




Proceedings of the USC Public Diplomacy Conference  
University of Southern California  
February 7-8, 2008

**PHILIP SEIB, EDITOR**



**AFRICOM**

**THE AMERICAN MILITARY AND  
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA**

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Edited by Philip Seib

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## Foreword

In December 2006, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld requested presidential authority to create a centralized command for the African continent. On February 6, 2007, United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) came into being.

One year later, in February 2008, the University of Southern California's Center on Public Diplomacy held a two-day conference to address fundamental questions regarding the creation of the new command, specifically how AFRICOM might affect U.S. foreign policy in Africa, African perceptions of the new arrangements, and the use of "soft power" in public diplomacy.

The idea for holding a conference on the public diplomacy role of AFRICOM came from Professor Philip Seib, shortly after he joined the USC Annenberg School for Communication as a Professor of Journalism. Under Professor Seib's leadership, the conference showcased multiple perspectives on AFRICOM's development, as this publication demonstrates. The conference attracted a sizeable audience from across the country to hear panelists from U.S. government agencies, diplomats from a number of African countries, as well as from think tanks and NGOs with expertise in African affairs.

The USC Center on Public Diplomacy considered AFRICOM to be a worthwhile area of study and dialogue, not only because the new command will operate in a part of the world important for reasons of economic growth, resource distribution, and global security, but also because it provides a focal point for discussing how elements of national security, traditional diplomacy, and public diplomacy intersect. The conference underscores the Center's innovative research, analysis and training goals in the field of public diplomacy, goals which in turn enable improved communication and cooperation between diverse public diplomacy participants and emerging global publics. In this spirit of inquiry, we intend to continue our evaluation of AFRICOM's successes—and shortcomings—in an effort to understand the potential and challenges for public diplomacy.

GEOFFREY WISEMAN

Director, USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School



## Preface

Officials of the Defense and State departments cite a commitment to public diplomacy as an essential element of AFRICOM, the U.S. military command for Africa created in 2007. Questions remain, however, about whether a military command can and should engage in public diplomacy.

This was the central issue at the conference about AFRICOM held at the University of Southern California (USC) in February 2008. Panelists and audience members underscored the complexities of this task. Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, noted that the approach of the Department of Defense (DOD) to public diplomacy and strategic communication “is not about creating a ‘Brand America’ or getting various people even to like us.” Instead, he said, the task “is about harmonizing our actions with our words to generate an alignment among key stakeholders—an alignment of their perceptions with our policy goals and objectives.”

Part of the way to reach that end is through listening as an element of public diplomacy. Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates, deputy to the commander for civil-military activities, cited this when she said that listening “is something that all of us who work with Africans need to do better. You only need to live and work in Africa to understand that we may think that we have all the answers; but we really don’t have very many answers that are going to work in these countries....”

Talking as well as listening will be important. As a practical matter, noted Ambassador Mark Bellamy of CSIS, “the main public diplomacy task that AFRICOM is going to face for the next year or so is really going to be one of explaining its mission” to African audiences and to American constituencies as well. Bellamy noted “a great deal of skepticism and misapprehension in regard to AFRICOM’s mission in Africa and elsewhere.” Within the U.S. government and in the NGO community, said Bellamy, there has been concern about “whether the DOD was proposing to get out of its lane,” usurping the role of USAID and other non-military agencies and infringing on “the humanitarian and



development space” that various NGOs occupy in Africa. Given these concerns, said Bellamy, “I think AFRICOM is at a point where it’s best to start de-dramatizing its mission.”

The purported embrace of “soft power” by the Defense Department has also been met with skepticism. According to Nicole Lee, executive director of TransAfrica Forum,

soft power by definition is the use of economics, diplomacy, and information to support national interest. It is supposed to be the opposite of military hard power, the opposite of tanks, aircraft carriers, other tools of war that basically break things and kill people. Soft power is supposed to be about engendering cooperation through shared values. It is not something that we believe can be accomplished by the U.S. military or frankly any military regardless of specialized training, cooperation with experts, and their good intentions. In the context of the African continent soft power is not at all a new concept. It has not even always been a positive concept. Throughout the Cold War the U.S. used soft diplomacy to support strong men across the continent... AFRICOM, for all the talk of its being new and innovative engagement, could simply serve to protect unpopular regimes that are friendly to U.S. interests while Africa slips further into poverty as was the case during the Cold War.<sup>1</sup>

The question of “who does what?” came up throughout the USC conference. Public diplomacy has been the responsibility of the State Department, but perhaps that is changing. Abiodun Williams, associate dean of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies of the National Defense University (who has since moved to the U.S. Institute of Peace), said: “With all due respect to diplomats, I think that public diplomacy is too important to be left entirely to non-military agencies. The military’s actions impact other countries, which can provoke positive or negative reactions. Therefore, the military cannot afford to ignore public diplomacy or treat it as an afterthought.” Williams argued that because AFRICOM “will be operating in an environment of skepticism and suspicion... it is essential that AFRICOM take public diplomacy seriously.” He added that “public opinion in African countries will be a powerful force that will help or impede AFRICOM’s mission.”

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<sup>1</sup> For two American journalistic critiques of AFRICOM that echo some of these remarks, see David Ignatius, “Into Africa Without a Map,” [washingtonpost.com](http://washingtonpost.com), January 6, 2008; and Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Africa Command Trims Its Aspirations,” [washingtonpost.com](http://washingtonpost.com), June 1, 2008. See CPD’s online Newsroom: Media Monitors at [uscpublicdiplomacy.org](http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org) for an extensive overview of media coverage on AFRICOM.

Another facet of this issue was described by Mark Malan, peacebuilding program officer for Refugees International. He observed that although “hearts and minds are important,” long-term capacity-building is what matters most. Malan also urged adoption of “a single set of messages,” saying that “Africans read the messages tailored for the American market.” So, when U.S. military officials discuss the importance of African oil and the need to “reach deep into ungoverned spaces” in pursuit of terrorists, Africans take note. As for devising the approach of American public diplomacy in Africa, Malan pointed out that more than AFRICOM itself is involved. Africans, he said, “have very long memories of slavery, colonialism” and other elements of their history, and this makes achieving credibility an integral part of the public diplomacy task.

Emerging from these and similar points raised at the conference are recommendations related to future policymaking, many of which were presented at a USC Annenberg policy briefing in Washington D.C. in March 2008.

- The Department of Defense should better define “public diplomacy” in the context of AFRICOM and develop an appropriately sophisticated plan for engaging in public diplomacy. Simply saying that “public diplomacy is important” is inadequate. Secretary Gates has discussed the importance of soft power, but how the military might adopt that approach remains undefined.
- The respective roles of Defense and State in initiating public diplomacy efforts need better definition. Similarly, a chain of command needs to be established in determining the content of U.S. public diplomacy. It is still unclear how policy related to AFRICOM will flow from the White House, through the Defense Department, State Department, and other agencies.
- Foreign governments, NGOs, and others interested in Africa’s future should be consulted as public diplomacy ideas are developed. U.S. public diplomacy related to AFRICOM must reflect lessons learned during the long and complex (and often unsavory) history of outsiders’ involvement in Africa.
- The emphasis on listening cited by Ambassador Yates requires structure, not just a casual “we hear you” acknowledgment of Africans’ concerns and aspirations. This is another aspect of public diplomacy that needs careful thought and better definition.

- The challenge for public diplomacy related to AFRICOM could be better understood if African public opinion were to be more systematically analyzed. The conference participants were aware that there is considerable suspicion among Africans concerning AFRICOM's true purpose, but there seemed to be little knowledge of the depth and virulence of African opposition that has been reflected by much African news coverage of AFRICOM.

The following transcript is important because it gives various publics—in the United States, Africa, and elsewhere—an opportunity to hear directly from leaders, supporters, and critics of AFRICOM. As this regional Command develops, this transcript will be valuable in holding policymakers to account and in determining if AFRICOM is a success or failure.

A few words of acknowledgment are due to the USC Annenberg School for Communication for their generous endorsement and support of this conference. Dean Ernest Wilson and Associate Dean Carola Weil's commitment to furthering the discussion about public diplomacy in Africa was invaluable to the success of this event. We are also grateful for the support of Professor Patrick James and the Center for International Studies at USC. A special word of thanks to the USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School, in particular to Sherine Badawi Walton for assistance with editing the final manuscript and to Lisa Larsen, who coordinated the conference expertly. Amelia Arsenault tirelessly transcribed the proceedings.

PHILIP SEIB

Professor, USC Annenberg School of Journalism

## Conference Opening Dinner and Keynote Speech

Moderator:

Ernest J. Wilson III, Dean, USC Annenberg School for Communication

Keynote Speaker:

Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates, Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities, United States Africa Command (AFRICOM)

Thursday, February 7, 2008

**PHILIP SEIB:** It is my pleasure to welcome you to the first session of our conference, “AFRICOM: The American Military and Public Diplomacy in Africa.” I’d like to say a few words about how all this came about. Last May I saw an article in *The Washington Post* by Walter Pincus about AFRICOM noting the soft power mandate that AFRICOM was to have to preemptively reduce conflict.<sup>1</sup> And I thought, how interesting for those of us who study the concept of soft power and believe in its future. By soft power, I mean convincing rather than coercing. It is exceptionally important that the Department of Defense and other parts of the United States government are giving this concept a try in this new policy initiative in Africa.

For academics it is certainly worth studying, and given USC’s interest in public diplomacy this is a very logical topic for us to scrutinize. Beyond just looking at it within the university, part of our responsibility extends beyond the academy. We have a responsibility to let the public know about this, to shine our spotlight on it, to foster discussion and debate so people in the United States and Africa and elsewhere can make informed judgments about this approach to foreign relations. That is what we hope to do here during this conference.

To begin the substance of our discussions, it is my pleasure to introduce the dean of USC’s Annenberg School for Communication,

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<sup>1</sup> Walter Pincus, “U.S. Africa Command Brings New Concerns: Fears of Militarization on Continent Cited” *Washington Post*, May 28, 2007.

Ernest J. Wilson, III. In many ways, as he knows, the success or failure of AFRICOM will be determined by issues of communication—by how well the people of Africa communicate their aspirations and how well representatives of the United States communicate their sense of purpose. Ernie understands the vital role that a school of communication can play in studying and constructively evaluating AFRICOM, and on a larger scale how communication helps determine whether hope or despair, conflict or peace will prevail in world politics. So as we begin this scholarly process tonight, here to set us in the right direction is Dean Ernie Wilson.

**ERNEST J. WILSON, III:** This is a school of communication. We believe in speaking and listening. It is almost a year to the day since President George W. Bush announced this very important initiative. It's a pleasure to look out at this audience and see some friends from the military, and the civil side, and TransAfrica, and the DOD [U.S. Department of Defense], the UN, and other Centers.

When I spoke with Assistant Secretary of State, Jendayi Frazer, who is unable to be here tonight because of events in Africa that she must attend to, she said something to the effect that how we design and implement AFRICOM will define the way in which the United States projects our power and influence globally into the future. So AFRICOM is important in and of itself. For those of us who care about Africa, who have traveled around Africa, it is hugely important. But I dare say it is almost more important as a model for what may come in the future if you think back to the Goldwater-Nickles Act, which really helped define the joint nature of the Defense Department. Prior to that Act you had the Navy over here, and the Air Force over here, and the Marines, and Army over there. Of course they were integrated; but they probably never spoke to each other. It was not very effective for U.S. foreign policy.

We are now confronting a very interesting challenge. The world has changed radically and globalization is here. By “globalization” I mean the pace of international transactions, the depth of international transactions, the scope of international transactions have all expanded to the point where everybody in this room: your job is now influenced by globalization. It's not a theory, it's not an academic thing. It's something you have to deal with every day in your professional life. So AFRICOM becomes hugely important.

We are delighted that you have come to Los Angeles. There is no city in the United States and no city in the world that has more representatives of homeland populations that exist outside the capital of the country. We have more Persians than any place else except Tehran. And that

is true for fifteen or sixteen other nations around the world. We live internationalization here in Los Angeles. This is not state-to-state. It's business. It's neighborhood associations. So it's very real to us here. Fortunately we at USC have a provost and a president who also believe in the internationalization of the university, and have built up a number of Centers that address this issue of international and interdisciplinary work. We are also located a stone's throw away from a place called Hollywood. Because we are near Hollywood, we pay close attention to communications issues. How people understand one another through media, the movie industry, the print media, blogging, etc.

And that leads me to the USC Annenberg School for Communication, which I have the privilege of leading. We are blessed because of the vision of our founding father, Walter H. Annenberg, who was U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain. He said that he wanted to start a school of communication that would be of service to all people. Underscore *all* people. So it is on that tradition that we build at the Annenberg School with a world-class Journalism School, which drives us to be concerned about issues of practice. And a Communication School which drives us to be concerned about big ideas, about theoretical issues, and about the issues of the mind as they are practiced in the media.

That leads me in turn to the USC Center on Public Diplomacy (CPD). They are probably the leading institution trying to create a practice and a study of something called public diplomacy. By "public" diplomacy we mean it's not government-to-government. Globalization means that women's organizations in Kenya, civic organizations in Russia, business organizations in Manhattan or Berlin have their own foreign policies these days, irrespective of what governments do. So how do we understand the foreign policy of the private sector? Of non-profit organizations? Of NGOS? How do we understand the ways in which governments try to mobilize their own populations on our side of the border, and how they try to jump over the governments of other countries to speak directly to their populations through a process of public diplomacy? These are some of the issues that CPD confronts in a general way.

AFRICOM is really important. As we move forward with a presidential election coming up, a new set of national security advisors will be in the Oval Office. There will be a new Congress. So here is a challenge that I'd like you to think about over the next day. Public diplomacy means in part that non-governmental organizations are going to have a greater say in what the United States does internationally. Church groups, neighborhood groups, and business organizations. This is not unique to the United States. Geoff Cowan who founded this Center, made a great point, which is: We do public diplomacy here in

the United States; but Germany has a public diplomacy toward France. Nigeria has a public diplomacy toward South Africa. So it's not just the United States. China has, dare I say, a not ineffective public diplomacy initiative toward its region and also towards Africa.

So I want to present two issues. One, how do we talk to one another and listen to one another across the following borders: public, non-profit, governmental, and organizational, and research? We don't do that particularly well right now. I'm speaking as someone who has migrated across those borders. We are trying to do a better job at the University of Southern California and our Center on Public Diplomacy through events like this so we can listen more effectively to what you have to say. And we hope that you listen also.

Here I come to the tougher part, which is the inter-agency process. And it is very difficult. The Defense Department has a budget that is what? Three quarters of a trillion dollars? It's a big budget; take my word for it. The State Department has a tiny budget. If the State Department, and USAID, and the Agriculture Department, and the intelligence community, and the White House, and the Congress do not find a way to work more effectively around the issues that you have come here to talk about, that failure will damage the national security interests of the United States of America. This is not just an academic issue. If the Defense Department, if the State Department, if the National Security Council do not find a way to work with the next political leadership and with Congress to fix these institutional issues, then I fear that the national security interests of the United States will be compromised. That is probably also true for the UK, for the French, for the Nigerians, and for the South Africans. They too have to find a way to harness hard power, which we'll talk about, and soft power to make smart power. Though I challenge you, this is a safe space here in sunny southern California. So you can say things here that you couldn't possibly say inside the beltway. So let it rip.

I'm going to have a chance to inflict my hard power, soft power, smart power presentation on you tomorrow. Let me turn to what is my real task and my delightful task, which is to introduce our dinner speaker. Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates is now deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities for the United States Africa Command. In other words she's right at the fulcrum where all of these issues come together. But she is well prepared for that. She used to live in a country that I used to live in for a while that has gone through a number of name changes. She was posted to Kinshasa in the Congo during the Rwandan genocide period. She has also served as Ambassador to Ghana in West Africa and foreign policy advisor to the U.S. European Command, EUCOM, which encompasses 92 countries, not only in Europe but also in Africa

and the Middle East. She's done a number of things in public affairs. And so here is a woman of many parts who has spanned the diplomatic dimension, the national security dimension, and the public diplomacy dimension. So without further ado, let me invite Ambassador Yates to the podium.

**AMBASSADOR MARY CARLIN YATES:** Good evening. It looks like our interagency cooperation has already begun. You thought that you were going to open with Assistant Secretary Frazer from the State Department; but you were willing to accept a Department of Defense employee as a pinch hitter. So I think that that's inter-operability from the very beginning. My very inspiring boss, General William Kip Ward, reminds us daily that we all work for the same flag. He does this dramatically because he usually has it attached to his sleeve.

Thank you Dr. Wilson and the USC Center on Public Diplomacy, and the Annenberg School for Communication for organizing a conference that comes, in my estimation, at the right time and examines a subject of great importance—public diplomacy in the context of AFRICOM. It's important because we are building this command. I also want to compliment USC's outstanding public diplomacy Masters program. I was a public diplomacy practitioner for much of my diplomatic career. I heard about those who get to study here and there is a place for you in the Foreign Service once you finish.

I'm also old enough to remember when I started at USIA [the United States Information Agency] that we as public diplomacy officers were taught that one of our jobs in an embassy was to make sure that the policy makers really understood what Edward R. Murrow used to say. His mantra: that the last three feet of delivering any message was really what was most important. You could have the greatest ideas in the world, the greatest programs and policies, but if you didn't explain them to people, they weren't going to be communicated and they weren't going to succeed.

When our four-star Army boss explains this to both his generals and the rank and file, he puts it in a different way. He says, you have to get out of your foxhole, and you have to go to somebody else's foxhole. You have to appreciate what they are seeing before you can begin to understand what you are supposed to be doing and how it's going to affect someone else.

But now we just have to figure out how we are going to implement this when it comes to AFRICOM. I intend to take notes at this conference and take them back and share them with the command. We are figuring out our public diplomacy, or as we call it our strategic communications.



I think that this dialogue will be very, very useful. I said that there are only a handful of us working in the trenches in this year between—I'm going to try some military language on you: between IOC and FOC. That stands for Initial Operating Capacity, which started in October of 2007 to Final Operating Capacity, which is projected for October of 2008. But even though there are only a few of us working in the trenches, we are rather amazed at how many conferences there are about AFRICOM. I think that this speaks to what Dean Wilson was just referring to. It is an innovative idea, and the time is right. So we thank you in the academic world who have the time to think and reflect and focus on us—the few in the trenches trying to make this work. And I plan to take away a lot from here.

I could talk for hours about AFRICOM. Three weeks ago I went to Paris and did ten videoconferences to our embassies—ten one-and-a-half-hour press conferences in three days. At the end of that time I didn't even want to hear my own voice anymore. I didn't want to hear anything about AFRICOM, that was for sure. But I hope that in the sessions tomorrow we'll have a chance to have more one-on-one dialogue.

I'm going to limit my comments to two major themes, even though there could be more. First, and I think the most important thing that you alluded to: why the establishment of AFRICOM and its experimental interagency nature in Africa is the right thing to do at the right time. We are going to have to work very hard to get it right.

The second is why we call it a command under construction. I'm going to give you a status report because you've read a lot and heard a lot. But from those of us fighting our way through it, I'll tell you where we think we are.

First, why? And why now? Creating AFRICOM allows the Department of Defense for the first time to consolidate its programs in Africa under one commander and a single staff. It's a cohesive structure instead of having the nations of Africa under three geographic commands. I'm sure that you've probably heard that, but I want to explain a little bit more. It's actually an acknowledgement of the growing strategic and global importance of Africa. The decades when our primary objectives in Africa were only humanitarian are over. We acknowledge that much needs to be done and remains to be done to address the poverty and the disease and many of the other problems in Africa including conflict and lack of stability. The Africans are changing. They are building their own responsible democratic institutions. We need to celebrate with the nations of Africa who one-by-one are beginning to mark their fifty years of independence since colonialism. Times are changing and the institutions are changing. Look at the institution of the African Union

that just last week spoke out about the rebel activity in Chad. That wouldn't have happened several years ago. And they have taken on the enormous peacekeeping missions of Sudan and Somalia. We can sit here and debate in a conference whether it's been effective or not, but they took on those missions and they deserve our support for capacity building as they want it.

The Dean and I were talking at dinner about the importance of listening. I think that that is something that all of us who work with Africans need to do better. You only need to live and work in Africa to understand that we may think that we have all the answers; but we really don't have very many answers that are going to work in many of these countries and in these institutions. So we want the African Union to grow, to become more responsible as well as the regional institutions and organizations. But we have to listen.

The global nature of the world also has changed, and the transnational threats are very real. To pandemics, to trafficking in persons, narcotics, terrorism, and climate change. You referred to CSIS's current study about smart power, and there's the HELP Commission. Those studies tell us that we need to rethink our institutions in order to be able to effectively address these trends and these threats. Do we think that these twentieth century Cold War paradigms are going to work? Have we learned something from the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan? About working interagency? About working coalitions? Working multi-nationally? Have we learned that maybe we need to strive to do this better?

I believe that if AFRICOM develops and can learn to work effectively first with the interagency, then regionally with Africans, multilaterally with coalitions, what a wonderful and powerful example this would be.

A quick digression. When I did some of these videoconferences with francophone nations last month, one prevalent question from the Africans was, "Are you establishing AFRICOM to counterbalance the French?" I thought I was in a time warp. They didn't say the Chinese. They said the French. "No," was my answer. And I actually went on to explain (and there is a reason to tell you this) that the United States and many of the European allies were brought together through our European Command in what we call an Africa clearinghouse. The nations of Europe get together and they say, "Mil-to-mil (military-to-military) what are you doing? What exercises are you doing? What training are you doing?" We formed that—and it has become very popular—so we could de-conflict and also find complementarity and expand our resources farther to help the capacity-building of our African partners.

Anyway, I believe that an institution that could be innovative is AFRICOM. I wouldn't be in this job if I didn't believe in it. Are we there yet? Absolutely not. Can we build it? I believe so. With time and patience and resources. I've been passionate about Africa for a long time. I believe that this command will bring value-added in its engagement. There have been some missteps, and General Ward is the first person to admit that. He also tells us that we are probably going to have a few more. We are probably going to meet a few walls and turn away. We are not going to get it right the first time in every instance. But he is leading us with such a spirit that we are going to find a way to be that model.

Much of the inter-agency debate and much of the public diplomacy debate is that AFRICOM is getting out of its lane. We ought to stay in the security lane and not act like we are going to do development work, and not act like we are going to be the foreign policy arbitrators on the continent. I think that we probably had our strategic communication and our public diplomacy a little bit off, because I think that the command itself intends to look at the military and security programs, but also to look at security with a little bit wider aperture. In the sense that if you want economic prosperity in a country—and of course all of the countries want that—you must have stable countries, you must have secure borders. These are all issues that we can work on but if we work closely with our AID and Peace Corps and other partners and NGOs, we can bring better security and stability to the nations on the continent. Actually, in 2002 our national security strategy said that America is less threatened by conquering states than by failing states. This is very applicable in Africa. We do not intend to garrison and station troops on the continent. That is not the goal of the Africa Command. It is to work with the other agencies and the other members of our government who really have been there much longer. We like to point out that last year about \$9 billion was spent by the U.S. government in Africa, and the size of the piece of that pie that was military was about \$250 million. That's not very much. So we need to be there—we of the Department of Defense. It's hard to know which “we.” We need to be there to find ways to have complementarity in programs and go forward.

I want to tell you that Deputy Secretary Gordon England came and spoke to an interagency gathering the week before last. He said, “Hard power is easy. It's kinetic. It's what we know as the military.” He said, “Soft power is hard.” And it is hard. It's going to be hard for all of us. But we believe in the preventive security approach. We don't care which buzz word you're using. Whether you are going to call it “active security” or “phase zero” or “whole-of-government approach,”

“soft power,” it’s the same thing. This is transformational diplomacy. It’s easy to talk about it, but making it actually work and implementing it is the hard part.

Before I leave the “why we are building this” discussion I need to tell you a little bit more about General Ward’s vision. He has been working hard, and we’ve all worked hard on a very succinct mission statement. Each of the geographic commands has a mission statement. The phrase that is underlined and boldfaced in his mission statement is, “sustained security engagement.” Especially being a practitioner on the African continent, I believe this can be said of many of our government agencies. We come up with programs. They’re innovative. We resource them. And then an administration changes or we have congressional dictates and so our programs wax and wane. We hope that by forming this command with the three commands coming together that we can project ourselves in a more sustained way and keep our programs at a more consistent level.

In March 2008, General Ward will go before the U.S. Congress to give his posture statement with the other five geographic commanders. This will be a historic moment—the first time that there will be a posture statement dedicated to Africa. Before the European Command commander would speak about the European nations: And oh, by the way, we’re doing this in Africa. That was probably the most that was said. Then the Central Command Commander would talk about the countries in the Horn of Africa: And oh, by the way, after Iraq and Afghanistan this is what we are doing in the Horn of Africa. And then the Pacific Command, if they ever got to talking about the islands down there. I’m not sure because he has China and Korea. So now all of those nations are together and when General Ward speaks before the Congress he will be sitting at the table arguing for resources. We cannot be misleading to our African partners that immediately money is going to flow. We have to manage expectations. But I believe that the structure eventually will evolve so that more resources will come and so that we will be able to have that sustained engagement.

The second point that I was going to speak about is where we are in this construction project. General Ward likes to say that it’s a command under construction. And we are. Admiral Moeller, my cohort in crime, likes to say that it’s like sailing a ship when you are building it. I actually think that’s what it feels like some days. The idea that Africa would be a separate command or unified command is not brand new. When I started working in Africa about fifteen years ago it was being discussed. So when the Pentagon decided in 2006 to review, as they do every two years, their unified command plan this was looked at seriously. In November 2006,

a planning team was put together to look at this. What was unique is that it was an interagency planning team. So we were already beginning to think that this command would be different. And then in February of 2007, President Bush announced that he would stand up a separate command for Africa, and about twenty people went to Kelley Barracks and began the transition team. The commander wasn't named until June, and he didn't get his Senate confirmation until September 2007.

So when we say that we began this construction project October 1, we began it October 1 even though there was planning done before that. That's four months ago. We have maybe a few more than 300 people at Kelley Barracks. We hope that by October of next year we will have 1300 people. But 300 people isn't very many at a headquarters when you are trying to stand an entire command up, so we are looking for a little space here and encouragement. Though General Ward keeps saying that building this team is really important; none of it is easy. Nothing is more difficult than the interagency peace, but nothing will be more fruitful, not just for the military, but for the interagency, the government writ large. If we can begin to function more effectively in an interagency sense then I think that our government will have more power. That's certainly what these studies are indicating.

I could tell you about some of the problems. It's not like the military doesn't have other jobs right now. Even though the military commander can tell the military to pack their bags and go, they can't do that to the State Department folks. It's not like they don't have another job. So even though we've got all sorts of other jobs for them to do, we don't have them there. And DOD civilians don't come unless there is a position description written for them. You can't write the position description if you don't have the people there to write it. So then we get to the hard one, the interagency, where we have to have legal agreements between agency and agency. I think it took six months to write the job definition for me. It was about two weeks after my being in the job that they called and they said, "You can't be in the job yet. You have to be Acting." And the lawyer at Africa Command said, "Forget it. She's in the job." So we have many complications. This is just the beginning. But I think that we are going to get it right.

Besides the people and building the team, which General Ward puts a lot of emphasis on, it's the transfer of missions. That sounds like military talk, but think about it. Right now there are three commands and there are all kinds of activities going on. There is the security cooperation, all the military-to-military activities and planning for contingencies—operations which, by the way, we had to activate last week for Chad. But we in the Africa Command, with our 300 people in the trenches, were

not able to do that. But we could go over and watch what the European Command was doing so we can transfer that.

Also, you know that in a headquarters there are the planners and the thinkers. But the implementation of security considerations happens by the components. So are we going to have components? Are we going to have an Air Force for the African Command? Are we going to have an Army? A Navy? Yes we are. Those conferences are going on. But imagine now that the Air Force component that's with European Command is going to be split apart. How are they going to do this? This is all the construction that is going on in the course of this year.

I will just put that out as a backdrop for why thinking about our strategic communication and our public diplomacy is certainly an important part of it, but some days we are so busy worrying whether we are going to meet the deadline for this promise. We have this big calendar that has all these stars. And it's kind of like that explosion day we are going to take on this mission. We want to get there. That's our goal. Let me leave the construction phase because we could talk about that all evening.

I want to close by saying that I am very excited about listening tomorrow and learning from the exercise of putting this back in the public diplomacy box. I am so interested in the change that is going on about how we communicate. We talk about the decentralization of communication and how it is happening thanks to the Internet, thanks to the way that globalization is changing the world. So we have a new institution, an embryonic organization, in AFRICOM. And we have a new way in which the world is evolving and I bet you that some of the students here are the ones that are going to figure out how we can make this work. I believe that this is going to be an effective way to communicate in Africa. It's going to be an effective way to reach out to the peoples of Africa, if we can get our communication right. I don't think any of us on the team thinks we've gotten it quite right yet. But we are here to listen tomorrow and I'll take notes back to my folks in the trenches and we will certainly see if we can move forward. Thank you very much.

**ERNEST J. WILSON, III:** Questions? We'll take about four or five questions.

**AUDIENCE QUESTION:** Darius Udrys, Center for Civic Education. We promote education for democracy in sixty-five countries, including many in Africa. And my question is, in what position would General Ward be, in your opinion, to recommend public diplomacy programs such as the

ones that we run in many countries across Africa, teaching young people about democracy and good governance.

**AMBASSADOR MARY CARLIN YATES:** I can't speak for my boss completely, but I think that he would put that one squarely back in the camp of the State Department, because they will be the primary actors. That is one thing that I didn't say. He makes it clear every time that he speaks that there is no change: the State Department has the lead in foreign policy; USAID has the lead in assistance programs; NGOs have their portal into the U.S. government, as traditionally, through the State Department. None of that changes. We want to build a structure and a headquarters so we can find ways for complementarity. I must say that it is very exciting when you have people like the Treasury and the Department of Homeland Security and Agriculture coming to these meetings and they want to be part of this. I think that as far as promoting public diplomacy—and it's wonderful work and very, very important; I mean developing free press and all of that in Africa—that stays pretty solidly in the State Department lane.

**AUDIENCE QUESTION:** You listed the many different kinds of things that you are facing as you try to pull a process together: terrorism, and disease, civil wars, and all the rest of it. The United Nations has the same kind of thing facing them, and one of the problems that a lot of people feel has hurt the United Nations is that they've only had one gigantic success in terms of a mission and getting it done. That was the elimination of smallpox, because they really focused on it. If you have all those different things, are you going to pick one major thing and try to get one thing done? Or are you going to do a lot of those little things forever?

