Where (Who) Are Collectives in Collectivism? Toward Conceptual Clarification of Individualism and Collectivism

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In psychological research on cultural differences, the distinction between individualism and collectivism has received the lion’s share of attention as a fundamental dimension of cultural variation. In recent years, however, these constructs have been criticized as being ill-defined and “a catchall” to represent all forms of cultural differences. The authors argue that there is a conceptual confusion about the meaning of ingroups that constitute the target of collectivism. Collectives are rarely referred to in existing measures to assess collectivism. Instead, networks of interpersonal relationships dominate the operational definition of “ingroups” in these measures. Results from a content analysis of existing scales support this observation. To clarify and expand the individualism–collectivism distinction, a theoretical framework is proposed that draws on M. B. Brewer and G. Gardner’s (1996) conceptualization of individual, relational, and collective selves and their manifestation in self-representations, beliefs, and values. Analyses of data from past studies provide preliminary support for this conceptual model. The authors propose that this new theoretical framework will contribute conceptual clarity to interpretation of past research on individualism and collectivism and guide future research on these important constructs.

Keywords: cultural differences, individualism, collectivism, ingroups, outgroups

Across many subfields in psychology, there has been growing interest in understanding the influence of culture and cultural differences in how people feel, think, and behave. Cultural analyses have been brought to bear in studies and theories of cognition (e.g., Nisbett, 2003), well-being (e.g., Diener, Oishi, & Lucas, 2003), persuasion (e.g., Wosinska, Cialdini, Barrett, & Reykowski, 2001), justice (e.g., Brockner, Chen, Mannix, Leung, & Skarlicki, 2000), and trust (e.g., Yuki, Maddux, Brewer, & Takemura, 2005). In all of these domains, one of the most widely used frameworks for characterizing and examining cultural differences pertains to how individuals define themselves and their relationships with others, in particular the groups or collectives to which they belong. In most Western cultures, such as the United States, the core of self-definition is based on individual autonomy and separation from others. In contrast, in Eastern cultures, such as the People’s Republic of China, the self-concept is defined primarily based on shared cultural beliefs and values. According to Hofstede’s analysis, individualism is proposed to the study of cross-cultural differences is usually ascribed to Hofstede (1980), who identified Individualism as residing within a culture or a person (Leung, 1989). Another is whether the focus is exclusively on representations of the self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) or on broader values and belief systems (Triandis, 1994). However, the distinctions should not detract from the fact that there is a great deal of conceptual convergence in the numerous discussions of individualism and collectivism, independent self-construal and interdependent self-construal, and related constructs. In one way or another, all of these representations deal with variations in whether individuals are viewed as separate and autonomous entities or as interconnected and embedded in interdependent social relationships, along with normative prescriptions and values about the priority to be given to individual and group interests. The current article focuses on this conceptual convergence among the various perspectives on how people define themselves and their relationships with others. Like Oyserman et al. (2002), we use the terms individualism and collectivism to refer to this dimension of variation, and our level of focus is the individual within the context of shared cultural beliefs and values.

To be sure, there are some important distinctions among these terms. One difference centers on whether individualism and collectivism should be conceptualized as residing within a culture or a person (Leung, 1989). Another is whether the focus is exclusively on representations of the self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) or on broader values and belief systems (Triandis, 1994). However, the distinctions should not detract from the fact that there is a great deal of conceptual convergence in the numerous discussions of individualism and collectivism, independent self-construal and interdependent self-construal, and related constructs. In one way or another, all of these representations deal with variations in whether individuals are viewed as separate and autonomous entities or as interconnected and embedded in interdependent social relationships, along with normative prescriptions and values about the priority to be given to individual and group interests. The current article focuses on this conceptual convergence among the various perspectives on how people define themselves and their relationships with others. Like Oyserman et al. (2002), we use the terms individualism and collectivism to refer to this dimension of variation, and our level of focus is the individual within the context of shared cultural beliefs and values.

Few constructs in the history of social thought have enjoyed the same length and level of attention as individualism and collectivism. Indeed, the discussion of individualism can be traced in Sophists’ teaching and in the ideas of Adam Smith (1776/1949), whereas the collective themes can be found in Plato’s Republic and in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Du Contrat Social (1772/1954). In more recent social science literature, credit for introducing the concept to the study of cross-cultural differences is usually assigned to Hofstede (1980), who identified Individualism as one of four primary dimensions of cultural variation in organizational values and practices. According to Hofstede’s analysis, individualist societies emphasize “I” consciousness, autonomy, emotional independence, individual initiative, right to privacy, pleasure seek-
ing, financial security, need for specific friendship, and universalism. Collectivist societies stress “we” consciousness, collective identity, emotional dependence, group solidarity, sharing, duties and obligations, need for stable and predetermined friendship, group decision, and particularism (see also Hui and Triandis, 1986; Sinha and Verma, 1987).

Of the dimensions of cultural differences identified by Hofstede (1980), the individualism–collectivism (I–C) distinction has garnered by far the most attention in subsequent cross-cultural research in psychology. As Bond (1994) put it, “the culture-level contrast between individualism and collectivism has exerted a magnetic pull on cross-cultural researchers over the past years” (p. 69). In fact, more than one third of published studies in cross-cultural research cited individualism and collectivism as at least a partial explanation of observed differences across cultures (Hui & Yee, 1994).

Recently these constructs have received harsh criticisms on both conceptual and methodological grounds. One main criticism is that researchers tend to define and assess these constructs in overly broad and diffuse ways. For this reason, these constructs have been described as being conceptually “fuzzy” (Earley & Gibson, 1998), “overweighted” (Bond, 2002), “not valid” (Fijneman, Willemsen, & Poortinga, 1995; Fiske, 2002), and a “catchall” to represent all possible forms of cultural differences (e.g., Bond, 2002; Earley & Gibson, 1998; Hofstede, 1994; Hui & Yee, 1994; Kagitcibi, 1997; Oyserman et al., 2002; Rohner, 1984; Triandis, 1994). In referring to their content analysis of the most widely used measures of individualism and collectivism in cross-cultural research, Oyserman et al. (2002) noted the large heterogeneity in construct definition and scale contents and concluded that the variability in cultural differences on components of collectivism suggests “the multifaceted nature of cultural ways of being connected and related to others. . .” (p. 28). Noting the lack of parallelism in the content of measures of individualism and collectivism, Earley and Gibson (1998) conclude “. . . quite frankly, if one simply observed the highly varied operationalizations of I–C without reference to the underlying construct, it might appear that these measures tap unrelated constructs” (p. 291).

Many investigations of the construct acknowledge the multidimensionality of the attitudes, values, and practices that compose individualism and collectivism and call for the development of more refined measurements to capture each unique dimension separately (Bond, 2002; Fiske, 2002; Ho & Chiu, 1994; Oyserman et al., 2002; Triandis et al., 1986; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Some efforts have been made in this direction. For example, Y. Chen, Brockner, and Katz (1998) created a measure of individual–collective primacy to capture the extent to which individuals would be willing to sacrifice personal interests for those of the group when there is conflict between the two, with the intention to relate this specific component of collectivism to group behavior. The differentiation of measures of vertical versus horizontal individualism and collectivism (e.g., Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) represents another effort to refine the construct. Furthermore, many factor-analyzed scales have been generated to delineate the effects of specific elements of individualism and collectivism (Triandis et al., 1986; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990; Wagner, 1995).

Recognizing that collectivism is not a stable target-independent orientation, researchers have also developed scales for different types of ingroups. For example, Hui’s (1988) scale contains five types of ingroups—spouse, kin, neighbors, friends, and coworkers—whereas Rhee, Uleman, and Lee (1996) differentiated three types of kin (parents, children, and relatives) in their analysis. Similarly, Rhee, Mull, Uleman, and Gleason (2002) have separate measures for family, relatives, and friends in their collectivism scale.

As a result of the sheer breadth and depth of the theorizing of these constructs, instruments to assess individualism and collectivism, or specific aspects thereof, have proliferated. Many of them, however, have idiosyncratic operationalizations and low internal reliabilities (Bond, 2002; Brett et al., 1997; Fiske, 2002; Oyserman et al., 2002). Even when significant findings emerge in a particular study that uses a particular measure, they often stand alone without a coherent body of support from similar findings in other studies that use the same measure (Oyserman et al., 2002). Given the proliferation of measures and implicit definitions, Earley and Gibson (1998) even went as far as calling a moratorium on research that uses these constructs until greater theoretical coherence has been achieved.

Despite these criticisms, a recent review and data analysis by Schimmack, Oishi, and Diener (2005) defends the construct of individualism as a valid and important dimension of cultural differences, arguing that many of the apparently conflicting findings in the literature derive in part from failure to take into account national differences in response styles on self-report measures at the individual level. Their re-analyses of horizontal and vertical I–C scale data from an international survey indicate that when acquiescence response styles are statistically controlled, horizontal individualism shows high convergent validity with Hofstede’s (1980) original rankings of nations on the I–C dimension. Responses to the two collectivism scales, however, were so highly correlated with overall endorsement scores (response bias) that their validity could not be determined.

