and 55% preferring to vote for a male or no difference and 45% more likely to vote for a female.

Descriptive Statistics

The survey was implemented during a time when land rights and women's representation were in the public consciousness. Four land-related bills were passed by parliament in July 2016 and signed into law in September 2016. According to the Malawi Afrobarometer (2017), many citizens were aware of the law; 73% stated that they knew nothing at all about the recent land law, 9% a little, 10% some, 5% a lot, and 3% didn't know. Men were more likely to know about the law than women, with 37% of men and 17% of women knowing at least something. Men's greater knowledge—coupled with their greater opposition to the law—implies that backfire effects will be strongest among men. It also runs counter to the expectation that men may have less crystallized views on all gender issues and thus be more impacted by endorsements than are women, at least on all gender issues (Clayton et al., Forthcoming).

Even if Malawi does not have a quota, women's representation was high on the agenda in the run-up to the 2009 and 2014 elections and the Gender Equality Act of 2013. This survey did not ask citizens if they had heard about a possible quota, but it did ask whether they had considered the importance of a candidate's gender or had heard about a related campaign—the 50/50 campaign—which supported women candidates in the elections. According to Wang, Muriaas, and Kayuni (Forthcoming), in contrast to the land law, more men (55%) than women (31%) had heard about the campaign. This suggests that men may not be less informed than women on all gender issues and thus underscores the need to disaggregate gender reforms.

Based on two questions that were not experimentally manipulated, the results demonstrate that many citizens consider unequal land rights and women's underrepresentation in politics important issues, at least in principle (Figure 2). When it comes to unequal land rights, 12% do not see it as serious at all, 18% as somewhat serious, and 70% as very serious. For low number of women in political office, 12% say not serious at all, 19% somewhat serious, and 69% very

serious. Even though high numbers of Malawians report that they see these problems as concerns, this does not mean that all citizens will be favorable toward concrete reforms that could threaten their interests. The high level of support may also reflect social desirability bias. An indirect method like a survey experiment is ideal for priming citizens to think about messengers or reforms that they believe threaten their interests and measuring which policy advocates can be relatively more effective at assuaging opposition to change.

Figure 2. Belief that unequal land rights and political representation are problems in Malawi



Attitudes about Reforms

Small differences are present in respondent attitudes across gender, lineage customs, and views on gender issues, which could also be due to social desirability bias. Women are no more likely than men to see unequal land rights or women's political underrepresentation as problems. Although the gender difference in attitudes about land reforms is statistically significant ($p<.05$), it is substantively small: 69% of men and 70% of women see the issue as very serious and 10% of men and 15% of women say it is not serious at all. (See Appendix 3). Women are more likely

than men to say that the low number of women in political office is serious, but the difference is significant at the $p<.10$ level. Although this is surprising, it is consistent with a variety of indicators in our survey and the Afrobarometer. It suggests that men and women are not monolithic groups, but rather that their attitudes may be better explained if other characteristics and orientations are taken into account.

Next we consider how attitudes about land reform and political participation vary across lineage systems and a priori views when considering how likely a person is to view inequality as problematic. As expected, matrilineal citizens are significantly more likely to see unequal land rights as very serious ($p<.05$) and marginally more likely to see women's underrepresentation in politics as serious ($p<.10$), keeping in mind that matrilineal citizens may have more female political leaders.

Bivariate tests offer little evidence that attitudes about gender equality and land reform are related. However, a priori views are positively related to support for increasing women in political office, though the difference is marginally significant ($p<.10$).

Attitudes about Actors

Results show a small but statistically significant gender difference in views of WDs and WOs. Only attitudes toward WDs vary significantly, with women more likely than men to see WDs positively, although the difference is significant at the $p<.10$ level. So too, patrilineal citizens see WDs more positively than do matrilineal citizens ($p<.10$). While these groups do not differ in their perceptions of Malawian WOs, matrilineal citizens are slightly more likely to see WOs as representing women's interests ($p<.10$). This suggests that men may be inclined to accept endorsements when they come from WDs and that patrilineal citizens may not react well to endorsements by WOs.

Results and Discussion

We first examine average treatment effects and then test conditional treatment effects across respondent gender, lineage, and gender attitudes for eight groups which vary in size from 6% (male, matrilineal, supports gender equality, n=102) to 19% (female, matrilineal, does not support gender equality, n=324). Despite the small group size, endorsements have significant effects.