**AMBASSADOR MARY CARLIN YATES:** The programs you refer to would be very much in the traditional USAID lane. What we will try to do is focus on security relationships, which we already are. We want to find ways to expand those. Again, we're talking about border security. A program that is going on right now is having a series of ship visits in West Africa. These are ships that have both NGOs and African partners on the ship. They are looking at how to do counterterrorism and counternarcotics programs. So our work will stay in the security lane. We just hope that by bringing interagency together in our headquarters that we'll find ways to expand those programs. I think that our government has been remarkable in the money that it has dedicated in the last few years both to PEPFAR [the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief] and to

malaria. Our government has done a good job in trying to address some of the health issues, but I know how difficult it is.

**AUDIENCE QUESTION:** You've already mentioned personnel issues, but what is your budget and how is that working out?

**AMBASSADOR MARY CARLIN YATES:** That is a question that I can't answer. What I can say is that I don't want to raise expectations of the African partners that immediately the funds are going to open up, either the funds that already exist in DOD or for getting more funds on the Hill. Once we are speaking with one voice on the African continent we have a chance for getting more resources. Fortunately, that's something that I haven't had to get involved in, so I can't really answer your question about the exact budget.

**AUDIENCE QUESTION:** There's been a lot of discussion about the fact that the military is really heading up AFRICOM and there is a great humanitarian component to it. Do you see the DOD taking on the lead contractor role in those areas? Or will HIV-AIDS and medical programs and services still fall under the State Department/USAID types of funding?

**AMBASSADOR MARY CARLIN YATES:** We're not taking on the lead role. We—DOD—is not taking on the lead role. Those programs remain squarely in USAID and State channels. But if we are all there working together we ought to find ways to do it better, be more effective, and use the available resources more effectively.

**ERNEST J. WILSON, III:** Let me take the prerogative of the Chair. The last time I talked to my buddies in southern Africa, and Nigeria, and a couple of other countries, they weren't really crazy about AFRICOM. I know there has been some movement over time, but I wonder if you could bring us up to date about the way the Africans view this new initiative.

**AMBASSADOR MARY CARLIN YATES:** I go back to the point that we all have to learn to listen better. I think that some of the missteps that General Ward politely refers to are that there was probably not enough consultation initially with our African partners. We have attempted to correct that. He very carefully looked at the continent and chose to go to the African Union in Addis Ababa on his very first trip. He didn't want to go to one region or one country. He wanted to go to the organization that the Africans have selected as their lead organization. We looked at



the regional organizations. He decided to go to SADC [Southern African Development Community] and CEAC [Coalition for an Effective African Court on Human and Peoples Rights] in the southern and central part. He sent Vice Admiral Robert T. Moeller and me to West Africa, to ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States]. Each time we went and met with various Africans as we did in Nigeria, one of the countries you referred to, the response was: “Nobody ever explained it that way. We didn’t know that that’s what you were going to do.” Because of course what was out there was the sound and the fury in the press, and in our decentralized world in the blogs. In a sense we have ourselves to blame. But I think that we are righting the wrong. South Africa is of course a very, very important country. It is a leader. It is an engine on the continent. They are a very young nation and they are going through a very political time right now. I think what we need to do is to continue our mil-to-mil [military-to-military] dialogue and not get caught up in what certain politicians who might be running for office say in the press.

## Opening Remarks

Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Undersecretary for Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense

Friday, February 8, 2008

**PHILIP SEIB:** Welcome to the continuation of our conference on “AFRICOM: The American Military and Public Diplomacy in Africa.” We are dealing with a very important and relatively unexplored topic, especially in the academic context, and so we look forward to breaking some new ground today.

Last night Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates did a terrific job of getting this conference underway. One of the many interesting things that she mentioned was the importance in public diplomacy generally and in AFRICOM of listening. That’s something that the United States doesn’t always do very well. We tend to establish a presence someplace and say, “We’re the United States. We know what’s good for you. Do it.” That’s not going to work in Africa, and it’s probably not going to work anywhere else in the world these days. But I think that in the development of AFRICOM and in the evaluation of AFRICOM, the ability of the United States government and its entities involved in AFRICOM to listen to the aspirations of the people of Africa is going to be extremely important. That should be part of the discussions today—a realization that the new world in which AFRICOM is operating is going to require a sophisticated kind of public diplomacy that is grounded in listening.

Now I’d like to introduce the opening speaker for today’s part of the conference. We are very fortunate to have with us Ryan Henry, who is Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. I looked at some testimony that he provided to the House Armed Services Committee last November, and I’m going to quote a few points from that testimony because I think they will be helpful in framing some of today’s discussions.

He said that, “the creation of AFRICOM does not foreshadow a militarization of foreign policy or foreign assistance towards the continent.” This is a very crucial issue in the foundation of AFRICOM.

He also said, “AFRICOM’s focus is not on war-fighting but rather to prevent problems from becoming a crisis and prevent a crisis from becoming a catastrophe.” He also said, “Security must be defined broadly and approached holistically,” which gets to the essence of AFRICOM.

We are pleased to provide a forum for and to foster discussion about points such as these. And we are pleased that we can begin these discussions with Ryan Henry.

**RYAN HENRY:** In Washington it’s a truism that the length of your title is inversely proportional to your importance either to your agency or the broader government. Since I’m someone who has a title almost several lines long, it’s a good indicator of how little influence I have or for that matter how much expertise in Africa. But I do have an interest and I have had the pleasure of being able to participate in some of the formative stages of AFRICOM and some of the decision-making on how we would proceed. So I thought that I might share some of those insights with you here today.

I want to be clear that I claim no expertise in African affairs. That’s one of the reasons why we’re excited to be here today representing the department: because of the expertise that is here.

My limited expertise lies in the management of large, complex enterprises and how to get a little more effectiveness out of those organizations. It’s a role that I play for the department writ-large currently. But, as any management expert will tell you, one of the key ingredients in trying to understand how to be more effective—as Ambassador Mary Carline Yates said last night—is to listen and to participate in a dialogue to gain an understanding of what the fundamentals of success are. And so that’s why we are pleased to participate in this forum on public diplomacy.

It has been the intent of AFRICOM to be part of that listening mode from the announcement by President [George W.] Bush that AFRICOM would stand up, which interestingly enough occurred a year ago to the week. AFRICOM, at its core, is about public diplomacy, which is critical to its mission, and how we as a nation compete not only in Africa but in the wider marketplace of ideas concerning issues of governance and security that are facing key regions, critical indigenous peoples, and global stakeholders throughout the world today.

I would like to share with you some of my thoughts regarding strategic communications as challenges we see erupting in this new information age that we live in, specifically in the areas of national security. Also, some of the ideas for public diplomacy that we plan on inculcating in AFRICOM as we move forward, and some general observations that

I've personally formed regarding Africa based on my interactions with continental stakeholders during the last few years.

What is becoming obvious, to even casual observers of international affairs, is that the list of challenges facing the United States in the area of security is becoming much more complex and less clearly defined within the traditional defense missions that we have. They require patience that will stretch over not just years but many decades before we start to see solutions. These threats require engagement of the entire panoply of capabilities that exist across the entire U.S. government not just solely within the Defense Department. They cannot be solved by military tools alone. Most times the military tool will not be the preferred tool of use.

As we have learned in recent years and as many of you with expertise in Africa already know, achieving success is based upon many ingredients: a viable economic development mechanism and market mechanisms that are in place; institution-building; the rule of law; promoting internal reconciliation; good or at a minimum functioning governance; delivery of essential services; freedom from radical or group-based violence; and an effective messaging from the sovereign on the value that they are delivering to the people—or strategic communication. As you can see, few of those, if any, fit in the traditional roles that the U.S. military plays.

As Secretary {Robert} Gates has said recently, this nation must invest more in “non-military instruments of national power.” That is a theme that we actually put forward in our legislative agenda, which just went up to the Congress last week. Whether you want to call it “soft power” or “smart power,” or even just “the right power,” the bottom line is we have created, for a variety of reasons, a national security structure that today is currently out of balance and is biased toward the military toolset.

Steps are now being taken to help redress this imbalance in the required capabilities by boosting funding for other areas, as the President requested in his budget: a thousand more Foreign Service Officers; expanding USAID activities; new authorities to attract and recruit for other government agencies charged with overseas missions and to make those personnel deployable. While laudable and fully supported by us, these efforts will take years, if not decades to mature. In the meantime, Secretary Gates has stated that the United States shoulders an additional burden to institutionalize these capabilities internally. We need to also ensure that these lessons are retained across all levels of activity we do.

Secretary [Donald] Rumsfeld prior to his departure issued a directive, an internal guidance document that sets the policies of the department, saying that this area of stability operations, which involves a lot of these

non-traditional areas that the military is not used to working in, is of equal importance to the area that we've done traditionally, which is major combat operations. That is a major shift in how we will use the military in the future. War-fighting is only half of the role.

AFRICOM is one of several manifestations of the department's intent to push ahead with new ideas that make sense for the twenty-first century. Its creation eliminated an artifact of the Cold War where we had the continent of Africa under the responsibility of three separate combatant commands. This anachronism insured Africa was not a priority, or even of secondary importance, to any of these three commands. Now, under the leadership of the commander, General Kip Ward, that has changed. Africans will now have a single military point of contact within the department that is exclusively focused, night and day, on their broader security issues.

Public diplomacy is a most important tool in General Ward's kitbag of capabilities as AFRICOM emerges as a full-fledged command. AFRICOM, and to a lesser extent what we are doing in similar efforts in our Southern Command, which is focused on Latin America, can both be seen as experiments in security aspects specifically involving new public diplomacy. It is important to understand that the Department's approach to the twin issues of public diplomacy and strategic communication is not about creating a "Brand America" or even getting various people to like us. At its core, public diplomacy or strategic communications is about harmonizing our actions with our words to generate an alignment among key stakeholders—an alignment of their perceptions with our policy goals and objectives. That has proven much harder in execution than it might seem, since the American government operates in a very competitive international marketplace of ideas.

In this interconnected world, Africa included, populations are constantly making informed or, unfortunately in many cases, misinformed judgments on whether any global or regional player's actions match their rhetoric. The new media—whether Internet-based web sites, podcasts, YouTube, MySpace—are fueling this trend since U.S. actions must compete in this market where Islamic jihadists, conspiracy theorists, political demagogues and other ideologies all seek to gain currency for their specific messages.

It's also an interestingly fickle marketplace that we are playing in, whereby tens of thousands of opinions can be instantly and positively shaped, for instance by the delivery of needed humanitarian supplies following a disaster—witness the Banda Aceh relief effort following the Indonesian tsunami—and unfortunately negatively altered by digital

images of the exception-to-the-rule behavior and brutality of a few individual low-ranking soldiers—witness Abu Ghraib.

To paraphrase a military term: these are perception effects that we must contend with into the future and what our strategic communication will need to adapt to in the evolving security environment in which we will operate.

As it forms, AFRICOM is embracing the whole-of-government approach to its organizational structure. We have learned, sometimes painfully, that operations today do not always reflect the neat and tidy bureaucratic boundaries laid out in our 1947 National Security Act, by which the government has operated since World War II in the area of international security. It was designed for the realities of the Cold War. Today's operational realities blur across multiple domains of soft, or blunt, or sharp power, and often this occurs simultaneously.

To be effective in this environment requires more than just military knowledge from Defense individuals. It requires the expertise and capabilities that reside in multiple government departments. Thus, AFRICOM is a departure from the primary focus on combat. It embeds representatives of departments from State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, Energy, Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture and others as integral parts of the command. For the first time ever in a command, we actually have someone from another department, Ambassador Mary Yates, who is part of the command. She is one of two deputies to the commander, which is a major departure not only for the U.S. military but for the government writ large.

For AFRICOM to be ultimately successful, embracing this whole-of-government approach is not enough. We must do more to facilitate a “whole-of-society” view as well. This is not about the militarization of U.S. foreign policy, or aid, or developmental activities. Each of those tend to be led by their core agencies like the State Department or the agency for Aid and International Development. Instead it represents a sober appraisal that DOD efforts can and actually do support other civilian efforts to build civil society throughout Africa. As you are probably aware of the investment of the United States on the African continent, only 3 percent comes from the security and defense realm and 97 percent comes from the diplomatic and developmental ends.

Before I conclude my remarks, I would like to leave you with some observations that I have come to develop regarding Africa and the evolution of AFRICOM. As I said at the outset, I am by no means an expert; but I have had the opportunity to lead several diplomatic trips to the continent, I have visited most of the nations there, and have garnered insight from African political, military, and community leaders. That has

been coupled with my broader work in global security and with my being able to talk to many of the non-African stakeholders.

The following points are worth pondering, I believe, as we think about Africa and the strategic communication challenges before us:

First, the United States, by virtue of its size and history, intuitively brings a continental perspective to African issues. It is the only engaged global power that looks at Africa as a continent and not through the filter of discrete regions, or as an exploitable resource for raw materials.

Second, most times our actions in Africa are perceived by others through a larger lens of America's strategic global role, which can sometimes appear very intimidating to Africans, since we possess more operational reach and a broader strategic perspective than other actors possess.

Third, other nations, principally European and former colonial powers, might know much more about Africa and possess a greater understanding of the continent's challenges or specific regions than we Americans do. But other nations are also captive, to some extent, of their history in the region and that history places limits on what they can achieve.

Fourth, African challenges are transnational and regional in nature. Currently, African governments and institutions are moving toward more "continentalism," if you will, and in some instances shared accountability. We need to adopt and adapt to those changes by using new approaches. AFRICOM is one.

With sustained and coordinated commitment, we can achieve results in Africa, but success will require many, many decades—not several years. Progress in Africa is not a sprint. It's more like an Ironman triathlon. It requires the vigorous use of all elements of national power—diplomacy, investment, military, economic, and informational. AFRICOM provides a mechanism for sustained versus episodic security engagement on and with the continent.

By nature, Americans are individualistic, which is probably one of the reasons that we tend to act more than we tend to listen, while European countries are more communalistic. But to be successful, America has to adapt its approach to a more multilateral, supporting and less dominating way of dealing with African partners.

We need to remember that AFRICOM is an experiment in government organization and operations—existing on the leading edge of bureaucratic innovation. It will need to adapt and evolve continually over time as we learn from engagement with African nations how to best make our contribution on the continent and make it as effective as possible.

In conclusion, AFRICOM is a risk-laden experiment on the part of government and the Department of Defense focused specifically on how to more holistically engage the continent of Africa, a specific region of emerging interest. And public diplomacy is a fundamental element of its success. We cannot continue to pursue 21<sup>st</sup> century missions in an information, digital-network age with bureaucratic constructs and thinking laid out as part of the Industrial Age in the aftermath of World War II.

AFRICOM will change in its organization and its mission focus from time to time as we learn more from working with Africans and about what they fundamentally need from us in order to be successful. Our public diplomacy and strategic communication efforts, what incoming State Department Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy, James Glassman, refers to as “the arsenal of persuasion,” are absolutely critical for the viability in the marketplace of ideas concerned with effective governance and genuine security of regional citizenships. My personal measure-of-effectiveness for the command is the degree to which its impact and influence keeps American combat troops off the continent for at least the next half-century. That is a matter for history to judge, but one we can help guide. Thank you, and I will be happy to take questions.

**MOUCTAR BALDE:** My question is about the location of AFRICOM in Stuttgart. Why not have it somewhere, anywhere, in Africa? Johannesburg? Addis Ababa? Senegal? Anywhere in Africa?

**RYAN HENRY:** That is the subject of much discussion. A fundamental decision was made by the Secretary of Defense (the former Secretary of Defense was involved in formulating the decision to stand up AFRICOM and then the current Secretary of Defense who’s been involved with its implementation) and the President of the United States that AFRICOM and the leader of AFRICOM, its commander, would be on the continent. But what you refer to is: why not a specific place? As we think forward on AFRICOM, the current planning is that there will not be a place where we put the command and a lot of infrastructure and bureaucracy grows up around it as is traditionally the case. We’re not taking that approach. We’ve really made an effort to think about the time we live in and the mechanisms by which you get things accomplished in an information age. The concept of a specific place where everybody is based, we think, is outmoded for what the capabilities are and what the needs of the continent are. So there will be a specific place that will be selected some time in the future where the commander will move to be on the continent. But it will be a tiered command. There will be a spot where he



is and there will be relatively small staff. And there will be five regional points of presence aligned with the regional economic communities of the African Union, one for each of the regions. Beyond that there will be a third tier, which will be represented in over 29 of the 53 embassies on the continent where we will have liaison offices for coordination of military and security activities. So there will be three different tiers of presence on the continent. It will be a distributed command. The fourth tier, which will be, by and large, the largest population-wise, will not be on the continent. Those are the individuals that do not need to deal with Africans or the commander on a daily basis. They will be somewhere off the continent. Currently there is a growing population in Stuttgart. That might move somewhere else in Europe. It might move somewhere else in the United States. It might be dispersed functionally across different places. Those are all things that we will learn how to do best in the coming years. One of the things that we are trying to be mindful of, especially as Americans and the way that we want to get in there and get something done, is it could probably be very easy for us to overwhelm our African partners either with our enthusiasm or our size. And so we want to keep it as low profile but as effective as possible. So you won't see a large movement *en masse* from Stuttgart to one place on the continent, but you will see the building up over time both on the continent and off the continent.

**AMBASSADOR BRUCE GELB:** When America's enemies start getting information about this wonderful multi-tiered extension of our influence in Africa, doesn't that just play into their message that "There they come. First we had the English and then the French. This is now a perfect example of American colonial domination."

**RYAN HENRY:** They'll clearly create that message for different purposes. That's why strategic communication is the alignment of words and actions. If we had words alone then we might have a problem. General Ward's strategy going forward, supported by the Secretary [of Defense], is not to get caught up in the rhetoric on how we are going to posture ourselves on the command but to clearly send a message that the activities that we are doing, especially for the near term, are going to be the exact same things that we've been doing for the last twenty years. It's the military-to-military relationships. Over time we are going to see how we can do a better job of supporting the diplomacy and the developmental activities on the continent. The problem we're generally having is that when we say "a new military command" we've removed the normal title we use of "combatant command" and referred to it by

the other title that we have for the other commands around the world—a “unified command.” But our actions are going to make the difference in how we interact. We think that this will allow us to overcome a lot of the rhetoric. It’s not something that is going to be done in the first year; it’s going to take several years to do it. Many of the people who are complaining the loudest about the standup of the Africa Command are also the ones requesting the most vigorously that we get in there and that we interact with them.

We are dealing with this perception that when we say that we are putting a command on the continent, they see central command and they see turning Africa into the Arabian Gulf. That’s not at all where we are going. We can only say it so many times and in so many places. What’s really going to make the difference is our actions.

**JONATHAN TAPLIN:** Why is this thing being run out of the Defense Department as opposed to the State Department? Is this because we can only get this kind of large money by using defense as an excuse? Like building the Internet or building the highway system in the fifties because it was a defense highway system. Is this a budgetary thing?

**RYAN HENRY:** First of all, I want to reiterate that 97 percent of the investment in the continent is going through the means that you want it to go through. Less than 3 percent is going through the Defense Department. Of that 3 percent, a vast majority is consumed in the Horn of Africa task force, which has turned from a combat mission to a civil affairs mission and into the Pan Sahel Initiative, where we do have an emerging terrorist problem. A very, very small percent, probably less than 1 percent of U.S. investment in the continent, is happening in other military-to-military activities with partners on the continent. The Department of Defense is part of a “whole-of-government” approach. It’s a very small part on the continent. We think it’s worth putting it into a bureaucratic Petri dish and see what we can do, not just by us doing it ourselves, but by bringing expertise from other parts of government, embedding them in the Command. And so when we do interact, our small 1 percent, we can do a better job. With the 3 percent total we can do a better job of supporting that other 97 percent. I agree with your concern. I don’t agree with what you see as the manifestation of it. I think it’s just the opposite. The leadership is clearly in the developmental and the diplomatic end. The defense end is only a very small part.

**CAROLA WEIL:** Picking up on the point that you’ve just made about the small investment. Many of us who have been following developments

on the international security front have noted that there have been previous efforts such as the Africa Crisis Response Initiative and various other initiatives to strengthen security arrangements on the continent. One might, with all due respect to the efforts going on now, suggest that we might be sending a signal that we are not, in fact, as interested in multilateral approaches to strengthening Africans' own capabilities to handle their own security arrangements. Instead we are saying, "This didn't work and so we are coming in on our own now." Now you've recognized that it's a very small investment, which then creates a problem of an expectation gap, because the expectation that is generated by a unified command is one that Americans will come in and rescue Darfuris, Chadians, Somalis, Ethiopians. How do you counter that message, particularly in light of preceding experiments?

**RYAN HENRY:** The two questions you raise are that this has the taste of unilateralism associated with it and the other one is how we address expectations. I would say that if someone wants to read unilateralism into this, they are not listening to what we are saying. They'll just have to watch our actions. One of the questions is: Why now? One answer is that we do not look at Africa through a Cold War prism anymore where it has to do with its relation to other key states, whether it be in the Pacific, in Europe, or the Middle East. It has to do with Africa itself. We've had the exact same presence and activity on the continent. We've just had it split between three commands, three different military leaders who had it as a tertiary or lower priority. We are saying that now is the time to look at it and give it one person at the four star level with direct access to the Secretary and the national command authority who is focused on it solely. That is the difference.

As far as unilateralism versus multilateralism, after having looked at it, we don't think that success is assured; however, we do think that the roadmap and the direction the African Union is going, the regional economic communities, and the African Standby Force, suggest that Africans will be able to meet their own security needs. The last thing that we want to do is pick up responsibility and accountability for crises and conflicts. What we'd like to do is deal with those problems by formulating the capability and responsibility for Africans to respond to their own security needs. Again, the Standby Force looks like it could potentially be a viable mechanism in the future if it's built right. That's a big 'if.' We think that we have an understanding of what it is about developing and maintaining a reliable military. That's what they will need to do to be able to meet their own crises. But I would say it's anything but unilateralism. In most of the regions in the world where

there is a problem we respond with leadership. What we are trying to do here is develop foundational capabilities within Africans themselves and if there is a crisis, to be a supporting participant rather than a leader.

I think that you will find throughout the remainder of this administration—I can't speak for the next one—we can see that in our behavior and our actions in Somalia, in Darfur, now in Chad, and with some issues in the trans-Sahel, is that we are playing in the background. We are playing a supporting role only when we have unique capabilities, which normally have to do with planning and some understanding of the logistics and sustainment rather than at the more kinetic end of the spectrum. We do not want to put combat forces on the continent, partly for very selfish reasons. We are very concerned about the fact that once they go on, they cannot come off. We cannot afford to get into that sort of quicksand. We don't want our European partners necessarily to get caught in there too. That's why we have African solutions. We need Europeans in other places around the world in partnering with us—for instance, in Afghanistan where they can make a difference that cannot be handled indigenously.

We think that there is potential in Africa, but it's going to be very difficult to achieve that potential so that they can actually meet their own security needs. Again I want to say that if we look at it through a security prism only, it's not going to get there. You have to act through the governance, central services, and the reconciliation of a whole bunch of different aspects.

The expectancy going in was one of our chief concerns. Here are the Americans with their checkbooks and they are going to start solving some of our problems. Again, we rely on strategic communications—the coupling of actions and words to try to get stakeholders' perceptions aligned with what our policy is. That is something that is going to have to develop over time. We are saying it. Some people are listening. Some are choosing not to. We can see it in the different behaviors and the reactions of countries, some are positive about us coming: “They're going to station forces here, or fight for our security, or there's going to be economic gain.” And others saying, “I've got to play the role of negativism as far as the Command coming.” We cannot solve those problems with some publicity or diplomatic blitz. We have to do the best we can. But it's going to be sustained alignment of words and actions over time that's really going to make the difference.

**ROB KELLEY:** My question deals with prospects for change in military culture. There's an interesting article in *The [New York] Times* this morning about the new operations manual that the Army intends to

release. It's an attempt to recalibrate stability operations, and reconcile stability operations with more traditional war fighting. There was an observation from a Lieutenant General William Caldwell, who said that, "there's going to be some resistance... It's going to take some time to inculcate that into our culture."<sup>2</sup> I think that this is an important point to raise about AFRICOM. The obstacles for being able to affect this kind of change within military culture so you can achieve success. What do you think those obstacles are? And how do you plan to address them?

**RYAN HENRY:** Bill Caldwell's a very smart guy. I've had the pleasure of working with him. I think that some of his concerns were probably applicable three or four years ago. Culturally, within the service we are not having that problem of understanding what we are trying to do when it comes to Africa—within the military or within the interagency—as far as the people who are volunteering to go forth and the attitudes that they are bringing to the problem. Secretary Gates testified before both the House and the Senate yesterday and made this point pretty strongly. Within the military-industrial complex we do have a problem. We have over half a trillion dollars a year in expenditures in the Department of Defense. There is a long trail of people who that money works its way through. Lots of communities and institutions.

As we move away from a lot of the more kinetic forms of military intervention to some of the softer ones, there's a real resistance. There's a political resistance. There's a cultural resistance. There's a bureaucratic resistance. He [Gates] put forward some of the changes that we are going to need. I mentioned that Secretary Rumsfeld, two and a half years ago, put out a directive that we are going to balance war fighting capability with security cooperation or stability ops capability.

The real proof in the pudding has been the common experience that our war fighters have gone through in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is not a commander there who wouldn't trade a battalion for a provincial reconstruction team on a moment's notice. There's not a commander there that wouldn't want to have dollars to be able to dig a well versus bullets to be able to go in and make a raid. That's something a whole generation is going through.

I think the military gets it. We have the Counterinsurgency Manual that came out a year and a half ago that Dave Petraeus took over to Iraq. You can see the difference that it's made. In warfare we talk about the "center of mass". And in a counterinsurgency the center of mass is not the military, it's the local populace's allegiance to the sovereign. It's

<sup>2</sup> Michael R. Gordon, "After Hard-Won Lessons, Army Doctrine Revised," *New York Times*, 8 February 8, 2008.

the sovereign government's ability to deliver services to the people and affect their lives. I think that the military, the war fighters, the guys with the boots on the ground, they get it and we're not going to have any issues with them.

I can promise you that General Ward gets it. I believe that most of his staff gets it. There will be some resistance, though, in our political process and the military industrial-complex that will want to build Mach 3 fighters, and future combat systems, and \$3 billion warships. They are going to have some trouble adjusting to this difference.



## **Panel 1: The Rationale for AFRICOM's Public Diplomacy Commitment—Soft Power and American Strategy in Africa**

Moderator:

Adam Clayton Powell, III, Vice Provost for Globalization, USC

Panelists:

Ambassador Brian Carlson, Senior Liaison for Strategic Communication for the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State

Charles P. Kosak, Principal Director, Office of African Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Nicole Lee, Executive Director, TransAfrica Forum

**ADAM CLAYTON POWELL, III:** Welcome to the first panel in this morning's program. USC, as many of you know, is doing more and more focused activity in and about Africa. As of December, at the end of the year, we have identified 209 scholars across the campus who are conducting educational activities, research projects, service-based learning, and internships in and about Africa. This spring the Office of the Provost will launch a USC Africa website to link all these scholars and activities. Obviously one link will be this program.

Our panelists:

Ambassador Brian Carlson has served for thirty-six years in the Foreign Service, including as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Latvia. Other postings took him to Spain, England, Norway, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Venezuela. Since returning to Washington in 2005, he has led inspection teams in the U.S. and in Washington for the Inspector General of the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors. He also lectures on strategic communications and public diplomacy at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center.

Nicole Lee was appointed Executive Director of TransAfrica Forum in December 2006. Before accepting that position she was the



organization's chief financial officer and senior policy researcher. Before joining TransAfrica Forum, she was managing director of Global Justice, a Washington advocacy group focusing on HIV/AIDS and child survival policy. Earlier, she was based in Haiti for three years researching claims and interviewing victims of human rights abuse. She's also worked in South Africa assisting in the largest class-action suit ever filed on the African continent for victims of environmental racism. She's also a regular contributor to *Pacifica*, to Pacific Radio, and to Al Jazeera.

Charles Kosak has held posts including Deputy Director of NATO Policy, Senior Policy Analyst in the Balkans Taskforce, and head of the office for the International Rescue Committee in Bosnia. He was also a Peace Corps volunteer in the Congo and speaks French and Swahili.

**AMBASSADOR BRIAN CARLSON:** I thought I would use this opportunity to say a few of the things that Assistant Secretary Frazer would have said last night, had she been able to come. I'm not going to read her remarks by any means, but I will use them as an outline just to throw out a few thoughts.

As we talk about AFRICOM and the issue of public diplomacy, perhaps because I majored in History I believe that you need to think about where you started in order to know where you are going. Many of us have commented on the fact that AFRICOM was announced about a year ago this week by President Bush. But in fact it was fifty years ago this year that President Eisenhower ordered the establishment of the Bureau of African Affairs at the State Department. I think it was an important decision because it recognized the fact that we were moving into a new era. It came about because of three factors: the decolonization of Africa; the beginning of the Cold War; and—something that is probably not often thought of in this context, our own American civil rights movement.

The reality in the State Department was that until 1958 African policy was basically managed through our Bureau of European Affairs. Our embassies in Europe had consulates in Africa. We saw Africa very much through the filter of the lens of European affairs, the NATO alliance, our concerns with Soviet communism. The establishment of the Bureau in the State Department came about, in many ways, as a recognition of a change in the world situation. We began to have more embassies in independent nations in Africa and they were reporting directly back to Washington to a Bureau of African Affairs. Over time this had a wonderful benefit as we began to develop ever more rapidly a cadre of American diplomats who had lived on the continent of Africa, whose careers were committed to understanding and developing relationships with Africans. It basically developed a cadre of officers who knew what

they were doing when they went to Africa and had a good sense of what Africans were thinking and what Africans wanted.

The Cold War was obviously a factor in 1958. Because of the Cold War you could say that the security of Europe was what mattered most to our embassies in Europe and often in Washington. But we should also remember that it was around that time that Vice President Nixon made a visit throughout Africa and got a first-hand look at what was going on in Africa and brought that back to Washington. Eisenhower and Nixon were very much behind this change in focus about our relationship with Africa. That trip was a very early step in American public diplomacy toward Africa.

The third point is the American civil rights movement. Eisenhower, Nixon, the people of that time realized that what we were doing at home did have an impact on our relations abroad and that what we were doing abroad had an impact on our country at home. We were dealing at that time with segregation, Jim Crow, the legalization of inequality. That just didn't sit well with a country that saw itself as being a leader in democracy and freedom around the world. This was no clearer in any place than it was in Africa where Soviet propaganda, for example, made great hay out of the fact that we were having these difficulties over segregation at home and we were talking to an African population that was unsympathetic, obviously, to racism.

In 1954 there had been the Supreme Court decision on segregation in public schools, *Brown v. the Board of Education*. One of the important functions of public diplomacy is to report back to our national leadership how our policies are being perceived, how they are being dealt with. I would argue that it is not only a function of public diplomacy to talk to the Executive Branch but also to the Legislative Branch to remind our Congress of how we are being perceived abroad, maybe even to the Judicial Branch. Very few people note the fact that it was the State Department that filed an amicus brief in *Brown versus the Board of Education* urging that the court consider the impact of these policies, these racist policies, on our foreign policy and the damage that segregation was causing to the U.S. image abroad. I've been wondering if we can ever get through to our legal affairs people the idea of filing an amicus brief with the Supreme Court these days on some issue. But nevertheless it happened then and was taken into account. The civil rights movement and the changes that stemmed from that have had an enormous impact on our image abroad as a country.