On the basis of these findings, Schimmack et al. (2005) have suggested that, although the concept of individualism is meaningfully defined and assessed, “cross-cultural psychologists may have to rethink the concept of collectivism” (p. 27). Consistent with this view, we focus attention in this article on issues related to the conceptualization and measurement of the collectivism end of the I–C distinction. Our goal here is not to re-review the vast literature on collectivism (a task that has already been accomplished admirably by Oyserman et al., 2002) or to develop new measures of the construct. Rather, our purpose in this article is to describe a theoretical framework that will serve as a lens for understanding previous research on individualism and collectivism and (most important) a guide for systematic future research on cultural differences.
Anomalies in the Collectivism Research

Despite the centrality of social groups to the concept of collectivism, surprisingly little attention has been given to the meaning of “collectives” in the theorizing and the measurement of collectivism. In this paper, we will argue that even though the construct has been labeled “collectivism,” the target ingroups referred to in most existing measures of this construct are not collectives (or even groups) at all. This confusion about the target of collectivist orientations is reflected in two related anomalies in the literature on I–C that we review here.

Where are Collectives in Collectivism Measures?

According to Etzioni (1968), collectives consist of individuals who are bound together through a common set of values and norms. Etzioni defined a collective as “a macroscopic unit that has a potential capacity to act by drawing on a set of macroscopic normative bonds which tie members of a stratification category” (p. 98). Individuals within a collective are bound to one another through emotional predispositions, common interests and fate, as well as by mutually agreed upon social practices. Accordingly, the social bonds among members of a collective do not require close personal relationships. In fact, social categorization theory and social identity theory posit that the collective self is based on depersonalized transformation of seeing self and others no longer represented as individuals with unique attributes and differences but, rather, as embodiments of a common shared social category (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).

Following the above definitions of collectives and the collective self, we note that most conceptual discussions and operationalizations of ingroups in the collectivism research rarely involve collectives or large social groups as the target level of focus as the term collectivism implies. Instead, it is specific interpersonal relationships or relational networks with personalized bonds of attachment, such as family/relatives (Triandis, 1994, 1995), close friends (C. C. Chen, Chen, & Xin, 2004), colleagues (Tsui & Farh, 1997), or hometown fellows (Earley, 1993), that have dominated the implicit definition of ingroups. To examine the validity of this observation, we conducted a content analysis of items from 21 frequently used scales for measuring individualism and collectivism (see Oyserman et al., 2002).

For purposes of this content analysis, we first reduced the list of 21 scales to 14 sets of items, combining 6 scales developed by Triandis and his colleagues (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995; Triandis, 1994; Triandis, 1995; Triandis et al., 1986; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, & Asai, 1988; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) into one item set, and similarly for 3 scales developed by Earley and his colleagues (Earley, 1989, 1993; Erez & Earley, 1987), in order to eliminate redundancies across measures. With repetitive items deleted, the total number of items across the 14 scales is 408.2

After we reviewed all the items in the scales, we developed a content coding system that distinguished three types of targets being referred to by the statement in the item—individual self, relational others, and unspecified group, or collective. The system also distinguished between items that referred to a single target type versus items that pitted two types of target against each other. This $3 \times 2$ classification generated the following six mutually exclusive target coding categories:

- S: items referring to characteristics of or orientations toward the individual self (e.g., “What happens to me is my own doing” and “I am a unique individual”)
- R: items referring to orientations toward personal others (e.g., parent, friend) or small interpersonal networks (e.g., family, friends, workgroup; e.g., “I can count on my relatives for help if I find myself in any kind of trouble” and “The well-being of my co-workers is important to me”)
- G: items referring to orientations toward a group (unspecified) or large collective (e.g., “It is important to maintain harmony within my group” and “What is good for my group is good for me”)
- S–R: items that explicitly pit individual self interests or preferences against interests of relational others (e.g., “To cooperate with someone whose ability is lower is not as desirable as doing the thing on one’s own” and “If any of my relatives were in financial difficulty, I would help them even if it made my life difficult”)
- S–G: items that explicitly pit individual self interests or preferences against group interests (e.g., “I sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group” and “I am willing to give up my personal opinions in order to belong to the group”)
- R–G: items that explicitly pit needs of a relational other against group interests (e.g., “The needs of family come before the interests of my work group” and “My group membership is more important to me than my close relationships”)

Of the 408 items rated by two coders, all but 24 were judged to have a codable target, and interrater agreement in assignment of coding categories was 94%. (Disagreements between the two coders in item classification were resolved by discussion.) Table 1 presents the number and the percentage of items of each target category for each set of scale items. To examine the differential between focus on relational networks versus groups/collectives, we calculated the ratio between R and G target codes for each scale. To compute the R/G ratio, we divided the sum of R items and S–R items by the sum of G items and S–G items, that is, $[R + (S–R)] / [G + (S–G)]$.

As can be seen in Table 1, across all of the scales, only 15% of the items focus solely on orientations toward individual self compared with 48% of the items devoted to relational and collective orientations; the remaining 32% of codable items in the scales involve trade-offs between individual self-interests and interests of relational others or a group/collective. It is interesting that we found no items that were coded as R–G (trade-off between relational others and group interests). Moreover, of the 14 measures analyzed, 5 (including the most widely used) are exclusively or predominantly composed of relational items (Triandis scales: Hui, 1988; Hui & Yee, 1994; Rhee et al., 2002; Verma, 1992). In fact, the Rhee et al. (2002) scale even explicitly defines itself as a measure of “relational collectivism.” Three of the small scales are exclusively or predominantly composed of group/collective items (Oyserman, 1993; Wagner, 1995; Yamaguchi, 1994), and the remaining 6 scales have a balanced mixture of relational and collective/group items (Y. Chen et al., 1998; Earley scales: Gaines et al., 1997; E. S. Kashima & Hardie, 2000; Matsumoto et al.,

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2 We made no attempt to distinguish individualism scale items from collectivism scale items because individualistic statements are often reverse scored as measures of collectivism and vice versa.
1997; Singelis, 1994). Even in these latter scales, however, the groups being implicitly referred to may be relatively small social groups rather than large collectives.

Overall, relational items dominate over group/collectivistic items by 2.6 to 1, supporting our assertion that collectives or large social groups have not been the central target focus in the collectivism research. Moreover, the total absence of any items reflecting a trade-off between relational and group/collective interests also suggests an implicit assumption in the existing literature that relational orientations and group/collective orientations are essentially equivalent or compatible. This pattern of results implies that what cross-cultural researchers have primarily examined is differences (or similarities) in people’s relational, not collective, orientation across cultures.

**Individualists Are No Less Collectivistic Than Are Collectivists**

Another noteworthy anomaly in the existing collectivism research is the finding from Oyserman et al.’s (2002) meta-analysis that Americans (who generally score high on measures of individualism) are found to be no less collectivistic than East Asians (particularly Japanese and Korean), depending on the scale contents of collectivism. For instance, compared with the Japanese, Americans score higher on collectivism items such as “belonging to the ingroup,” and “seeking others’ advice,” whereas they score lower on collectivism items such as “valuing group harmony,” “valuing hierarchy and groups goals,” and “preference for working in groups.” Moreover, it was also reported that Americans in general score the same as the Koreans on collectivism. When items concerning relatedness are included in the scale, however, Koreans score higher than Americans on collectivism. Thus, the essential cross-cultural difference underlying lower American collectivism lies in lower American valuation of group harmony and duty to the group, and a high value of interpersonal relationships within a group, such as group harmony, seem to characterize East Asian collectivists, whereas a sense of belonging to and connecting with a group appears to better depict American collectivists.

The above evidence suggesting that individualists could be no less collectivistic than collectivists is consistent with decades of research on social identity (Abrams & Hogg, 2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and ingroup favoritism (Brewer, 1979; Mullen, Brown, & Schmidt, 1992) that has been conducted almost exclusively in highly individualistic Western cultures. For example, research conducted in the United States has shown that Americans tend to evaluate products made by their ingroups more positively than those made by outgroups (Brown, Collins, & Schmidt, 1988), view their university more positively than a rival university (Cialdini & Richardson, 1980), and make group-serving attributions when their group succeeds and explain away their group’s responsibility when the group fails (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1992; Elsbach & Kramer, 1996). Thus, there is abundant and highly consistent evidence showing that (individualistic) Americans exhibit group enhancement and protection tendencies and make clear distinctions between their ingroups and outgroups, favoring their own ingroups.