Because the dependent variable is measured on a Likert-type scale, ordered logistic regression was employed instead of means comparisons (Long and Freese, 2014). Inclusion of additional demographic control variables for which heterogeneous treatment effects, unless theoretically justified, is unnecessary in a randomized treatment assignment and can bias estimation of the average treatment effects (Mutz, 2011).

Average Treatment Effects: Expert Authority

Average treatment effects are examined in order to test the conventional wisdom that messengers shape public support positively and uniformly across reform types and messengers (H1). Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the effects depend on the messenger and reform type. Overall, endorsements have a positive impact, but only for WOs relative to the control. As shown in Figure 3 and Table 3, the probability of being not at all likely to support the quota increases to 13% when it is endorsed by WDs, relative to 8% for Malawian WOs ($p<.045$) and 8% for the control. When comparing the two quota endorsements, support is higher when the Malawian WOs endorses the law than when the WDs advocate for it.

Figure 3. Predicted probability of supporting quotas and equal land rights, by endorsement (Average treatment effects)



Shows effects in the entire sample.

Table 3. Significance levels for pairwise comparisons, average treatment effects

		Not at all likely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
Quotas	WO vs. WD	0.047*	0.820	0.431	0.336
	Control vs. WD	0.119	0.610	0.146	0.851
	Control vs. WO	0.885	0.583	0.244	0.441
Land rights	WO vs. WD	0.006**	0.726	0.296	0.748
	Control vs. WD	0.927	0.655	0.335	0.480
	Control vs. WO	0.018*	0.488	0.771	0.327

Yet, for the land rights reform, the WO endorsement significantly reduces support relative to the control ($p<.05$). The WD endorsement, while not significantly different from the control, is

more effective than that of the WOs. This too contradicts H1 because it suggests that not only the messenger but also the reform type matters when considering endorsements' impacts.

Overall, these results offer very limited support for the conventional wisdom that expects a uniform and positive impact of endorsements across messengers and reforms. There is limited evidence that in the sample as a whole, WOs are effective quota advocates and that WDs at least do not have a negative impact. But, these findings indicate a need for greater concern about the potential for endorsers to undermine support for sensitive land reforms.

Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Interests and A Priori Views

Theoretically, endorsements' effectiveness will depend on advocate and reform type, as well as respondent type, because each is inextricably linked to respondents' interests.

Examining the group whose members are likely to feel most threatened by gender reforms requires disaggregating male respondents to take into account the intersection of lineage customs and attitudes. Looking at the respondent profile most likely to have interests that go against reform—men who practice patrilineal customs and do not support gender equality—significant backfire effects are found for both land reforms as well as gender quotas (Figure 4 and Table 4). The probability of being very likely to support the reform is 48% in the control, but falls to 43% with WD endorsement ($p<.10$). So too, patrilineal men who do not support gender equality are significantly less likely by 34 percentage points to support land reform when it is endorsed by WOs than in the control condition for the very likely category ($p<.001$) and significantly less likely by 15 percentage points to support land reform when it is endorsed by WOs than WDs for the very likely category ($p<.05$).

Figure 4. Predicted probability of supporting quotas and equal land rights, by endorsement (Man, patrilineal, does not support gender equality)



See Figure 3.

Table 4. Significance levels for pairwise comparisons, average treatment effects (Man, patrilineal, does not support gender equality)

		Not at all likely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
Quotas	WO vs. WD	0.158	0.165	0.482	0.166
	Control vs. WD	0.562	0.812	0.044*	.058†
	Control vs. WO	0.570	0.324	0.331	0.377
Land rights	WO vs. WD	0.025*	0.886	0.256	0.427
	Control vs. WD	0.417	0.344	0.120	0.269
	Control vs. WO	0.000***	0.018*	0.700	0.000***

Across matrilineal men who do not support gender equality (Figure 5 and Table 5), for both reforms, backfire effects remain pronounced. Support for quotas is 25 percentage points lower when endorsed by WDs than in the control for the very likely category ($p<.05$) and 19 percentage points lower when endorsed by WOs than the control in the very likely category

(p<.10). The backfire effect is larger and more significant for land reforms. In the control, 94% are very likely to support land reform, compared to 43% for WDs (p<.001) and 41% for WOs (p<.001). This suggest that for men, it matters little what their lineage customs are. Rather, endorsements' impact is shaped by gender and a priori views of gender equality. The mere mention of an actor—whether foreign or domestic advocating a reform—appears to prime fears that such reforms will become a reality and lead men to develop even stronger views in the opposite direction (Sniderman and Piazza, 1993).