The Defense Department, in setting up AFRICOM, is in many ways now catching up, if I can put it that way, with this entire process of decolonization that's been going on in many countries around the

world. It's about time. They are addressing a longstanding gap in their bureaucratic structure. Why should Africa be dealt with by a European Command that is also focusing on the questions of Western Europe, and the former Soviet Union, and all those countries? How else will we ever build expertise in the Defense Department of the kind that we have in some other parts of the world, where we have Foreign Affairs Officers and people in the Defense Department who actually understand and appreciate the problems of Africa, who have developed contacts over there through the years as they have moved up the ranks and developed contacts and expertise in Africa? Our Bureau of African Affairs now has 44 embassies and 4 consulates. They know a lot about what's going on in Africa because they listen.

I think that is a very important point. Another thing I would point out—certainly from the State Department view (I think Ryan Henry made perfectly clear that he shares it, and I believe that it's shared by all the leadership in Defense), is that AFRICOM and its creation is in many ways a bureaucratic reorganization within one part of the U.S. government. Our policy toward Africa is much bigger than AFRICOM. AFRICOM will make it more possible, more coherent as we go about organizing the military part of our relationship. But that relationship is still driven by the State Department, and by the president first, of course. Foreign policy is very much in the hands of the Secretary of State and that will continue. Security assistance is managed by USAID. I think that we need to keep this in context.

There is a tendency always when we do anything in the United States government that the amount of discussion that we have about it in and around the United States tends to overwhelm and blow things out of proportion. I think that if we keep our eye on the ball that we will remember that Africa is actually quite a success, particularly for this administration. If you look at the number of things that this administration has done in Africa: the President's PEPFAR initiative on HIV/AIDS, one of the largest health initiatives undertaken in the entire world; the malaria initiative, which is making real differences in the disease that has been largely pushed out of the way in other parts of the world but where we still need to do things about it in Africa; the Millennium Challenge Corporation; and our efforts helping with regional security. All based, as Ryan Henry noted, on helping Africans solve African problems. I'll close at that point.

**CHARLES P. KOSAK:** One of the things I want to say is there's been a feeling that we haven't consulted enough on AFRICOM. We've actually consulted more on AFRICOM than we have with the standup of any other

command in U.S. history. My department's deputy assistant secretary, Theresa Whelan, set up a series of roundtables at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, DC, a preeminent organization with very talented Africanists. We had very talented defense attaches come in. We had ambassadors come in. We basically asked a lot of questions. We didn't say this is what we are going to do and this is how you're going to like it. The interesting thing to note in all of this is that Africans basically said two things: Number one, don't come big. Don't build a base in Africa and don't seek to put combat troops on the continent. The second thing they said was, in a way you are kind of catching up with us. You have these three combatant commands as they presently exist in charge of the continent, their areas of responsibility. But we have the African Union. We have the regional economic communities that have played an instrumental role in helping to promote stability in different regions in Africa. So when you do come, make sure that you are linking with the African Union and that you're working with the African Union. Ryan touched on this a little bit so far as the question of unilateralism—not going to Africa to lead but to work with the institutions that are already on the continent. I think that's important.

I'm not suggesting for a second that everything has been perfect. I'm proud of the fact that we endeavored at the very outset to sit down and listen to Africans and gain their perspective. The way we moved our planning forward in many ways emanated from those consultations. The distributed headquarters presence that Ryan talked about was a result of those consultations. It was simply put that if we are to deal with the tyranny of distance in Africa, we can't locate ourselves in one place only. If we are to more effectively liaise and work with Africans and the regional institutions, then we need to have the means with which we can do so on a regular basis.

General Ward makes an excellent point that we need to focus on what added value we bringing to Africa. So there is a focus on programs and not just talking the talk anymore but walking the walk. In many ways by dealing with the suspicions that exist by focusing on programs and proving ourselves to detractors whether in Europe, or the United States, or in Africa. We are going to stay in our lane and we are going to continue to do the things we've always done but seek to do so more effectively. I wanted to bring that point up as something that I think is essential.

The other thing is that many of the African ambassadors that we talked with, and defense attachés, and other senior African leaders, liked the preventative focus rather than the reactive focus. They also liked

the whole-of-government approach at the operational level. We were getting very positive feedback through the course of these discussions.

We are integrating skill sets and we're not integrating statutory authorities. And we are not integrating resources. This is an interesting area for us to discuss today. Because in reality whether you are talking about the NGO leadership in the United States or you are talking about African leaders, or European leaders, or just leadership in general focused on Africa, there's this view that, "Oh my god, we're embedding USAID and OFDA [The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance]! We are embedding all of these elements within the command." The assumption was—and maybe the next conclusion was—we're subordinating these institutions to a command. And we're creating a giant PRT [Provincial Reconstruction Team] for Africa. Well, nothing could be more different from the truth. That was never our intention. The intention really was to have USAID in the command and to have OFDA in the command and have elements from the interagency so you have expertise, so when DOD acts within its statutory authority, within its comparative advantage, it can focus on crises before they become catastrophes. It can work better with USAID. It can act sooner rather than later with USAID. That kind of connectivity. Every agency has its subculture of decision-making processes and language.

One of the things that I experienced when I was the head of office of the International Rescue Committee in Bosnia during the worst of the fighting there, is that whenever I went inside the wire, so to speak, to meet with the implementation force commanders, I was like a Martian to them. I was the NGO guy with a blue helmet and a white vehicle. It was hard for them to communicate with me, and it was hard for me to communicate with them. When you talk about having these kinds of expertise, this kind of subcultural understanding within the command, you are going to better position the command to work with these other agencies and to cross-fertilize ideas. At the onset of famine for example, you'll have a USAID rep working with Ambassador Yates and saying "this is what we are doing in Washington" and having the OFDA rep doing the same. So when Ambassador Yates is meeting with General Ward and General Altshuler and they're talking about what appropriate role DOD would play, what role USAID is interested in having DOD or OFDA play, then you have an improved ability for DOD with its comparative advantages, whether it's logistics or what have you, to work in a more preventative or efficient manner. That is very important. People made a lot of assumptions about embedding these capabilities. Does that mean that you are subordinating these agencies to the command in Africa? That is absolutely not the case.

The other thing I would say is that about \$9 billion is spent in Africa every year. Most of that is spent through the State Department, not through the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense—in terms of its soft funding sources, is comparatively tiny: about \$250 million a year. So when you talk about expenditures in Africa on the soft side, really the Goliath is the State Department not DOD. There are some out there who think DOD has trillions of dollars and now DOD is going to get increasingly involved in developmental activities, humanitarian activities, etc. Statutorily we can't spend money like that. We're very restricted as to how we spend our money. Title 10, Title 22—these are legal aspects. So you're not going to have this massive infusion of DOD funding to do these things and constrain humanitarian space in the way I think that some people have misinterpreted some of this.

As a Peace Corps volunteer in the Congo, I used to go for a run every morning and I listened to a Walkman. Within the first couple of months I learned that people thought I was communicating with the Central Intelligence Agency. I had to meet with the village chief to make my case that I was not in fact spying and making these sinister communications with Washington. At the end of the day, the suspicions were there. And it's not unique to Africa. All around the world there is a perception of America as being omnipotent. In fact, many felt that things happened in the Congo because the United States let it happen. Or things didn't happen in the Congo because the United States decided that it shouldn't happen. So the way I was able to build my credibility in the Congo was by doing my job, by doing what I said I was going to do. It was just being there. Listening and proving that I wasn't a CIA agent by involving myself in the programs that I was working on.

Talking is one thing but actually doing things is another. I think that General Ward gets this, and you couldn't have a more capable, charismatic, and dedicated commander who will focus the command on all of the right things and will work tirelessly to dispel these suspicions, not just through talk alone but through the actions that he takes.

**NICOLE LEE:** I'm the critic. I've been asked to look at AFRICOM through a critical lens in terms of its soft power mandate—a U.S. Africa command, a military command with a soft power purview. Soft power by definition is the use of economics, diplomacy, and information to support national interest. It is supposed to be the opposite of military hard power, the opposite of tanks, aircraft carriers, other tools of war that basically break things and kill people. Soft power is supposed to be about engendering cooperation through shared values. It is not something that we believe can be accomplished by the U.S. military, or

frankly any military, regardless of specialized training, cooperation with experts, and their good intentions.

In the context of the African continent, soft power is not at all a new concept. It has not even always been a positive concept. Throughout the Cold War the U.S. used soft diplomacy to support strongmen across the continent from Zaire, Congo, Nigeria, to Southern Africa. AFRICOM, for all the talk of its being a new and innovative engagement, could simply serve to protect unpopular regimes that are friendly to U.S. interests while Africa slips further into poverty as was the case during the Cold War.

There's been a lot of talk about how we've moved away from Cold War politics and I think we need to unpack that a little bit more. The public diplomacy mission of AFRICOM is, at this point, vague at best and has many Africans asking why the U.S. has not, for example, supported the AU mission in Somalia but instead supported a unilateral mission with the government of Ethiopia through their joint taskforce stationed in Djibouti. We and they are asking whether the U.S. is really interested in addressing the joint security needs of Africans, or does its proposed military presence foreshadow the kind of destruction we have seen recently in Somalia?

In response to queries along these lines, the public affairs staff of AFRICOM confirms that what AFRICOM is actually trying to do is to create and support further interaction of Ethiopia and Somalia. Instead of placing U.S. troops in harm's way, AFRICOM wants to create through soft diplomacy an environment continent-wide where African forces are doing the U.S.'s bidding, and protecting our national interests under the guise of strengthening Africa's multilateral institutions. In short, AFRICOM will protect U.S. access to resources and provide a new front on the U.S. global war on terror, very likely at the expense of Africans and African livelihoods.

AFRICOM, despite the PR campaign of the DOD and the rest of the administration, may be the same old U.S. foreign policy towards the African continent. It is not a new establishing of relationships. And the work of the U.S. Defense Department, the State Department, and USAID to achieve more stable environment in which economic and political growth can continue, may not be what's going to take place. Nor, if we look at history, will it—once fully operational, really prevent the wars and the skirmishes that we have been discussing.

Our African partners are concerned that with the establishment of AFRICOM it just might do more harm than good. It may be the "poised hammer" that makes everything suddenly look more like a nail.

Consider the history of U.S. military bases around the world. SOUTHCOM in terms of the School of the Americas has had an impact on Latin America as well as the historical record of engagement on the continent. When you look at what happened in Liberia in 2003 when U.S. Naval ships were right off the coast of Liberia while an absolute ethnic cleansing was going on and nothing was done, we're not that far removed. When you look at history, whether it's two years, or ten years, or twenty years of U.S. military engagement on the continent of Africa, it has been a selective engagement that very rarely has had anything to do with the interest of African peoples.

**ADAM CLAYTON POWELL, III:** Thank you. We are going to Q&A in a minute, but it's the moderator's privilege to ask the first question. I'd like to go from the general to the specific. Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan is in Kenya this week moderating talks and he says, this morning, that we are within days of an agreement. We've been hearing this morning that the U.S. needs to listen, to be less dominating, preventive rather than reactive, integrating resources, no massive increase in funding. What does all of that mean when you come down to a specific case such as Kenya? What, if anything, should AFRICOM be doing in such a situation, short-term or beyond?

**CHARLES P. KOSAK:** From my perspective, what's happening in the Rift Valley is not new. The longevity of the instability has taken some people by surprise, but this is a geographic area where you have numerous tribal affiliations, and in Kenya's history there has always been instability related to elections in Kenya. When you ask, what the Command should do in Kenya, I would say that at this point you have Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer working as hard as she is to bring the parties together and come to some sort of negotiated arrangement, as along with Kofi Annan. It stays in the diplomatic realm and under the purview of the State Department, and I think that's a good thing. From the security perspective, I've been pleased to see that the United States Army has stayed out of things. I would not see that Africa Command would be able to prevent such a scenario or be involved in something directly like that. This is still within the purview of the State Department.

**ADAM CLAYTON POWELL, III:** It sounds like your bottom line is that there is no role right now for AFRICOM in such a situation.

**AMBASSADOR BRIAN CARLSON:** I think that's right. I think there is no role.



**AMBASSADOR MARY CARLIN YATES (FROM THE AUDIENCE):** We have a military command that has Kenya as part of its purview right now, Central Command. The Central Command is not taking an active role. It's exactly as Chuck has said, this is the time for the D of diplomacy and not the D of defense. So when David Ignatius asked that in *The Washington Post*, I thought that it's no different. We have a military command that has that in its AOR [Area of Responsibility] for right now.

**CHARLES P. KOSAK:** I would go so far as to say that it would be counterproductive and probably inciting if we were to involve ourselves in such a situation. It's something that needs to be handled indigenously. The political leadership needs to be pressured to do the right things here.

**AUDIENCE QUESTION:** There's also a question of what should the U.S. government be doing in Kenya, not just what should AFRICOM be doing. It's going to take a while to establish AFRICOM. This is a multi-year process. During this process there will be crises, there will be moments when the question arises: what's AFRICOM doing about this crisis? In Kenya today, it may be Rwanda tomorrow and maybe the DRC after that. Managing those expectations is not going to be easy because often the answer is that AFRICOM doesn't have a role to play now. Explaining that to Congress and to the public is going to be one of the bigger public diplomacy challenges that AFRICOM faces in its early years.

**NICOLE LEE:** The last point is important in that there is a lot of discussion about how AFRICOM is leading the way for this new innovative diplomacy with Africa. We don't believe that to be the case. Kenya is a very good example. I'm glad to see that AFRICOM does not see itself as having a role at this point. But certainly the U.S. administration has had a role in the way in which the framework, if you will, of Kenya has now come to this point. We have shown a lot of support to a government that has been accused of—and found to be—the perpetrator of many human rights violations. Yet we've turned a blind eye to that. Even with Jendayi Frazer working very diligently, frankly in some ways the administration has thrown her under the bus. When she said that there was ethnic cleansing going on, she was not backed up by the president in that. So there are many ways in which what we are seeing in Kenya happening right now is just the beginning of the confusion about what State should be doing, where Defense comes in, and how the administration, depending on who's in the president's office, views the importance of human rights, real democracy, votes being counted, and so forth. While

the Kenya issue is on CNN right now, this is not the first time that an election in Kenya was irregular. It is the first time that the U.S. has been called upon so vehemently to have something to say about it.

**CHARLES P. KOSAK:** I'm going to have to disagree respectfully here. You mention, Nicole, the School of the Americas and a DOD role that has kind of a sinister implication and consequence. The fact of the matter is that the State Department runs FMF [Foreign Military Financing] and IMA [Installation Management Agency]. The fact of the matter is that if you are talking about capacity building in Africa, the State Department is in charge of the Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance program [ACOTA]. That's about \$50 million a year. For the very reasons you cite with respect to the School of the Americas and that sort of thing, I think that that's a good place for that program to be run. The Department of Defense works with the State Department. You have all of these statutory and programmatic realities in terms of how security assistance is not only prioritized but actually implemented in terms of Africa. I would not paint a picture of the Department of Defense conspiring with dictators in such a way that we are not seeking to promote reform appropriately in some of these areas. We are making progress. With respect to who's in charge of what, the State Department remains very much engaged in some of these capacity-building programs for some of the concerns that you cite, human rights issues, the appropriate vetting of those individuals that we train. This is all done through the State Department. These are checks and balances that have been in place for quite some time.

**NICOLE LEE:** May I respond? The intent is certainly not to demonize any one individual, but the concerns that I'm raising are not merely the concerns of progressive civil society institutions. Congress has stated, and I'm sure they're not just stating it to us but they are stating it to the Defense Department, that they are concerned with the blurring of the lines between State and DOD. They are concerned with the fact that even though we've had a lot of discussions, there seems to be a lot of confusion around what the budget is for this. Congress is concerned about the budget for this and how that will dwarf the State Department budget. So I don't think these are necessarily the ramblings of an activist. This is actually something that Congress takes very seriously.

**AUDIENCE QUESTION:** Recognizing that you are not able to change the policy right now, under what circumstances could you imagine AFRICOM becoming actively involved in a crisis in Africa? It's fine to say this one

isn't appropriate, but it seems to me that by saying these things you are raising these questions: why exactly is AFRICOM so prominent with diplomacy as opposed to State? Now I understand you can't reallocate the budget. This question is about under what circumstances does it actually become active, or does it become active under any circumstances?

**AMBASSADOR BRIAN CARLSON:** The circumstance when I would see AFRICOM becoming involved in some crisis in Africa is when the National Security Council and the State Department decide that they want AFRICOM's help. I can imagine that the most likely time for that would be when we have agreed with the African Union that a peacekeeping force needs to be some place where they are not. Few countries have the logistical capability that we do to move people from one place to another, to perhaps provide intelligence from satellites and things like that, to support that force in its ability to help solve the problem.

**ADAM CLAYTON POWELL, III:** So you are saying that typically it would be to support multinational operations?

**AMBASSADOR BRIAN CARLSON:** It's the one that I can imagine most likely.

**AMBASSADOR BRUCE GELB (FROM THE AUDIENCE):** This is a meeting that has something to do with public diplomacy. I just heard a most interesting thing from Mr. Kosak on how this is all going to work. It's not all going to be the Defense Department taking over the State Department because it's going to be something where everyone works together. State will have a voice. Strangely enough, I heard the exact same thing approximately eight years ago on how beautifully it would work if you took the United States Information Agency and put it underneath the State Department because they work so closely together and yet they are housed in foreign areas. There is hardly anybody inside the State Department or outside commenting on this merger that has not said it has been a very bad failure. The people on the ground, especially who used to be USIA people, talk about how organizationally it hasn't worked. Representing the State Department when you try to talk to a journalist or walk in the shoes of one of the thought leaders of the country, you're always now talking State Department policy. I happen to be a great friend of the military. But I'm also listening and I'm hearing what they are saying in the Middle East, which is we don't want those military people on the ground. We want all the problems solved, but we don't want them on the ground. The Africans are saying the same thing.

This is another example of a different form of hegemonic kind of colonialism. The United States is going to really organize it. I don't know how public diplomacy is going to work if it didn't work under the State Department, and I'm worried that the State Department is going to work no better under the military in AFRICOM, which somebody said is a test for what could go on all over the world.

**CHARLES P. KOSAK:** Look, let's face it here. The question was: when will you do something in Africa? I think the muted issue there is Rwanda. One of the things that I like about this command is: one commander, one command, one Africa. In many ways Central Command was focused obviously on Iraq. A lot of intellectual energy and a lot of resources went to what has been a U.S. government priority. Brian mentioned that the European Command takes a huge chunk of the continent but it's also very focused on European affairs. To eliminate that kind of bifurcation is very good, and certainly to take a more holistic approach to the continent is good too. The other thing is that I can't say that the command is going to prevent a Darfur, or it's going to prevent another Rwanda. What I like about the command is that you have someone like Ambassador Mary Yates, who is the deputy to the commander for civil military affairs, who has tons of African experience, someone who will have a multi-agency team that she can work with everyday to help make the Department of Defense work better in Africa.

When I say work better in Africa, I mean identify problems before they become crises and work to address those crises before they become catastrophes. The worst thing is to maintain all of these conventional capabilities and never do anything in Africa or react so late that the problems are so big that the ability for us to save lives and do things in such a way that we are sustaining a better environment is that much more difficult or costly. The focus on capacity building is important. Africans themselves have said that to us time and time again. In many ways we are catching up with Africa. In many ways the establishment of this command is acknowledging the importance of the African Union, acknowledging the importance of the regional economic communities, acknowledging the significance that the African Union is going to be setting up Africa Standby Forces and positioning ourselves in such a way that we can work with African leaders to do the things that they want to do to promote stability on the continent. I would say again that this is an internal Department of Defense reorganization. It is not to subordinate other agencies underneath General Ward in Africa.

I'm going to stick to David Ricardo on this. It's all about comparative advantages. It's about legal statutes. I'm a former nongovernmental

organization worker, and I can tell you right now that one of the things that was most important to me when I was on the ground in Bosnia was my impartiality. I could not go to places to save lives in Bosnia if the belligerents perceived me to be too close to the U.S. government or working for the United States government. That's number one. The other thing that was absolutely critical was that I maintained my independence. I could criticize the United States government because I felt like we weren't doing enough or we should be doing more. I could maintain an independent voice and I could maintain a voice for the IDPs [Internally Displaced Persons] and refugees. When you talk about human security, I kept applying Band-Aids to wounds that would never heal in Bosnia. I kept going to the collective centers and bringing toothpaste and hygienic supplies to newly minted widows and orphans. I tell you that the proudest day in my life was when the United States military through NATO came in and the bad guys sat down. That's when my work became very exciting because I saw progress, I saw sustainability. So for me to get IDPs back to a village that they had been ethnically cleansed out of, the military had to be there to provide area security. The police had to be there to provide close security. AID had to be there to think about a sustainable development program. OFDA had to be there to bring in medicine, shelter, to take care of immediate needs. The NGOs had to be there to advocate in the midst of a political crisis when there was no one else to advocate on their behalf.

Are there suspicions and paranoid out there about security? Do you know where these monies are going? I understand all that. It is a grey area; but it's an exciting area if we are able to collaborate appropriately. DOD is not going to try to do things that AID doesn't want it to do. It can't. It doesn't have the resources and it doesn't have the expertise.

I can't stand up here at USC and teach chemistry. The chemistry professors would laugh at me. We are going to stay in our lane. The question is: how can we work better together within our lanes, within our comparative advantages to have a better impact on people's lives in Africa? That's the issue.

**AUDIENCE QUESTION:** I have some questions about the presence of China in Africa. China has very large civilian and military assistance programs in Africa, often very unpopular with the people on the ground. I've seen some reports that in Sudan the Chinese oilfields have been attacked by the rebels and that now China wants to bring in some security forces to protect their holdings there. Another concern that I've had is the head of the largest Muslim community in Nigeria recently made a pilgrimage to Iran to meet with the authorities. His deputies are still there holding

talks of some sort. You have Chinese influence and you have Shia influence. Is AFRICOM purposed to counteract these? Or if it isn't, why is it acceptable for Chinese and Shia influence in Africa but not for U.S. influence?

**AMBASSADOR BRIAN CARLSON:** Let me take a stab at this by saying a little something about how we look at China. I know that it's out there that we are creating AFRICOM because we are concerned about Chinese influence. Or the other one is that we're doing it because of oil. All I can tell you is that it isn't so. That is not the reason for this decision. It had nothing to do with China.

In fact, we've taken several looks at this at the State Department and the interagency. What China doing in different parts of the world is a matter of considerable continuing analysis. We are noticing a lot of activity by China in different parts of the world where they were not traditionally present. I should also point out that we're also noticing a lot of activity in China that didn't exist there before. People buying cars, and changes in lifestyle, economic changes, and so forth in China that are welcomed. China is obviously becoming an increasingly important player on the world scene and an increasingly important market and an increasingly important producer of goods around the world. It's quite natural that a country that is industrializing and so forth is going to need natural resources. As they go for natural resources, guess what? We and the West Europeans already have all the easy-to-get natural resources. So where does that leave the Chinese to go? They have to go looking in places where it's pretty tough to find natural resources, where they weren't sought or recovered before. You are seeing Chinese activities around the world, particularly in natural resources markets and the development of such markets, that we didn't see before. Just like any other country, as their business and economic reach goes out, so do a lot of other aspects of Chinese activity. They have aid programs and all the rest that go out. We sometimes notice that with some of the generous aid programs, building roads and so forth, it just so happens that the road actually connects a mine to a port and makes it easier to get the stuff out of the mine to the port so it can be shipped to China or wherever.

I don't mean to overly minimize the degree to which China is involved and present in a number of countries where they haven't been before. I just want to stipulate that at least we at the State Department do not take the point of view that everything China is doing is part of some grand malignant plan that threatens the United States. In many ways much of it makes enormous amounts of sense. I want to encourage China, on the other hand, to become a more responsible partner in a number of parts of

the world. We'd like to see their aid tied to human rights, labor rights, and other kinds of standards—the same kind that we, and the Europeans, and many others follow. We have some goals and a number of things that we are working on with China. But our policy in Africa is not an anti-China policy.

**CHARLES P. KOSAK:** I agree with everything you just said, Brian. But let me just be more specific. China is not sending in more troops to protect their oilfields in Darfur. You may be aware that there is a joint—a hybrid mission, the United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur. China is sending engineers, and we are very pleased to have China playing a constructive part in this hybrid force. We continue to work toward a certification in the implementation of UNAUMID [The United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur] and to bring greater security to Darfur. I want to be very clear that the Chinese are working constructively within the context of UNAUMID.

The more I learn about Africa, the more I learn that I don't know a whole lot about Africa. I think that's an important thing here. We say, "Well, that's a big place," or, as some people unfortunately say in the Pentagon, "That's a big country." I'm being a bit facetious here. The reality is 53 different countries. And in my experience in the Congo, there are hundreds of languages, dialects, and tribes, and that sort of thing. With respect to China, in Liberia there is a committee that is working to improve development and to continue the excellent progress that is being made there. The Chinese are playing an important role. It's important that we work constructively with our Chinese friends. We are in some places working very well, and they're working within the context of the international approach in a positive way.

**NICOLE LEE:** This is really interesting for me. It's one of the problems with the rhetoric. I don't mean that in a negative way, but the rhetoric around AFRICOM defies belief when people hear that this has nothing to do with China. Coming from a human rights perspective this is going to sound strange but, well, shouldn't it? If this is a command that is a U.S. command and U.S. national interest is to ensure that we have enough oil and we know that 25 percent of U.S. oil will be coming from Africa in the near future, why wouldn't this be about ensuring that the natural resources that we need can come to us? When the Gulf of Guinea is filled with oil platforms from China and we have very few, when the Niger delta is overrun with rebels, why wouldn't this be about ensuring that we can attain these natural resources? I think that it's difficult for people on the continent and for civil society in the U.S. to believe that

it has absolutely nothing to do with China, and that this has nothing to do with the war on terror, nothing to do with resources. It kind of defies what you would think this would truly be about if this command is to ensure that our national interests are ascertained.

**AMBASSADOR BRIAN CARLSON:** Let me make one quick point: U.S. energy policy sees our national security as being fundamentally based on a large, market-driven worldwide supply of energy which is distributed according to market forces freely decided by a free and open market. The only time that we become concerned is when it looks like somebody is going to interfere with and limit the open market. It's not that we are worried about how much oil comes from Africa *per se*. We want a worldwide free market in energy; that's where our national security comes in. Of course we have an interest in the global war on terrorism. You have only to remember the attacks on our embassies in Africa to remember that of course there is no part of the world that is not a front in the worldwide war on terrorism. Of course that's an interest. We have interests in all parts of the world. The point is, nobody sat down and said, "I've got a great idea on how to stop the Chinese in Africa. Let's set up AFRICOM."

**NICOLE LEE:** It's interesting because you talk about the free market. There is significant obstruction to the free market many times coming from democratic free movements both on the continent of Africa and in Latin America. I imagine there would be many obstacles for the free market on the continent of Africa including one of our major oil partners, Nigeria. I'm curious how that does not play in to our defense interests as well.

**AMBASSADOR BRIAN CARLSON:** I'm not going to say that our defense interests aren't tied to our national security interests. But I would suggest that if, for example, Nigeria is a major oil producer, I think that they have an interest in a wide-open free international energy market too. After all it's no good if you keep it in the ground. You won't make any money on it that way.

**ADAM CLAYTON POWELL, III:** Sometimes it's not apparent to those of us in the United States just how large an investment China is making in Africa. The economics and finance minister of Zambia gave an interview recently in which he said that the Chinese had gone through country-by-country in sub-Saharan Africa, including Zambia, and said: "What would you like? A sports stadium? A new office building? No problem.



We'll build it for you. We'll give you the money for it, no strings attached." So the level of investment starts to get a lot of attention. And just a personal experience: fifteen years ago if you'd gone to Nairobi, you would have seen WorldNet and other U.S. agencies represented on radio and television. Today you go to Nairobi and you turn on broadcast television and there is CCTV Chinese news.

**JONATHAN TAPLIN:** Mr. Kosak, I was surprised that you are using the term "comparative advantage." Those of us who work with CEOs of major American corporations believe that the militarization of American foreign policy has hurt our comparative advantage. Many countries that don't have a perceived forward-thrust, military-oriented foreign policy have more comparative advantage in dealing with huge infrastructure projects, all sorts of possibilities whether in Africa or East Asia, wherever. Whether it's just perception or not, the notion that we have potentially put this new command in there is perceived that it's to guard oil. As Alan Greenspan said, we have to admit that we are in Iraq because of oil. The perception is that oil is the next frontier in Africa and that's where we are going.

**CHARLES P. KOSAK:** Again, I don't think perception is reality in this case. When I'm speaking of comparative advantages, I don't think we are militarizing foreign policy in Africa. We were just talking about access to markets and that sort of thing. Corruption is unquestionably a problem in Africa, but that is not something that the Department of Defense is going to be taking the lead on. That falls squarely under the State Department and USAID. When you talk about budgetary transparency and you talk about democratic processes and improving governance in the civil sector, that is governance, and it is under the State Department. Basically State will continue to be in the lead. We made a mistake early on when we were talking about governance as it related to U.S. Africa Command because it created some confusion. When we talk about governance on the DOD side we are talking about professionalizing the militaries. We're talking about reforming the militaries so they are under civilian control. We're talking about working with the military so that there is transparency in military budgeting, so that there is a right-sizing of militaries that makes sense for the potential threats that a country faces and that sort of thing. We're not seeking to militarize foreign policy. DOD is going to stay in its lane and use its skill sets with respect to training militaries and building capacities, and do so as appropriate. We're not seeking to grow DOD authorities and grow DOD resources and move into areas where we do not have the expertise, we do not have the resources, and to be

frank, where we have no business going. That's not going to happen. General Ward has been very clear on this. What we are trying to do is many of the things that we've always done but just do them better and sooner, so we can address issues before they become so chronic that addressing them is more costly or ineffective. It's important to bear that in mind.

**AUDIENCE QUESTION:** I wanted to bring up the example of a task force that Under Secretary Henry had earlier said was an example of a transition from a hard power mission to a soft power mission and that that's the future. I would presume that would be a guideline for AFRICOM'S mission. They've been out digging wells, fixing schools, building health clinics, and so on. I was just wondering: those are all done under the premise that we are helping to build stability and development for the long-term interests of the U.S. and the African nations themselves. But ultimately when it comes down to it, the interests really boil down to protecting the oil markets and countering terrorism. That those are the primary interests was shown with the U.S. support for the factional warlords in Mogadishu, and the U.S. tacit and implicit support for the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia. That has obviously created a lot of problems for the civilians living there. Assistant Secretary Frazer was in the media soon after the invasion saying that we had success with our gunship attacks to take out terrorists related to the embassy bombings in 1998. Do you see that there is a conflict between what we are promoting now as long-term interests when compared to our actions that support short-term interests to counter terrorism even at the risk of damaging stability in this example of Somalia? And how do we push forward to try to alleviate that so that we come out of this looking like we are doing this for the right reasons?

