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Japan–Taiwan relations under Beijing’s watchful eye

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Japanese Representative to Taiwan Mikio Numata attends a name-changing ceremony of the Japan's de facto embassy from ‘The Interchange Association, Japan’ to ‘Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association’, in Taipei , Taiwan 3 January 2017 (Photo: Reuters/Tyrone Siu).

In Brief

International politics surrounding Taiwan is quietly changing thanks to a rejuvenation in Japan–Taiwanese relations. But revitalised bilateral ties are likely to spell trouble for already rocky Sino–Japan relations.

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Since Tsai Ing-wen and the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) rose to power in Taiwan’s 2016 presidential election, the new government prioritised developing economic partnerships and trade agreements with economies other than China. The Tsai Ing-wen administration has been especially eager to expand such ties with Japan because of its anxiety over Taiwan’s economic dependence on mainland China.

The initial momentum in bilateral relations with Japan has quickly faded away. Strong local protests in Taiwan have prevented any reductions in bilateral trade barriers such as food import regulations that were imposed on Japanese products following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster.

Yet Japan is putting in the hard yards and, as a result, the Japan–Taiwan relationship started to warm up earlier this year. In March, Senior Vice-Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications Jiro Akama visited Taiwan to attend a Japanese tourism fair. Although official meetings with his Taiwanese counterpart and other officials were reportedly not arranged, the visit itself signified the most important breakthrough in relations since Japan cut off diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 1972. The Chinese government responded by sending a strong demarche to the Japanese government and publicly criticising its actions.

In Taiwan, there is a political rule of thumb when it comes to its external relations. If cross-Strait relations between Beijing and Taipei are stable, the political sensitivity of Taiwan’s international relations decreases. If cross-Strait relations are unstable or tense then any major diplomatic move by Taipei is likely to be ‘censored and punished’ by Beijing.

For instance, during Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency from 2008 to 2016, cross-Strait relations were stable, enabling Japan and Taiwan to sign 28 bilateral agreements — including a 2013 fisheries deal to curb the diplomatic row over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands — with little fuss from Beijing.

The strengthening of ties was offset in the last two years of Ma’s presidency, when he emphasised Japan’s aggression in World War II and challenged Japan’s claim over the economic exclusive zone surrounding the Okinotori Islands in the western Pacific. As a result, president Ma left office with Japan—Taiwan relations looking somewhat grim.

Under Tsai Ing-wen’s presidency, cross-Strait relations continue to be the key factor in the Japan–Taiwan bilateral relationship. The Chinese administration suspended official contact between the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits and its Taiwanese counterpart, the Strait Exchange Foundation, because Tsai refuses to accept the ‘one China’ outcome of the 1992 consensus between the two sides. This outcome was previously embraced by the Ma administration.

As long as unpredictability defines cross-Strait relations, any move by Taiwan to enhance its relationship with the United States or Japan may trigger a serious diplomatic reaction from China. The prime example is Tsai Ing-wen’s phone call to President-elect Donald Trump last December which ‘provoked’ China to push São Tomé e Príncipe, one of the 22 diplomatic allies of Taiwan, to end ties with Taiwan. China strategically chose to retaliate against Taiwan rather than the United States to avoid stirring trouble with the new leader of the world’s most powerful nation.

Japan’s official position on its relationship with Taiwan is that it maintains ‘unofficial working-level relations based on economic and cultural exchanges’ and will not support the independence of Taiwan. Yet China continues to criticise the extent to which Japan adheres to this official position. China suspects Japan may secretly support Taiwanese independence. Japan’s approach to the new Taiwanese administration may then prove to be essential in guaranteeing the future of already shaky Sino–Japan relations.

Taiwan is an indispensable part of the region and its relations with its neighbours and world powers will continue to evolve regardless of Beijing’s efforts to isolate it. Japan is Taiwan’s second largest trade partner after mainland China and Taiwan is Japan’s fifth largest trade partner. Japan cannot secure its economic interests by simply sitting and waiting for the results of behind-the-scenes cross-Strait talks. Japan needs to integrate Taiwan into bilateral and Asia-Pacific regional free trade agreements, while further promoting the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and the China–Japan–Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement, both of which include China.

Both Beijing and Taipei are responsible for establishing stable relations in the region. If they fail to do so, Sino–Japan relations are likely to worsen. To prevent this, all actors in the region should pursue cautious diplomacy and exercise good judgment.

Yasuhiro Matsuda is Professor at the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, University of Tokyo.

2 responses to “Japan–Taiwan relations under Beijing’s watchful eye”

  1. “Taiwan is an indispensable part of the region and its relations with its neighbors and world powers will continue to evolve regardless of Beijing’s efforts to isolate it.”
    I would not be so sure about that Mr Matsuda.
    As time drags on China’s international influence will continue to grow while Taiwan’s continue to shrink. This is no longer the cold war period when SK, Japan and Taiwan were given generous uplifting by the US and China was struggling on its own experimenting with reactionary communist and socialist systems. Now the playing field is more even and China’s potential is still quiet a bit away from truly tapped. As influence grows, Taiwan’s space will only get squeezed further. Only exception to this is the countries that have say…antagonistic stance towards China. US have its own pro Taiwan faction for their reasons, Japan too, and perhaps also India. Outside these three you will be hard pressed to find ones willing.

    Also, if you are truly worried about Sino-Japanese relations there’s bigger tickets to worry about. I have recently personally attended events in countries where noticeably ranked Japanese officials pretty much openly discerned…interesting views on China ranging from suggesting China as unlawful occupier of its currently owned land (not sea) territory to borderline commercial defamation of China’s business dealings in the country the event is taking place, and worse. One better hope they know what they are doing, because if they continue these activities and these were also under China’s watchful eye…the only hope for Japan is for China to fail somewhere down the road or perhaps ignore, forgive, forget about Japan once they are in a position to respond in kind.

    • Well, China got an even field because many western countries particularly the USA went to China for cheap labor; however, the Chinese government demanded a lot from them such as technology transfers and having their citizens being educated at the top universities in those foreign countries at the expense of the foreign taxpayer’s expense and the foreign companies gave in to their demands. You wonder if it wasn’t for the foreign firms, how far would have China become what it is today?

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