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The Battle For German Public Opinion: The Russia/Ukraine Narrative

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Putin’s propaganda machine is fighting a desperate PR battle—at home and abroad—for control of the narrative of its war against Ukraine. The Republican victory in the U.S. midterms has consolidated America’s anti-Russian narrative as evidenced by the Senate’s passage of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act, which supplies lethal weapons to Ukraine. Even more ominous is the findings of the Levada Center that only 5-6 percent of Russians are prepared to sacrifice for Putin’s Ukraine ventures. Russians say, if anyone is to shoulder a burden, it should be Putin and company. These setbacks make the battle for German public opinion even more crucial, a battle that is now being conducted on the front pages of the German press.

The two open letters to the German public

Two open letters to the public capture the intense battle for Germany’s dominant narrative of Russia’s War on Ukraine.

The first, entitled “Another War in Europe? Not in our Name” argues that another European war must be avoided at all costs, that Russia is defending its legitimate interests, that the media must be “neutral,” and that the hostilities in Ukraine go deeper than Putin’s leadership. The “Not in Our Name” letter was signed by sixty prominent Germans, from the fields of theology, politicsGerhard Schroeder, Roman Herzog, and other prominent Social Democrats and members of Die Linke party; industryEckhard Cordes, Stefan Duerr; the artsWim Wenders, Hanna Schygulla, Klaus Maria Brandauer; and one “bio farmer.”

The second open letter, entitled “Secure Peace, Do Not Reward Expansionism” argues that Putin’s Russia is the clear aggressor against Ukraine, that Russia has violated past agreements in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, that Russia’s media has defamed the Ukrainian people (who bore the brunt of World War II losses), and that the territorial integrity of Ukraine (and Georgia and Moldova) should not be sacrificed to the “level-headedness” of German policy towards Russia. The “Do Not Reward Expansionism” letter was signed by one hundred top academics from Germany’s fabled universities and by foreign correspondents specializing in Russia and Ukraine.

“Not in Our Name” blends moral relativism with peace at any price

Excerpts include:

  • North America, the European Union, and Russia are spiraling towards conflict. All parties have a common responsibility for peace and security.
  • Putin’s (admittedly) illegitimate annexation of Crimea must be understood in the context of the threatening Eastward expansion of NATO and the EU that proceeded without an accompanying deepening of relations with Moscow.
  • A new détente is needed that guarantees the same security for all parties. The security requirements of the Russians are as legitimate and pronounced as those of the Germans, Poles, Balts, and Ukrainians.
  • Any move by the West to exclude Russia from Europe would be against history, unwise, and dangerous.
  • It is the responsibility of the Bundesrepublik to nurture peace and avoid one-sided accusations of guilt. The German media must provide neutral reporting, unlike previous articles and essays that demonize an entire people, without taking into account Russia’s security fears.
  • This conflict is about something deeper than Putin. Heads of state come and go. Russia would likely feel the same with a leader other than Putin.

“Do Not Reward Expansionism” combines clear Russian guilt with German historical responsibility

Excerpts include:

  • The authors of “Do Not Reward Expansionism” offer that it is no accident that practically no signer of “Not in Our Name” is an expert on Russia or Ukraine. Rather, they have limited understanding of post-Soviet space and have not conducted the necessary research and study of the history of the region to know what they are talking about.
  • The overwhelming majority of true experts agree that there is a clear aggressor and a clear victim in Russia’s War On Ukraine. Russia cannot be regarded as a “victim.”
  • No defect of the Ukrainian political system can be used to justify Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its veiled military intervention in East Ukraine. (They might have added: Who is Russia to criticize Ukraine’s political system?)
  • If Russia feels threatened by EU or NATO expansion, it should complain to Brussels and not instead inflict thousands of deaths and devastating destruction via a hybrid war on Ukraine, which is not even a member of either organization.
  • Why negotiate in good faith with a Russia that has not honored its international agreements in past “dialogs”? In the 2008 agreement, negotiated by the EU to end the Georgian conflict, Russia agreed to remove its troops from occupied territory. Russian troops remain to this day. (The authors might add that Russia has not honored any of its Ukraine agreements from Geneva to Minsk).
  • Experienced journalists remember that only three percent of the Russian people considered the potential NATO entry of Georgia and Ukraine as a major danger to their country. NATO refused these countries admission in 2008 because of pressure from Germany reacting to warnings from Russia. 
  • Half truths, falsehoods, and defamation of the Ukrainian people circulate widely in Germany as a consequence of superficial research and the frequent appearances of Kremlin spokespersons and Putin Vesteher (literally “Understanders”) on German television. There is no reason to complain that Putin’s propaganda is not reaching the German people via mainstream media.
  • Peace should come about not through weapons or the legitimization of offensive military actions.
  • The attempted export of Putin’s illiberal society to Germany should be combated in Germany’s own interest.
  • The German state should actively aid the Ukrainian state, which lost a minimum of four million in World War II and had two million of its people forcibly transported as Ostarbeiter to work for the German war effort.

Why the media offensive of Putin allies?

As someone who follows German TV news and talk shows regularly, I can attest that the German media bends over backwards to be neutral (except in bringing negative news about America). German state television routinely interviews representatives of all the parties in parliament, among them persuasive and vocal Putin Vesteher, such as the head of die Linke party, the irascible Gregor Gysi, who makes Putin’s case better than Putin himself. Germany’s Channel 1 (ARD) carried a softball interview with Putin on his way back from Australia in which he did his best to frighten Germany with WWIII rhetoric.

That the Putin coalition of Versteher, celebrities from the arts, pacifists, theologians, and industrialists with financial interests in Russia feel it necessary to make front page news with their “Not in Our Name” appeal suggests that the Kremlin considers it is losing the battle for the German soul.

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THE AUTHOR is a member of the International Advisory Board of the Kiev School of Economics. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not of the school. Click here for information on his documentary film Women of the Gulag.