**CHARLES P. KOSAK:** You're bringing up some good points. A good example of the soft power that we've been talking about is the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative. The thing that I like about this program and the thing that makes it unique is that it's a multi-faceted, multi-agency program. It hasn't been perfect and there are complexities related to it, many of them budgetary. On the military side there's training to build capacity within African militaries to deal with porous borders and ungoverned space—places where extremists might seek to take advantage of these spaces. On the State Department side, through the United States Agency for International Development, there is programmatic funding to build schools and that sort of thing in those areas where an African government may not have the resources to reach out to build schools

and provide essential services. Toward that end, that's appropriate. You don't want *madrasas* to be built in areas that may potentially radicalize populaces. At the end of the day, the threat in North Africa is very real, and I think it's safe to say that it's worsening. So it's something that we have to take very seriously. But again, it's Clausewitzian. You can't solve political problems through military means alone, so we need to be very careful about who is doing what and how we proceed in building capacities. First and foremost you don't want to build capacities that can be used in a manner that is inimical to our values. That's critical. You don't want to identify certain groups as being terrorists when in fact it may be an indigenous group that is fighting against the government but really have nothing to do with the transnational terrorist threat. So we need to take a very prudent approach to these types of problems.

I was recently traveling through North Africa and passed through Paris when I met at the Quai with some French officials. Four French tourists were killed in Mauritania recently. It's a serious threat, and there are linkages to al Qaeda. It's something we need to approach very carefully with our friends in Europe and working with the governments on the ground in Africa, and do so not in a ham-handed way but in a very carefully thought-out process. At the end of the day, we need to be able to balance the short-term and the long-term approaches. Nicole brought up a very good point. AFRICOM is not altruism. At the end of the day, a stable and prosperous Africa is good for Africa and it's good for America. It's good for the world. So we're using State Department expertise and diplomacy and AID developmental initiatives and OFDA emergency assistance initiatives and working with NGOs. To the extent that we are able to stay within our lanes and help promote stability and prosperity in Africa, what comes with that is an increasingly interdependent market connectivity. Our trade with Africa is increasing and will continue to increase. That's all the more reason why we need to maintain a sustainable presence on the continent, something that is continuous and persistent and not as erratic as it has been in the past.

**NICOLE LEE:** Sustainability in our foreign policy isn't something that we've proven we're very good at. There is a genuine mistrust that comes from this historical reality. One of the major concerns that comes up, is this notion that we need to whitewash or erase the past U.S. involvement on the continent, whether it is twenty years or two years ago, whether it is the fact that the U.S. military has unilaterally acted in the Horn of Africa instead of working multilaterally through the AU. We say: forget about that because what we are really doing now is building schools and health clinics for our long-term benefit. There's a lot of confusion

when we talk about past behavior really being the best indicator of future behavior. What we are asking people to do on the continent is believe what you hear not what you see. I think that we all agree up here is that we are talking about a long-term transition, but that transition cannot be successful unless we are at least willing to admit that our actions have many times hurt the interests of Africans on the continent, that we have acted in a way that is both selfish and not sustainable, and that we are taking tangible actions that will really make the difference. In the last year, from my perspective, the Africa Command got off to a very bad start in terms of how it was discussed in terms of the floating rhetoric, the rhetoric you can't get a hold of. Questions about the budget; even today Congress has one answer the Department of Defense has another. It's not quite clear. All of these things continue to breed mistrust. It's not merely going to be, "Just believe us, we really are trying to do the right thing." As the questioner pointed out, actions are going to certainly speak louder than words. There is another way. We have rarely chosen the other way.

**CHARLES P. KOSAK:** Has anyone heard of AUMISOM? The African Union Mission in Somalia? Jendayi Frazer has worked extremely hard at working with the African Union to build an operations plan to generate a mission working through the African Union. The Ugandans have been there for some time. Another success: Burundi has deployed to Mogadishu. This mission is not perfect but it's an example of the State Department doing precisely what it says is the U.S. government priority, and that is not to work merely unilaterally but work through African institutions. The other thing I want to make clear here, the bombings in 1998 killed more Africans than Americans in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. There are people who were affiliated with that who are still running around and who are seeking to operationalize further attacks against the United States and against others on the continent. Sometimes you have to approach these very, very extreme threats with appropriate mechanisms.

**AUDIENCE QUESTION:** I heard a little bit about success in Africa being measured by economic development, institution building, and processes that were good governance, essential services, peace, and investment. I've been at the World Bank and I understood that that was their mission—reconstruction development. They have more than 2,000 people focused on Africa. I'm curious to see if this is a role that we are picking up because maybe the World Bank wasn't as successful in Africa? I'd like to hear from Nicole about what your constituents think about the World

Bank in Africa and maybe Ambassador Carlson on how we are going to deconflict or harmonize with World Bank programs.

**NICOLE LEE:** Overall I think that most folks on the ground on the continent that have benefited from World Bank programs are very pleased with them. Those constituents, of course, have concerns about the U.S. role in the World Bank and how we have used our veto to ensure that our corporations and our interests are promoted first. Certainly in terms of broadening out a defense mandate to those issues, I would imagine that most would prefer the framework that the World Bank has put forth rather than a new experimental framework.

**AMBASSADOR BRIAN CARLSON:** I don't really feel qualified to talk about the World Bank—I'm not an Africanist—other than saying that I think we see it as one of many tools in the development toolbar. But maybe one of my State Department colleagues would feel more comfortable to talk about it; but I just don't know.

**CONSUL ATAKTI HAGEGE HAILU [FROM THE AUDIENCE]:** I would like to make a few points regarding the issue of Somalia and Ethiopia. Primarily the issue of Somalia was a constant with Ethiopia because it threatened our security and stability. The terrorists themselves waged a jihad against Ethiopia and so Ethiopia had to act. Ethiopia started the war because its security was threatened by the jihadists. The role of the United States should not be overemphasized here. The United States, in fact, advised the Ethiopian government not to act in Somalia, not to go to war with the jihadists. But because our internal interests were threatened we had to act militarily. They clearly waged jihad against the Ethiopian people. That was the major reason for us to intervene in Somalia. Secondly, the United States had a role, of course. We exchanged some intelligence regarding the jihadists and the overall security situation in Somalia, but the role of the United States was very, very small in regard to what the Ethiopians have done in Somalia.

Regarding AFRICOM, my personal view, not my government's view, is that it's important for the United States as well as for Africa to protect the framework in Africa. When Africa is peaceful, when Africa is capable of feeding its own people, then the United States will benefit. No question about that. The U.S. role must be to enable the Africans to administer themselves, to govern themselves. Other than that I don't see a role for the United States in Africa. If Africa is enabled to defend itself, to keep its internal peace through external support from the United

States and European powers, then that would be a very good win for all involved.

**NICOLE LEE:** Ethiopia has a lot of concerns around their borders: Eritrea, Somalia. I'm interested in knowing from your government's perspective—perhaps they're the same—how do you anticipate the Africa Command assisting you and ensuring that your security is better attained? What is your expectation?

**CONSUL ATAKTI HAGEGE HAILU:** I have never been so much involved in AFRICOM, but I would think enabling us to defend ourselves to keep our internal security, to provide us with the technical resources, would be the best direction for the United States. Otherwise, we believe that we can do our own job by our own selves. So that would be the right direction instead of having a military force in Africa.



## **Panel 2: The Military's Mandate—Determining the Scope of AFRICOM's Public Diplomacy Responsibilities**

Moderator:

Nicholas Cull, Director, Master of Public Diplomacy Program, USC

Panelists:

Major General Herbert L. Altshuler, Director of Strategy, Plans, and Programs, AFRICOM

Ambassador Mark Bellamy, Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Abiodun Williams, Associate Dean, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University

**NICHOLAS CULL:** It's a great pleasure to be moderating this second session of the AFRICOM Conference. The subject is the military's mandate—determining the scope of AFRICOM's public diplomacy responsibilities. Before we go to the panel, I want to draw attention, for those of you who are unfamiliar, to our masters program here at USC. The quality of the students in the Masters Program on Public Diplomacy is just extraordinary. I know that those of you that are putting together a public diplomacy presence for AFRICOM are looking for good people and this is an excellent place to start.

Our three panelists each bring terrific experience to this subject:

Major General Herbert “Buz” Altshuler is a distinguished military officer with long experience in psychological operations, much decorated, and with a particular experience in Bosnia overseeing psychological operations for the United States Army there. Ambassador Mark Bellamy was a career diplomat of long service especially in Africa, and was Ambassador to Kenya between 2003 and 2006.

Abiodun Williams has had a distinguished career, including much service with the United Nations. He was director of Strategic Planning



in the Executive Office of both Kofi Annan and then of Ban Ki-Moon and has served in peacekeeping roles in Bosnia, Haiti, and in Macedonia.

Before I call on the panelists, I thought it would be useful to set out the working definition of public diplomacy that I use with the students here at USC. The first step we use in defining public diplomacy is to look at just what diplomacy is. Diplomacy is a process by which an international actor conducts its foreign policy by engaging with, in most cases, another international actor. Public diplomacy goes beyond this by seeking to conduct foreign policy but by engaging with a foreign public. We talk about five key areas of public diplomacy. The first area is listening. The first way in which an international actor engages with foreign public is by listening to others. That is something that we hope will be much a part of AFRICOM. The second element is advocacy, the part that many nations push forward and do to the exclusion of other elements. How will AFRICOM be part of America's advocacy role on the African continent? The third area is cultural diplomacy. The fourth area is exchange diplomacy. Will AFRICOM be figuring in those areas or coordinating that kind of activity? The fifth area is international broadcasting, which has historically been associated with public diplomacy and is a major way in which an international actor engages with foreign publics. I assume that AFRICOM will have no international broadcasting role, but I hope it will at least facilitate the international broadcasting of what is happening in Africa. So that is the scope of what we see as public diplomacy.

Now I would like to bring in our panelists. Buz, maybe you could give us your take to begin with on this question of the scope of AFRICOM's public diplomacy responsibilities.

**MAJOR GENERAL HERBERT L. ALTSHULER:** This is a great honor to be part of this organization and to be talking about U.S. AFRICOM, as controversial as it may be and it may continue to be. I think those of us who are assigned to the organization have a clear idea of what our mission is and the expectations that are placed on us by our government. We have been very busy organizing ourselves and filling out our structure so that we have people in places where they are needed with skill sets that are needed to be able to execute the mission sets that have been described for us. I would tell you that part of the discussion about AFRICOM is: Why now? What's it going to do? I think the advantage for those of us who are here today of being part of this get together is to do that first part of public diplomacy, and that's listening.

Last night, Ambassador Yates talked about getting it right. Well we're all about getting it right, but whether we get it right the first time or

not is open for discussion. We're not overly sensitive to criticism and in fact if it's constructive, and it makes sense, and it's something we should do, we certainly want to hear and want to act on things that seem to make sense. There's been a lot of talk here about listening to the Africans. Well we need to listen to the Africans but we also need to listen to the Americans. For that matter we need to listen to the French, and the Germans, and all of our other friends and allies. We also need to listen to our own leadership. We need to listen to our Congress. We need to listen to our business leaders. We need to listen to those people who are in leadership positions in international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and faith-based organizations, because all of these organizations, and agencies, and departments have a role in what we are trying to do as a government in Africa. Our boss, General Ward—you've heard him described here a couple of times and everything that's been said about him is true. He's charismatic, he's dedicated, he's passionate, he's open. And he's very clear about how he wants us to move forward to accomplish this mission. He sees it as a long-term mission as I think we all do. This is a generational rather than a one-budget-year, or a five-budget-year, or one- or two-presidential-term project. This is something that the United States government is taking on with its eyes open and we'll try various means to harness the capabilities of the departments and agencies of our government, to bring to bear those skills and those capabilities that are required to build capacity in the nations of Africa.

The first thing you must know about our approach to this is we will do nothing that does harm to any existing program. Our goal is to add value to those activities that are currently underway not only by the United States government but those positive activities that are making a positive difference for the nations, and the peoples, and the leaders of Africa by our allies and friends—organizations, nations, others who are basically stakeholders and who are interested in seeing progress among the nations of the African continent. So our role in the public diplomacy aspect of our government's effort to enter into this activity is going to center around the programs that we will be in support of. Those programs are mostly under the supervision of the Department of State. There was a lot of talk in the previous panel about who has responsibility for what. We do not intend to usurp any of those authorities. We do not intend to take over any of those missions. We intend, however, to bring those capabilities of the Defense Department that when needed, that when they can add value to an existing program to try to make those programs better, to evaluate, to help measure the effectiveness, to help change those programs so they will be more effective and perhaps to

make recommendations about which of these programs are sustainable and which are not from our point of view.

When it comes down to what we are going to do and what we are going to be expected to do, I would tell you that it's to support programs that are ongoing, to do no harm to those things, to add value to everything we engage ourselves with from the standpoint of what capabilities the Department of Defense can bring to those activities to improve them, to improve the service, to improve the speed with which the service is provided, to help evaluate the effectiveness of the service and bring those things forward.

The other thing that is in our charter, is to go nowhere where we are not invited. The great debate about building Fort Bragg, North Carolina, or Fort Benning, Georgia, or Fort Hood, Texas somewhere on the African continent is really sort of wasted breath. Our intent was never to put forces, or bases, or garrisons on the continent of Africa. We are willing to have a presence if we are invited to have a presence. That presence would be for some good, for a purpose. For example, those of you who followed our initial structural conversation know that we talked about putting some sort of integration teams on the ground distributed regionally with five of the economic communities that are organized under the AU. The question is, what would these organizations do? In one iteration, these would be organizations of a combination of military and representatives of the departments and agencies of the government that were organized for a particular function—for example, maritime security. It would make great sense then to put a capability that could help improve maritime security, maritime awareness and capacity—for example, in the Gulf of Guinea. To help those countries improve their capability and capacity. They are not the same thing. You have a capability to do something but it may be so small that you can't do it effectively. So you must grow that capability to give you the capacity to deal with the size of the problem that you are facing.

There are other functions that might be included in a regional presence, a regional office, or some other kind of a construct. If it's in another part of the continent, we look at regional challenges and perhaps put our interagency organization on the ground to help deal with those. They could be long-term organizations or they could be there until the problem becomes fixed. The problem becomes fixed when those nations that we are assisting are capable and have the capacity to do what it is that the original organization was placed on the ground to do.

I would say, in summary, that our approach to public diplomacy in terms of the missions that we have been given as a military organization will be seen in the programs that we support and how successful they

are. General Ward sometimes talks about it using military terminology, where we talk about engaging, we talk many times about maneuver, and firepower. The analogy that he likes to use sometimes is that programs are our virtual maneuver and strategic communications are our weapons systems. We envision ourselves not talking about things until we've done some of those things and then telling people that we did them and how we did them. So we are turning the wheel a little bit. Rather than making promises and being watched and scrutinized, we will quietly go about our business and as our programs achieve levels of success, begin to talk about how and why so that others will be enabled.

The last thing I would say about this, is that we see our success as AFRICOM in how well we are able to support and enable the other players and actors and stakeholders in doing what they are doing to help the nations of Africa move forward into the future.

**NICHOLAS CULL:** So you're talking about the public diplomacy of the deed?

**MAJOR GENERAL HERBERT L. ALTSHULER:** Absolutely. I would just quote the motto of the Twenty-second Infantry Regiment that is very simple but I think very demonstrative of how we see AFRICOM: deeds not words.

**AMBASSADOR MARK BELLAMY:** Thank you, Nick, for your definition of public diplomacy. I had scrawled on a piece of paper earlier, what is it after all that we are talking about? Public diplomacy: how does it differ from strategic communications and so on and so forth? That's a good definition. We still pay the price from when we sacrificed an active public diplomacy program and began the process of demolishing USIA. In the early 1990s there began the process of closing libraries overseas, slashing programs, shedding staff, leading eventually by the end of the decade, to shoveling what remained of the USIA into the State Department, a State Department that wasn't prepared to accept or utilize the USIA. I recall the big debates about integration being mostly about where can we get them some office space and something to do? That was a strategic blunder, one of the great strategic blunders probably that we have committed in the post-World War II era. It's a legacy that we are living with today. We lost a great deal of our vitality and creativity and credibility when we got rid of USIA, and we have not recovered.

One of the great strengths of USIA was its quasi-independence as a government agency. We all knew that USIA officers were Foreign Service Officers and that they were paid in the same way and trained

in the same way that other Foreign Service Officers were. However, as a practical matter there was always a bit of separation. Sometimes it was a physical distance, more often it was a spiritual distance that USIA maintained. That enabled that agency to project an image of the United States, to run cultural programs, educational programs, broadcasting programs in ways that were seen as not shrink-wrapping U.S. policy with a stamp of the State Department on it. That greatly contributed to the credibility of our public diplomacy efforts at that time. By the same token, this distance that USIA was able to maintain meant that it was able to receive a little more clearly signals from overseas about how the U.S. was viewed. The USIA played the role of an antenna receiving those signals and interpreting them for the rest of government.

We have a legacy that we are trying to overcome. The question that this panel was asked to address was what should the military, or specifically what should AFRICOM, be doing to fill that void? A good question. To respond, first is that it will not be the job of AFRICOM or DOD to have to develop or explain or justify U.S. policy to foreign audiences—U.S. policy generally or U.S. policy on Africa. That will of course be the job of the president, the National Security Council, the Secretary of State, ambassadors, and embassies. AFRICOM and DOD will of course have a voice and will be exponents of policy, but AFRICOM will not have to develop and disseminate that message. It goes without saying that whatever we say about U.S. policy overseas about what we intend to do in order to achieve our goals or to advance our interests has to be said with one voice. That's an easy thing to say but not always easy to achieve in practice. In some ways the U.S. government lags well behind other governments in being able to achieve that unity of message.

The main communication task, the main public diplomacy task that AFRICOM is going to face for the next year or so is really going to be one of explaining its mission not only to African audiences, to foreign audiences, but in some cases explaining that to audiences at home, to congressional and other audiences as well.

Up to this point, I think it is fair to say there has been a great deal of skepticism and misapprehension in regard to AFRICOM's mission in Africa and elsewhere. We've heard a lot of speculation about how AFRICOM's real mission is to counter growing Chinese influence in Africa, or how it's going to help us secure energy supplies from West Africa, or how it's going to help us to go into Muslim communities in Africa and convince people to surrender their sons and daughters to American military justice. The fact that these fears are exaggerated, the fact that these worries are somewhat outlandish, shouldn't lead us to simply dismiss them. We need to listen to these concerns and register

them as expressions of a deeper mistrust of what our U.S. motives and particularly U.S. military motives are in Africa. To some extent we have tried to offset those concerns by stressing this soft power preventive agenda. In some of the earlier iterations AFRICOM was presented as something radically new, as something entirely novel, as an experiment in the application of soft power and of whole-of-government approaches to a particular geographic region. That explanation, which was meant to be reassuring, has also triggered a whole separate set of concerns within the U.S. government and places like the State Department, USAID, and others about whether the DOD was proposing to get out of its lane and take over activities that belonged to other agencies of government. It has provoked some concern in the NGO community about DOD coming in and perhaps crowding NGOs out of the humanitarian and development space that they occupy in Africa. Our early efforts in promoting AFRICOM have also elicited a second set of concerns and worries.

I think AFRICOM is at a point where it's best to start de-dramatizing its mission. If I read it correctly, and if I listen to AFRICOM proponents today, I think that is in fact what is happening under General Ward's guidance. I'm hearing an emphasis on getting more back to basics, to the core business of what DOD does best. If we are able to frame it as a long overdue and logical reorganization of the U.S. government, particularly DOD, as it does business in Africa, that will be positive. It will also be positive for those of us who've worked on African issues for a long time and can remember the 1990s when it was almost impossible to mobilize DOD responses to crises in Africa largely as a result of the experience in Somalia. It ought to enable us to tell a very positive story today about how the setting up of AFRICOM will mobilize and focus more U.S. attention on Africa and bring more resources to bear in solving African problems, which is a big advance over where we were a decade ago.

The public diplomacy message of AFRICOM could be enhanced by stressing the fact that we are going to do a number of traditional things in Africa in terms of our security and military-to-military relationships. But because of AFRICOM we are going to be able to do those things in a more coherent, more systematic, better organized, and a better resourced fashion. By that I mean that we are going to be working with African military organizations to help them professionalize, to help them become more competent and carry out the responsibilities that are given to them by their governments, to make them more cognizant of the need to respect civilian authority, and to enable them to do things like respond to disasters and to carry out nontraditional roles, which in many African countries it is sometimes only the military that can do that.

So, basically I would argue that AFRICOM will be on surer ground over the next year or two by de-dramatizing the experimental nature of its mission, and by returning to basics, and by explaining how we are going to do traditional things in a much more effective fashion. I think there also needs to be a public diplomacy effort directed domestically here at home. One reason for that is that I don't know what the actual figure is for the establishment of AFRICOM. How much money is this costing? General, you can correct me if I'm wrong but I've been told five to six billion dollars in costs for setting up this new command and effecting the transfer from CENTCOM and from EUCOM and so forth. Whether it's five billion or six billion or whether it's three billion, the figures that are being cited are pretty large. When you talk about maybe 1,600 in terms of the headquarters staff, that is small by DOD standards, but it's gigantic by everybody else's standards. When you talk about those numbers and then, by the way, our total security assistance budget for Africa is only \$250 million and that's mostly out of the State Department, someone is bound to ask the question why are we spending all this money? Why are we going through these reorganizational acrobatics when our programmatic budget for Africa is miniscule? We may be spending ten times more money on getting organized to do business in Africa with a budget for doing business that is very small indeed. I think we need to be prepared to deal with that imbalance. One way to do that is to better resource the State Department and other agencies in ways that the DOD can work with them. I think that that's going to be one of the tasks in justifying the AFRICOM concept here at home.

**ABIODUN WILLIAMS:** I would like to start off with some general observations. The first is that, particularly after listening to the discussion we've had last night and this morning, it is an inescapable reality that our relationship with Africa is still at the stage where we continue to speak in broad generalizations about a continent that is four times the size of the continental United States and includes a country, the Congo, which is the size of Europe, and Nigeria, a country of 130 million people. The fact that AFRICOM ironically has a continental perspective is not helping to view a continent that is very diverse and very different. It is essential that AFRICOM's activities, particularly its public diplomacy approach, reflect the complexities of a diverse continent: fifty-three countries of various sizes, different societies.

The second point is that this is critical because if you do not understand the diverse nature of the continent it is difficult to appreciate that impressions of AFRICOM vary greatly throughout the continent and

within individual countries. AFRICOM needs to gain a comprehensive understanding of these perceptions.

The third point is to underline a point that Ambassador Mary Yates made yesterday, which is that one of the enduring problems in relating to the U.S.'s engagement with Africa over the years has been the lack of a long-term and sustained commitment. Many African allies have viewed, to speak frankly, the U.S. as unreliable—that it will cut and run at the first sign of difficulty and pressure. The creation of AFRICOM is at least an indication that this might be changing.

Before you can conceptually think about the scope of one's activities you have to ask the question: should you be involved in public diplomacy as a starting point? It is important that the military generally and AFRICOM specifically should be involved in public diplomacy for a number of reasons.

The first is, with all due respect to diplomats, public diplomacy is too important to be left entirely to non-military agencies. The military's actions impact other countries, which can provoke positive or negative reactions. Therefore, the military cannot afford to ignore public diplomacy or treat it as an afterthought. I make this point based on my experience in three peacekeeping missions: in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Macedonia, and in Haiti. Based on that experience in the field at the operational level, the lines dividing public diplomacy from military missions are not as clear as the bureaucratic lines in Washington, which is another reason that I think the military has to pay attention to this. In the case of AFRICOM there is a specific imperative why public diplomacy will be critical because it will be operating in an environment of skepticism and suspicion. Given the skepticism and suspicion it is essential that AFRICOM take public diplomacy seriously. What Africans think of AFRICOM is important. Public opinion in African countries will be a powerful force that will help or impede AFRICOM's mission.

AFRICOM needs to engage, not only with governments but with NGOs, with civil society, and the media. Public diplomacy by its very nature is a vital tool that allows you to engage with very diverse elements within society. For those compelling reasons I think the answer to the question, should AFRICOM be involved in public diplomacy?—is yes.

It is important to understand what public diplomacy cannot do, before addressing what it can and should do and the scope of the activities. There are three essential things that public diplomacy and AFRICOM's public diplomacy cannot do and shouldn't aspire to do. The first is public diplomacy cannot substitute for clear strategic goals. Clarity of mission is essential. Part of the difficulties that we've had in the last several months and in the last year, is that AFRICOM has been working through



trying to find out and clarify what essentially its mission is going to be and what it will actually accomplish. It is imperative and it is important because if you do not know what it is you want to do, it might end up somewhere else. So it cannot be a substitute for clear strategic goals.

The second point is that it cannot substitute for a lack of coherence and a unity of effort in implementing U.S. security policies and programs. If the implementation is weak, if it is not coherent, and there is no unity of effort in implementation, public diplomacy is not going to fix that. So the strategic goals have to be clear. The mission has to be clear. The implementation has to be sound. Public diplomacy cannot fix problems at the implementation level.

The third point is that public diplomacy cannot replace the political will that will be required for AFRICOM to succeed, and the political will that will be required to ensure the sustained and steady engagement without which success will be impossible. We will need political will on the part of whichever administration takes office next January. You also need political will on the part of Congress to give the requisite political and, of course, requisite financial support to Africa. Public diplomacy cannot substitute in the absence of that political will.

Those are three clear things that it cannot do and it cannot fix at the strategic level, the operational implementation level, and the political level. Having said that, let me say now what it can do and what it should aspire to do. It is critical that it should help to shape the strategic communications environment on the continent in which AFRICOM is going to operate. In trying to do so, it cannot merely be reactive. It has to be proactive. In trying to shape it you have to use certain key tools, one of which is listening. Listen carefully. It also means understanding what is going on on the continent. Those will be key in trying to shape the strategic environment.

The second objective of public diplomacy is what we've heard already about the widespread misconceptions about AFRICOM and about its mission. Public diplomacy has to endeavor to reduce those misperceptions and those misunderstandings of the mission that complicate relations between the United States and Africa—misperceptions about the militarization of foreign policy, the militarization of assistance, misconceptions about whether this is motivated to counter China's influence. All of those issues which have come up will also need to be addressed and also the great suspicion that the United States will withdraw at the first sign of problems. AFRICOM must be perceived, if it's going to be successful, as an organization that addresses African issues as fully as it does United States interests.

The third point is that it must attempt to manage the expectations of the command; that AFRICOM will provide no quick fixes and it is not going to be a silver bullet. So you are not going to have quick fixes; you have to manage expectations.

The fourth point is that even as we think about the scope of AFRICOM's public diplomacy activities at the outset, we have to bear in mind that the scope and nature of its public diplomacy activities, indeed its activities more generally, will change over time. It will not be static. Africa is a dynamic continent. The security environment in which AFRICOM will operate will evolve. Public diplomacy will have to respond to the changing circumstances and changing situation.

**NICHOLAS CULL:** I have a question for each of the panelists. I want to ask Buz specifically if he could talk about how he himself negotiates the boundary between psychological operations and public diplomacy. Under the umbrella of psychological operations you have military support for public diplomacy and things that are very much out in the open, but in public perception there are also covert abilities within your capabilities. How do you avoid the well-meaning intention of the military somehow calling into question the credibility of American public diplomacy? How do you walk that line?

**MAJOR GENERAL HERBERT L. ALTSHULER:** Let me say something about how I define psychological operations. Specifically we look at that capability as a function that uses information, true information, in such a way that we create a message crafted specifically for a particular target audience with the attempt of influencing their attitudes and behavior. There is nothing nefarious about that. In business that's called advertising.

**NICHOLAS CULL:** What do you do about the reputation that psyops has?

**MAJOR GENERAL HERBERT L. ALTSHULER:** We are not conducting psychological operations at AFRICOM. We do have information operations capabilities. The U.S. military has military information support teams in various places around the world, in our embassies helping our chiefs of missions and ambassadors to craft messages that they think are important to further their programs within that country to various target audiences within the nation. This is really not psychological operations in its popular definition. What we are doing in terms of public diplomacy is, as I said earlier, conducting missions, programs, activities, and exercises to support those ongoing programs of our government that are assisting

African nations to solve their problems. From the military standpoint our military-to-military activities are all about improving the quality of the security sector, professionalizing militaries through training young soldiers—training non-commissioned officers to be effective, training officers to lead properly, training the entire force to understand that it is subordinate to civilian authority, putting professionalism and integrity into the ranks so that the militaries of these countries will become well-respected institutions of their government, respected by their people, respected by their neighbors, and respected by other nations in the world. If we are using “advertising technique,” if we are focusing our message to specific places and specific people to try to convince them to act in a certain way or to behave in a certain way that is beneficial to their organization, or to their government, or to their mission then, yes, you could say that we are using influence. But the techniques that we use normally at a tactical level for disseminating these messages are not things that we plan to deploy in our public diplomacy program.

**NICHOLAS CULL:** Thank you. Mark, you were an ambassador in Kenya. How do you think that having AFRICOM would have helped? Were there times when you were sitting there with your big desk with a big flag at the corner of it thinking if only there was an AFRICOM, if only I had this resource? Or is this not something that you would have wished for?

**AMBASSADOR MARK BELLAMY:** If only there were an AFRICOM it could have helped the CGTFOA figure out its mission. My experience as an ambassador in Kenya is not unlike the experience of other ambassadors who have relationships with military command. Much of the relationship that I had with the military command that was there had to do with trying to work together to calibrate our activities to make sure that we were on the same page, and not getting in each other's way, not sending conflicting messages. Had AFRICOM existed I'm quite convinced that there was more that we could have done to prepare the Kenyan military and other militaries there to help them carry out the missions that their governments had assigned to them. There is more that we could have done to prepare for the kinds of natural disasters, or man-made disasters, or humanitarian emergencies that we know that we are going to see in that part of Africa, but for which nevertheless we know that we are not fully prepared or integrated as a government. I think that this is one area where AFRICOM can bring real value-added to Africa and to the State Department. The answer to your question is yes, there is more that we could have done with an active and fully developed Africa Command. It's not clear to me that there was a lot more to do in the area of increased

development activity. That's another subject that perhaps we could address later in the day.

**NICHOLAS CULL:** Abi, we've heard a lot about military-to-military relations and military-to-military as a form of public diplomacy. But you talked about the need to reach out to African civil society. How would you suggest AFRICOM go about doing its outreach to African civil society?