Cross-cultural studies testing the assertion that collectivists make sharper distinctions between ingroups and outgroups than do individualists also have found that American individualists show no less, if not more, ingroup favoritism than do East Asian collectivists. For instance, Bond and Hewstone (1988) found that British high school students in Hong Kong had more positive images of their ingroup than did Chinese students. Similarly, Rose’s (1985) cross-national comparative study found that Americans had more favorable views of their country than did Japanese. Moreover, Snibbe, Kitayama, Markus, and Suzuki (2003) found less ingroup bias among Japanese football fans compared with their American counterparts, even though both cultural groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Total no. of items</th>
<th>No. of items</th>
<th>% S</th>
<th>No. of items</th>
<th>% R</th>
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<th>% S-R</th>
<th>No. of items</th>
<th>% S-G</th>
<th>R-G ratio</th>
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<tr>
<td>Singelis (1994)</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hui (1988)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Hui &amp; Yee (1994)</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>62</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>88</td>
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<td>10</td>
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Note. Rows do not add up to 100% because of noncodable items. S = items with individual self target; R = items with relational target; G = items with group target; S-R = items with individual–relationship trade-off; S-G = items with individual–group trade-off; R-G ratio = (R + S-R)/(G + S-G).
equally identified with their university and the sports team. Finally, Y. Chen et al. (1998) found no average cultural difference in ingroup favoritism between Chinese and American participants across all experimental conditions; the only condition in which greater ingroup favoritism among the Chinese was observed was when participants individually performed well while their ingroup performed poorly. A follow-up study by Y. Chen, Brockner, and Chen (2002) also found that American and Chinese students favored their ingroup over an outgroup to a similar extent.

As Schwartz (1990) put it in his critique of current research on collectivism, these findings call for recognition of differences among types of collectivism. The traditional core meaning of collectivism as giving priority to ingroup goals over personal goals overlooks important values that serve goals that are collective but that are not those of a narrowly defined ingroup. In effect, “collectivists” often show less consideration than do “individualists” for the welfare of strangers—strangers who might be considered part of a collective ingroup in a broader sense of the word.

### Relational Versus Group Collectivism

The above two anomalies appear to challenge the fundamental tenet of the collectivism notion. First, collectivism is a misnomer: Collectives or large social groups have not been the main target of focus in collectivism measures; instead, it is people’s orientations to relational others that dominate most conceptual discussions and empirical measures of collectivism. Second, conclusions drawn both from Oyserman et al.’s (2002) meta-analysis report and from decades of social identity research (including those conducted cross-culturally) suggest that individualists are, in fact, no less collectivistic than are collectivists, in terms of favoring their ingroups over outgroups (Brewer, 1979; Mullen et al., 1992).

One theoretical framework that helps to resolve both of these anomalies is the trichotomization of the self proposed by Brewer and Gardner (1996), which makes an important theoretical distinction between relational self and collective self (in addition to individual self). This model stands in contrast to the view of a single continuum anchored by individual self at one end and collective self at the other in the I–C framework. Instead, Brewer and Gardner (1996) postulated that there are three different levels of the “social self”—the individual, relational, and collective levels of self—as distinct self-representations with different identity properties, loci of agency, and motivational concerns (see also Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). The relational self is the self defined in terms of connections and role relationships with significant others (Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Markus and Kitayama, 1991). The collective self is the social (collective) identity in the theoretical tradition of social identity theory and social categorization theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al. 1987), defined in terms of prototypical properties that are shared among members of a common ingroup.

The relational and collective levels of self postulated by Brewer and Gardner (1996) represent two different forms of social identification, that is, processes by which the individual self is extended to include others as integral to the self-concept. One defining distinction between these two social selves is that the relational self is personalized, incorporating dyadic relationships between the self and particular close others and the networks of interpersonal connections via the extension of these dyadic relationships. By contrast, the collective self involves depersonalized relationships with others by virtue of common membership in a symbolic group. Collective identities do not require interpersonal knowledge or interaction but rely on shared symbols and cognitive representations of the group as a unit independent of personal relationships within the group (Eitzen, 1968; Turner et al., 1987).

The capacity for social identification—extending the sense of self to include others in one’s self-concept—is one universal feature of human psychology that ensures the very survival of the human species and serves to regulate and maintain the essential relationships between individuals and others in their environment (Brewer & Caporael, 2006). In all societies, individuals view themselves as part of defined social groupings (ingroups) characterized by mutual cooperation and reciprocal obligation (Levine & Campbell, 1972; Sumner, 1906). We do not doubt that societies differ in terms of degree of individualism, specifically, the extent to which a culture emphasizes independence and autonomy over interdependence and harmony (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Schimmack et al., 2005). What we challenge is the notion that individualism precludes social identification with social groups and collectives.

In our view, a more complete understanding of cultural differences in social identity will start from the recognition that all societies must meet primary needs for both individual and social identity and provide for an effective interface between individual self-interest and collective interests and welfare. What differs across cultures is how social identification processes are represented and channeled to regulate social cooperation and achieve a balance between expression of individuality and social conformity (Brewer & Roccas, 2001; Brewer & Yuki, in press). Although the capacity for social identity is postulated to be universal, the locus and content of social identities are clearly culturally defined and regulated. Across all societies, individuals maintain close personal relationships, small-group interpersonal networks, and membership in large, symbolic groups (Brewer & Caporael, 2006; Caporael, 1997). But cultural systems rely more or less heavily on these different forms of social connection as the primary locus for defining the social self and for exercising social control over individual behavior. Thus, people in all cultures have three levels of social orientation—individual, relational, and collective levels of the self. What differs among people across cultures is the salience and priority of these three different selves.

Drawing on the distinction between relational and collective selves, Yuki (2003) suggested that the predominant characteristics of group cognition and behavior may differ across cultures. Whereas people in Western individualistic cultures tend to place emphasis on the categorical distinction between ingroups and outgroups, people in East Asian cultures tend to perceive groups as primarily relationship-based (see also Brewer & Roccas, 2001; Brewer & Yuki, in press). Moreover, although social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) proposes intergroup comparison as a key source of ingroup identification and cooperation, such a perspective is argued to be more applicable in North American and European individualistic cultures than collective East Asian cultures. It is primarily Western European and North American individualistic cultures that rely heavily on abstract, categorical group memberships in constructing social identities. For people in East Asian collective cultures, the primary source for identification and cooperation emanates from the maintenance of relational harmony.
and promotion of cohesion within groups. Accordingly, it is theoretically important to differentiate between relational collectivism and group collectivism (Brewer & Roccas, 2001) as two different forms of social embeddedness.

Related Distinctions

Other researchers in the field of cross-cultural psychology have also explicitly or implicitly acknowledged that conceptualizations of “collectivism” may be better characterized in terms of relational interdependence. For instance, Kim (1994) distinguishes between “undifferentiated” and “relational” modes of collectivism. Adams and Dzokoto (2003) have suggested that social identity in West Africa is best characterized as “relational individualism” in that individuals make case-by-case decisions as to whether to trust others by taking into account the relational connections to them (Shaw, 2000). Critics of prevailing conceptions of Japanese culture have made similar arguments. Moemeka (1998) suggests that “communalism” would be a more accurate concept to describe Japanese society; Miyahara (1998) proposes “interpersonalism,” and Nishida (1996) recommends “joint autonomy.” And according to Hamaguchi (1982, as cited in Yamaguchi, 1994), what appears to be collectivist behavior from a Western individualist perspective can be reduced to kanjin-shugi (i.e., a tendency to put importance on person-to-person relationships).

Similarly, Earley and Gibson (1998) have suggested that ingroups in collectivist culture are analogous to Durkheim’s (1933) conception of “community,” i.e., close knit groups or clans, characterized by common bonds and obligations and by ‘mechanical solidarity,’ whereas individualist societies are characterized by what Durkheim referred to as ‘organic solidarity’ (p. 267). Moreover, Smith and Long (2006) have suggested that some individual level measures of collectivism misrepresent Hofstede’s (1980) original conceptualization of collectivism, which was characterized in terms of category membership, as distinguished from masculinity–femininity, which was defined in terms of preference for different types of relationship, regardless of category membership. Existing individual-level measures do not always reflect this distinction. Because many items within these scales refer to aspects of relationship quality and the need to maintain harmony, some items could reflect equally well both cultural femininity and collectivism (see also, Y. Kashima et al., 1995). Thus, there is potential confusion as to whether some published results that have been interpreted in terms of interdependent self-construal among East Asians may actually be reflections of cultural femininity rather than collectivism.

Relational and Group Collectivism in Past Research

In light of the distinction between relational versus group collectivism, it becomes clear why interpersonal relationships or relational networks, instead of collectives or large social groups, have been the primary emphasis in many conceptual discussions and empirical operationalizations of collectivism in the existing research. What researchers in the cross-cultural domain have essentially focused on is relational collectivism, anchored by their understanding of social identification processes in East Asian cultures. Indeed, in many empirical studies examining collectivism effects, researchers often had to give relational cues in their manipulations to bring forth “collectivist’ reactions among collectivists (Y. Chen et al., 1998; Y. Chen et al., 2002; Earley, 1989, 1993). For example, in Earley’s social loafing study, participants in their ingroup condition were told that their group primarily consisted of individuals who came from the same region of the country as themselves, are similar to themselves, with many common interests, likely to be close friends if they actually met one another and might be distantly related to one another. Similarly, Y. Chen et al. (2002) also had to emphasize common relational values to induce participants’ sense of attachment to their ingroup in the study. Moreover, when relational attachment is statistically controlled for, the predicted relationship between collectivism and ingroup favoritism was no longer significant.