Figure 5. Predicted probability of supporting quotas and equal land rights, by endorsement (Man, matrilineal, does not support gender equality)



See Figure 3.

Table 5. Significance levels for pairwise comparisons, average treatment effects (Man, matrilineal, does not support gender equality)

		Not at all likely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
Quotas	WO vs. WD	0.421	0.535	0.919	0.458
	Control vs. WD	0.045*	0.072†	0.190	0.049*
	Control vs. WO	0.120	0.113	0.136	0.095†
Land rights	WO vs. WD	0.021*	0.341	0.002**	0.838
	Control vs. WD	0.002**	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	Control vs. WO	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***

Examining effects for men from patrilineal areas who support gender equality, Figure 6 and Table 6 show that rather than a backfire effect, quotas men in this group are 22 percentage points more likely to support the reform when endorsed by WOs than the control for "very likely" ($p<.10$). This difference is also significantly different from the WD endorsement. This suggests that WOs can be effective policy advocates among patrilineal men who support gender equality. At the same time, this group is less likely than those who do not support gender equality to actually need policy reform, suggesting the limitations of an advocacy-based approach.

Figure 6. Predicted probability of supporting quotas and equal land rights, by endorsement (Man, patrilineal, supports gender equality)



See Figure 3.

Table 6. Significance levels for pairwise comparisons, average treatment effects (Man, patrilineal, supports gender equality)

		Not at all likely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
Quotas	WO vs. WD	0.094†	0.028*	0.035*	0.037*
	Control vs. WD	0.789	0.656	0.409	0.588
	Control vs. WO	0.279	0.123	0.004**	0.063†
Land rights	WO vs. WD	0.007**	0.038*	0.447	0.057†
	Control vs. WD	0.552	0.561	0.664	0.617
	Control vs. WO	0.004**	0.027*	0.515	0.004**

Yet, even in this more supportive group, the results are reversed for the more sensitive reform. For land reform, men who practice patrilineal customs but hold positive views toward

gender equality are still less likely to support the reform when endorsed by WOs than the control ($p<.01$)—a backfire effect—and less likely to support the reform when endorsed by WOs than WDs ($p<.01$). A similar backfire effect exists for matrilineal men who support gender equality but are presented with land rights endorsements (Figure 7 and Table 7). When presented with WOs' endorsement, these men are less likely to support the reform than the control condition ($p<.001$). This suggests the limits of endorsements among this group of respondents; endorsements may lead to backfire effects for land reforms, even among patrilineal men who say they support gender equality.

Figure 7. Predicted probability of supporting quotas and equal land rights, by endorsement (Man, matrilineal, supports gender equality)



See Figure 3.

Table 7. Significance levels for pairwise comparisons, average treatment effects (Man, matrilineal, supports gender equality)

		Not at all likely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
Quotas	WO vs. WD	0.207	0.174	0.186	0.176
	Control vs. WD	0.296	0.271	0.353	0.308
	Control vs. WO	0.868	0.860	0.831	0.844
Land rights	WO vs. WD	0.078†	0.180	0.865	0.262
	Control vs. WD	0.170	0.124	0.049*	0.072†
	Control vs. WO	0.002**	0.000***	.000***	0.000***

Among women, whose interests are less threatened, the endorsements' effects are either insignificant, or positive compared to the control. Among patrilineal women who do not support gender equality, WOs positively impact support for land reforms ($p<.05$; Figure 8 and Table 8). Among patrilineal women who support gender equality, both endorsements are significantly more effective than the control for quotas and land rights (Figure 9 and Table 9). (For models with no significant results, see Appendix 4).

Figure 8. Predicted probability of supporting quotas and equal land rights, by endorsement (Woman, patrilineal, does not support gender equality)



See Figure 3.

Table 8. Significance levels for pairwise comparisons, average treatment effects (Woman, patrilineal, does not support gender equality)

		Not at all likely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
Quotas	WO vs. WD	0.845	0.964	0.905	0.941
	Control vs. WD	0.625	0.343	0.278	0.365
	Control vs. WO	0.570	0.378	0.405	0.420
Land rights	WO vs. WD	0.647	0.962	0.478	0.923
	Control vs. WD	0.241	0.279	0.465	0.322
	Control vs. WO	0.571	0.228	0.022*	0.163

Figure 9. Predicted probability of supporting quotas and equal land rights, by endorsement (Woman, patrilineal, supports gender equality)



See Figure 3.