**ABIODUN WILLIAMS:** Let me go back to a point that Mark Bellamy made at the outset. He was saying that the students were trying to see the exact stage at which the term public diplomacy came into being. In fact, it's of an even earlier vintage than the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. The first record of it, which is interesting as we talk about Africa and AFRICOM now, was by Ed Guillion who was the dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, who had been ambassador in Zaire and Congo—whichever name you wish. He used it when the Fletcher School in the sixties was starting up the Ed Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy. That is the earliest record that we have of the term being used, coming out of his own experience in Africa.

To the question as to how AFRICOM would reach out to African civil society, the first point that I would make is that AFRICOM would have to communicate its mission in a way that does not breed resentment. The manner in which it engages with civil society has to be in a way that does not breed resentment.

The second point is one that General Ward makes quite effectively, that AFRICOM is going to add real value to what the U.S. is doing in Africa. It would be essential that in reaching out to civil society on the continent AFRICOM should explain how exactly AFRICOM will add this real value to African security. Just asserting it would not be compelling. You have to explain how exactly you are going to do it. AFRICOM must stress that it has a role in building effective security mechanisms that are going to be beneficial to African countries. But you have to explain exactly what this means not just assert it.

**NICHOLAS CULL:** Thank you. May I throw this open to the floor?

**AMBASSADOR BRUCE GELB (FROM THE AUDIENCE):** I have a dual question. The first part is, with Mr. Moi in charge of Kenya do you really think he would have been open to anything that AFRICOM were to suggest? The second one is for Mr. Williams. What kind of outreach would you recommend that would be effective in Africa?

**AMBASSADOR MARK BELLAMY:** Would Daniel arap Moi have been open to AFRICOM? I think he would have been, and I think his calculation would have been how much am I going to get out of this? The calculation for us would have been, how much of this can we stand? I think that's probably the kind of question that we'll face in other African governments as well.

**ABIODUN WILLIAMS:** One of the positive trends in Africa over the last fifteen years is the increasing importance of civil society on the continent. This change has been quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative, because we have an increasing number of groups on the continent, and qualitative because they are now interested in advocating on a whole range of policy issues not just narrow issues of community development. They are interested in political change, in democratization, in security. Bringing in civil society groups, getting their input into what AFRICOM is doing, getting their input into potential activities that AFRICOM is thinking about at the time when these activities are being planned is functional. It becomes dysfunctional when the activities are formulated and then you reach back to civil society. It is much better to bring them in when you are thinking about formulating the activity. So that would be one concrete way one would reach out to them.

**SARAH GRAHAM:** I was intrigued by the word "scope." This is something that academics can hold on to and start unpacking, leaving behind some of the ambiguities of what AFRICOM is trying to achieve. If we can start identifying some public diplomacy interests that AFRICOM has, we can start identifying what some of the opportunities on the ground are to start getting some progress. My question is, we haven't heard about PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] or the other commands. What can PACOM tell us about the scope for effective public diplomacy in this context?

**MAJOR GENERAL HERBERT L. ALTSHULER:** If you are speaking specifically about those programs in Africa that are currently under the supervision and realm of responsibility of PACOM or CENTCOM, those programs will continue. If you are addressing those programs that PACOM conducts in their principal AOR in northeast Asia and Southeast Asia and so forth, I think what you'd have to look at is that PACOM has been in this business a very long time. Their AOR, with the possible exception of the Koreas, is fairly tame at this point. Their greatest challenge is natural disaster. Where is the Pacific Command involved in supporting those types of programs? We have looked at that, and I have a little experience operating in PACOM. They do a great deal of disaster preparedness

work. They do assessments, they do exercises that we call tabletops—scenario-driven seminars where actors, and stakeholders, and responders come together in a particular area and discuss how they would respond to a disaster of some sort. Another disaster strikes in the AOR and you are off and running. Those training opportunities go a long way to commit us and our friends and allies in the region to being able to prepare for and respond to those types of activities.

**AMBASSADOR MARK BELLAMY:** Partly in response to this question and partly in response to something Buz said earlier about value added, is the need to continue to ask ourselves about what is the value added of Africa Command. Looking at other commands and looking at our past experience in Africa, we'll see that in some cases in civilian activities that the U.S. government has carried out in Africa, we tend to go in, we try to build something, we try to train a few people, we turn it over, and we leave.

Africa is littered with boats that aren't being used, equipment that has fallen into disuse, buildings that have been abandoned. No sustainability. This has been a general problem but it has also been a problem specific to our military engagement in Africa. Part of that has been because Africa has been second priority for most of these military commands. If EUCOM, or PACOM, or CENTCOM has other requirements then Africa is going to be last on their list of places to go to. I think that one of the messages of AFRICOM can be that we'll be back. We will be back and this will be sustainable. Although AFRICOM will be carrying out traditional missions in Africa but on a bigger scale, one of the big differences will be continuity and sustainability.

**PHILIP MORGAN:** My question is for Ambassador Bellamy. I'd like you to elaborate a little bit more on your reference that somehow AFRICOM de-dramatize itself, that it needs to find ways to cause Africans to be less nervous about whatever they think AFRICOM may be. You referenced that perhaps the DOD should get back to basics, and that it should get back to doing what DOD does. Would you elaborate a little bit on some examples of what you mean by that? Normally we think of the DOD doing military things. So what exactly would de-dramatize the military image of AFRICOM in the minds of Africans?

**AMBASSADOR MARK BELLAMY:** When I talked about de-dramatizing I was referring to some of the earlier statements and arguments that came out when this idea was first surfacing, shortly after President Bush said we need to create this new command. You heard a number of things

ranging from we're going to build schools; we're going to run girls' education projects; we're going to deliver services; we're going to carry out a range of developmental activities. A lot of this was speculative and experimental but I think that the idea that this new command in Africa was going to go off and sort of haphazardly apply lessons learned in counterinsurgency situations in Afghanistan and Iraq to peacetime situations in Africa, that for many people suggested a radical departure from the DOD norm in Africa. That caused concern not only in African audiences but in our government as well. This may be a bit of a caricature on my part but that's what I was referring to. General Ward and his team have done an admirable job in the past couple of months refocusing what they hope the AFRICOM mission will be. It's interesting that so many of the questions and the old perceptions persist. So much of the discourse now is about what AFRICOM is not going to be. It really does remind us of how important first impressions are and how lasting first impressions are.

When I talked about traditional functions I outlined a few of them. There are a lot of peacetime missions that DOD has conducted in Africa and elsewhere. These include civic action programs, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response. But most importantly they cover a range of training, exercising, and capacity building with African militaries. My argument is that there's a lot we can do there. There's a lot that we can do better and more coherently, and better resourced in a more sustainable way without becoming overly experimental and alarming different constituencies about what our real aims are.

**ABIODUN WILLIAMS:** One of the distinguishing characteristics of AFRICOM in relation to the other commands is that we have for the first time a preventive mandate. As to the question related to adding value, AFRICOM has to figure out where exactly in terms of the levels of prevention it's going to focus on to have this added value. You see what I mean? Because prevention really works at different levels. You have an operational level for prevention. The strategic objective there is to halt escalation, for example. So are you going to work at the operational level for prevention and look at activities of that level? That's the level where diplomatically you would put in good offices and mediation, the sort of thing that Kofi Annan is doing in Kenya. That is also the level more robustly where you would find the preventive deployment of troops, the sort of thing that happened in Macedonia, the first place in the Balkans where U.S. ground troops were actually deployed. That's the operational level.

Is it going to move to another level, which is the structural level? The strategic goal there is to alter the structural conditions which lead to conflict. This is the kind of level that USAID, for example, works at in terms of the use of development assistance.

Then you have the third level of prevention which is a more systemic level because we have recognized in recent years that we have focused a lot on the operational and the structural level. For example, in the African case we know if you look at Sierra Leone and Congo you see the impact of conflict diamonds. You see the impact of extractive resources on conflict. You also see now in West Africa the increasing role of narcotics trafficking and many of those countries in West Africa not having the capacity to monitor their maritime waters. Thirdly, Africa is awash with small arms and light weapons. We have to find a way of handling that. It's all well and good if one has a preventive mandate but how do you actually implement that mandate? How do you actually give life to that mandate in concrete ways? This is something that the mission will have to do.

**ALISHA RYU:** I'm the East African bureau chief for the Voice of America Radio. I just arrived here from Kenya two days ago specifically to attend this because I think it's a very important discussion that we are having. A lot of things that I've heard here are a little bit off the reality of what I see on the ground as a reporter. I spent the last one and a half years in Mogadishu talking to clan elders, talking to people about what's happening. What I hear from them and what I hear from scholarly discussions—there's a disconnect. What I wanted to ask about the new AFRICOM concerns having access on the ground to places like Somalia where you have to have some people going in there to see what's going on and not just rely on state-to-state reports or even civil societies. I'm sure you'll agree that that kind of information can be manipulated. That's very important for the Horn of Africa right now because I believe that it is close to being a complete al Qaeda haven. When you need crucial information how do you intend to do that with this kind of emphasis on security? You can't send personnel into places like Mogadishu because there is that security problem. Where are you going to be able to get that information that you need that is realistic and reliable?

**MAJOR GENERAL HERBERT L. ALTSHULER:** Let's make sure that we understand that even with all the things we've said about AFRICOM being preventive and being soft power, it is still a military command. General Ward still has Title 10 responsibilities. We will still maintain the capability to use military action when required. That decision is made at



levels of authority well above us. With respect to gathering intelligence or gathering information, we will continue to do it the way we normally do it. We have the authority to put people on the ground. Other agencies of the government have different authorities to put people on the ground. Within our headquarters we are building an intelligence directorate. We are calling it intelligence and knowledge development because one of the key things to us is not so much the order of battle of the adversary but it's the kinds of things that you refer to, the mood of the people. Many of you may have heard of this new concept of mining the human terrain or human intelligence.

We've learned this lesson in Afghanistan and Iraq. We have now created things we call human intelligence teams. Two or three people who interact with the people on the ground in the streets very much like you have, asking questions, coming back for visits, establishing rapport and relationships to find out not so much where all the bad guys are but how the people in the community feel about the bad guys. How do they feel about the good guys? What do they think needs to be done? What are the solutions to their particular problems? What kinds of engagement activities and soft power activities would discourage the young people in their region, or in their village, or in their town from picking up an AK47 and joining some militant group? The methods are pretty much the same. But we've refocused on the value of human intelligence, which people like you are so good at doing. How that will play out, how we'll organize that, how we'll enter some of these areas where we don't have a great deal of freedom of movement, how we will protect those people who do that are all part of a strategic and operational plan on how we will gather information. A good bit of that will have to be done under the authorities of the chiefs of mission. We're not going anyplace the ambassador doesn't want us to go unless it's an area where we are actually engaged in some sort of conflict where the authority falls to the combatant commander as opposed to the chief of mission.

**ALISHA RYU:** I'm in the business of just telling what the story is. A lot of times that gets me into trouble because it comes into conflict with what the U.S. is actually supporting. As a VOA person, sometimes people look at me very funny and say, how does that work? And I say my job as a reporter is to tell the truth about what is going on. I'll give you Somalia as an example. One of the things that is radicalizing the Somalis right now is our support of a transitional federal government that has absolutely no credibility in Somalia. As long as we continue to support a government that has no grassroots support we will be seen as a government that pushes an agenda because it fits our goals rather than

the Somalis' goals. That goes as an extension to Ethiopia as well. When you get that kind of information will AFRICOM have the power to then recommend a policy change? Or say we need to go in another direction because the information that we are getting on the ground is something very different than we hoped it would be?

**MAJOR GENERAL HERBERT L. ALTSHULER:** The operative word is "recommend." General Ward reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. Information that reaches him about these situations that you talk about that is corroborated or that is even surmised may spark our gut feeling. If he feels that this is important and a policy change should be considered, he certainly has the authority to do that and to do it at the highest levels. As a four-star commander who reports directly to the Secretary of Defense, his next level of report is the Commander in Chief. He has the access and in this particular case, General Ward certainly has the passion and he has the courage. As to how that works out in terms of a methodology or how we do it structurally, or how this information is corroborated, he's going to rely on a lot on people like you who continue to tell the story.

**NICHOLAS CULL:** One of the fundamental problems within public diplomacy is that the best listening in the world is of no use unless it's connected into the policy process. This has been the problem for public diplomacy in the United States as far back as 1947 and the National Security Acts and right when they decided who would have access to the NSC. That's never really been fixed.

**AMBASSADOR MARK BELLAMY:** That problem is compounded in this specific case by the fact that we don't have an embassy in Mogadishu. Nobody has an embassy in Mogadishu. By definition everything we learn is second-hand. That puts you in a hole to begin with. That's part of the problem. Another related danger is that you end up in a situation where different U.S. government agencies are listening in their own way. You may have the task force in Djibouti saying, we'd like to send a few guys into Somaliland to pick up information. You may have the CIA saying we'd like to send some people into Mogadishu. You may have USAID saying we've got some projects so we think we can safely go in and gather some information. You get different USG agencies that are trying to gather this information and triangulate it without it necessarily being coordinated because there is no embassy and they are using it to promote whatever bureaucratic agenda they might have. Somalia is a very special case in that way.

**CAROLA WEIL:** Picking up on several comments made this last round but also earlier about the implicit premise of public diplomacy, there is the issue of consensus. It seems to underline the driving mechanism behind AFRICOM that we will not go in anywhere where we are not invited is, I think, the language you used. This raises a specific question. Whose consent? In situations such as Somalia where you might not have a legitimate government, in situations such as Sudan where you may not have a civilian authority, in situations of peacetime where you have burgeoning civil society that may in fact be oppositional to its government, who do you listen to? Not to mention all the domestic audiences that Mark Bellamy pointed out.

**ABIODUN WILLIAMS:** It's an important question and it is one that has bedeviled not only bilateral relations but also the United Nations, if you think about peacekeeping and the evolution of peacekeeping operations. In the first generation of peacekeeping, the first forty-five years, certainly until the end of the Cold War, the consent of the government was always one of the conditions for the deployment of peacekeeping troops or at least the consent of the two warring factions. But of course there are times when, as you rightly say, there is no government to give consent or sometimes you go in and you have shifting alliances and shifting factions. So what do you do in that situation? From my own experience it is one of those issues that is dissatisfying to theorists, as one who has lived in both worlds, because you can't really generalize in terms of a principle that will guide you. You can look at a specific case and then it is always a coalescence of the interests of the key players both within the country and within the region, and of course ultimately the permanent members of the Security Council as to whether this effort is going to be a coalition of the willing mandated by the Security Council, or it's going to be another operation. If you think about Kosovo, the reality of that time was that there was no Security Council authorization because you wouldn't get one because of the Russians. It's one of those situations where you can't have a general principle which is going to guide you. You have to look at the particular case and then decide what you do. But it's a very difficult problem because operationally when you have no government, you have shifting factions, and they may not necessarily want you to be there. It makes it extremely difficult to implement the mandate that you have.

**MAJOR GENERAL HERBERT L. ALTSHULER:** The only thing I would have to add to that is if we're on the verge of a kinetic activity or operation,

then the final consent for us is the Commander in Chief. If the president decides that, we as the military need to go someplace and do something, then we'll do it. There are other authorities, the United Nations, in Africa the AU, the economic communities, all of whom are concerned with security matters. We could be invited to bring a military force to train, to act, to demonstrate, perhaps to operate by a head of state, by the Department of Defense based on the advice or request of the ambassador if we have one, or by the President's decision that this is something we need to do.



## **Luncheon Speaker:**

Soft Power, Hard Power, Smart Power—Lessons for AFRICOM  
Dean Ernest J. Wilson, III, USC Annenberg School for  
Communication

**ERNEST J. WILSON, III:** I want to talk a little bit about hard power, soft power, smart power. Then I want to suggest a few things that smart power might teach us about AFRICOM and then a few things that AFRICOM might teach us about smart power.

AFRICOM is hugely important both to those of us who care about the continent of Africa: 900 million people, of growing importance to America because of raw materials, because of terrorism, other national strategic concerns, pandemics. It is also important, and I want to underline this, for what the United States and, by extension, other nations choose to do with their power. The notion of an experiment has been laid before you at this conference. One way to think about AFRICOM is as a bold experiment in a new way of organizing internally within DOD but also organizing in a more networked, external way with other agencies of government, and also with NGOs and the private sector in the United States, in Europe, and certainly in Africa. That's a pretty complicated agenda, trying to do all that. On the military side, the notion of a revolution in military affairs is a very robust, well-accepted concept in war-fighting and in strategy. Similar notions of globalization exist on the civilian side or non-governmental side. These things are forcing us to think about public diplomacy in ways that we did not think about it before—public diplomacy as soft power, and more generally.

Why are we interested in public diplomacy and soft power these days? Let me suggest a couple of reasons, especially for public diplomacy. There are both structural reasons that we are interested in it, and also what the French might call conjunctural reasons, things that just happen to be happening at this particular time.

The structural reasons are extremely important. The populations of the world are getting smarter. Democracy is spreading. If you look at GDP per capita in many nations around the world, the middle class is growing and is growing typical appetites. They want more knowledge,

more autonomy, and more information about the world unfiltered by government. The world, in a sense, is becoming smarter. With globalization, there are more transactions taking place across our borders affecting more people, moving more quickly. The world is moving away from a situation in which you had nation states operating somewhat autonomously with their own perceptions and relationships with others, to a much more networked, globalized world where what we do in Los Angeles will affect what happens in Seoul, Korea, and vice versa. And what is decided in Abuja, Nigeria about the price of oil, will affect what happens in Detroit.

We are in a world where the basic parameters are changing substantially. As a consequence, the old notions of traditional diplomacy have to go out the window. We have to think much more about public diplomacy. How do we speak directly to publics above and beyond their governments, which is how public diplomacy is partially defined.

The second reason that we are interested in public diplomacy and soft power beyond these long-term structural effects is conjunctural. The most compelling immediate reason to think about smart power is the widely perceived shortcomings of the current policies in place. These are critiques of unilateralism, hard power over soft power, speaking loudly and listening little. These are critiques that don't come from the left or the right in the United States. These are very centrist critiques that we hear. They're not just coming from the South. Our allies are complaining that the United States has been too unilateral and did not listen enough. This puts enormous burden on those of us who want to be practitioners and those of us who want to be scholars to take account of some of the short-term conjunctural issues, as well the longer-term structural issues that are pushing all actors, all nations, NGOs, and corporations to be much more sensitive to issues of soft power, listening more effectively, and public diplomacy. I was talking to a colleague from Germany who is here at the [Los Angeles] consulate, who was saying that public diplomacy is not just an issue that we're concerned about in Southern California or in Washington, but these are issues of global import.

How do we untangle these conjunctural and these structural issues to better understand soft power, hard power, smart power? I suggest we need to do it in three ways: One, we need to better understand the conceptual basis. What do we mean by soft power, smart power? I've worked enough in government and the private sector to realize that institutions matter. A lot of discussion today has been about how do we revise institutions and reform them. But a neglected topic has been politics. We can talk about institutional change but in some ways that's moving deckchairs around on the Titanic. We can talk about conceptual

issues. But conceptual clarity about institutional reform is completely insufficient if there is not political will to define what we do with the concepts and the institutions. Now this is a particularly apt moment to talk about politics. With presidential and Congressional elections coming up, this is a time of tremendous shift, potentially at least, in the political landscape of the country.

So I'd like to say something about the conceptual issues hard power, soft power and smart power, to suggest how those relate to institutional change, and to end up talking a little bit about the forbidden topic of politics.

Hard power. It's pretty clear what we mean by that: it's the power to coerce. It's the power to force other people against their will to do what you want them to do. There are instruments available to do that like economic embargos, boycotts, military intervention. That's the traditional thing that the military does. The military's mission has traditionally been what? We blow stuff up and we shoot people, hopefully for the national purpose. That's what we mean by hard power. It has particular instruments and it has particular targets.

The same thing is true about soft power. Soft power is supposed to convince people to want what you want through a variety of ways—through persuasion, they can follow your example. So what are the mechanisms for that? Traditional diplomacy, what the State Department does, what the USIA used to do. It's also what independent cultural groups do, women's organizations. They try to influence people. Universities try to do this to a certain extent. So, all these things are important. The challenge in this converging world of ours is to be smart about the use of hard power when it's necessary. And let's not be naïve; it's still a tough world out there. Sometimes you have to use hard power. But you don't want to use hard power to the exclusion of soft power. It's like trying to walk on one leg. It's doable but you don't get very far, very fast. What I call the combination of hard power and soft power is smart power.

This is a topic that has been taken up by CSIS recently.<sup>3</sup> I recommend this document to you. This is a topic that those of us here at the Annenberg School have been working on for a couple of years, trying to understand the meaning of smart power. Smart power is simply the ability to combine soft power and hard power in ways that advance one's own national or institutional purposes. Very straightforward.

Let me say something about institutions. Institutional reform is absolutely necessary for smart power to work. The principal institution for coordination and the interagency process is the National Security

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<sup>3</sup> Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye Jr., coauthors, *A Smarter, More Secure America: Report of the CSIS Commission on Smart Power*, November 6, 2007.



Council. The problem with the interagency process is that each agency has its own rules, regulations, and also its own culture. We shouldn't minimize the cultural difference between our friends at the State Department and our friends in the Defense Department, our friends in foreign ministries, and our friends in defense ministries. When you walk into the room you know which culture they're from. So what we are talking about with institutional reform is not simply a new bureau over here or an individual posted over there but it's what the Goldwater-Nickles Act tried to do years ago, which is to create an incentive structure for jointness. In the bad old days, when you went through a service—Marines, Army, Navy—you spent much of your time within that silo. As I understand the mechanisms of Goldwater-Nickles, the incentive structure was changed so you didn't get these nice things on your shoulder unless you had been able to interact closely with another service. The Joint Chiefs of Staff became very influential. They created incentives for cooperation. So it's not enough just to have a concept, "We have to cooperate," you must have incentives. In other words, you cooperate with smart power or you don't get promoted. You cooperate through the interagency process or you get fired, or even worse your budget gets cut, which is worse than death in many instances. Speaking of budget, the problem with the institutional setting is that we don't start off with a level playing field. The institutions of hard power have a lot more resources than the institutions of soft power. They have more money that is well distributed around the 50 states. This gets to the political issue. There are bases. There are hospitals. There are not U.S. embassies in the 50 states, so the constituencies really aren't there.

The other issue that I want to return to is the cultural issue. We have to find ways to make the NGOs more comfortable talking to the military, the military more comfortable talking to the universities, the universities more comfortable talking to the national security types. That doesn't come automatically. It's hard work. We have considerable clumps in both institutions that really don't want to talk to one another. A lot of the State Department, talk to the military? I don't do that. A lot of my fellow academics, talk to the military? We don't do that. Now there are those of us in this room who are sort of amphibians. We really do believe in talking across these borders, and we take it seriously. We work at it, and it is work. At the end of the day, we hope that the rules of engagement between the civil and the military, between universities and the National Security Council, or the State Department, or the intelligence agencies will be written in such ways that reflect current realities, both the opportunities and the challenges that the United States of America faces. I do want to say that these are challenges that the French face, that the

Germans face, that the Nigerians confront, South Africans, Ghanaians, etc. But this is kind of a U.S.-centric conversation, which is okay. Part of what I say is relevant for others, but there are some areas obviously where we are hugely different.

Now let me turn to the tough part, which is politics. You can have a great concept, but if it's not institutionalized it won't last, and it won't get institutionalized unless there's a political coalition and constituency to take those good ideas, embed them in institutions and then act on them. At the end of the day the effectiveness of any foreign policy is a matter of power and politics. In democracies priorities are set by elected political leaders. Smart power in foreign policy rests on politics and power as much as it draws on robust concepts and nimble institutions. By itself, a concept is just a concept. It needs political legs in order to move forward. Not surprisingly, the political asymmetries of hard power and soft power are skewed in favor of hard power.

General Eisenhower talked about the military-industrial complex. We have a situation where the allocation of military resources is pretty much allocated to all 50 of our states. Could we point to anything comparable on the soft power side? It's tough to do; it's a tough political imbalance. But if allocational decisions are based on political constituencies and alignments, then those of us who care about soft power, public diplomacy, and national security just have to confront this honestly and ask what we are going to do about this imbalance? This is very difficult for people to do inside bureaucracies. It is very difficult, and sometimes illegal, for people in DOD, and sometimes the Department of State, the Commerce Department, to get deeply engaged in these kinds of political discussions. But there are certain forms of political education that can be done. That's also the work of some of you who are sitting around these tables from non-governmental organizations, from universities, from think tanks. How do we have a discussion about the political coalition that is necessary to move from an over-reliance on hard power, to integrate that with soft power, to make it smart power?

The challenge is not just one or the other. It's how do we combine these things? I suggest to you that they will not be combined effectively, and people will not pay attention to them unless we start a political dialogue about this very important subject, which is what I think this document from CSIS is in part trying to do.

Here are a few things that might actually be done. One, we have a political campaign. It's my experience that a lot of these policies that we are talking about will get set over the next six months because the campaign teams have to prepare their candidates with something to say when they go before the cameras. Promises get made, attitudes get

shaped that ultimately will determine what an administration does once it gets into office. I had the privilege of serving in various positions in campaigns and on transition commissions. It's a lot of fun. You do politics. You meet with the candidate. You pretend to give advice. He or she pretends to listen. Great feeling of power. It's a real challenge for those of us who are foreign policy groupies because for the most part, nobody cares about your issues. This is a problem because you have the foreign policy wonks over here, and then the pollsters come in and say, "Mr. Candidate, here's what you have to do: healthcare, police, crime, abortion." Then you're knocking on the door and saying, "Please, sir, can we come in and have two minutes of your time?" Eventually you might get in to see the candidate. For those of us who care about these issues, I would strongly urge you to talk to the people you know who are giving advice to the shrinking pool of candidates and tell them that smart power is important. In the next six months a lot of these things will be set in stone.

Secondly, there are party platforms coming forward. I would strongly urge those of us who care about these issues to use what influence we have as policy wonks to influence the national platforms of our parties. Those are two short-term things that one can do. It includes op-eds, going to conferences like this, participating in the political process, voting. But this, in and of itself, is not going to work.

National security issues are ultimately defined in the medium and long term. Think tanks, interest groups, universities, must develop a coordinated strategy to better inform the American people of changes that are taking place around the globe and the options and obligations that we have to respond to those changes. I don't know particularly how to do this, but I do know that unless some of us start figuring this out, American national security interests will be ill-served.

That is a challenge that I would like to put forward. I guess my bumper sticker version of this is, "Smart power needs a smart campaign." Not a holier-than-thou campaign. Not an, "I know more than you do" campaign, but a smart campaign.

Let me conclude with a few ideas about the ways in which the smart power idea might be relevant to our topic for today, AFRICOM.

Conceptually, one has to be clear at the front end of a mission about the purposes of that mission, otherwise you will not achieve it. So, conceptual clarity is essential. Mission clarity, strategic clarity is equally important.

Second, institutional reform is obviously necessary among all the players. I know of some NGOs that are creating military liaisons to

better interface with the military forces, either local or international, because they realize it is so important.

A quick footnote here: the institutional environment is changing radically. It's becoming less hierarchical and more distributed. As we think about these organizational forms we have to get away from thinking that every organization in the world looks like this. The internet, blogs, other forms of new media, are mediating the world. They are changing radically the way that organizations operate and are shaped. So, as we think about institutional reform, let's look ahead twenty years to the flattening of organizations, the disappearance of other organizations, our ability to have virtual meetings when we are spread around the world, rather than creating organizations for the past.

It is clear, as some of you have said already, that we need to be politically astute about explaining the political message to the South Africans and the Kenyans and the Nigerians and the AU. We need to also be sophisticated and communication-sophisticated about speaking to the American people. You can set up commands and you can set up interagency taskforces, but if it all looks like just those people in Washington playing with blocks and toys and it doesn't have a constituency that is treated with respect to which these complicated issues are explained, then the sustainability that we've talked about today will not be there.

Finally, what can we learn about hard power, soft power, smart power from what's happening with AFRICOM? One is that it's hard to do. It's really hard to make these changes, to create smart institutions. I have to say that I've been skeptical of AFRICOM, as I think many people have been. I've learned more about it; I've learned a lot from today's discussion. But one of the things I've learned is how difficult it is to really get it right. Let's assume that AFRICOM is a way to do smart power, which I think that it can be. Even with good will, it's hard to do it.

Second, I think there is a challenge of mission creep. We are in a situation where one of the stories that can be told is the following one. We live in a dangerous world. Humanitarian intervention is essential. Human rights issues are very important. Someone has to do it. I think we can all agree to that. One version is that we want the State Department and AID to do it. The State Department doesn't have the manpower. They don't have the surge capacity, they don't have the numbers, and they don't have the budget. Other than that, they are perfectly prepared to do it.

They are filled with smart people who work long hours with great training. They just don't have any money, political friends, or that sort of stuff, which is a problem. So therefore, who has lift capacity, money,

surge capacity, and also has smart people who think strategically? I know. We'll ask these guys to do it. Well, that works in the short term and probably works in the medium term. But at a certain point there really is something to expertise and experience. If I want a war fought, I know where to go because people have been trained to do that. If I want a development process done, not even a process, a project, a well, I won't go to the military. I'm going to go to those overworked, underfunded people at USAID. I think that AFRICOM is making great strides. It's a great idea. It could be a blueprint for the future, but we've got to get greater equality across these institutions otherwise we risk not doing any of these things well.

What other lessons are available? Well, there are no other lessons that are available, because it hasn't started yet. Putting on my scholar-practitioner hat, I'm going to suggest that AFRICOM embed scholars and see this as a great and grand experiment in the design and exercise of U.S. foreign policy.

I thought this was a really clever idea. I talked to the General and he said, we're already doing a bit of that. He has embedded a historian, which I hate to admit as a political scientist is probably absolutely the right thing to do.

I do think that it presents a very interesting opportunity to have these kinds of conversations on a regular basis. Put in some anthropologists, some economists, and especially some communications experts, General. I think that would be extremely important. After year one, you ask, what works and what doesn't work? After year two you ask, what works and what doesn't work. Then you convene a meeting like this and say here's what we've discovered, what do you think of this evidence? What do you think of these interpretations? I think that's the way as we move across national borders, institutional borders, cultural borders, that we all develop cultural competence, the ability to understand institutional cultures and political cultures. Let me stop here for questions.

**CHARLES P. KOSAK (FROM THE AUDIENCE):** That was an excellent description of smart and hard power. As a former NSC official, you know that part of the complexity we face with Africa Command in its standup is that we are attempting to create a whole-of-government approach at the operational level. At the strategic level we're an interagency. We've had disagreements, and that's often good. It lends itself to better processes and certainly a wide array of thoughts to avoid mistakes. But do we need a national security act to create a whole-of-government approach at the strategic level, and what would it take to do that? Also, we talked a lot about political will. We as Americans are wonderfully self-critical. We

criticize ourselves all the time. Particularly the military; we're always doing lessons learned and trying to figure out what we did wrong. Part of the complexity too, you seem to be saying, with hard power is there's a political investment. There are jobs created for Americans. There are very obvious self interests that fall into that area. On soft power, as you point out, you don't really have advocates. Americans are very good in terms of reaching out to people in need, but if they perceive that the people we are reaching out to lack the political will themselves—taking on corruption, creating their own institutions, reforming their own institutions and maintaining progress in their own countries—then many Americans would perceive that providing soft power assistance is a never-ending black hole.