The distinction between relational versus group collectivism also makes it possible to recognize that both individualists and collectivists are part of a group-oriented human species, and, therefore, capable of showing group-oriented behaviors and attitudes, such as ingroup trust. A recent study by Yuki et al. (2005) provides a direct test to this possibility. Specifically, they found that Americans tended to trust strangers on the basis of a common group category membership, whereas stranger trust for Japanese was contingent on whether the target person shared a direct or indirect relationship link with a close other. The presence of a potential relationship connection across group boundaries had a stronger effect on outgroup trust for Japanese than for Americans, but participants from both cultures trusted strangers who were members of their ingroup.

Other evidence suggests that East Asians do not readily engage in outgroup discrimination in minimal group settings, when discrimination does not indirectly benefit the self (Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999). For relational collectivists, cooperation or non-cooperation with others is driven more by a direct or indirect network of relationships with the self, regardless of categorical group boundaries (Yuki et al., 2005). Intergroup discrimination in East Asia can be characterized as strategies that maximize one’s own personal interest by maintaining mutually beneficial relationships with fellow ingroup members (Yamagishi, Jin, & Miller, 1998). Consistent with this reasoning, a series of studies by Yamagishi and colleagues (Jin, Yamagishi, & Kiyonari, 1996; Karp, Jin, Yamagishi, & Shinotsuka, 1993) showed that Japanese engage ingroup favoritism in a minimal group situation when an apparent cue of intragroup interdependence is provided. In a condition in which participants were told that they were the only person within their ingroup who was given the reward allocation task, they did not show ingroup favoritism. They did, however, favor the ingroup when it was emphasized clearly that everyone in the experiment was performing the reward allocation task, which supposedly made them think about interdependence (and reciprocity) within their group. These findings are consistent with our contention that the source of Japanese ingroup loyalty is the maintenance of reciprocal relationships with fellow ingroup members. In contrast, participants in minimal group experiments in North America and Australia have shown significant ingroup discrimination even when reciprocal interdependence within groups has been eliminated (e.g., Perreault & Bourhis, 1998; Platow, McClintock, & Liebrand, 1990), suggesting that ingroup favoritism in these cultures is based on desire to benefit the ingroup as a whole rather than on expectation of reciprocal favors from other individuals in the group.
In summary, it is critical that cross-culture researchers explicitly recognize the difference between relational versus group collectivism because they suggest two rather different bases for collective orientations across cultures and help resolve two theoretical and empirical anomalies in the existing literature.

Elements of Collectivism: Self-Representations, Beliefs, and Values

The theoretical distinction we have discussed thus far differentiates between two different types of collectivism, distinguished on the basis of whether the social ingroup (the target of collective orientation) is defined as a network of interpersonal relationships or as a depersonalized social category. However, extant measures of I–C vary on a wide range of content dimensions other than the referent target individual or group. Results from both factor analyses and content analyses of various I–C scales reveal numerous ways in which the items in these measures can be subdivided into different content domains. For instance, Wagner (1995) factor analyzed 43 items from three different I–C scales and identified five distinct factors: independence and self-reliance, competitive achievement, preference for working alone or in groups, subordination of personal interests to group interests, and beliefs about group productivity. At a more conceptual level, a classification scheme developed by Ho and Chiu (1994) identified 18 different components of both individualism and collectivism, clustered into five major components labeled values, autonomy/conformity, responsibility, achievement, and self-reliance/interdependence. Elaborating on the value component, Schwartz (1990) concluded that collectivism encompasses four value types: prosocial (universal collectivism); restrictive conformity; security; and tradition, all of which do not necessarily hang together.

In what is probably the most comprehensive content analysis to date, Oyserman et al. (2002) sorted items from 27 different I–C scales into seven components of individualism (independence, individual goal striving, competition, uniqueness, self-privacy, self-knowledge, and direct communication) and eight components of collectivism (relatedness, group belonging, duty, harmony, seeking advice from others, contextualization, hierarchy, and preference for group work), noting that scales varied widely in their sampling of content across these diverse component domains. In fact, in many of these analyses there is a lack of parallelism between components of individualism and components of collectivism, making direct comparisons impossible.

In order to make meaningful comparisons between individualism, relational collectivism, and group collectivism as cultural worldviews, the constructs need to be decomposed into basic underlying elements that are shared across all three. As a framework for such decomposition, we start with a more abstract representation of what is meant by cultural worldviews. Broadly defined, culture is a system of shared meanings and understandings, together with a set of practices that enact and reinforce the shared worldviews (Triandis, 1972). Cultures provide group members with answers to fundamental questions, including questions of self and identity (Who am I, or Who are we?), questions about how the physical and social world works and how things are interrelated (beliefs), and questions about how things should be and what is the right course of behavior (values). At the individual level, these elements of culture correspond to some of the primary building blocks of psychology—self-concept, cognition, and motivation.

As an aspect of culture, the I–C dimension addresses questions regarding how individuals define themselves and their relationships to others within the social system, including self-representations, beliefs about independence and interdependence, and the relative value placed on self-fulfillment, relationships, and group welfare. More specifically, we propose that the distinctions between individualism, relational collectivism, and group collectivism can be decomposed into the following basic elements:

Self-representations. Corresponding to the different levels of self-construal identified by Brewer and Gardner (1996), this refers to shared understandings about whether the self is best represented as a separate, unique individual (individual self-construal), or as a node in a tightly connected network of interpersonal relationships (relational self-construal), or as an interchangeable part of a larger social entity (collective self-construal).

Agency beliefs. This refers to implicit or explicit understandings about what makes things happen in the social world, primarily the distinction between independence and interdependence as the source of social events and outcomes. Beliefs about agency can be vested in individuals (individual autonomy), in networks of reciprocal relationships (relational interdependence), or in groups as collective entities (collective interdependence).

Values. Although cultural value systems dictate rights and obligations in all spheres of life (Inglehart, Basanez, & Moreno, 1998; Schwartz, 1992), the value elements associated with I–C dimension refer more specifically to the relative importance placed on individual rights and obligations (self-fulfillment, individual responsibility), rights and responsibilities associated with maintaining relationships and the welfare of relationship partners (interpersonal harmony, reciprocal exchange), or rights and obligations associated with the collective welfare of the group as a whole (duty to authority, collective cooperation). In effect, individualism, relational collectivism, and group collectivism address the issue of whose interests (individuals, relationships, or groups) should be given priority when interests conflict.

Coding Item Content

To test whether concepts of self-representations, agency beliefs, and values are represented (at least implicitly) in operational definitions of individualism and collectivism, we conducted a second content analysis of the 14 sets of I–C scale items used in our previous analysis, this time coding each of the 408 items into the following content categories:

I: Self-representation statements—items that express self-construal as an individual or identification with others or with a social group (e.g., “I am a unique individual” and “If a member of my group gets a prize, I would feel proud”).

3 This also probably accounts, in part, for the inconsistency in findings regarding the correlation between scores on individualism and scores on collectivism across different measures. Although originally conceived by Hofstede (1980) as polar opposites, at the individual level, individualism and collectivism have proved to be sometimes negatively correlated but more often positively correlated or orthogonal (see e.g., Schimmack et al., 2005).
The discrepancy between the content of items in measures of the individualism versus collectivism ends of the dimension suggests that, implicitly at least, collectivism is conceptualized primarily as a value system, (i.e., shared norms and beliefs about what is important and about obligations and responsibilities to others and to groups), whereas individualism is operationalized primarily in terms of beliefs in an individuated self and individual agency. Thus, the two are not parallel constructs (as measured). It is possible to believe in the uniqueness and autonomy of individuals and still place high value on maintaining close relationships with others or on collective cooperation and group welfare. Although a focus on interdependence with others and a strong sense of identification with related others or with groups certainly provide a cognitive underpinning for collective obligations and values, beliefs and values are not entirely isomorphic. Thus, the fact that individualism measures are primarily about beliefs and cognitive representations, whereas collectivism measures are primarily about values and duties may account for the fact that Individualism and Collectivism scales, two refer to self-representation (Related and Harmony, Belonging, and Hierarchy). This difference is another indication of the lack of parallelism between conceptualizations of individualism and collectivism in many of the extant measures of these constructs.

4 At the societal level, individualism and collectivism have also been characterized in terms of cultural practices. However, we have not included behaviors in our content classification scheme because of inherent ambiguities about the cognitive or motivational underpinnings of specific practices. For instance, the statement “I seek the advice of family members before making any important life decisions” could be motivated by multiple reasons. Individualists might do so as a matter of self-interest, whereas relational collectivists might do so because of desire for harmony or to take others’ interests into account. In this respect we agree with Oyserman et al. (2002), who criticized the inclusion of practice items in existing INDCOL scales “because it gives rise to confusion between underlying cultural values which are assumed to shape behaviors and the behaviors themselves” (p. 42).