Table 9. Significance levels for pairwise comparisons, average treatment effects (Woman, patrilineal, supports gender equality)

		Not at all likely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
Quotas	WO vs. WD	0.384	0.352	0.405	0.387
	Control vs. WD	0.358	0.192	0.018*	0.102
	Control vs. WO	0.271	0.109	0.005**	0.059†
Land rights	WO vs. WD	0.560	0.609	0.812	0.720
	Control vs. WD	0.123	0.031*	0.149	0.036*
	Control vs. WO	0.208	0.115	0.007**	0.044*

In sum, the endorsements' impacts are larger and usually negative for men, while they are small and positive for women. Some support is present for biased assimilation among women (H2a), but surprisingly it was among patrilineal women who do not support gender equality,

contrary to H3b and H3c. The effect for women, when present, tended to be equally positive for both advocate types (H2d) and reform types (H2e), as hypothesized.

These results broadly support the hypotheses that backfire effects will result among those whose interests are threatened—i.e., men, patrilineal citizens, and those who do not support gender equality (H3a-c). And, they support the expectation that backfire effects will be larger for land rights than quotas (He). However, larger backfire effects were not found for domestic WOs than WDs among men, contrary to Hd. In a few male groups, WOs were effective endorsers.

Conclusions and Implications

Taken together, the results suggest that the endorsements' effects depend on the receivers' interests. Gender appears to be the strongest driver of the size and direction of the effects. But an intersectional approach is needed. For men, a priori views on gender equality are the most important mediators of messengers' effects, and attitudes about gender are more important than lineage customs. But, there is one exception. When patrilineal men support gender equality, WOs are effective quota advocates. Most effects are insignificant for women. But, among patrilineal women, WDs and WOs improve their support of reforms compared to the control.

The effects also depend on issue and messenger type. Overall, WOs, and to a smaller extent WDs, are as effective as the control for quotas, but cause backfire effects for land reform. The effects vary most across male and female respondents, with messengers usually causing backfire effects for men, but having either no impact or a positive impact for women. Messengers cause backfire effects for all male groups when it comes to land reforms. WDs, however, tend to do less harm than WOs in the area of land reform among patrilineal men who hold positive views on gender equality.

These results suggest that campaigns can have unintended negative effects. Around the world WDs and WOs work to improve women's status, but those who really need convincing

may react negatively when reform attempts are backed by typical gender reform advocates. To date, scholars have not adequately addressed this issue, and this failure has significant implications for women's rights advocacy.

These results harbor implications for the international development and governance literatures that tend to lump "women's rights" together. Some women's rights issues challenge interests more than others and thus present particular challenges for reformers seeking to shape public opinion. The experimental design demonstrates the complexity involved in successfully advocating for gender equality reform and that certain groups are clearly more intimidated by norm change in the private sphere.

These results are likely applicable to other aid dependent Sub-Saharan countries. They call into question assumptions that anti-progressive attitudes exist in only some societies—namely in Arab, Muslim, or patrilineal contexts. Instead, these results present deeply troubling evidence that support for a gender reform with the potential to alter gender status in the family decreases significantly among men when endorsed by actors with potential political power to push for change. These findings show the importance of more comparative research on the effects of different types of campaigns on public opinion in different settings. Unlike Masoud et al. (2015), who find that religious endorsements can improve support for equality among men, our results show that in general, WDs and WOs do not have this same clout. This suggests that other policy endorsers might be needed. Policymakers and scholars must take reform type and the target population into consideration. However, they also suggest that with context sensitive and evidence-based information, more effective policy strategies can be implemented and better local development outcomes for women and men achieved.

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Optional Online Appendices

Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics (Afrobarometer)

Table A1.1 and A1.2 shows comparisons of women and men's views of international organizations in each of the African countries included in the Afrobarometer (Wave 4). Significant differences are in bold. Men are significantly more likely to be critical of international organizations in many countries, and this gender difference is larger in Malawi than in any other country.