**ERNEST J. WILSON, III:** Absolutely. The rap on the soft power side on foreign assistance, an area that I have worked in over the years, is that it's a rat hole. We don't get our money's worth. If you ask the American people what percentage of total expenditure is dedicated to foreign assistance, what do they guess? Do you think that it's 5 percent, 10 percent, 15 percent? I wish it were. What's the real number? Less than one-fifth of one percent. Who knew? This is what leadership is supposed to do.

Leadership is supposed to operate on the borderline between possible and impossible, and translate those things which are impossible into the possible. We're curiously schizophrenic about this as Americans. On the one hand you read the Pew Polls: generosity. We believe in multilateralism. We believe that America shouldn't use military as the only response. All that goodwill is there but it has to be mobilized politically, which requires leadership taking a risk. I think part of it is that the simpler the better. I think if we don't get this right, we get blown up again. I have two kids, and they live in Washington, DC. I have a very personal reason for getting this right. I was in Washington and I remember exactly what I was doing on 9/11. I don't want that to happen again. But I'm equally convinced that if we don't get what we are talking about today right, it increases the risk of bad things happening.

On the very interesting question about the national act, let me give you my bold and risky response. Yes and no. No, because there is a lot that is already permissible about interagency work. It's an educational process. So when the leadership at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, on both sides of the aisle must sit down and wrestle with one another over how do we balance our hard power and our soft power assets, and our ability to project and deploy those assets, that's probably a good thing for the republic. Just on the educational dimension.

Second, it is now illegal to move too much money from one account to another account. It's tough to do it in the 150 account which is the State Department and embassies. It's hard to do it in DOD. Why? Is it rational? To a certain extent, but also you have chairs of committees who more and more want to protect their own turf. Jointness threatens their ability to exercise their own power. But I think we have to head that direction or else we fail.

**AMBASSADOR BRUCE GELB (FROM THE AUDIENCE):** I happened to be sitting next to Alisha Ryu, who has been back two days from Kenya. I suddenly found that I was learning more about what was going on back in the real world and about public diplomacy from about twenty minutes of talking to Alisha than a lot of what I heard today in that wonderful meeting; things that have to do with war and peace and things that have to do with solutions in Kenya. Maybe it's not necessarily a Voice of America expert who is on the ground, but we had better make sure that we get the facts and get them communicated all the way to the top of the chain, and not just spoken but understood. Half of our problem in public diplomacy is that we're not there when the decisions are made. The decisions are made and then the problem hits the fan and then public diplomacy is going to try to solve that.

**ERNEST J. WILSON, III:** There are two issues here that I think are important. One is what I call cultural competence. In some ways at the same time our society is becoming more globalized we have become increasingly culturally incompetent. As a percentage of its population, fewer Americans speak a foreign language. How crazy is that? The number of Americans with passports has not risen anywhere near where it should be, or the number of students who travel overseas. We have to find some way to make our young people more competent in cultural understanding and especially in strategic listening. Strategic listening means not only wanting to listen but also hearing and then translating what you hear into action, which also means giving up some of your own assumptions, which is the very difficult part. When I worked on the National Security Council I used to get these brown packages, unmarked. I thought it was pretty cool for a while. These brown packages would come over marked for your attention. I was in a skiff, which is like working in a safe. So I thought, "pretty secret stuff." I made sure that nobody was around. I open them up and they are weekly briefings from the United States Information Agency about attitudes toward the United States or issues that the United States thought were important from Mogadishu, from Nairobi, from Hanoi. I read them dutifully for about two weeks. I

wanted to read what was happening at USIA because they would know what was really happening on the ground. I then turned around what seemed like two minutes later, and there was a stack of these other things that had been unopened and unread almost to the ceiling. The immediate drives out the important. When the National Security Advisor said, "Get over here immediately," he didn't say, "What's the long-term perspective on the way that people in Somalia view our policies?" We have to find some institutional way to address this. It may involve a deputy national security advisor for strategic issues, not just for strategic communication, although that's important as well. The last couple of White Houses have done that for strategic communications, but what's needed is someone whose job it is to sit somewhere between the State Department and 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue with a staff to talk about these longer-term issues because they get short shrift at the National Security Council.





## **Panel 3: Africa and AFRICOM—How Africans Perceive the Mix of American Military and Public Diplomacy Plans**

Moderator:

Michael Parks, Director, USC Annenberg School of Journalism

Panelists:

Nicole Lee, Executive Director, TransAfrica Forum.

Mark Malan, Peacebuilding Program Officer, Refugees International

Ambassador Charles A. Minor, Ambassador of Liberia to the United States

**MICHAEL PARKS:** You might ask, what's a journalist doing here? The short answer is that I was a correspondent in South Africa for four years. I get back there more than twice a year for family reasons. I've reported from many countries in Africa.

The question before us this afternoon is, what do Africans think about AFRICOM? As Dean Wilson noted last night, there wasn't extensive consultation. In fact, there was a lot of pushback. So now, reflection. What do Africans think about AFRICOM?

We have with us two Africans and a fellow American who also does Africa. Ambassador Charles Minor has been Ambassador for Liberia to the United States nearly four years now. But don't expect him to be particularly diplomatic because he is really a businessman, a businessman in Liberia and a businessman in Africa working to train a generation of African managers. When he stopped being a businessman and became a diplomat he had 120 clients in 25 African countries.

Mark Malan was an officer in the South African Army, or the South African Defense Forces as it became known. He's now the executive coordinator for the Partnership in Effective Peacekeeping at Refugees International. Before that, he worked in conflict prevention, management, and resolution at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Center in Ghana. If you want peace put a soldier in charge of it.

Nicole Lee is the executive director of TransAfrica, and is really the point person for everything Americans outside of the government think about Africa.

**AMBASSADOR CHARLES A. MINOR:** Our government considers the announcement made in February that the U.S. intends a new unified combatant command, AFRICOM, to promote U.S. national security objectives in Africa and the surrounding waters to be timely and appropriate. It wasn't for us to get involved in implementation, the timing, or even the location of the command. Our remarks will therefore be limited to the perceptions that we, and our fellow Africans, appear to have regarding this major U.S. policy consideration. When Liberians see the American decision for a uniform stand-alone command for Africa, we believe it is a paradigm shift in U.S. policy implementation, a move away from the presently divided areas of responsibility for Africa in three different commands.

AFRICOM will deal with the entire continent of Africa and the surrounding waters, with the exception of Egypt. For too long the decisions on politics, on commercial activities, on security, on development, policy decisions for Africa on behalf of Africa have been made in Berlin, in Paris, in Lisbon, or in London. I think the time has come for African decisions to be made in Africa.

Secondly, it is well established that many non-Africans behave as though they are the patrons of Africa and can better serve Africa. Not long ago, the French president visited the World Bank and told the president of the World Bank, who had already appointed a vice president from Zimbabwe, to appoint a French man because that appointment belonged to France.

Africans understand that in today's international community, the United States is a leading player. Its intervention is sought whenever there are crises. When the U.S. intervention is delayed or refused, the consequences have been clear—crises, catastrophes. So we look to the U.S.. We look to the United Nations also for their intervention, but we know UN intervention has to be driven by the United States, for without that, even the Europeans would be very reluctant. So Africans have a very strong yearning to see greater intervention as partners in Africa. Africans today also have a very strong yearning to live in peace, to ensure that all Africans can afford their basic needs, that Africans can eventually escape the poverty trap, that our rich endowments and our great heritage remain ours, and that we are recognized and accepted as a serious actor on the world stage.

What role will AFRICOM play in support of those goals for Africans? Will the new command aid Africans in pushing their development frontiers farther? Or will AFRICOM usurp national authority? Will it support regime change particularly now that it is on the ground? Will it be able to respond more effectively and more quickly to humanitarian crises or help combat terrorism?

We in Liberia hope that AFRICOM will more greatly engage Africans, their governments, civil societies, and the private sector as partners. We hope it will have a training and development mandate that will further enhance African security and help to rebuild regional capabilities.

Those involved in international relations know well that diplomacy and foreign policy are inextricably linked to the interests of sovereign states and their societies. If AFRICOM does assume an effective and appropriate partnership with Africans, it will have to assist Africans to achieve the objectives enumerated earlier: for peace, for stability, for higher standards of living for the African people, not just our governments, not just the upper classes. We have to look at civil society. We have to look at the private sector. We have to look at the lower classes. By supporting Africa's capacity to be secure, to have stability, that will ensure an enabling environment for productive endeavors for economic growth and for development. African governments, non-government institutions, and their peoples will be able to concentrate their material resources much less on maintaining security and far more on the development of our human capital and our infrastructure to facilitate the advancement of our people.

Two months ago, the BBC summarized what was perceived as the views around the continent. That announcer indicated that Africans were uneasy about the U.S. plan for AFRICOM. AFRICOM, they feel, will be in the backyard of certain countries and that will undermine those countries' regional influence. AFRICOM will, according to some, be there to protect U.S. oil interests and mining interests, and above all would help to reduce the competition for Africa's resources from China. There are also fears that AFRICOM will draw Africa into the U.S. war on terror. Those goals are not central to our continent. We know many lessons we have learned already. There are places where the U.S. command exists, like in Germany, without undermining that country's influence in Europe. AFRICOM did not exist in Kenya or in Tanzania when terrorists attacked U.S. embassies and killed more Africans than Americans. Therefore we do believe that an effective AFRICOM presence could most certainly help our countries and our regions with the training and the development of more professional security sector institutions and personnel. To make the command effective, it will have

to include in its structure the capacity to work not just with governments but with what is called “the fifth estate” by Stuart E. Eizenstat—non-governmental organizations. It is also important to suggest the role of the fourth estate. To keep the people fully informed and to listen to what they have to say, will be critical to the successful implementation of this new initiative.

Let me note that Africa has had too many military interventions in the overthrow of elected governments. We hope that those military interventions are part of our past and are no longer in our future. We hope that AFRICOM will, in whatever training they help to implement in our security sector, help to make the personnel in that sector truly professional, and support the establishment of a culture that underscores the fact that the military is always subordinate to civil authority, and that it is through the ballot box and not the barrel of a gun that things are to be changed.

**MICHAEL PARKS:** You’ve certainly, I would think, provoked a lot of questions with that and reminded us of the heterogeneity of Africa.

**MARK MALAN:** The first question I will address is, do Africans want new attention from the U.S. military? The second is, what most concerns Africa about AFRICOM? And the third, what kinds of public diplomacy programs are most likely to be effective in Africa?

The answer to the first question, do Africans want new attention from the U.S. military, is no. Is that quick enough? It’s a little more complicated than that. The general operations of AFRICOM are unwelcome. There were enough headlines from February of last year onwards. Some of them: “African States Oppose U.S. Presence”<sup>4</sup>; “North Africa Reluctant to Host U.S. Command”<sup>5</sup>; “SADC Shuns Specter of U.S. AFRICOM Plans”<sup>6</sup>; etcetera, etcetera. In general, AFRICOM was not well received in the media. But that’s a certain part of Africa. Abi Williams reminded us earlier that Africa is not monolithic. There are 53 AU member states. There are different regions. There’s sub-Saharan Africa, and then there’s that other part of Africa that some of us in the sub-Saharan region don’t really see as Africa proper. Then there is Africa south of the Limpopo River, which is only now becoming part of Africa and joining the rest of the continent. It’s really complicated. Within that, it’s like saying

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4 Simon Tisdall, “African States Oppose U.S. Presence,” *Guardian*, June 25, 2007.

5 Craig Whitlock, “North Africa Reluctant to Host U.S. Command,” *Washington Post*, June 24, 2007.

6 Peter Fabricius, “SADC Shuns Spectre of US Africom Plans,” *Sunday Independent*, July 15, 2007.

civilian and military. Not even the military is monolithic. Army, Navy, Air Force, U.S. Marine Corps, they've all got different cultures. NGOs, we're all very different. There are hardcore think tank NGOs. There are humanitarian NGOs, all kinds.

There have been varied reactions to AFRICOM. The first came from the press, some shocking journalism in fact. One article quoting an authoritative source about this fear of the Americans coming: an unemployed Somali worker. I'm not an expert in public diplomacy or in communications, but if you want to get the message home, quote a more credible source than that. There is civil society. Again, there are hardcore think tanks that tend to produce a more nuanced, and balanced, and measured analysis. Then there are the African governments themselves. There is the military, the operators themselves that might be more willing to welcome aspects of what AFRICOM intends to do. Then there are their political masters who sometimes listen more to the journalists than they do to their military advisors when making pronouncements on AFRICOM.

I'll try to resist using too many quotes, but this was a Nigerian journalist writing last December: "Recently, when the nefarious proposal of the formation of a Western Euro-American military base on African soil was promoted by America, many sharp-thinking Africans were skeptical and gasped with fear that America is finally spreading its ugly tentacles of domination, harassment, intimidation, and daredevil terrorism to Africa after dealing with many lesser countries in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East."<sup>7</sup> There are many more; they get more hilarious. But these are perceptions, and perceptions are important. I was reading up on a definition of public diplomacy. The one by Hans Tuch, author of *Communicating with the World*: "Official government efforts to shape the communication environment overseas in which American foreign policy is played out in order to reduce the degree to which misperceptions and misunderstandings complicate relations between the U.S. and other nations."<sup>8</sup>

I think that some of these journalistic reports indicate that the misperceptions and misunderstandings were not reduced at all. They are still rampant. Some of these journalistic comments must have affected official pronouncements. We got one after another official pronouncement coming in a wave after February of last year. In October of last year we got the first AU pronouncement by the Pan African Parliament. Again

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7 Isa Muhammad Inuwa, "AFRICOM: U.S. Extending Terrorism to Africa," *Daily Trust*, December 3, 2008.

8 Public Diplomacy Alumni Organization, "What is Public Diplomacy?," <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm>

it was, “prevailing upon all African governments through the African Union not to accede to the United States of America’s government’s request to host AFRICOM anywhere on the African continent.”<sup>9</sup>

This is supposed to be the most democratic institution of the united states of Africa calling upon all member states. Having said that, Africa is not homogeneous in terms of the member states, but there is one thing that Africans aspire toward and that’s unity. There is no way Zambia is going to take a different position from South Africa or from Mozambique on the nature of AFRICOM. They will stick together. If there is a call by SADC to the AU to take on an SADC position regarding AFRICOM, this is pretty binding and it’s pretty powerful. To the best of my knowledge, Ambassador, Liberia is the only country that has come out openly and embraced hosting AFRICOM, in the famous op-ed by President Johnson-Sirleaf of last year.<sup>10</sup>

It is of concern. We know what Defense Minister for South Africa, Mosiuoa Lekota, affectionately known as Terror Lekota to his countrymen, is taking the lead and spearheading the assault against AFRICOM, or the rejection of AFRICOM, refusing to meet with General Ward. Later, in an SADC meeting, he talked about Africans having to manage AFRICOM, which threatens our sovereignty, and speaking with one voice on AFRICOM, whose establishment would result in thousands of U.S. soldiers being stationed in Africa.

You know and I know, and all of those persons listening to this morning’s briefings by DOD officials will know, that this is not the intention. It never has been. How did the Africans get the message so wrong? Well, they were bent out of shape I think by the CJT [Commander of Combined Joint Taskforce] of Horn of Africa. Unfortunately the messaging that came out of the kinetic operations in January and June of last year were more powerful than the more subtle, maybe misguided, messages on development and a humanitarian role for AFRICOM. We know that’s been explained to us. I’ve read up on General Ward’s pronouncements to the AU and others that it’s about continuing with external capacity building and military-to-military cooperation programs but adding value to them. I think that a lot of the damage has been done and now it’s time to get a bit of realism and, as Ambassador Bellamy said, to get back to basics.

What concerns Africans about AFRICOM? Well, we heard the concerns all morning. It’s about oil. It’s about China. It’s about the

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9 African Press Organization, “Pan African Parliament Debates Motions,” <http://appa-blog.wordpress.com/2007/10/24/pan-african-parliament-debates-motions/>

10 Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, “AFRICOM Can Help Governments Willing to Help Themselves,” *allAfrica.com*, June 25, 2007.

global war on terrorism. Yes, it is about these three things, perhaps not in that order of priority. In Theresa Whelan's briefing slides on possible tasks and roles for AFRICOM—the four-months-ago version that I was reviewing before coming here, on the list of things that AFRICOM could do, the support for the global operation of the war on terror is very last on the list. But these are the issues that really catch the particular media attention.

The Ambassador highlighted the need for security sector reform in Africa. I'm passionately for it. Five million U.S. dollars support to one battalion of the Congolese armed forces is not going to reform the FARDC [Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo]. That army is a 164,000 strong. It's out of control. It's as responsible as FDLR [Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda] and Nkunda's forces for the human rights abuses that are going on in the Eastern Congo. That's not security sector reform. I'd love to see AFRICOM making those efforts much, much better.

However, if we highlight the capacity building role of AFRICOM it's not so easy to prove successes. General, you spoke and Mr. Henry spoke, about converting words to actions. Actions speak louder than words. But in the realm of capacity building, especially security sector capacity building and peacekeeping capacity building, it's a generational project. How does one show quick success? Apart from being a warrior and being involved with Refugees International, for eight years I worked on a Norwegian-funded project called Training for Peace in Southern Africa. When I left the Institute for Security Studies that I was working for and doing this project after eight years my training project programs on policing violence against women and children, on training UN police officers within the SADC grouping of member states, collapsed. No more Norwegian money. No more Mark Malan writing the curriculum and presenting it with a couple of Norwegian and Swedish cops. Was this capacity building? No, it fell flat.

We go to U.S. programs. In 1997 Warren Christopher came to Pretoria and knocked on my office door. What's wrong with your government? Well, I'm no longer working for the government. You guys don't want to sign up for ACRF [ARM Climate Research Facility]. And still South Africa took a long time to come on board. But since '97 it got better. ACRI [African Crisis Response Initiative] was better. ACOTA [African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance] was better. That was the Kenyan model. That was the U.S. listening to the Kenyans saying, no, we don't need tents, but we need ABCs, we need this, that. That became the model. Operation Focus Relief. Really listening to the Africans, giving the Nigerians and others what they wanted and letting



them deploy to bolster UN missions in Sierra Leone. One hundred percent success between capacity building and capacity utilization, that was really smart. So I do think that there are things that can be done. I don't think we are doing the military piece, the non-humanitarian AID-State part, right. There is huge value to be added. As an African, I am frustrated by capacity building, which so often equates to learned helplessness amongst Africans. I was there when the State Department, through their ACOTA, did the first core headquarters staff training for the ECOWAS standby force the year before last. About sixty guys from NPRI [National Policy Research Institute] with golf shirts came and two containers of equipment were shipped in from the United States. Those ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] colonels, and lieutenant colonels, and majors don't know what to do with that kit when they arrive. I mean it's not capacity building.

So what kind of public diplomacy is likely to prove effective in Africa? I think one that's backed by substance. We talked about a budget. It'll be interesting to see what President Bush offers when he goes to five countries in Africa next week and compare this to what the Chinese president would sign a check for. Maybe he'll double funding. We've heard about this for PEPFAR; but what beyond that? Does any of this align with what AFRICOM's mission will be? It would be great if programs could emphasize some kind of a multilateral agenda. This morning there was mention of the new U.S. Army FM37 Stability Operations Manual. Indulge me for one minute to read part of five pages of comments: "The document creates the strong impression that the U.S.'s primary responsibility is for stabilization operations worldwide." This is my comment to the U.S. Army: "It does not adequately reflect the importance of the UN as a global instrument for stabilization and reconstruction. "Throughout the manual when the UN is mentioned it is treated as nothing more than one of the many players or actors that the U.S. Army will encounter during stability operations. In Appendix A, it appears that the UN has a lower status and importance than NGOs and that it is equated with the likes of the OAS, EU, and AU as well as the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross]." How they slipped that into the manual there, I don't know. Finally, "the U.S. Army operates within an international legal and organizational framework where the UN Security Council has primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security and, implicitly, stability." The UN is not a bit player in this regard, but is treated as such throughout the draft manual. "The U.S. role in, and contribution to, national stability operations should be located within the global framework." Blah, blah, blah, and it goes on for five pages.

The point is that the African security architecture is shaped with the primacy of the UN Security Council in mind. Africans do like the United Nations. Of course, we do. It's egalitarian even though there are complaints about the structure of the Security Council, with the five permanent members.

So AFRICOM needs something that emphasizes more than multi-lateral engagement. Joining up with the AU's permanent security council and their architecture with the sub-regions is 100 percent correct. But also, so is going up to the higher level and working with the United Nations.

Significant programs with a budget. Africans cannot resist a checkbook. The Chief of General Staff of the Congolese Armed Forces when pushed on why the Congolese government is taking help from the South Africans to train two battalions, taking help from the U.S. to train their rapid reaction battalion for the FARDC, accepting 400 Chinese military instructors to come and train up its army. Why? Why don't you coordinate this through MONUC [United Nations Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo] or through USEC [United States European Command], which has been on the ground? Why do you do this? Why do you play the one donor off against the other? The answer was, well, I am an African and therefore polygamous. I'm also poor. I will not say no to any offer of assistance. Money does count for Africans, so programs need to be a little bit more substantive than a mercy ship coming by and doctoring some people in the name of humanitarian assistance. Hearts and minds are important and impact projects; but it's not the same as development. There's been talk this morning of sustainability, multi-year funding. Capacity building is not one hundred Green Berets for one hundred days. That's not capacity building. Kinetic operations in Somalia are far sexier for the media to latch on to.

Lastly, a single set of messages, please. There is a need to reach out to an American audience, the legislators and those who will elect the president. But Africans read the messages tailored for the American market as well. Africans get onto the Internet, they read congressional testimonies, they read when U.S. Generals say oil is important, they read about ungoverned spaces and reaching deep into these ungoverned spaces, they read about the countries being written about as a breeding ground for terrorists. You can't have this set of messages for Congress and then go to Africa and say, look at this as a benign command.

I'll stop there because I think a lot of the messaging has gotten way better, especially since General Ward's confirmation. I think AFRICOM

is good and it's good for Africa. I just think we need to simplify the messages and get back to basics, and we can get behind AFRICOM.

**MICHAEL PARKS:** Thank you, Mark. Provocative and passionate. Nicole, you sit on the receiving end of American concerns about Africa and African concerns about America. What do you see?

**NICOLE LEE:** Most of you heard what I said this morning, so I'm going to try to keep my comments brief and also different. A part of the issue can be found in this notion of dismissing the concerns that people on the continent have. While some perceptions may be false, many of them are rooted in real concerns that are historical. One of the things I think is important to mention is that AFRICOM has become the victim of U.S. policy that in itself is difficult for Africans, although every time I say the "Africans," it seems strange just because, of course, it's not a monolithic situation—but I say it for expediency.

When you look at how we've used soft power, many of the issues that Africans have with AFRICOM can be found there. Just a couple of examples: one of the things that we've assumed today is that our PEPFAR program (I think that's the quintessential example) is really working. In the '09 budget, the president has asked for basically level funding. We're certainly not treating as many people as we can. African civil society is pretty clear on that. We've now said that we are going to create this command and, also in a program for which we've received accolades upon accolades, we're going to give enough money so we can treat 500,000 more people on the continent. That's of concern, this notion of aid with strings. Structural adjustment remains a huge concern both for civil society in Africa and for many poverty stricken regions where civil society can barely exist. Structural adjustment has not helped the economies on the continent.

When we talk about China, the strategy that China has employed is so different than what the continent has seen. In my estimation, the welcome that they have received in many nations has to do with the fact that our foreign policy seems disingenuous at least in its effects on the overarching concern that we have to ensure that African economies are sustainable. Why do I say this? This is something that is rarely mentioned. We've talked a lot about the bureaucracy and about the problems between interagencies. The truth of the matter is that whether it be Chad, or Iraq, or wherever, it is one U.S. foreign policy that they are looking at.

So the notion that Africans should now look at this as this brand new, innovative initiative that's somehow going to erase both the historical

inequities that we've seen in our policy and also our real ineffectiveness in terms of our soft power mandate, is very difficult. It's something that people don't talk about. We talk about the war on terror. We talk about China specifically. But what we really don't hear a lot about is how we've been inadequate. Many people on the continent just see this as a perpetuation of inadequacies, except with a gun.

As the moderator stated, we do work a lot with U.S. constituencies. One constituency we've been working a lot with is the African Diaspora. This is a growing and extremely important constituency. One of the concerns I hear over and over again, is about the regimes in place in Africa. We know that there are conflicts and many undemocratic regimes. A lot of Diaspora groups believe, however, that many of the regimes that flourish and continue to exist would have been toppled by democratic practices had the United States not intervened and played a role to prop up these regimes. That is another impression that people who are on the continent and of the Diaspora have, that cannot be easily shaken just by suggesting that this time we have altruistic motives.

**MICHAEL PARKS:** Thank you very much. Ambassador Minor, I think I need to give you a right of reply to some of Mr. Malan's comments. You seem to have a divergent point of view.

**AMBASSADOR CHARLES A. MINOR:** Yes, I do. I'd like to point out that we have three countries now, that consist of the organization called the Mano River Union, with a fourth country about to join: Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Cote d'Ivoire. Those countries were the center of a serious crisis in the last fourteen years. Liberia was the eye of the storm. Obviously the situation is still not 100 percent clear with Cote d'Ivoire, and everyone remains a little bit uneasy about the situation in Guinea. The concern is to make sure that in that sub-region of the region of West Africa, we are to maintain peace to prevent the recurrence of that. It takes substantial resources to get coordination amongst the various security apparatuses in those areas. It takes a lot of money to train new defense forces that can have a different attitude than the sectional forces that we've had. All of the countries require support and assistance. From where would they get it? Obviously not from South Africa. Obviously not from Libya. We need more neutrality for that kind of assistance. In the case of Liberia, the United States has offered to provide help. That help is provided primarily through contracting by the U.S. State Department. I wasn't sure what the answer was to the Dean's question about what America gets from what they put out in foreign policy. But I'll tell you that almost 80 percent of what was given

to train our forces by the contractors, returned to the United States in terms of salary and benefits to those who offered the training. We felt that the Army would have done a better job save for the fact that the U.S. Army is over-occupied. Our sense is that an AFRICOM would take a job like that and do a much better job at a far more economic cost than what we are experiencing today. That is the kind of issue that small countries want addressed. When you look at what AFRICOM intends to do, and you talk to the General and others who know what they hope to do, and if they are open to partnership with Africa to try to direct it to the areas where we cannot help ourselves, that shows without a doubt there is a need for an AFRICOM. The small countries, and the majority of the countries in Africa are small, are without their own capacity to do that. So AFRICOM does have a role.

**MICHAEL PARKS:** Well, even the large countries have shown some difficulty sorting themselves out. Mark, did you have any comments or should we go to questions?

**MARK MALAN:** Nothing except to absolutely agree with the Ambassador. I spent the whole of August in his country doing a review of security sector reform, both the U.S. contribution and the UN contribution to building up the police. In a region such as the Mano River basin and the Mano River Union countries, to privatize a new 2000-strong force in Liberia in a region that has been beset by mercenaries, was perhaps the wrong message. When we talk about public diplomacy, it's not just about words. What message do you send when the armed forces are being rebuilt with vehicles that have got the U.S. flag but PAE [a Lockheed Martin company] written large under it. I think they are doing a good job of basic training, but you're right. It's not rocket science that is going on. It's good, solid basic training. It doesn't need to cost \$22 million. Also, it's not just the small countries that need the assistance with security sector reform.

It was mentioned this morning, that one success that was not AFRICOM but that U.S. military-to-military cooperation can claim already, is the restraint of the Kenyan armed forces in not getting involved in internal unrest. There is, however, need for capacity building for the Kenyan police, which are really feared as one of the more robust police forces in Africa. There's huge work to be done across the security sector and there the interagency cooperation is really great. Again, to go back to the stability operations manual, there are times when the U.S. military wants to reform an entire criminal justice system. That's okay if there is martial law.

**ABIODUN WILLIAMS (FROM THE AUDIENCE):** This is a quick comment, a reaction to the question that was posed: Do Africans want new attention from the U.S. military? Mark said, unequivocally the answer is no. I'm not so sure it's that simple. The question is, what kind of attention do Africans want, and which Africans are you talking about? If the question is do we want the U.S. military to give assistance in a humanitarian crisis, I'm sure that there are many Africans who are suffering in such a crisis who would say, yes that would be something we would welcome. If another question is, should the U.S. military help the African Union build up its own security apparatus so that it can do a better job in dealing with security challenges on the continent, I think the answer would be more positive if, when faced with the prospect of genocide and the alarm bells are sounding, and Africans are saying that no one is coming to help. Those victims, or potential victims, might give a different response. So the answer to that question would be quite nuanced. One final point. Of course, the Ambassador of Liberia is much better placed on this, but I remember that when Britain, the former colonial power, intervened at a crucial stage in Sierra Leone, many Sierra Leoneans were delighted and said that Tony Blair intervened at the right time, turned the tide, and of course contributed to a successful peacekeeping operation. Many Liberians watched and said, we wish the U.S. could have played a similar role in Liberia. Again, I think the question is: what kind of attention? Who are you asking? You get a much more nuanced response and it's not necessarily altogether negative.

**CHARLES P. KOSAK (FROM THE AUDIENCE):** Mark, I appreciate your comments. I think you always present very insightful perspectives from the continent. You are certainly right about the working together. This is, after all, about public diplomacy. We are looking not only to embed U.S. expertise in the command for the reasons I described, but also to embed functional African military representatives in the command as a way of linking with African militaries. European officers in the command as well. That will happen eventually. Your point about working together through a global framework is very well appreciated. You saw Berlin plus—the competition if you will, between NATO and the European Union, and how that can impact operations such as airlifts to Darfur. It's unfortunate, as U.S. Secretary of State Condi Rice said at the time, that the problems are big enough here that there's plenty for everybody; let's not argue about who has the ultimate authority and that sort of thing.

I'm very proud of ACOTA and its evolution because I think that's an example of something that's been sustained over time and the funding has increased over time. We did get it. At first it was, this is what we

can do for you, take it or leave it. It's moved into a menu of things as if to say, you're a sovereign nation, you know what your needs are. What are you interested in and how can we help you? So it's a menu and it's a better approach. Ultimately the intent of ACOTA is to set up a cadre of trainers. One of the challenges that we face is that the attitude in some cases has been, "No, no, keep the money coming, keep the U.S. military trainers coming. Do the just-in-time training whenever we deploy as part of a mission on the continent or elsewhere." How do we culturally, diplomatically, operationally get to the point when we can convince leadership to assume responsibility as this program intends?