5 Most of the noncodable items were statements regarding personal preferences or practices or items regarding seeking and taking advice from specific others.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>No. of items</th>
<th>No. of items</th>
<th>No. of items</th>
<th>No. of items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Representation</td>
<td>Belief</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singeles (1994)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui (1988)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui &amp; Yee (1994)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsumoto et al. (1997)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oyserman (1993)</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wagner (1995)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaines et al. (1997)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verma (1992)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earley (1987, 1989, 1993)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhee et al. (2002)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashima &amp; Hardie (2000)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamaguchi (1994)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen et al. (2002)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (all scales combined)</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Rows do not add up to 100% because of noncodable items.

B: Agency belief statements—items that express beliefs about agency in terms of independence or interdependence (e.g., “In the long run, the only person you can count on is yourself” and “Colleagues’ assistance is indispensable to good performance at work”).

V: Value statements—items that express values, or beliefs about what should be (e.g., “The most important thing in my life is to make myself happy” and “Family members should stick together no matter what sacrifices are involved”).

Rows do not add up to 100% because of noncodable items.
Collectivism often turn out to be orthogonal factors rather than polar opposites (see Footnote 3).

A New Model of Individualism and Collectivism

Crossing the components of worldviews with the distinctions among individualism, relational collectivism, and group collectivism leads to the schematic model represented in Table 3. In effect, this model decomposes the distinction between individualism and collectivism into some fundamental elements that define and shape the relationship between individuals and groups within a particular society (Triandis, 1972).

The various cells in Table 3 correspond to different potential definitions of individualism or collectivism, most of which appear in the extant literature. Hofstede’s (1980) operationalization of cultural differences in individualism, for instance, focused solely on agency—beliefs about individual autonomy, independence, and self-determination within organizations, and this focus on independent versus interdependent agency has continued in most later work on I–C within the workplace (e.g., Earley, 1989; Wagner, 1995). In many other contexts, however, individualism is equated with self-interest and competition, which are best classified as values.6

The constructs of independent and interdependent self-construals focus almost exclusively on locus of identity, distinguishing between separate, unique individual selves versus relational selves (Cross, Bacon, & Morris, 2000; Markus & Kitayama, 1991), whereas social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) focuses on the collective self. Most conceptualizations and measures of collectivism, on the other hand, emphasize values, particularly obligations and responsibilities toward relational others (e.g., Kim, Triandis, Kagitcibasi, Choi, & Yoon, 1994) or duty to groups (Oyserman et al., 2002). Thus, even though the basic distinction between separation and embeddedness may be common to all understandings of the nature of individualism versus collectivism, our model makes it clear that there are many different ways of being “separate individuals,” and many ways of being “embedded” in social relations or groups. Given these variations in meaning, it is not surprising that results from different studies order cultures differently on relative individualism or collectivism or reveal different patterns of relationship between I–C and social behaviors at the individual level.

It is important to note that none of the component elements in Table 3 should be seen as mutually exclusive. Within any culture, individuals can place some importance on individual uniqueness, interpersonal relationships, and group memberships, believe in the efficacy of both independent and interdependent problem solving, and place value on the interests of self, specific others, and groups as a whole. The content of proverbs and adages extant in different countries is particularly revealing on this point. For instance, one content analysis of popular Chinese sayings identified elements of both individualism and collectivism in the distribution of content across 379 sayings (Ho & Chiu, 1994). So, for example, in China, “a single hand clapping, though fast, makes no sound” but “rather than have three or four people to steal a cow, it is better to steal a dog alone.” And in America, “too many cooks spoil the broth” but “many hands make light work.” As we said earlier, all cultures must contain elements of all nine components in order to meet varied and complex demands of social life. Where individuals and cultures differ, however, is on the relative salience of these elements of worldview and on where priorities are placed when the demands and implications of different aspects are in conflict.

Further, the relative emphasis on individual, relational, or collective elements of beliefs and values may not always be consistent within cultures across different domains (e.g., politics and business vs. family and social life). In fact, there may be trade-offs whereby high focus on a particular social target in one aspect of worldview is balanced by greater focus on other targets in different domains. And the elements of self-representations, agency beliefs, and values may not always be consistent among themselves. For instance, results of a recent cross-national study conducted in the United States, Australia, Japan, and Korea (Y. Kashima et al., 1995) revealed that belief in the essential nature of individuals was similar across all of these cultures but that cultures differed in their beliefs about individual versus group agency. Brewer and Roccas (2001) have argued that the very emphasis on individual autonomy and responsibility that characterizes American culture on the agency belief element gives rise to high need for inclusion and intergroup attachment.

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6 We have not even included competition values in our model because we believe this is a dimension that is orthogonal to individual, relational, and group levels of self. Competitive orientations can be interpersonal or intergroup (cf Hinkle & Brown, 1990).
belonging in large social groups on the self-representation element. Along similar lines, some of the critics of collectivism theory among cultural psychologists that we cited above have argued for a concept such as “relational individualism” that captures the complex dynamic between individual self-interest and relational concerns that characterize Japanese and other so-called collectivist cultures (cf. Ryan, 1998).

We would argue that relational and group collectivism may be more incompatible overall than are aspects of individualism with aspects of either form of collectivism. Individual uniqueness, for instance, may be quite compatible with relational intimacy and interdependence (Waterman, 1981), and individual agency may be combined with a strong sense of duty to group in many cultural contexts. However, connectedness to others based on strong interpersonal ties and networks may inherently conflict with a depersonalized representation of social groups and associated values. This is particularly interesting given the absence of recognition of explicit trade-offs between relational interests and group interests in the I–C measures that we have reviewed here. The extent of incompatibility among any of these elements is ultimately an empirical issue, but our model provides a conceptual framework from which such questions can be addressed systematically.

Testing the Model on Existing Data

Our decomposition of the I–C constructs helps to explain why existing measures of I–C often have low internal consistency and produce mixed results in cross-cultural comparison research (Oyserman et al., 2002). Combining the results of our two content analyses indicates that most scales contain an imbalanced mixture of items sampling the nine components of the model and, further, that items assessing individualistic orientation are not parallel to items assessing collectivistic orientation in terms of loci. Individualism is operationally defined largely in terms of identity and agency beliefs, whereas collectivism measures are dominated by value statements regarding interpersonal relationships. As a consequence, it is difficult to draw from data using existing I–C measures to generate data that can be used for purposes of systematically testing our model as a whole. Nonetheless, we did undertake a set of analyses by using existing data from previously published studies to test specific components of the model.

Relational Versus Group Collectivism: Discriminant Validity

Our initial analysis was designed to test the theoretical distinction between relational collectivism and group collectivism, holding item content constant. For this purpose, we analyzed a data set collected from a sample of 156 business-school students in the United States, who responded to two versions of the Relational Self-Construal Scale developed by Cross et al. (2000). One version was the original Relational Self-Construal Scale (α = .86), and the other was an adapted collective version of the same scale (α = .83). All the relational targets in the 11 items of the relational self-construal scale were changed to collective targets to form the scale of group collectivism. For example, the item “My close relationships are an important reflection of who I am.” Similarly, the item “When I think of myself, I often think of my close friends or family also” was adapted to “When I think of myself, I often think of the groups I belong to.” This procedure for generating separate scales for the two types of collective self-construal provided a very conservative basis for assessing the discriminant validity of the constructs holding content constant, although it was somewhat limited because of the restriction to the self-representation content domain.

The uncorrected bivariate correlation between the two scales was .48. Following Schimmack et al. (2005), we controlled for agreement response set by computing, for each respondent, a grand mean of their ratings (on 7-point agreement scales) across all positively worded items in the full questionnaire. Controlling for individual differences in response set, the partial correlation between relational and collective self-construal scales was .16 (p < .05). Thus even this very conservative test (holding item content constant across the two scales) supported our hypothesized differentiation between relational and group collectivism.

Differentiating Components of I–C

Our next analyses were designed to test the usefulness of decomposing the I–C constructs into component elements. We started by selecting items from existing I–C scales to generate subscales that represented different elements of the 3 × 3 taxonomy presented in Table 3. We then used these subscales to assess the relative predictive validity of the different components in various domains.

Study 1: Factor analysis of I–C subscales. Our first analysis used data collected for Y. Chen et al.’s (2002) cross-cultural study of ingroup favoritism. The questionnaire administered in this study (conducted in the United States and China) contained several measures of individualism and collectivism that have appeared in the literature (Singelis, 1994; Singelis et al., 1995; Triandis et al., 1986) and Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) Collective Self-Esteem Scale. On the basis of our two content analyses of these measures, we selected items from among these scales that formed subscale measures of Individual Self-Representation (IS; 3 items), Relational Self-Representation (RS; 6 items), Group Self-Representation (GS; 4 items), Individual Agency Beliefs (IB; 4 items), and Group Values (GV; 5 items).8 (See the Appendix for subscale items and reliabilities.) The intercorrelations among the five subscales are presented in Table 4. Simple bivariate correlations reveal that none of these correlations are more than moderately high (largest r = .53) and some are negative. Moreover, after controlling for individual differences in response set, the partial correlations among several of the variables became negative (e.g., correlation between relational self-representation and group self-representation). It is not surprising then that a confirmatory factor analysis testing a one-factor

7 Following Schimmack et al. (2005), we controlled for agreement response set by computing, for each respondent, a grand mean of their ratings (on 7-point agreement scales) across all positively worded items in the full questionnaire. The correlation between relational and group collectivism scale scores was then recomputed after partialing out the correlation of each scale score with this grand mean.