Table A1.1. Perceptions of how much IOs and NGOs help Malawi, by gender

FEMALES – Help Mean	*Sd*	*Number of obs*	*MALES – Help*	*Mean*	*Sd*	*Number of obs*	*Diff-in-Means [F-M]*	*Country Mean*
Malawi**	3.99	1.06	148	4.20	0.93	274	-0.21	4.13
Mozambique***	4.05	0.95	311	4.25	0.92	416	-0.19	4.16
Liberia***	4.03	0.91	543	4.20	0.87	567	-0.18	4.12
South Africa	4.11	1.02	292	4.27	0.93	403	-0.16	4.20
Tanzania**	4.00	0.84	436	4.12	0.84	511	-0.13	4.06
Ghana*	4.09	0.92	353	4.20	0.87	473	-0.11	4.15
Mali*	4.15	0.89	456	4.25	0.88	531	-0.10	4.20
Burkina Faso*	4.41	0.79	356	4.50	0.74	456	-0.09	4.46
Kenya	4.06	0.89	400	4.13	0.84	449	-0.07	4.10
Zimbabwe	4.59	0.78	514	4.63	0.73	542	-0.04	4.61
Benin	4.18	0.83	299	4.22	0.86	423	-0.04	4.20
Botswana	4.11	0.77	381	4.14	0.85	427	-0.04	4.13

Zambia	4.27	0.90	343	4.28	0.94	431	-0.01	4.28
Namibia	4.01	0.87	502	4.02	0.89	527	-0.01	4.02
Cape Verde	3.80	0.78	400	3.80	0.75	466	0.00	3.80
Uganda**	4.15	0.85	896	4.13	0.85	1003	0.02	4.14
Nigeria	3.71	0.87	767	3.68	0.92	862	0.02	3.70
Madagascar	4.46	0.58	438	4.42	0.58	522	0.04	4.44
Senegal**	3.64	1.02	721	3.61	1.04	768	0.04	3.63
Lesotho	4.74	0.64	469	4.68	0.73	497	0.05	4.71

p<.10*, p<.05**, p<.01*** Afrobarometer (2008). "How much help do international donors/NGOs provide?" *(Q98D)*

Table A1.2. Perceptions of how much influence IOs and NGOs have in Malawi, by gender

FEMALES – Influence	*Mean*	*Sd*	*Number of obs*	*MALES – Influence*	*Mean*	*Sd*	*Number of obs*	*Diff-in-Means [F-M]*	*Country Mean*
Malawi**	3.82	1.28	191		4.07	1.22	301	-0.25	3.97
Mozambique**	4.45	1.52	336		4.67	1.50	429	-0.22	4.58
South Africa	3.94	1.32	201		4.07	1.35	335	-0.13	4.02
Liberia	3.35	1.19	499		3.47	1.30	543	-0.12	3.42
Nigeria**	3.59	1.11	751		3.70	1.10	829	-0.11	3.64
Kenya	3.90	1.10	381		3.99	1.11	437	-0.10	3.95
Botswana	3.85	0.91	410		3.94	1.05	441	-0.09	3.90
Tanzania	3.91	1.15	443		3.99	1.23	510	-0.09	3.95
Zimbabwe	3.35	1.15	450		3.42	1.19	509	-0.06	3.39
Zambia	4.17	1.34	324		4.23	1.38	428	-0.06	4.20
Mali	4.44	1.11	420		4.49	1.15	501	-0.05	4.47
Ghana	3.77	1.12	312		3.81	1.22	442	-0.04	3.79
Burkina Faso	4.23	1.34	323		4.26	1.31	438	-0.03	4.25
Uganda	4.19	1.18	794		4.20	1.24	941	-0.01	4.20
Senegal	3.79	1.15	744		3.78	1.18	785	0.01	3.78
Lesotho	5.29	1.17	516		5.28	1.20	528	0.01	5.28
Madagascar	4.63	0.99	348		4.60	1.04	424	0.03	4.61
Cape Verde	3.79	0.99	311		3.71	1.07	400	0.08	4.45
Benin	3.83	1.08	274		3.73	1.13	391	0.09	3.77
Namibia	4.21	1.10	475		4.10	1.14	488	0.11	4.15

p<.10*, p<.05**, p<.01*** Afrobarometer (2008). "How much influence do international donors/NGOs have?" (*Q99A)*

Appendix 2: Randomization

7,750 respondents participated in the survey. Of these, 1,704 were selected at random to receive the experiment. Two-tailed χ^2 test show treatments are randomly distributed across electoral districts (p<.298; Table A1.1).