**MARK MALAN:** A very good question. That's one of the reasons I'm not counting IDPs and refugees because of the challenges of capacity building. When can you say capacity has been built? My experiences with trainers courses, both with African police and with the military at the Kofi Annan Center, is that they fail. Because when the so-called trainers have been trained and they go back to their host institutions, whether they be police or military, they lack the training infrastructure. They lack the funding to bring people on courses. They lack the equipment, etcetera. Unless one is willing to make a deep investment in building, staffing, equipping, maintaining the training schools, salarizing the people, scheduling the courses, investment and training of trainers really doesn't help. It gives them a certificate on the wall and a per diem they collect whilst on course. To me a huge disappointment was investing three years of my life in the Kofi Annan Center, which is a G8 funded big blue building. It's supposed to be owned by ECOWAS and Ghana Armed Forces, the Ghanaian government; but if the Brits pull out tomorrow that institution collapses.

I came up and talked to some folks at State the first year I was there, it was 2004, and said, you know what? It's a scandal. It's a shame. It's a real pity the U.S. hasn't got a military office in there. We've got the Brits. We've got the French. The Germans are running the IT. We've even got a Swiss Officer. How about you getting involved? Then we got a reserve U.S. Marine Corps Major. Then we got a very fantastic active duty Marine Corps Colonel down there. He was ignored by the Brits, until the time I left he did not have a job description, and was not integrated into the decision-making within the Center. Here is a representative of the most powerful nation on earth being shunned by the Brit masters. I officially worked for a Ghanaian two-star general, but the Brit colonel paid my salary. So whom am I going to obey? Her majesty's government or President Kufuor?

My hope is that with engagement of AFRICOM, hopefully with a permanent headquarters on the continent and a deeper understanding of these kinds of dynamics, that perhaps this engagement is not as dramatic as ACOTA or OFR or some of the big exercises. I often use the example of the Brits. Somebody mentioned Sierra Leone, what they did in setting up an office of national security, a security sector review and policy that was put in place. All institutions being built up. Their post-intervention engagement and security sector reform go way wider and deeper than U.S. assistance to the Liberian process where the police are left largely to the United Nations. There is really huge work for AFRICOM to do in making things sustainable. We can all do training of trainers courses. Two weeks and then put it down and go. But that capacity is not left behind.

**NICOLE LEE:** I think we're having difficulty talking about what this panel is really supposed to be about, which is Africans' perceptions of AFRICOM. I know that we have our perceptions. Those perceptions are valid, but in a day-long conference the opportunity to talk about people is a rare opportunity. We need to think about what the majority of the people on the continent really consider to be issues. It certainly isn't terrorism. I'm curious to find out what the other panelists think about why there are concerns and there are conflicts on the continent. It's important to talk about the perceptions and maybe the root of some of the perceptions on the continent versus our own.

**MICHAEL PARKS:** You've just put out a fairly provocative challenge to the Africans in the room. What do you think about AFRICOM?

**COLLEEN TURNER (FROM THE AUDIENCE):** My name is Colleen Turner. I'm the former Chief of Strategic Communications for the Iraq/Afghanistan Transition Planning Group. Obviously my focus had been on CENTCOM. However, I want to first thank USC for hosting this because the State and Defense relationship—I wouldn't compare it to the Crips and the Bloods in Los Angeles, but I wouldn't say that it's been all that great.

After five years the Iraqi perceptions are still that the Americans are in Iraq for oil, to establish permanent military bases, and on a Christian crusade. This is a view widespread in the region and in much of the world. If I were in Africa, I would be looking at AFRICOM as, convince me that the Americans are going to be any different here. What are you going to do to convince me of this? Now I've heard some great preventive things, such as the idea of the unified versus the combatant command.



My experience has been that interagency communication has been not been very good about this. The Institute of Creative Technologies, right here at USC, has fabulous communication programs that the Army is using that could be easily adapted to diplomacy. Like a communications batting practice machine in terms of immersion simulation programs. I'm wondering if you've been made aware of these things or are trying to find out more about using them towards these kinds of preventative diplomacy programs. Lastly, a heartfelt question on my part, is anything been done to help Americans develop more of a curiosity about the wonderful gifts that African countries and groups in Africa could be teaching Americans to develop ourselves as better human beings in the planet?

**MICHAEL PARKS:** I'll let the General think about whether he's going to respond. We have a question in the back.

**TOM SEAL (FROM THE AUDIENCE):** By way of background for my comments and questions, I am a marine, retired, but I was with the State Department for three-and-a-half years working in Africa largely. Getting to the capacity building, that was an issue that was very difficult. Depending on what country it is, there are different issues, however we found it didn't work. At the worker level excellent results, but when you went up to any higher supervisory level it didn't work. When you took away the economic supervisor expatriate over all of it, it just went out the window. The use of assets, the continuation of training, the whole idea of standards, and the importance of following SOPs [Safetandard Operating Procedures]—these things seemed to be cultural. It transcends the military. As Africa Command goes in and tries to do these things, I wonder if that's part of what people are thinking about?

Mark, you mentioned the United Nations. Yes, I've seen that on the ground where the UN has a great deal of influence in Africa. But also the United Nations builds dependency. How can AFRICOM coordinate with the UN?

**MICHAEL PARKS:** We have two things floating out here. We have a challenge to the Africans.

**NICOLE LEE:** It's not actually a challenge to the Africans. It's a challenge to all of us because we have to develop an understanding of perceptions.

**MARK MALAN:** Tom had a question whether or not the less than spectacular successes in capacity building at the managerial level, supervisor level

and higher has something to do with cultural influences. I think it has something to do with what you are building capacity for. One of the finest fighting units I've ever seen in operating on the African continent was 32 Battalion, a bunch of Angolans that had turned sides and were trained up by a mad guy called Colonel Jan Breytenbach, the finest part of the so-called South African fighting machine. They were Angolans. No problem learning the technology, which was basically World War II equipment, 81 millimeter mortars from the French, etcetera. We were using basic kit. I'll come to the point now. South Africa is never going to go through a revolution in military affairs. We're not going to be engaged in a three dimensional battle space. We're not going to have high tech warfare. So I think capacity building efforts in terms of the equipment used should just keep it simple. Fancy stuff is not sustainable on the African continent. We talk about standardization and interoperability of the weapons for the African Standby Force. The continent is awash with small arms, but it's crap. AK47s. What did the U.S. State Department equip the new army of Liberia with? Crap AK47s from Romania. They had to send half of them back because they were unserviceable.

Let's forget the culture. The African Standby Force has a roadmap to be fully operational by the year 2010. Heck, that's only two years time. There's no way that's going to happen. There's capacity building at a different level, support to the PSOD [Peace Support Operations Division] in terms of staffing. What worries me about African security architecture is that everything is paid for by donors. It's the EU Africa Peace Facility. Yet we claim African solutions to African problems with G8 funding. This really worries me. Africa can't have the ASF up and fully running by the year 2010. Part of the reason is, it's finances; it's political will; it's all these things. But the AU was required to go in and fix the Darfur region of Sudan and now it's been pushed into UNISOM in Somalia before it has this management structure in place, before it has even matured. The international community, the UN, the United States, and others are partly responsible for prematurely delegating responsibility. Capacity building is slow. It's long term. It takes patience. I guess you can equate it to development. There's no quick fix.

**AMBASSADOR CHARLES A. MINOR:** Let me just add to what Mark has just said. He mentioned the experience we are having in Liberia, using a contractor to undertake the training for the United States State Department. It took almost one year to convince the contractor that you cannot continue and this program will never be sustainable if you give the trainees continental breakfasts in the morning prepared by expatriate cooks when we have way more soldiers who are looking for work to

do, who can cook local food, for those trainees. It took us one year to come to Washington to convince the contractor to make that change. We've been saying today that you have to listen and digest what you are hearing. The trainers were not listening. That's why that kind of program can't be sustained over the long term. We have to give them local people. That's possible if you are listening. We have got to say to them at the very beginning, you can't give them a diet that they are not accustomed to, that they don't eat at home. Get local people to cook local food. It took us one year to convince them to do that.

**TOM SEAL (FROM THE AUDIENCE):** My question was not about military training. I'm talking about capacity building across agriculture, infrastructure, all the very many things that Africa needs. It just gets back, as you are saying, to a cultural thing. Vehicles. What happens to the vehicles when the expatriate manager leaves? It's that kind of problem that has to be solved and it's not just military.

**NICOLE LEE:** The continental breakfast part is humorous. What isn't funny is that the number of folks that you needed to have trained, are not trained yet. It brings me to an assumption that's been made a few times. We are assuming that it's going to be military-to-military and not military-to-contractor. I haven't seen any kind of assurances that military contractors are not going to be used throughout AFRICOM. As a matter of fact, I've heard rumblings that they will be a major part. I'll be interested in hearing if there is any information on this. The magazine *Serviam* had an issue dedicated to AFRICOM. This is a contractor industry magazine. Lockheed Martin and Blackwater and others write for this and advertise there. The article stated basically that the contractors along with the Heritage Foundation, came up with the newest idea of what AFRICOM should look like and they are expecting basically a windfall from it. So even though military-to-military sits better with me I have not seen any evidence that contractors will not be involved. Contractors are of course another issue in terms of what perceptions on the ground on the continent are. Africans have TVs and have the Internet. They are well aware of issues like Abu Ghraib. They are well aware of Blackwater.

**CONSUL ATAKTI HAGEGE HAILU (FROM THE AUDIENCE):** The first point that I would like to make is that the acceptance of AFRICOM depends on its purpose, and its purpose has to be clear. Its goals, objective, mission, have to be clear. If it is, for instance, peacekeeping, and I'm talking for myself, not for my country, we have to recognize that governments

will have to pay a political price by accepting American forces in their own countries. If a United States force is placed in my country, what would ordinary people think? Historical independence, pride in their country— for many Ethiopians it would mean colonization. That's how they would see it. If it's right or not, that's something different. The perception would be of the intervention of a foreign force in a historically independent country. So, if any country accepts that arrangement that government would have to pay political costs at home. This is clear. Secondly, this is not to say that Americans are not accepted in Africa. They are accepted, especially in my country. I read a survey a couple of months ago that the perception towards Americans in Ethiopia is one of the highest in the world, about 70 percent positive. But the military aspect of it is not something that would be welcome.

But we have opened our doors for investment. If American companies would like to invest in Ethiopia as our colleagues in agriculture, industry, and mining, then they would be most welcome because they would be partners in our development efforts. So that would be a plus for us at the same time as for the Americans. But when it comes to the military, to AFRICOM, I'm doubtful about it because of historical cultural attitudes and a deep-rooted perception of the people in that part of the world. So we have to think along these lines. What is it going to do? Does AFRICOM have a clear mission? Public diplomacy plays a role in communicating the mission to the people. So if the military aspect is more pronounced, the people will not accept it, definitely. If the soft aspect is more publicized, communicated to the ordinary people, then the chance for it to be accepted is much higher.

**MICHAEL PARKS:** That's a very useful comment with which to wind up this session: definition and clear communication. We've had a good discussion.



## **Panel 4: AFRICOM As a Public Diplomacy Paradigm—How it May Affect Future U.S. Policy in Africa and Elsewhere**

Moderator:

Geoffrey Wiseman, Director, USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School

Panelists:

Ambassador Mark Bellamy, Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Ambassador Brian Carlson, Department of State-Department of Defense Liaison, Strategic Communication

Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy

Mark Malan, Peacebuilding Program Officer, Refugees International

**GEOFFREY WISEMAN:** The job that I have is to help move toward general conclusions about our discussions today and to help fill in some of the bigger gaps. I would urge you to overstate rather than understate your arguments during this final session.

So in that general spirit I want to make a few general comments about the panels that we've had today. All of them were based around four big concepts related to AFRICOM: panel one was about the rationale; panel two concerned the mandate; panel three, the perception, and panel four focus is paradigms.

The very first theme that we discussed in panel number one was the rationale for AFRICOM. What struck me about this particular discussion was the general skepticism about the altruistic rationale for the new strategic command, and how governmental representatives tended to focus on the important "process benefits" to be derived from AFRICOM. New expressions for me were: whole-of-government activity, light footprint, DOD-Department of State cooperation and collaboration. Now again,

let me stress I'm overstating my point here but this became quite striking in the discussion when one of our nongovernmental panelists made the point: "Where are the national interests?" This of course should be coming from the other way. The national interests that Nicole [Lee] wanted to have a statement on were: What about the oil we're trying to protect? What about geo-strategic interests that the United States has—the bigger, geostrategic, Kissingerian kinds of issues? So we had an odd mix here. I wanted to ask this question: How far can AFRICOM and its governmental spokesmen go in being open and transparent about what the U.S. policy rationale is for AFRICOM? I'm not going to ask that it be answered right now, but I might ask Ryan Henry if he would address that in his comments in a moment.

The second big theme of the conference was AFRICOM's mandate. This too was fascinating for me as one quite new to the institution and the concept. But the strong subconscious message here was very much that this is a work in progress. I was struck by the military-to-military mandate of AFRICOM, which moves toward a civil-military mandate and becomes more acceptably Clausewitzian. Is there any wiggle room in changing AFRICOM's mandate? Is it set in stone? Or is this something that is very much up for grabs, up for negotiation, and which could change in the period ahead? That's the mandate theme.

The perceptions theme was probably the most controversial and the most interesting as a result of it being controversial. There were two sub-themes that arose here for me. On the one hand we had some eloquent statements by Abi Williams and others about the great regional variation in perceptions about AFRICOM throughout Africa. On the other hand we had statements of almost continental, pan-African proportions. Somewhere in between we probably find the truth. But nonetheless there is a tension here between the great regional variations in attitudes toward AFRICOM and a willingness to have an African view on this issue. This is interesting because of the identity politics to which AFRICOM is speaking in some part. Africans want to control their own identity. They engage in identity-building in the African Union (AU), in regional economic communities and so on. Where AFRICOM sails very close to the wind is that by having such a successful brand—AFRICOM, clear, crisp, succinct, evocative—it comes close to imposing an identity on Africa. The problem? It's an identity imposed from the outside. I'm really struck by this aspect of AFRICOM and, mischievously, I want to come back to Ryan Henry's comment this morning when he introduced himself and talked about his long title and how it carried implications in terms of influence in Washington. I was tempted to think that maybe AFRICOM needs to go down that path as well, perhaps by coming up

with an awkward, ungainly, and unappealing name. But of course what you've done is come up with the opposite, which is a terrific brand. There is an interesting tension there. A final question under the mandate theme: What would success or failure mean for AFRICOM over the next year or two?

The fourth and final theme was the paradigm question. Here I was struck by how military-to-military relations had a resonance of the old 1970s arms control debates about confidence-building measures (CBMs). What is quite intriguing here is, if you go back to the early 1980s, ship visits were regarded as CBMs. It was an acronym, "confidence-building measures" to promote good relations between East and West. There is a way in which public diplomacy is now carrying the confidence-building conceptual water in a way that arms control once did. It is asking a lot of public diplomacy to do this. This also relates to the question of how does public diplomacy fit into the traditional diplomacy set of questions. There were some very interesting comments during the day about the role the size, and the number of traditional diplomatic U.S. missions in Africa. It's a very heavy diplomatic presence, but we didn't talk too much about those embassies' roles. I think that there is something that we might be able to fill in a little bit.

To wrap up on the paradigm theme. What kind of paradigmatic examples can AFRICOM be said to represent? Example one offered by Dean Wilson: it's a paradigmatic example of smart power. Example number two: we heard numerous references to relations between the Department of Defense and Department of State, so is this a paradigmatic example of cooperation between historically warring departments? This is the bureaucratic politics paradigm, if you like. The third one is my civil-military relations paradigm: is this a new paradigm for civil-military relations? And my mischievous question here is: is this a way into a kinder, gentler military? The fourth and final one: is AFRICOM an example of military-based, military-oriented public diplomacy? This raises some very difficult and fascinating questions for us. It probably begs the question whether public diplomacy has probably been practiced more by the military historically; they just called it something else. In recent times, the State Department and government foreign ministries are practicing public diplomacy and they are calling it public diplomacy. That would be my fourth paradigmatic example: that AFRICOM is an example of military-based public diplomacy.

**RYAN HENRY:** Let me take the first one, which had to do with why AFRICOM. While I do claim to have zero expertise in the area of Africa, having listened to the last panel, it's very interesting to hear the people



who are up on all the specifics. My background is in worrying about global security for the country. I guess I did have an interesting role in midwiving the birth of AFRICOM inside the U.S. government. I think that while it couldn't have been done without Secretary Rumsfeld and the president acquiescing, we captured a moment in time where it could be done. While the idea had been gestating for a long time, the solution that came in was this: let us put together a five-year plan working up to the point where we could start AFRICOM. That occurred in November 2006. Secretary Rumsfeld announced his resignation. We sat down and talked to him and told him that we had just over a month and a half that we could get AFRICOM sold to the president. He gave us the green light to do it. I only say that because I can tell you why we stood up AFRICOM. I've only had the opportunity to listen to the last panel, but one thing I would disagree with is that everyone is talking in constants, that this is the way things are. I can tell you that it's very, very dynamic; what AFRICOM was to our team when we were standing it up, and giving life to some ideas and some frustrations that Secretary Rumsfeld had, and selling that to the president, and getting Secretary Gates' buy-in on it when he came into office. It's in the process of migrating. It's going to migrate some more. It is an experiment that will adapt to what works and what doesn't work. It will change a lot.

No matter what we say right now, on January 21 2009 an awful lot is going to change. There will be a different administration in power and they will have different things that they are trying to accomplish. Perceptions, ideas, the way [AFRICOM] is used on the continent will continue to change also. The fact is, these are shifting sands that we are talking about. What AFRICOM will look like, what it will do, what it's there for—these are not constants. How we'll operate, what the processes are, what the organization is. It was designed from the very beginning to be adaptable. That being said, we think of strategy as ends, ways, and means. There was a single end for which the idea was initiated: to keep American troops off the continent for the next fifty years. That was the goal. We cannot afford to be the 911 force for the African continent. We have too many global responsibilities that we have to meet. We would prefer that the Europeans not be the 911 force either. We think there are a lot of critical places where attacks on our homeland and attacks on their homelands can emanate from that aren't on the African continent. That's where we need to put our first priority. The solution is to help the Africans to be able to meet their own security needs. We don't expect them to become security exporters, but in the next many decades we'd like to see them stop being security importers and being a drain on security resources that we have collectively, we being the advanced

nations, to be able to keep the globe a place of stability where nations can work together and we can have progress. There was a specific instance in 2004 that generated the idea that we needed to do something like this. It was basically to not have American forces on the continent and not to get them drawn in, because we said that if they did they would probably never leave. There would be an insatiable demand to have them continue to combat. That was the ends.

Let me just talk a little bit about altruism. It is purely out of American self-interest not to have that drain on American security resources. The means is they get in there and do things that will help the Africans build a security capability that they will be able to administer, that will have an African face on it, and be led by Africans. But they're going to need some help in getting there, and that's the role that we would play. Some people can call that altruistic. Some people can call that self-interest. It is a means by which to get us to the end where we want to be. That is the reason for AFRICOM.

Now, a new administration comes in. They want to have a different activist policy. They want to get in there and make a difference. All that could change and therefore the means that we could use to achieve it could change too. It is part of our political system that we don't get locked into one mindset, that the American people get a choice on how they look at the world and to a certain extent how they look at regions every two years through the legislature, every four years through the presidency. They are free to change.

**GEOFFREY WISEMAN:** Brian Carlson, how far can the government go in telling the public, its own public and other publics, what the rationale is for AFRICOM?

**AMBASSADOR BRIAN CARLSON:** I think that the State Department view is that this is another very sharp arrow in the quiver of foreign policy arrows that we have to use in dealing with our relationship with Africa. There was a question raised at one point as to whether or not AFRICOM is changing our public diplomacy. Only in the sense that right now, for the short period of time we'll have to explain AFRICOM; so it has become another issue that needs to be explained and needs some attention to deal with it. But I see it as part of the foreign policy complex, not a problem.

**GEOFFREY WISEMAN:** I wonder if I could move to Mark Bellamy at this point and ask him what he thinks about this issue of wiggle room in the

mandate. We just heard this very interesting description from Brian. Is there wiggle room?

**AMBASSADOR MARK BELLAMY:** I hope so. We've just heard Ryan Henry say that this is a dynamic situation. This is very much a work in progress and there's nothing wrong with that. It will be perhaps a work in progress for some time. I don't think we need to make all the decisions between now and October 1. I don't think we are going to find or have all the answers in the next six or eight months. There's nothing bad about that. There are some decisions that need to be made sooner rather than later, it seems to me. There are some parameters that need to be established, so the wiggle room would not be infinite of course. I would just mention in this regard at least one thing that we haven't touched on and that is that getting the interagency cooperation part of this right is going to be very important. The real key to that is going to be the relationship with the State Department. If DOD and the State Department agree, things will work. If they don't agree then nothing will work. The key to that is going to be the chief of mission authority and how the AFRICOM commander relates to the different ambassadors in the field. It's a longstanding issue, and there are many ramifications to this. There's no need to go through all of this, but I think it's going to be one of the key challenges early on for AFRICOM. It's something that can perhaps be managed through a memorandum of understanding. I think it would be too bad if six months from now that was still an area of ambiguity and the AFRICOM commander was still trying to negotiate his authority with forty-four different chiefs of mission. That's not going to be a productive situation.

**GEOFFREY WISEMAN:** So Mark, perceptions. Do you think good traditional diplomacy can change perceptions of AFRICOM? Could public diplomacy change these current perceptions that you spoke so passionately about in the last session?

**MARK MALAN:** It's really hard to sell to a continent an experiment, something that's so dynamic and it's awaiting the resolution of interagency and bureaucratic tensions, because Africans are aware of this and say, how can you bring this joined-up thing when we are aware that State's budget is so miniscule compared to DOD? From a messaging perspective this flexibility or wiggle room that we probably need doesn't look good, particularly when you tell Africans that this was the product of a ten-year thought process within the DOD. How complicated can it be? I think it's really unfortunate that the unified military approach,

the unifying of three military commands in one joined-up command for Africa, comes at a time when there is a need for interagency dynamics to be resolved and Africans are aware of this.

This is a continent that has been through various experiments: Afro-socialism, Afro-communism, Afro-capitalism, etcetera. Africa has missed the globalization bus. We are still blaming the former colonial powers. Ghana last year celebrated the golden jubilee, fifty years of independence from the U.K. But if you go to the Queen's birthday party, it's the Ghanaian foreign minister thanking her majesty's government for so many billion pounds into this, so many million pounds into that. Whose country is it anyway?

Can public diplomacy change perceptions? I think we have to realize that perceptions of AFRICOM are not just related to post-February 2007 marketing or public diplomacy around AFRICOM. They relate to deep-rooted ideological assumptions in Africa about U.S. foreign policy on the continent. Not only do Africans like to have a unified position vis-à-vis the rest of the world, the North, big powers, and former colonial powers, but they also have very long memories, memories of slavery, colonialism, and more. They will often remind those who want to disengage from Africa, that actually, African solutions to African problems is nonsense. Africa's current problems with regard to insecurity and persistent armed conflict are not just of Africa's own making. I won't go into detail, blaming the colonials. There has to be a measure of responsibility. AFRICOM is confronting this deep-rooted ideological resistance. Unfortunately, the United States came down on the wrong side of various liberation struggles including in my own country, and is coming up against a very robust Chinese Africa policy which is not subject to the vagaries of whether the next administration is perhaps going to change it and the need to be flexible and experimental. China has invested heavily.

What Mr. Henry said this morning about matching actions with words was almost a definition of public diplomacy. That's a good place to start. Because if the actions are limited by the vagaries of what direction the new administration will take within the vagaries of the budget which is not yet known in terms of putting hard resources behind the various programs and projects of AFRICOM, then maybe we should tailor the words to fit more modest actions that are doable no matter who is in the White House and who is dominating in Congress.

What would these actions be that we could sell through traditional public diplomacy that may be more credible and maybe change African perceptions? I think we could start with a reaffirmation of post-Cold War U.S. security policy in Africa. State it simply as the Chinese Africa

policy is stated in very plain English, because the Africans will hark back to the Cold War dynamics on the continent. They will point fingers and say that this is more of the same under a new guise to protect oil, and natural resources, and all this kind of thing. I think it should be a clear statement, which offers credible, well-publicized, well-known U.S. security priorities linked to the Global War on Terrorism. But can we measure success and change perceptions in terms of winning the global war against terror? Probably not. Capacity building is long term, hard to demonstrate, hard to assess, hard to say this has been successful. Helping Africans meet their own security needs? Well, we haven't succeeded over the last fifteen years. When will we reach that point? I think Africa's going to be riven by conflict for the next fifty years at least. There may be cause to put American forces back in to help out. I really don't know, but one success demonstrator, which is doable within whatever budget one thinks AFRICOM will have and will demonstrate this success—is that actions are actually matched with words, may move towards a successful public diplomacy. I don't know what that success-demonstrator will be. I certainly know that it's not the Kofi Annan Center, because the five, or six, or seven donor countries behind it couldn't get that to work. Before that project, they built another center in Mali with the French backing it. The U.S. is supporting a Nigerian Center of Excellence at the strategic level. Three projects in one small region of Africa, not one of them sustainable in its own right. This is not smart.

If the actions cannot be more robust because of other U.S. global security priorities, then perhaps the words must be tailored more appropriately, then the U.S. is not seen to be speaking with a forked tongue when dealing with Africans. Simple objectives that are achievable. Straight players. No hidden agenda and one message for U.S. consumption and African consumption. It's an issue of credibility.

**AMBASSADOR BRIAN CARLSON:** Perhaps one could look at AFRICOM using the example of the Provincial Reconstruction Team, something that we've found to be very successful in a number of countries, particularly in Iraq and also some in Afghanistan. In a sense, what you do is you put into a given area all the elements of U.S. government power and capability in a team that has a fairly single-minded approach and they're focused on what they're supposed to do. You use all the capabilities. These are usually led by a State Department officer. There is a military component that provides security for the team and deals with security in the local areas. There also may be USAID. There is usually public diplomacy and other elements of the U.S. government can be represented on a PR team. We've had some considerable success with this. In

some sense, isn't that what we are really talking about in the African continent? We are talking about bringing together all the elements of U.S. government foreign policy and intergovernmental activities, and measuring them out to whatever the task of the moment is, but having the right tools to apply to the situation at hand. Finally, there has been a little bit of a tendency—perhaps because our subject is AFRICOM and AFRICOM's establishment is an important development—but I continue to say that we ought to keep it in context. It is part and parcel of the U.S. government's approach to Africa, which has a pretty well articulated purpose, and AFRICOM is part of that.

**RYAN HENRY:** I think most of the people in the room are experts in Africa. When decisions get made in the U.S. government it's not going to be by experts, it's going to be by generalists. We have a unique situation now where the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense both have PhDs in Russian history. That's because they got paid for it during the Cold War and that's what our strategic interest was. But America's strength, and to a certain extent its weakness, is that we are neither students nor prisoners of history and so all these built-in perceptions will not drive decision making. What will drive decision-making is, what are our interests? what works? what doesn't work? Let's not keep on doing something that doesn't work. That's kind of the way Americans approach problems. When they have global interests, you don't have the luxury of getting embedded and having your decision-making driven by these historical problems that the people that live in them continue to harbor. It also affects perceptions. As far as what our approach is, it is again not going to be driven by the sophistication through which the people in this room see the problem set. It will be driven by a more abstract set of objectives. All the intricacies of what's happened in the past will not drive where we go in the future. It will be, where do we go that has the highest probability of success? Let's try that. If that doesn't work, then we've got to try something else. That's one of the reasons we're standing up AFRICOM right now. We see a problem continuing in the area of African security, one that could possibly increase in the future. It has very little to do with the three common things that are put forth as to why we're doing this: global war on terrorism. Africa is a sideshow, a very minor sideshow in there. There are some problems in the Maghreb but they don't raise anything significant other than the degree that they are exported to Europe. It is not something that is driving American thinking or decision-making. There is a concern that ungoverned, misgoverned, undergoverned areas could in the future become safe havens, but the solution set there is to get local governments

to work, not for the U.S. to do anything specific. Competition with China. We see ourselves hopefully as global cooperators with China, not competitors with China. That's the direction we are trying to go. Just China is not driving our thinking when it comes to the African continent. The last one is resources and we have a very clear idea about resources when it comes to Africa. It is get them to markets. Help the Africans get their resources to markets and let them get the benefits of the global marketplace. We have no idea of taking a mercantile approach to the resources that are there.

**EVAN POTTER (FROM THE AUDIENCE):** It is very important that for about seventy years public diplomacy seemed in the popular imagination to be monopolized by various foreign ministries: USIA, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the British Council. Only since the Second World War would I say that we are seeing a shift almost outside the areas. After the Second World War, we had de-Nazification, which would have been led by the allied military. But outside the confines of that type of world war, public diplomacy has been driven by foreign ministries. Over the last ten years what you see coming out in stark relief is a monopolization of public diplomacy by militaries. Except in the past, the militaries have never used the term public diplomacy. What they've been talking about were ship visits, public affairs, obviously military assistance programs, officer training. But we haven't been talking about the military engaging in full-blown, long-term sustainable public diplomacy veering into cultural understanding and sensitivity. That's what we've been talking about in addition to the traditional public affairs that militaries have adopted.

Just a plug for Canada's role in Afghanistan: Twenty-five hundred Canadian troops in Khandahar, represent the largest forward deployment of Canadian troops since the Korean conflict. It's a big deal for us. In there we have our PRT 350 strong and sure it is led by a member of our foreign service but most of those 350 persons on that PRT are from the Canadian military. Maybe what we are seeing is monopolization of public diplomacy by the military. The military is becoming the sharp end of public diplomacy and—with all due deference to my State colleagues and my own colleagues in my foreign ministry, the military has the money. The military has the need. The military has the will to get the job done. The question that this raises for me is that public diplomacy has been seen historically as nice and relatively benign. But if the military is monopolizing public diplomacy for its strategic ends, that may create some confusion on the part of the members of the public in those countries in which they would like to exercise influence.

**AMBASSADOR MARK BELLAMY:** That's a very interesting comment, but I would keep in mind that that is Afghanistan. When you talk about Afghanistan or Iraq or you talk about certain counterinsurgency theaters you have a whole different set of rules. The military's going to not only be the sharp end of the spear in terms of public diplomacy, but the sharp end of the spear in terms of everything else, including development assistance and everything we are doing in a non-permissive environment. It's generally useful to look at the difference between non-permissive environments and counterinsurgency situations in the rest of the world.