8 No items in the available measures were classified as Relational Agency, Group Agency, Group Self-Representation, or Relational Values.
model resulted in relatively poor fit (goodness-of-fit index [GFI] = .82, root-mean-square error of approximation [RMSEA] = .09). By contrast, a five-factor model showed excellent fit to the data (GFI = .91, RMSEA = .05).

**Study 2: Predicting ingroup positivity (Y. Chen et al., 1998).**

Having empirically differentiated among various components of Individualism and Collectivism, we undertook additional reanalyses of other existing published data with these scales to assess the differential contribution of the components to various outcomes (see Table 5). The first such analysis used data from a study on ingroup positivity under conditions in which the ingroup performs poorly at the same time that the individual has performed well (individual success–ingroup failure condition). Results from the original study indicated that individual differences in collectivism predicted the positivity of ingroup ratings under these circumstances (interpreted as an indicator of loyalty to the ingroup despite adverse reflections on the self). These findings were reanalyzed by using the IS, RS, GS, IB, and GV subscales as separate predictors. Results of regression analysis indicated that only the GV subscale contributed significantly to the outcome, independent of the other I–C subscales. In the domain of ingroup loyalty under adversity, valuing group welfare and self-sacrifice on behalf of the ingroup differentially predicted ingroup positivity relative to other components of collectivism.

**Study 3: Predicting negotiation success (Y. Chen, Mannix, & Okumura, 2003).** The results of a cross-cultural study of interpersonal negotiation outcomes revealed a complex interaction of aspirations, competitive orientation, and culture in predicting the success (in individual profits earned) of interpersonal negotiations. In our reanalyses, we replaced the individual difference variable (competitive orientation) with each of our available I–C subscales (IS, RS, IB, GV) in this predictive regression and found that only RS contributed significantly (in interaction with aspiration and culture) to predict outcomes. Specifically, in the Peoples Republic of China and in Japan (but not in the United States), individuals with high aspirations and low relational self scores fared better in terms of individual profits than did individuals with high relational self scores (presumably because in these cultures, they had a high probability of being paired with a partner high in relational self-representation). Again, one component of collectivism could be differentiated from other elements of collectivism to account for individual and culture differences in this particular domain (negotiation behavior and outcomes).

**Study 4: Predicting ability attributions (Brockner & Chen, 1996).** In an earlier cross-cultural experiment, Brockner and Chen (1996) found that individualism interacted with self-esteem and feedback to predict whether participants attributed their own performance to ability. Individualists with high self-esteem were those most likely to attribute failure less to ability compared with those in no feedback conditions. Substituting IB and IV subscales for the overall Individualism scale in the regression analyses revealed that only IB contributed to this interaction. Moreover, the individual agency belief component in our analysis mediated the effect of culture, whose effect was not explainable in the earlier reported analyses. Relational values and self-representation subscales that we could construct from the scale used (i.e., Triandis et al., 1986) played no role, nor did collectivism measures in general in the original study. Again, these results confirm that a specific component of I–C measures accounts for an obtained relationship between individualism and protective attributions.

### Implications for Past and Future Research

Both the above results and those from the content analysis of target types reported earlier suggest that it is essential that researchers in the cross-cultural community differentiate the effects

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**Table 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subscale</th>
<th>IS</th>
<th>RS</th>
<th>GS</th>
<th>IB</th>
<th>GV</th>
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<td><strong>Intercoefficients</strong></td>
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<td>.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relational Self (RS)</td>
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<td>.37</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group Self (GS)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual Agency Beliefs (IB)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group Values (GV)</td>
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<td>-.14</td>
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**Table 5**

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<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Study 2</th>
<th>Study 3</th>
<th>Study 4</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ingroup positivity</td>
<td>Negotiation outcomes*</td>
<td>Ability attributions</td>
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<td>Individual Self (IS)</td>
<td>B = -.33, ns</td>
<td>B = -.02, ns</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relational Self (RS)</td>
<td>B = 2.04, p &lt; .15</td>
<td>B = -.15, p &lt; .05</td>
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<td>Group Self (GS)</td>
<td>B = 1.63, p = .10</td>
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<td>Individual Agency (IB)</td>
<td>B = -1.19, ns</td>
<td>B = .03, ns</td>
<td>B = -.51, p &lt; .001</td>
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<td>B = 4.46, p &lt; .001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual Value (IV)</td>
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</table>

* Regression weight for interaction of individualism–collectivism Element × Aspiration × Culture.
of relational and group collectivism both conceptually and empirically in their future work. The theoretical differentiation among three different domains within each of the target dimensions has important implications for how to interpret past research in this area as well as how to structure future research on cultural and individual differences in individualism and collectivism. Self-construal (e.g., Cross et al., 2000; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Turner et al., 1987), agency beliefs (e.g., Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995), and social values (e.g., Messick & Mcclintock, 1968) constitute three fundamental elements of human psychology and have long received independent attention in the history of social psychological research. Accordingly, when conceptualizing and testing the effects of individualism, relational collectivism, and group collectivism, researchers need to be clear about which domain of these worldviews can be expected to be most related to the phenomena examined, as effects emanating from each are theoretically different. For instance, individualists with strong individual agency beliefs do not necessarily place great emphasis on self-interests when facing a social dilemma situation, so a simple assumption that any aspect of individualism will predict cooperative or competitive behavior is likely to be unfounded. Similarly, people who place high value on group memberships might not always possess strong beliefs in group agency, so valuing group belonging may not necessarily predict preference to work in groups (rather than individually) in order to get tasks done. Greater conceptual clarification of the meaning of different forms of individualistic and collectivistic orientations should help researchers better match measures to research questions.

**Cross-Culture Comparisons**

Self-report measures of individualism and collectivism have been used in research at different levels of analysis. Some studies use such measures to assess chronic individual differences within cultures, and to correlate this assessment with individual behaviors, attitudes, or judgments (e.g., Gudykunst et al., 1996; Hui & Villareal, 1989; Hui, Triandis, & Yee, 1991). Other research has examined variation within individuals in different contexts or as a function of semantic primes (e.g., Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999; Oyserman, Sakamoto, & Lauffer, 1998). Most often, however, individual responses to I–C scales are aggregated to the group level in order to make comparisons between cultures in the strength of individualistic or collectivistic orientations. Such comparisons are fraught with methodological problems stemming from issues of equivalence of meaning across languages and cultural differences in response styles on self-report rating scales (e.g., Ji, Schwarz, & Nisbett, 2000; Peng, Nisbett, & Wong, 1997; Schimack et al., 2005; Smith, 2004).

Absolute versus relative comparisons. Given the ambiguity of interpreting mean differences across cultures, researchers are better advised to look at differences in the relative endorsement of individualistic versus collectivistic worldviews across different content domains. Our model suggests a strategy for such comparisons, namely, assessing the relative endorsement of individualism, relational collectivism, and group collectivism items within each of the three loci (i.e., self-representation, agency, and value). This would allow for characterizing cultural groups in terms of relative strength of the three worldviews either within domains or aggregated across the different elements.

An existing example of this strategy of assessing the three levels of I–C orientation is the Relational, Individual, and Collective Self-Aspects Scale (RIC; E. S. Kashima & Hardie, 2000). The RIC measure is constructed to present a series of sentence stems dealing with various issues of worldview (e.g., “I think it is most important in life to...” and “The most satisfying activity for me is...”) and then asking respondents to indicate their degree of agreement with each of three sentence completions, one representing an individualistic response (e.g., “have personal integrity and be true to myself”), one representing a relational response (e.g., “have good personal relationships with people who are important to me”), and one representing a group collectivistic response (e.g., “work for causes to improve the well-being of my group”). Aggregating agreement scores for each response type across items provides a profile of relative endorsement of the three orientations, holding context constant.

Thus, the RIC scale provides a model of the strategy we are suggesting but, because the item content was not generated from a theoretical framework, there is no systematic sampling of the three elements of worldview contained in our model. In fact, our content analysis of this scale [see Table 2] indicates that it is heavily dominated by value items [6 of the 10 sentence stems were coded as value statements] and underrepresents the agency belief element [only one sentence stem]. In addition, the group-level responses are ambiguous as to what type of group is being referred to, making no distinction between small interpersonal groups (e.g., family) and large collectives. Thus, it is unclear whether this measure adequately distinguishes between relational collectivism and group collectivism as we have defined it here.