Table A2.1. Randomized block design: Selection of respondents into the experiment

	Respondents not selected	Respondents not selected	Total
Balaka	280(4.6%)	80(4.7%)	360(4.7%)
Blantyre	561(9.3%)	139(8.2%)	700(9.0%)
Chikwawa	550(9.1%)	161(9.5%)	711(9.2%)
Chitipa	269(4.5%)	83(4.9%)	352(4.5%)
Dedza	555(9.2%)	158(9.3%)	713(9.2%)
Kasungu	241(4.0%)	86(5.1%)	327(4.2%)
Lilongwe	577(9.6%)	135(7.9%)	712 (9.2%)
Mangochi	256(4.2%)	88(5.2%)	344(4.4%)
Mulanje	283(4.7%)	73(4.3%)	356(4.6%)
Mzimba	1,095(18.1%)	311(18.3%)	1,406(18.1%)
Nkhatabay	275(4.6%)	74(4.3%)	349(4.5%)
Nsanje	275(4.6%)	79(4.6%)	354(4.6%)
Ntcheu	281(4.7%)	67(3.9%)	348(4.5%)
Rumphi	269(4.5%)	88(5.2%)	357(4.6%)
Zomba	278(4.6%)	82(4.8%)	360(4.7%)
Total	6,045(100.0%)	1,704(100.0%)	7,749(100.0%)

1,704 respondents were randomly placed six conditions. Table A1.2 shows that random assignment was effective across PSUs (p<.094).

Table A2.2. Randomized block design: Assignment of respondents to conditions

	1	*2*	3	4	5	6	Total
Balaka	13(4.6%)	13(4.7%)	13(4.4%)	11(3.94.0%)	14(4.7%)	16(5.8%)	80(4.7%)
Blantyre	20(7.0%)	26(9.5%)	22(7.5%)	27(9.8%)	27(9.0%)	17(6.2%)	139(8.2%)
Chikwawa	27(9.5%)	19(6.9%)	21(7.1%)	22(8.0%)	32(10.7%)	40(14.6%)	161(9.5%)
Chitipa	15(5.3%)	12(4.4%)	19(6.5%)	16(5.8%)	17(5.7%)	4(1.5%)	83(4.9%)
Dedza	25(8.8%)	22(8.0%)	31(10.5%)	18(6.5%)	28(9.3%)	34(12.4%)	158(9.3%)
Kasungu	7(2.5%)	14(5.1%)	17(5.8%)	19(6.9%)	19(6.3%)	10(3.6%)	86(5.1%)
Lilongwe	23(8.1%)	17(6.2%)	27(9.2%)	25(9.1%)	19(6.3%)	24(8.7%)	135(7.9%)
Mangochi	13(4.6%)	21(7.7%)	13(4.4%)	17(6.2%)	13(4.3%)	11(4.0%)	88(5.2%
Mulanje	18(6.3%)	10(3.7%)	15(5.1%)	10(3.6%)	12(4.0%)	8(2.9%)	73(4.3%)
Mzimba	56(19.7%)	60(22.0%)	42(14.3%)	56(20.3%)	58(19.3%)	39(14.2%)	311(18.3%)
Nkhatabay	13(4.6%)	10(3.7%)	10(3.4%)	9(3.3%)	15(5.0%)	17(6.2%)	74(4.3%)
Nsanje	12(4.2%)	14(5.1%)	16(5.4%)	10(3.6%)	11(3.7%)	16(5.8%)	79(4.6%)
Ntcheu	14(4.9%)	11(4.0%)	10(3.4%)	9(3.3%)	12(4.0%)	11(4.0%)	67(3.9%)
Rumphi	19(6.7%)	14(5.1%)	21(7.1%)	11(4.0%)	15(5.0%)	8(2.9%)	88(5.2%)
Zomba	10(3.5%)	11(4.0%)	17(5.8%)	16(5.8%)	8(2.7%)	20(7.3%)	82(4.8%)
Total	285(100.0%)	274(100.0%)	294(100.0%)	276(100.0%)	300(100.0%)	275(100.0%)	1,704(100.0%)

There were no differences in attrition rates across the six frames. Only 34 respondents did not provide an answer on the dependent variable (4-8 non-responses/group).

Two-tailed χ^2 test show treatments are randomly distributed across independent variables, except for respondent sex and education (Table A1.3).

Table A2.3. Randomization of treatment and descriptive statistics for independent variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	Total
Gender							
Male(=0)	36.4%	31.5%	29.9%	42.9%	36.2%	37.1%	35.6%
Female(=1)	63.6%	68.5%	70.1%	57.1%	63.8%	62.9%	64.4%
(N=1,689/Mean=.64/Sd=.5)	$\chi^2(5)=12.93(p<.024)$*						
Interviewer gender							
Male(=0)	53.6%	56.6%	59.0%	57.6%	53.7%	58.9%	56.5%
Female(=1)	46.5%	43.4%	41.2%	42.4%	46.3%	41.1%	43.5%
(N=1,696/Mean=.44/Sd=.5)	$\chi^2(5)=3.52(p<.621)$						
Lobola/Lineage							
No/Matrilineal(=0)	50.4%	49.6%	49.5%	48.4%	47.8%	50.2%	49.3%
Yes/Patrilineal(=1)	49.6%	50.4%	50.2%	51.7%	52.2%	49.8%	50.7%
(N=1684/Mean=.5/Sd=.5)	$\chi^2(5)=0.59(p<.989)$						
Men make better political leaders							
Strongly disagree(=1)	52.4%	42.8%	46.7%	49.5%	47.3%	41.9%	46.8%
Disagree somewhat(=2)	6.2%	8.6%	7.3%	8.5%	9.9%	11.0%	8.6%
Agree somewhat(=3)	10.6%	9.7%	9.0%	11.4%	10.2%	9.2%	10.0%
Strongly agree(=4)	30.9%	39.0%	37.0%	30.6%	32.7%	37.9%	34.7%
(N=1,670/Mean=2.3/Sd=1.4)	$\chi^2(15)=16.12(p<.374)$						
Rural residence							
Urban(=0)	15.7%	19.3%	18.2%	19.6%	20.1%	15.3%	18.0%
Rural(=1)	84.3%	80.7%	81.9%	80.4%	79.9%	84.7%	82.0%
(N=1,691/Mean=4.1/Sd=.4)	$\chi^2(5)=04.14(p<.530)$						

Appendix 3: Descriptive Statistics (LGPI)

Figure A3.1. Attitudes toward women's rights reforms by respondent gender, lineage, and gender views

To what extent are the following serious problems in Malawi today? Unequal land rights for men and women.







Low number of women in political offices.





LGPI. Data weighted.

Figure A3.2. Attitudes toward actors by respondent gender, lineage custom, and gender views

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Women activists represent western interests more than Malawian interests.







Do you feel positively, negatively, or neutral toward each of the following: WDs.







Do you feel positively, negatively, or neutral toward each of the following: Malawian WOs.


100.0
90.0
80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
5.1
6.4
6.0
5.5
88.9
88.2
Male
Female
Negatively
Neutral
Positively
Not significant


100.0
90.0
80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
6.2
4.9
5.3
6.6
88.5
88.5
Matrilineal
Patrilineal
Negatively
Neutral
Positively
Not significant



LGPI. Data weighted.

Appendix 4: Ancillary Figures and Tables (Non-Significant Models)

Figure A4.1. Predicted probability of supporting quotas and equal land rights, by endorsement (Woman, matrilineal, supports gender equality)



See Figure 3.

Table A4.1. Significance levels for pairwise comparisons, average treatment effects (Woman, matrilineal, supports gender equality)

		Not at all likely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
Quotas (Non-doctrinal)	WO vs. WD	0.736	0.764	0.815	0.788
	Control vs. WD	0.969	0.995	0.913	0.956
	Control vs. WO	0.852	0.843	0.811	0.825
Land rights (doctrinal)	WO vs. WD	0.962	0.957	0.827	0.886
	Control vs. WD	0.892	0.887	0.871	0.876
	Control vs. WO	0.670	0.802	0.871	0.975

Figure A4.1. Predicted probability of supporting quotas and equal land rights, by endorsement (Woman, matrilineal, does not support gender equality)



See Figure 3.

Table A2.2. Significance levels for pairwise comparisons, average treatment effects (Woman, matrilineal, does not support gender equality)

		Not at all likely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
Quotas	WO vs. WD	0.534	0.426	0.301	0.396
	Control vs. WD	0.349	0.381	0.526	0.389
	Control vs. WO	0.173	0.174	0.165	0.140
Land rights	WO vs. WD	0.886	0.680	0.393	0.592
	Control vs. WD	0.464	0.406	0.302	0.357
	Control vs. WO	0.146	0.098†	0.327	0.166