**Beyond East–West.** As any review of cross-cultural differences in individualism and collectivism will reveal (e.g., Oyserman et al., 2002), research in this area has been dominated by comparisons between participant populations drawn from Western countries (particularly the United States and Australia) and participants from East Asian countries (particularly Japan, China, and Korea). This restriction in sampling of nationalities may be partially responsible for the specific view of collectivism (in our terms, relational values of harmony and obligation to ingroups) that characterizes many of the extant measures of I–C, as these may be the particular components of collectivism that best distinguish East from West. A broader representation of nations in other parts of the world, including Africa and South America may be needed to appreciate the full range of cultural differences across the various elements of individualism, relational collectivism, and group collectivism.

**Behavioral and Psychological Consequences of Individualism and Collectivism**

Clarification of the nature of individualism and collectivism orientations becomes important to the extent that such orientations play a role in explaining social behavior. The comprehensive review by Oyserman et al. (2002) indicates that the I–C distinction is implicated in a number of basic psychological and social processes, including causal attributions, personal well-being, interpersonal communication and negotiation, workgroup behavior, and intergroup relations. We consider each of these in turn in the light of our conceptual model.
Causal attributions. Both theoretical arguments and empirical studies on the I–C distinction have implicated the I–C distinction in analysis of causal reasoning. In general, individualism is associated with dispositional and decontextualized reasoning and collectivism with holistic and contextualized causal reasoning (Choi & Nisbett, 1998; Menon, Morris, Chiu, & Hong, 1999; Morris & Peng, 1994; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). Although findings from comparative studies support the idea that dispositional inference is an American attribution style, and contextualized reasoning (including situational attribution) characterizes the attribution style in many collective cultures, the theoretical links between these attributional outcomes and the I–C distinction have not received clear empirical support (Oyserman et al., 2002). In light of our conceptual model and the analyses of the existing I–C measures, we suggest that a more differentiated understanding of individualistic, relational, and collectivistic worldviews and the loci within each may strengthen theories of the relationship between cultural orientations and causal attributions.

First, as we have shown, existing measures of I–C do not make differentiations among the three elements of worldview from our conceptual model; most scales include items that measure more than one, if not all, of the three elements within the single scale. Dispositional attribution (i.e., attributing the cause of actions and outcomes to internal factors within the individual actor) is directly associated with beliefs in individual agency and responsibility but not necessarily with other elements of the I–C distinction. The most direct evidence for the connection between dispositional reasoning style and individualism (Duff & Newman, 1997; Newman, 1991) may reflect the relatively high proportion of agency belief items in the individualism (rather than the collectivism) scales. As Hannover and Kuhnen (2004) argue, an independent self-construal activates both semantic knowledge (individual autonomy and dispositional traits) and procedural knowledge (context-independent mode of thinking) that mediate dispositional causal attributions.

Although the role of individual agency beliefs in decontextualized, dispositional causal reasoning is fairly well articulated, it is less clear what mediates the hypothesized relationship between collectivistic orientations and contextualized causal reasoning. Nisbett et al. (2001) have argued that the holistic reasoning in the Chinese culture derives from the traditional Chinese emphasis on reciprocal social obligation and the valuing of ingroup harmony. This conceptualization, however, does not distinguish between relational versus group-based collectivism, or the agency beliefs associated with them, as the basis of contextualized information processing. As our model suggests, relational collectivism involves a personalized worldview that involves understanding and appreciation of webs of relationships within and among one’s social networks. The agency beliefs associated with this heightened awareness of interconnectedness and interdependence may provide one path to contextualized reasoning and reduced individual attributions. In Hannover and Kuhnen’s (2004) terms, the most likely mediator in this case is the activation of procedural knowledge (context dependent mode of thinking) activated by interdependence beliefs. On the other hand, a belief in group agency associated with depersonalized group-based collectivism may also give rise to holistic thinking and dispositional attributions at the group (rather than individual) level (Menon et al., 1999; Y. Kashima et al., 1995). Again, using Hannover and Kuhnen’s theoretical framework, we would argue that the mediator in this case would be semantic knowledge activated by group agency beliefs. To add conceptual clarity, future research in this domain might be strengthened by focusing on the belief component of the I–C distinction and taking into account the differentiation we make between relational collectivism and group collectivism.

Personal well-being. The theoretical literature has posited that there are likely to be different sources of well-being for individualists versus collectivists. Attaining personal goals, happiness, and personal control are assumed central to well-being among individualists, whereas carrying out obligations and duties are assumed central to well-being among collectivists (Diener & Diener, 1995; Oishi, 2000; Suh, Diener, Oishi, & Triandis, 1998).

Though multinational well-being studies show moderate correlations between well-being and Hofstede’s (1980) individualism scores, this relationship is at least partially mediated by national wealth, gross national product, and civil rights factors. At the individual level, research has shown that the relationship between I–C components and well-being is moderated by overall cultural values and worldview. For instance, Oishi (2000) has shown that the correlation between horizontal individualism (uniqueness and autonomy) and life satisfaction was stronger in more individualistic nations than in less individualistic ones. Similarly, Kernahan, Bettencourt, and Dorr (2000) found a significant positive relationship between alocentrism and subjective well-being but this was stronger for African Americans than for European Americans. Finally, research with the RIC scale (Hardie, 2005; Hardie, Kashima, & Pridmore, 2005) has demonstrated that the dominant self aspect (individual, relational, or collective) is related to preferred styles of coping with stress and that mental health is associated with the level of uplift and stress coping ability in RIC-related aspects of self.

On the basis of our analysis of the elements of I–C orientation, it seems likely that the value aspect of worldview would be the most relevant to predicting psychological functioning and well-being. Considerable clinical evidence exists for the proposition that psychological dysfunction and depression is associated with discrepancies between perceived actual and ideal selves (Rogers, 1951). Shared cultural values are clearly an important source of definition of the ideal self, and cultural differences in whether primary values are vested in the individual, in interpersonal relationships, or in group welfare will dictate how actual–ideal discrepancies are calculated. Findings that show harmony maintenance as one of the greatest sources of stress in the work place in China (Lai, 1995; Lin & Lai, 1995) support this association between collectivist values and sources of well-being. From this perspective, it would be useful for researchers to examine whether it is relationship-based, rather than the group-based, collectivism that drives the well-being outcomes in various collective cultures (e.g., Japan, and China). It would also be theoretically important to investigate whether duties and obligations to collective levels of welfare, associated with group collectivism, might indeed turn out to be an important source of well-being and/or stress in individualistic cultures. Given the high levels of dedication to organizations and sports teams in many Western cultures (Ashford, & Mael, 1989), this pattern of relationship would not be surprising.

Self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987) makes a further distinction between “ideal self” (goals and aspirations) and the “ought self” (obligations and duties) as two different sources of self–ideal
discrepancies, and this suggests yet another dimension of relationship between cultural orientation and well-being. Where cultural values focus on attaining ideals (personal fulfillment, relational harmony, or group achievement), self-discrepancies should manifest themselves in symptoms of depression and loss of self-esteem. Consistent with the value placed on individual welfare in individualistic societies, Heine and Lehman (1999) have found that the ideal–actual discrepancy was more strongly associated with depression among European Canadians than among Japanese. To the extent that cultural values focus on *oughts* and obligations to self or others (relationships or groups), self-discrepancies should be associated with guilt, shame, and anxiety. More specifically, on the basis of our model, we would suggest that discrepancies from ought selves based on obligations to relational others should be associated primarily with shame, whereas self–ought discrepancies based on obligations to groups will be associated with guilt.

**Interpersonal communication.** Theoretically and empirically, individualism has been associated with a preference for direct and goal-oriented communication, with the intention to “take the floor,” whereas collectivism is related to an orientation of indirect communication, out of concern for communication partners’ feelings as well as concern with one’s own self-presentation (Bond, Wan, Leung, & Giaalalone, 1985; Gudykunst et al., 1996; Kim, Shin, & Cai, 1988; Tribbinsky, Ting-Toomey, & Lin, 1991). Clearly, relational-based collectivism, rather than group-based collectivism, is theoretically better linked with indirect communication. The very idea of possibly offending another individual or being appraised negatively by others is a relational, not a collective, notion. In light of the distinction between relational versus group collectivism, it is possible that when asked to shift focus to group, as opposed to relational outcomes, individuals in collectivistic cultures might begin to engage in more direct communications with members in their groups. Recent findings suggest that collectivists, such as the Chinese, are certainly capable of displaying direct and open communications (Tjosvold, Hui, & Sun, 2004).

**Negotiation and conflict resolution.** Past research in cross-cultural negotiation and conflict resolution shows that individualism is related to a stronger self-interest schema (Brett & Okumura, 1998; Y. Chen et al., 2003), a lower ability to assess the opponent’s preferences (Gelfand & Christakopoulou, 1999), and a preference for equity–rather than equality-based reward allocation (Leung & Bond, 1984) compared with collectivism. Further studies found that it was relational, horizontal collectivists, who are concerned with interpersonal harmony, that support equitarian rewards allocation. In contrast, the group-based vertical collectivists support economic reform that promotes merit-based differential rewards allocation (C. C. Chen, et al., 1997; He, Chen, & Zhang, 2004).

The importance of differentiating three elements of worldviews and relational versus group collectivism is also highly relevant in this research domain. For example, when outcomes of the negotiation or conflict are the central concern, the most relevant element of I–C should be values, as opposed to agency beliefs or identity—in particular, the extent to which individuals would choose to focus on their own self-interests versus those of others or their collective when faced with the conflict between the two. Moreover, when assessing procedural justice in resource allocations or decision making, we suggest that for individualists, the focus is likely to be on personal control (e.g., having a voice; Thibaut & Walker, 1975); for relational collectivists, the focus will be on the nature of the relationship with the exchange counterparts (Tyler & Lind, 1992); and for group collectivists, the focus will be on maintaining the stability and integrity of the group.

**Work behavior.** Our conceptual model also suggests several implications for research on work-related outcomes associated with I–C orientation. For example, because most workplace research on groups concerns small work groups (Earley, 1993, 1994; Wagner, 1995), as opposed to large collectives such as the organization as a whole, relational collectivism is most likely to be at play in studies that examined cooperation and performance in work groups. On the other hand, group collectivism that focuses on duties and conformity to norms should be theoretically more relevant to employees’ organizational citizenship behavior. Indeed the indigenous construct of “traditionality” (i.e., the extent to which individuals endorse societal norms) has been shown to relate to Taiwanese employees’ organizational citizenship behaviors (Farh, Earley, & Lin, 1997). Conceptually analogous to the notion of group collectivism, organizational identification (rather than relational quality at work) has also been shown to have positive impact on organizational citizenship behavior in the United States (O’Reilly & Chatman, 1986).

One work context that is particularly appropriate to test the distinction between relational versus group collectivism is the dilemma managers often have to resolve between relational interests and collective interests (Hill, 1992). As we suggested above, if cultures that are conventionally categorized as collective are in fact relational in essence, then it is likely that managers in those cultures would be more willing to place interests of relational others ahead of those of their organization when faced with a conflict between the two compared with their counterparts in individualistic cultures. Research on the role of *guanxi* (i.e., a particularistic personal relationship between two or more individuals) in Chinese organizations suggests that this might very well be the case (C. C. Chen, Chen, & Xin, 2004) because for the Chinese, the notion of ingroup or “my own people” includes individuals with whom one has *guanxi* ties, not the institution to which one belongs.

**Intergroup relations.** The distinction between relational and group collectivism also has implications for understanding the relationship between intragroup cohesion and intergroup competition. Previous studies conducted in individualistic cultures have suggested that intragroup cohesion and intergroup competition tend to be reciprocally related (Brewer & Brown, 1998). Given our argument that individualism cooccurs with group collectivism, the positive relationship between intragroup cohesion and intergroup competition that exists in Western individualistic societies makes sense. For those whose attraction to their collective entities emanates from a depersonalized distinction between ingroups versus outgroups, intragroup cohesion is enhanced in intergroup contexts (Turner et al., 1987). In the absence of a salient outgroup or intergroup competition, individualists are likely to be focused on personal identity rather than on social identity and less concerned about cooperation and maintaining harmonious relationships among ingroup members (Y. Chen, 2005; Yuki, 2003). In contrast, for those whose psychological basis for attraction to their ingroup is based on relational connectedness, devotion to the group is less affected by competition with outgroups. Ingroup harmony and cooperation are promoted by relational values, independent of the intergroup context. Hence, the dynamic relationship between intragroup cohesion and intergroup competition might be less likely
to emerge within cultures in which the psychological basis for group identity is relation-based.

The distinction between relational and group collectivism also resolves some theoretical confusion in I–C research regarding ingroup–outgroup discrimination. Many cross-cultural researchers have long claimed that the collectivists make a sharper distinction between ingroups and outgroups than do individualists (Earley & Erez, 1993; Triandis, 1995). Considering our analysis throughout the article, this claim needs to be modified to recognize that people in all cultures favor their ingroups over their outgroups to a similar extent; what differs across cultures is the meaning of ingroups versus outgroups and the basis of psychological attachment to the ingroup. Whereas the meaning of ingroups in many so-called collectivistic cultures refers to direct versus indirect relationships or relational networks (e.g., friends from the same college), the meaning of ingroups in individualistic cultures refers to a categorical membership distinction between one’s group and other groups.

In the European and American literature on social identity, the role of category salience in ingroup–outgroup discrimination has been well documented in experimental research that has used the minimal intergroup paradigm (Brewer, 1979; Diehl, 1990; Tajfel et al., 1971). Minimal groups are depersonalized social categories based on arbitrary category distinctions between ingroup and outgroup. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that ingroup bias based on such categorical distinctions may be in fact more pronounced in Western cultures than in Asian cultures. Wetherell (1982) conducted a study to test cross-cultural robustness of ingroup favoritism in minimal groups in New Zealand. She found that children with Polynesian background showed weaker ingroup bias than did those with European background, and they instead attempted to benefit both ingroup and outgroup members. Thus, depending on how researchers define and operationalize ingroup–outgroup distinctions in their examination of I–C, one might even find North American individualists make a sharper distinction than their East Asian (relational collectivist) counterparts.

General Discussion

Recent reviews of the individualism and collectivism research suggest that although individualism might be a valid and important construct differentiating cultures (Schimmack et al., 2005), the validity of collectivism is seriously questioned (e.g., Oyserman et al., 2002). Throughout this article we have argued for an important theoretical distinction to be made between relational collectivism and group collectivism, which helps to resolve anomalies in the existing collectivism research. Our proposed schematic model of individualism and collectivism makes further differentiations among self-representations, agency beliefs, and values as different manifestations of individualism, relational collectivism, and group collectivism. As we have argued, all cultures are likely to contain elements of all nine components in order to regulate the varied demands and complexities of social life. What differs across cultures and individuals is the salience and priorities of these components when demands associated with the various elements are in conflict with one another.

On a broader scale, our model of I–C has implications for how we might think about social change in an increasingly globalized world. It is generally assumed that, as a consequence of the global economy, societies are converging in the direction of greater individualism (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1998; Hofstede, 1980). However, it is very unlikely that entire cultural patterns—including the balance among individual, relational, and group self-representations, beliefs, and values—will be replaced in total with another cultural system adopted wholesale. Instead, change is likely to be piecemeal, with aspects of individualism (e.g., individual autonomy beliefs or values) being adopted without other cultural elements that have evolved in long-standing individualistic societies to promote collective identity and group welfare. If our analysis is correct, an exclusive emphasis on individual autonomy will weaken relational values and interdependence beliefs and undermine group loyalty and sacrifice that is based on strong relational ties.

If individual autonomy reduces relational collectivism without a concomitant increase in group collectivism, the effective interface between individual self-interest and collective interests and welfare may be disrupted and social instability an inevitable consequence, at least temporarily. Effective regulatory mechanisms across political, financial, and legal spheres in the society will have to be established so as to manage the new form of social interdependence (Durkheim, 1933). In this context, understanding the complexities of individualism, relational collectivism, and group collectivism and their interrelationships may prove to be critical to managing social change.

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### Appendix

**Subscale Items and Reliabilities**

Study 2. Data source: Y. Chen et al. (2002)

**Individual Self-Representation (IR):** \( \alpha = .69 \)

- I enjoy being unique and different from others in many ways.
- I often do “my own thing.”
- I am a unique individual.

**Relational Self-Representation (RS):** \( \alpha = .69 \)

- My happiness depends very much on the happiness of those around me.
- I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important than my own accomplishments.
- If a coworker got a prize, I would feel proud.
- To me, pleasure is spending time with others.
- The well-being of my coworkers is important to me.
- I feel good when I cooperate with others.

**Group Self-Representation (GS):** \( \alpha = 70 \)

- Overall, my group memberships have very little to do with how I feel about myself.
- The social groups I belong to are an important reflection of who I am.
- In general, belonging to social groups is an important part of my self-image.
- The social groups I belong to are unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am.

**Individual Agency Belief (IB):** \( \alpha = 61 \)

- What happens to me is my own doing.
- I tend to do my own things, and most people in my family do the same.
- Individuals should be judged on their own merits not on the company they keep.
- When faced with a difficult person problem, it is better to decide what to do yourself rather than follow the advice of others.

**Group Value (GV):** \( \alpha = 64 \)

- People should be aware that if they are going to be part of a group, they sometimes will have to do things they don’t want to do.
- I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of the group I am in.
- It is important to me to respect decisions made by the group.
- If the group is slowing me down, it is better to leave it and work alone. (reverse)
- I will stay in a group if they need me, even when I’m not happy with the group.


**Individual Value (IV) \( \alpha = .46 \)**

- One should live one’s life independent of others as much as possible.
- The most important thing in my life is to make myself happy.

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