**RYAN HENRY:** I would agree with Mark that it really has to do with the permissive nature of the environment as far as who is in the lead. Additionally, I would say that America has let its public diplomacy arm atrophy and then chopped it off with [shutting down] the U.S. Information Agency, which did have the lead. Our secretary has been out there publicly saying that we need to think about not necessarily resurrecting it but getting the capability to do what it did. The other issue you bring up is yes, the military does tend to be out front. It does have the resources, but shame on our government for not resourcing the other arms. One thing that we in the Defense Department are pushing for is to strengthen those other arms. But they have to be deployable. If you are going to put the resources in to get that capability but everybody insists on staying home, you're not going to get the effect. If you're going to do public diplomacy, you can't do it all from national capitals. You have to do it from the field and that's one inherent strength that the military has and it is more evident recently. As we start to build back up these institutions, both in the United States and in other Western nations, that capability has to be able to move back into the field.

**Yael Swerdlow (FROM THE AUDIENCE):** I want to go back to public diplomacy's emotional aspect related to accountability. I'm wondering whether AFRICOM is going to accept the jurisdiction of the international criminal court for its contractors and for its military personnel. That would go a long way in calming people down.

**RYAN HENRY:** The U.S. government's position under the current administration is that this would create way too much jeopardy for forces. We're not interested in getting into the slippery slope where our soldiers who are following their missions can get pulled into international criminal court. So obviously we've gone forward with the Article 98 agreements. That has been a speed bump in getting engaged in different multilateral



efforts and initiatives, specifically UN ones. We do not participate in any activities unless we have a waiver from that. Just so you can appreciate the sensitivities, maybe it's a great idea, but when you are the world's superpower and you're the country everybody loves to hate, you're the one that's going to end up getting the bad deal. Very few initiatives are solely good. There can be negative sides to them. As we look at that in the pluses and minuses, we cannot get over our uncomfortable feeling that it will be used against us. Between now and the next 348 days, that won't be changing.

**SANA KHAN (FROM THE AUDIENCE):** I want to play devil's advocate for those people who believe that the military should not be involved in soft power and public diplomacy efforts. If you are addressing the concerns of Africans of different countries, and those concerns are agriculture, employment, investment, cultural recognition, intellectual property rights, whether it is through military or through benign soft power initiatives, do you feel that this ideological concern about the military being involved in or monopolizing these efforts will be that big a deal? As a Pakistani, I feel that when you are in a push-comes-to-shove situation such as in Sierra Leone or Rwanda you don't care who comes to help you out. It's anyone at that point.

**MARK MALAN:** You asked if it involves employment, agriculture, investment, why not a military lead if it's good for Africans, if it's developing Africa? Just one example of why it may be a bad idea. There's been a delay in implementing good defense transformation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. One of the reasons is that there are two plans on the table for defense sector reform, one by the defense minister, and one written by a group of experts, many of the international under USEC but including the U.S.. The one sees a professional Congolese force of about 70,000 strong, sustainable over time. This is signed onto by the chief of general staff, the Europeans, and the donor partners. The minister's plan sees retaining a bloated army with more than 30,000 ghosts on the payroll, more than 30,000 troops that are over the age of sixty, and to keep them busy by involving them in agricultural production, building roads, etcetera. Apart from all sorts of other theoretical reasons why the military should be involved or should not be involved, this is one example where it's a wrong demonstration to African militaries.

**RONNIE LIPSHUTZ (FROM THE AUDIENCE):** I want to raise something that hasn't come up all day and that has to do with our fragile economic status. The global dollar overhang, the various deficits, the state of the

economy all point toward our posture not being sustainable over the next fifty years unless the rest of the world is willing to start paying us to do it. That may be a possibility, but one of the things that's missing here is a longer term view about how the changes in the global economy might effect the capabilities of the United States to mount and maintain these kinds of programs over the longer term, and what that might mean for Africa as well as for our relations with other countries that also might have interests in Africa. This is more of a comment than a question, but it seems to me that we keep talking about the long view, but are taking this short view that everything is copasetic and it's going to be smooth sailing in spite of the speed bumps. That's something that ought to be taken into account.

**RYAN HENRY:** I would just comment that it's been thirty years since Paul Kennedy's imperial overstretch. There is a theory that says that that is unsustainable. Economic growth is a key ingredient to that. During the Cold War we started out at 16 percent GDP investment, went down to 6 percent at the end. At the beginning of the GWOT [Global War Against On Terror] we were at 2.9 percent. We've gone up to about 4 percent GDP right now. If you look at the growth projections in that, our military can live well within the 4 percent GDP, which doesn't seem like it's too great a drag on the economy. Your concern with the dollar is a concern that we share too. We talk about whole-of-government power and that has been in the economic realm. Having the American dollar as the standard has made a huge difference. Some of us are very concerned about the erosion of that as a standard and going to something else, whether it be the Euro or a market basket of currencies. The reasons for that have to do with us supporting the word economy for the last ten years as it's been in a quasi-recession and it has not been the economic engine. East Asia is now stepping up to that. Unfortunately by the time we could start migrating out there, moving our dollar, and the Fed taking those actions, we do have this real estate problem that we're into right now. We're going to have to navigate our way out of it for the next twenty-four months. I just disagree with the premise that what we're doing has any sort of impact on our economic status or strength.

**RONNIE LIPSHUTZ (FROM THE AUDIENCE):** My point is not that it has an impact on our economic strength. My point is, will the amount of money to spend on these various tasks be available to fulfill them? The important point to recognize here is that for the last six or seven years much of the money that has gone to cover the federal deficit has come from the purchase of T Bonds by foreigners. I looked at this number

the other day. It's about equal to the tax cuts and its roughly equal to the amount of equity pulled out of American homes. We're sort of recognizing that that particular circle is probably no longer sustainable. It's not so much a question about the economy, but about the availability of the funds. Shouldn't we be exploring more cooperative modalities for addressing the kinds of things that AFRICOM is intent on addressing? I know that cooperation with China on these kinds of things would be very rough. More cooperation with Europe would be very rough. The unilateral thrust of this strikes me as being, over the longer term—the fifty years that you've expressed as the period during which American troops won't put their feet on the ground in Africa—as an awfully long time to maintain this kind of hopefulness.

**RYAN HENRY:** I mentioned not American troops but American troops in combat roles, which is a significant difference. I agree with you that there are some issues on the strength of the dollar long term. As far as the funds available, our economy will support anything we are considering doing in Africa. It's not quite lost in the noise, but it's close compared to when we look at our global security investment. It may not be what people want to hear but it's reality. One final point. Defense planning is all about distribution of scarcity. It's not about what you want to do; it's about the choices you make about what you don't have enough funds to do. When we do funding, we look at risk and how do we manage risk across all the responsibilities we have. We are not going to be able to eliminate risk, but we want to do the very best job we can at managing it. The idea of working with others, that's one of the whole reasons for the concept of building partnerships. The problem set even if we had unlimited money would exceed our budget. So we are going to have to do it with others. Our first choice is to do it with indigenous parties because they are the most effective. When that doesn't work, then we want to look at regional parties. When that doesn't work then we want to defer to multi-national coalitions to be able to get it done. The last thing we want to do is to do it ourselves. What I tried to put in my remarks is that AFRICOM will be fundamentally different because we are not looking to be in a leadership role. We are looking to be in a supporting role supporting the good efforts of others. So I agree with you and your line of thinking.

**DAVID HAIMSKY (FROM THE AUDIENCE):** Throughout this conference one of the recurring themes was defining the rationale for AFRICOM and defining the rationale for this new sort of engagement on the Africa continent. The word altruism has been mentioned repeatedly. My

question is, would AFRICOM not be best served by being more honest, and I'm sorry to be a Morgenthalian realist here, about our real intentions on the continent? Altruism implies selflessness. We're clearly doing this for national security interests. That doesn't mean that it's not beneficial to Africa itself. Would we not gain more credibility by saying that this is what we are in here for rather than attributing it to some altruistic motives? My presumption is Africans are not really going to take us seriously. We're not going to be credible in their eyes if we're portraying our policy in selfless terms. To caveat on this, I want to raise the issue of Chinese influence. Throughout this conference, Chinese influence has been downplayed. I would like to ask whether the panelists really believe that China's role on the continent has no bearing on our national security interests. At least one country has been persuaded to eliminate Taiwanese representation. That demonstrates a lot of political influence that may not be beneficial to U.S. interests.

**AMBASSADOR BRIAN CARLSON:** We said earlier that the U.S. sees it as being in our national interest to deal with an Africa that is democratic, stable, prosperous, has normal economic relations with its neighbors, with us, with other countries, and participates in world markets. I don't quite follow what would be more in our national interests than that.

**STEPHANIE PHILLIPS (FROM THE AUDIENCE):** We've talked about flexibility. We've talked about the dynamic nature of this command. We've talked about our political process and how it changes every four years. But we've also talked about the possibility of this being a positive thing. Even our critics have. Mr. Malan has mentioned that there is a chance for this to have a positive impact. The ambassador from Liberia mentioned that we can have a positive impact if we listen to the people. We also could have positive impact if we look at the long-term goals. If we're constantly changing and listening and being dynamic, how are we going to look at those long-term goals? How are we going to look at a region where the problems are long-term and systemic and examine those? What are we doing in order to not every four years flip-flop back and forth between what one administration and the next administration does? How are we going to address long-term planning? I think we have some great ways of communicating. Speaking with the military officers here, there are great plans for interacting with the African people and cooperation. But how are we going to keep that long-term planning so that as soon as we build a school it doesn't fall into ruins?

**AMBASSADOR BRUCE GELB (FROM THE AUDIENCE):** We started this whole process by asking the question, what exactly is AFRICOM? We had a lot of comment on it and I think we've ended up with a clear picture of what AFRICOM really is. It's been positioned in an extremely positive way to me by Ryan Henry. The only comment that I would like to make is, it's very clear that because this is equally a meeting having to do with public diplomacy that if you think of this whole process as the National Security Council's thinking for Africa, for the first time public diplomacy is a part of the discussion and your number one objective. Because you know from the Africans what the problems are. They've been stated very clearly by Mark Malan and a number of other people. Our job as public diplomatists is to present information in a positive way that will make it very clear to the individual African countries where we start the program why this is in their interest every bit as much—if not more, as the national self-interest of the United States.

**MATT ARMSTRONG (FROM THE AUDIENCE):** I'm sure most of you have already read Secretary Gates's comments at CSIS about two weeks ago talking about capacity. The \$36 billion for FSOs was what he spends on healthcare and whatnot. One of the things that was implied in that, and this goes to the point of why the military is really getting deep into public diplomacy, was that if you mentioned it to somebody in the military they would deny they did public diplomacy until some time last year, probably some time after Mike Doran got his office. Part of this capacity is that the military has this educational float. We have the National Defense University. We have the Army War College, Navy War College, the Combined Arms Center. Somebody earlier mentioned General Caldwell who has come out with an FM30, an operations manual. In chapter seven, "Information Effects," he gets into a definition of strategic communication that you are not going to find at the State Department. Why? In part because nobody in State is able to sit down, take the time to think, hash this out and go about it.

Another point is an elephant in the room known as the Smith-Mundt Act. As we're talking about AFRICOM and as we're talking about communication every now and then we heard comments about how do we communicate back to America in order to get to understand what's going on in Africa and other parts of the world. What are your thoughts on how Smith-Mundt affects how you can communicate with Africa, because it impacts what we say because we are very afraid of blowback?

**RYAN HENRY:** Let me run through my quick response to the issue with China and recognizing it. China is a concern, but it's way down on the

list. When we think of China, we think of Asia, ASEAN. We think of the impact of Korea, the Taiwan Straights, Japan, relationship with Australia, and the relationship with India. In the next tier down comes what they're doing in the Middle East and how they're being unhelpful with Iran, specifically the \$20 billion fuel deal they signed with them. And then comes Latin America. And fourth down there comes Africa. It really doesn't rise above the noise floor as far as what our concerns are there. I'm not telling you that China's not there, it's just not something that rises to the level that needs to be addressed.

I think you confuse dynamic with chaotic. You described a chaotic situation and we have a dynamic situation, one that adapts to the environment. It adapts to a political environment and it adapts to a geo-strategic environment. There's no one that I know in the top levels of government that wants to go into one that is static. We find that that doesn't work very well and we feel that the input of the American people is very important to how we develop our foreign policy. To the issue of float. It is extremely important and it's what separates us from the rest of the U.S. government, not just the State Department. We fund somewhere between 18 and 22 percent float to move our people around, to deploy them, to send them to schools. It is secondary to deployability, but it is still a very critical factor and one that differentiates us. We happen to have committees in Congress that are willing to fund us for that. The other committees are not as understanding.

Finally to the issue of blowback. We're very concerned about blowback but that's only when we are doing things that get out of the realm of public diplomacy and get into the realm of psyops and other sort of operations. We are precluded from anything that has the potential for blowback. We are extremely sensitive to that, but in the area of public diplomacy it doesn't impact us. And finally, the Defense Department does not do public diplomacy. What we do is support public diplomacy. The public diplomacy lead is the State Department and there's really nobody that I am aware of in the Defense Department who has any confusion about that.

**QUESTION (FROM THE AUDIENCE):** Ambassador Carlson, this morning you mentioned our energy policy—that we want to have on basically a free market basis. Mr. Henry, you said basically, we want to get the Africans to market. My question has to do with concentration of wealth. What we have seen in many areas of the world is overall wealth increasing but simultaneously poverty is increasing. You're seeing concentration of wealth in very small areas, certainly if we look at where the wealth is in energy. Specifically if we look at oil, it is in very small hands in

not necessarily democratic states. So don't we have policies here that can exacerbate the problems? While poverty does not create terrorism it certainly lends to the conditions in which terrorism expands.

**AMBASSADOR BRIAN CARLSON:** I don't think we do it in an explicit way. One issue is what is the principle behind our energy security policy, which is free markets and abundant supplies, that everybody can take advantage of. Income distribution is yet a different social issue in many countries. Generally speaking of course, we are in favor of a distribution of wealth that leads to stable societies. If you get beyond that, then you have to look at each country one by one. One thing I've noticed is that oil is a little bit like cocaine. It causes a dependency and it's not a healthy dependency.

**RYAN HENRY:** Specifically to your oil question, it is a concern. It's a great concern in the Middle East. It's a great concern in Russia where there is a massive consolidation going on. Not to say it's not a concern in Africa. One perception that I think is in error is that we can do something about everything that's out there, all the problems. We really can't. Even if we could, we can't manage ourselves on that broad a spectrum. There are only so many things that you can focus on, and work on, and get done. So it's the number of management units that you have to put against a problem. In the national security realm in things like that we ask the Treasury, can you take the lead on that, can you handle it, because our bag of problems is full. It's not that it's not important. It just doesn't rise to the critical set that we have to take care of first. There are other things in line in front of that that we have to manage our way through and try to fix.

**MEG YOUNG (FROM THE AUDIENCE):** Not to harp on China, but it's interesting it keeps coming up. It seems that it's not that people don't hear your reason, it's that they don't accept that China isn't important. I wonder if it's not more valuable when you are talking about strategic communications to Africa or to people who are interested in Africa to address assumptions about U.S. interests before you actually address what U.S. interests are. When you came back and said, "China's fourth on the list; it's important but it's not that important," it places it in context and then you can move on. In the second panel somebody said, "China's just not important. It's not why we're there." It's not a satisfactory answer and I think that there are a number of things about AFRICOM where people are going to have assumptions about why the U.S. is there and hearing about why the U.S. is there is not necessarily going to assuage

those assumptions. I'm wondering if that's something that your strategic communications people think about?

**AMBASSADOR MARK BELLAMY:** I want to offer something on this issue of China since it keeps coming up. It's clear that the Chinese have a somewhat different view of how to act in Africa than we do. China is very deliberately and very systematically seeking equity investments and long term contracts for natural resources in Africa as a way of meeting its energy demand for the next two decades and a way of ensuring that it has a supply of raw materials for its industrial growth. This is being done in a way in which aid, loans, and investments are being bundled and official relationships are being developed with a series of African governments. It is of some concern to the United States when this kind of assistance to certain governments, particularly oil-rich governments, has the capacity of reinforcing corrupt or unaccountable governance in certain places in Africa. So there is a concern about the way China is pursuing its legitimate economic interests in Africa. That is not a concern that AFRICOM can take care of. That's why it's number four on DOD's list of priorities. But it is a concern that the State Department and others working with other Western governments will want to look at.

**ABIODON WILLIAMS (FROM THE AUDIENCE):** The fact that China keeps coming up reminds us of one important point. Clearly this conference is focused on AFRICOM. It's a U.S. initiative, so we are focused on what the U.S. is thinking and what it's doing about in Africa. But the fundamental point is that none of Africa's security interests, security problems, and security concerns are going to be solved or addressed in an exclusive U.S.-Africa prism. It's not going to happen. Africa has other important allies, partners: China, Britain, France, Portugal, partners in the Middle East, the Gulf. So it is important that if we are going to address any of these, and if the U.S. is going to make headway in helping Africa address its security problems, it has to reach out to its other allies and partners.

All of these issues are difficult and they take time. Nothing is going to be solved in the next year, in the next three years, in the next four years. A great deal of patience will be required in terms of what AFRICOM will do as it evolves in its mission.

**RYAN HENRY:** To wrap up, I learned a lot here, as someone who was present at the creation of AFRICOM. Geoff brought up a point at the beginning that has been frustrating for us and I've never heard an explanation for it until you mentioned it, and it's the name. It is a catchy



name and that has generated a lot of traction for people generating their concerns for it. It crystallizes a lot of latent concerns that people have had with America's relationship with the continent. So we did too good a job of naming it. That didn't pop into focus until you mentioned it.

**AMBASSADOR BRIAN CARLSON:** Could I just have one quick word. In this case I think I can speak on behalf of DOD as well as State and say that we would like to thank the Annenberg School as well as USC for putting on this conference. This has been enormously useful to us.

# Appendix

## List of Conference Participants

AFRICOM: The American Military and Public Diplomacy in Africa  
February 7–8, 2008  
Los Angeles, CA

**Major General Herbert L. Altshuler**, Director, Strategy, Plans and Programs, United States Africa Command (AFRICOM)

**Ambassador Mark Bellamy**, Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies

**Ambassador Brian E. Carlson**, State-DOD Liaison, Office of the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs

**Mr. Ryan Henry**, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy

**Mr. Charles P. Kosak**, Principal Director of the Office of African Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense

**Ms. Nicole C. Lee**, Executive Director, TransAfrica Forum

**Mr. Mark Malan**, Peacebuilding Program Officer, Refugees International

**Ambassador Charles A. Minor**, Ambassador of Liberia to the United States

**Dr. Abiodun Williams**, Associate Dean of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University

**Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates**, Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities, United States Africa Command (AFRICOM)

### **List of Moderators**

**Nicholas Cull**, Director, USC Master of Public Diplomacy Program

**Michael Parks**, Director, USC Annenberg School of Journalism

**Adam Clayton Powell, III**, Vice Provost for Globalization, University of Southern California

**Ernest J. Wilson, III, Ph.D.**, Dean, USC Annenberg School for Communication

**Geoffrey Wiseman**, Director, USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School

### **Participant Bios**

#### **Major General Herbert L. Altshuler**

Director, Strategy, Plans and Programs  
United States Africa Command (AFRICOM)

Major General Herbert L. “Buz” Altshuler assumed responsibility as the director of Strategy, Plans and Programs, U.S. Africa Command in October 2007. Prior to that, he served as The United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) since April 28, 2001.

He graduated from the United States Military Academy and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant of infantry in 1967. While on active duty, he served in a variety of infantry assignments in CONUS and overseas. He served as a rifle platoon leader in the 173<sup>rd</sup> Airborne Brigade and as a battalion operations officer and rifle company commander in the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 22<sup>nd</sup> Infantry in Vietnam. Between overseas tours, he served in various command and staff positions, including aide-de-camp to the Commanding General, Fifth Infantry Division and Fort Carson, Colorado.

After leaving active duty he served as operations officer, 14<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Battalion, and as operations officer, 7<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group. Assigned to the 351<sup>st</sup> Civil Affairs Command, he served as exercise director, Secretary General Staff and Headquarters Commandant. In October 1985, Lieutenant Colonel Altshuler assumed command of the 353<sup>rd</sup> Psychological Operations

Battalion, until his departure in 1987 for the resident course at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Upon graduation from the War College, Lieutenant Colonel Altshuler was reassigned to the 351<sup>st</sup> Civil Affairs Command as Chief of Operations and Plans Division, where he was promoted to Colonel in 1989. In July 1991, he was assigned to the primary staff as Deputy Chief of Staff of Intelligence and Security. In June 1992, Colonel Altshuler assumed command of the 7<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group.

In December 1995, he was mobilized and deployed to Bosnia in support of Operation Joint Endeavor where he served as commander, Combined Joint Psychological Operations/IFOR Information Campaign Task Force, and Senior Psychological Operations Officer, IFOR staff in Bosnia in Herzegovina. Returning home in March 1996, he relinquished command of the 7<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group and assumed command of the 351<sup>st</sup> Civil Affairs Command. He returned to Bosnia with the 351<sup>st</sup> as commander of the Combined, Joint, Civil Military Task Force and Deputy CJ9, CIMIC, to Commander, SFOR. On June 27, 1997 he was promoted to Brigadier General. Upon his return from Bosnia in January 1998, he resumed command of the 351<sup>st</sup> Civil Affairs Command until March 18, 2000. He commanded the 89<sup>th</sup> Regional Support Command in Wichita, Kansas from March 28, 2000, until April 2001. He was promoted to Major General on October 7, 2000.

His awards and decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal; two awards of the Defense Superior Service Medal; three awards of the Legion of Merit; Bronze Star; the Purple Heart; three awards of the Meritorious Service Medal; the Army Commendation Medal with "V" Device and five Oak Leaf Clusters; The Combat Infantryman's Badge; the Parachutist Badge; Ranger and Special Forces Tabs; and numerous campaign and service medals.

Major General Altshuler holds a Bachelor of Science Degree from the United States Military Academy and a Masters of Business Administration Degree from James Madison University. He is married to the former Kathleen Sullivan. The Altshulers' daughter, Kimberly Gasperelli, resides in Lake Marie, Florida.

### **Ambassador Mark Bellamy**

Fellow

Center for Strategic and International Studies

William M. Bellamy joined CSIS in October 2007 as senior resident fellow in the Africa and International Security Programs. He came to

CSIS from the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., where he was senior vice president until his retirement from the Foreign Service in September 2007.

A career diplomat, Ambassador Bellamy was U.S. ambassador to Kenya from 2003 to 2006. During his tenure in Kenya, he directed U.S. counterterrorism programs in the Horn of Africa. He also supervised the U.S. government's largest foreign HIV/AIDS program and led multinational efforts to combat corruption and promote good governance in Kenya. Ambassador Bellamy served as principal deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs (2001–2003) and as deputy assistant secretary for African affairs (2000–2001).

His earlier diplomatic postings include deputy chief of mission in Canberra, Australia, from 1997 to 2000, and minister-counselor for political affairs in Paris, France, from 1993 to 1997. As political counselor in Pretoria, South Africa, from 1991 to 1993, he was closely engaged in U.S. diplomatic efforts to promote a peaceful transition from apartheid to democratic government. He served as officer-in-charge for South Africa in the State Department from 1987 to 1989 and as a political officer in the U.S. embassy in Harare, Zimbabwe, from 1985 to 1987.

Ambassador Bellamy holds a B.A. in history from Occidental College in Los Angeles and a M.A. in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He has certificates from the Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales in Geneva and the Ecole Nationale d'Administration in Paris. He is the recipient of a Presidential Meritorious Service Award, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Distinguished Civilian Service Award, as well as a Distinguished Honor Award and two Superior Honor Awards conferred by the Secretary of State.

Prior to joining the Foreign Service, Ambassador Bellamy worked as a journalist in San Francisco and public relations officer for a major bank in Los Angeles.

### **Ambassador Brian E. Carlson**

State-DOD Liason

Office of the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs

Brian E. Carlson, an experienced public diplomacy specialist and a Career Minister in the Foreign Service, serves the State Department as senior liaison with the Department of Defense for strategic communication

under the direction of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

Carlson has served thirty-six years in the Foreign Service, including as the Ambassador to the Republic of Latvia 2001–2005. Other postings abroad took him to Spain, England, Norway, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Venezuela. Since returning to Washington in 2005, Ambassador Carlson has led inspection teams for the Inspector General of the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors in the Middle East and Washington. He lectures on strategic communication and public diplomacy at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center and before public and civic groups.

Before going to Riga, and while managing worldwide operations for the Under Secretary of State, Ambassador Carlson co-produced President Clinton's November 2000 "White House Conference on Culture and Diplomacy." He has advanced nine overseas trips for U.S. presidents and managed press operations for many international events.

Carlson helped found the U.S.-Spain Council, and he developed a four-million-dollar scholarship fund to send young Spaniards to American universities. In London, during the first Gulf War, he helped establish ties to émigré Arab newspapers to support U.S. policy. As the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Carlson managed the opening of new U.S. public diplomacy operations in Eastern Europe, Russia and the new former-USSR states. His Washington assignments include directing the State Department press office and managing public diplomacy programs in Eastern and Western Europe. He speaks Latvian, Spanish, Norwegian, Bulgarian and Serbian.

### **Nicholas J. Cull**

Director

USC Master of Public Diplomacy Program

Nicholas J. Cull is Professor of Public Diplomacy and Director of the Masters Program in Public Diplomacy at USC. He took both his BA and PhD at the University of Leeds. While a graduate student he studied at Princeton in the USA as a Harkness Fellow of the Commonwealth Fund of New York. From 1992 to 1997 he was lecturer in American History at the University of Birmingham. From September 1997 to August 2005 he was Professor of American Studies and Director of the Centre for American Studies in the Department of History at Leicester.

His research and teaching interests are broad and inter-disciplinary, and focus on the the role of culture, information, news and propaganda

in foreign policy. He is the author of *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989* (Cambridge 2008). His first book, *Selling War*, published by OUP New York in 1995, was a study of British information work in the United States before Pearl Harbor, and was named by *Choice Magazine* as one of the ten best academic books of that year. He is the co-editor (with David Culbert and David Welch) of *Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500-present* (2003) which was one of *Booklist* magazine's reference books of the year, and co-editor with David Carrasco of *Alambrista and the U.S.-Mexico Border: Film, Music, and Stories of Undocumented Immigrants* (University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque, 2004). He has published numerous articles on the theme of propaganda and media history. He is an active film historian who has been part of the movement to include film and other media within the mainstream of historical sources.

He is President of the International Association for Media and History, a member of the Public Diplomacy Council and has worked closely with the British Council's Counterpoint Think Tank.

### **Ryan Henry**

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy  
U.S. Department of Defense

Ryan Henry became Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on 7 February 2003. In this role, he provides advice and assistance to the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on national security policy, military strategy, and defense policy.

Prior to his appointment, Mr. Henry served as Science Applications International Corporation's (SAIC) Corporate Vice President for Strategic Assessment and Development and before that, as a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC.

Mr. Henry has 24 years of military service, with experience as a combat commander, congressional staffer, experimental test pilot, and a technology and warfare architect with DARPA. His military awards include the O'Neill Trophy, Bronze Star with Combat "V", Meritorious Service Medal (2), Individual Air Medal (3), Strike Flight Air Medal (2), Navy Commendation (3) and Achievement Medals (2), and numerous combat, campaign, and unit citations.

Mr. Henry graduated with merit from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1972 and was a top graduate of the National Defense University in 1992.

He also has advanced degrees in Aeronautical Systems (University of Florida, 1974), Systems Management (University of Southern California, 1982), and Public Policy (University of Southern California, 1996). Mr. Henry is author of a book and numerous articles on the impacts of technology on public policy, national security, future conflict, and military operations.

**Charles P. Kosak**

Principal Director

Office of African Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Charles P. Kosak is a member of the Senior Executive Service (SES) and presently serves as the Principal Director for African Affairs.

He has served as Deputy Director of NATO Policy (10/2003 to 6/2005), Political Advisor to the Commanding General of V Corps, United States Army Europe (9/1998 to 8/2002), and Senior Policy Analyst on the OSD Balkans Task Force (1/1997 to 8/1998).

Mr. Kosak also served as Head of Office for the International Rescue Committee in Bosnia (9/1993 to 3/1995) and as a Peace Corps Volunteer in the Congo (9/1988 to 1/1991).

His awards include the Department of the Army Award for Superior Civil Service (2002), the Office of the Secretary of Defense Award for Excellence (2001), the Department of the Army Award for Civil Service (1999), the Office of the Secretary of Defense Award for Excellence (1998), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense Joint Meritorious Unit Award (1998).

He holds a Bachelors Degree from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst (Economics and Political Science) as well as Masters Degrees from the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland (International Politics and Economics) and the National War College, Washington, D.C. (National Security Studies).

Mr. Kosak speaks French and Swahili and enjoys running marathons.

**Nicole C. Lee**

Executive Director

TransAfrica Forum

Nicole Lee was appointed to the position of Executive Director of TransAfrica Forum in December 2006. Before accepting the position,



Nicole was the organization's Chief Financial Officer and a Senior Policy Researcher.

Prior to joining TransAfrica Forum, Nicole was the Managing Director of Global Justice, a Washington advocacy group focused on HIV/ AIDS and child survival policy. Prior to this, Nicole spent three years in the human rights field.

Living in Haiti, she researched claims and interviewed victims human rights abuse in Haiti for the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux. This organization provided both training and material assistance to victims' groups on the island nation. Her work included coordinating with judges and prosecutors in an effort to reform legal proceedings and assisted Haitian health sector with policy initiatives to promote "healthcare as a human right." In 2001, Nicole worked in South Africa, assisting in the largest class action lawsuit ever filed on the continent for victims of environmental racism. She has appeared on countless television and radio programs and is a regular commentator on Pacifica Radio and Al Jazeera.

Nicole holds a Juris Doctor degree and has done extensive graduate work in women's studies.

### **Mark Malan**

Peacebuilding Program Officer  
Refugees International

Mark Malan presently serves as a Peacebuilding Program Office for Refugees International. His work can best be described through the Mission statement of Refugees International as:

"[Generating] lifesaving humanitarian assistance and protection for displaced people around the world and working to end the conditions that create displacement... Refugees International acts first and foremost as a witness to the suffering of the displaced. Our advocates spend weeks in the field interviewing and meeting with war-affected populations, non-governmental organizations and aid agencies. RI conducted missions in over 20 countries in 2004, some in regions of the world where we have never previously worked. Recent missions have included the Darfur region of Sudan, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Liberia, Haiti, Uganda, Cambodia, and the Thai-Burma border, just to name a few."

Prior to joining Refugees International, Mark Malan headed the Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution department of the Kofi

Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana.

Mr. Malan was a senior researcher and head of the Training for Peace Program at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), based in Pretoria, South Africa. At ISS, Malan facilitated specialized training and research in support of ongoing efforts to establish indigenous Southern African capacities for participation in peacekeeping and peace-building missions.

He has developed a number of regional peacekeeping training courses and manuals, and has published extensively on issues relating to regional security and peacekeeping in Africa.

Before joining the ISS in 1996, Malan was a senior lecturer in Political Science at the Faculty of Military Science, University of Stellenbosch.

### **Ambassador Charles A. Minor**

Ambassador of Liberia to the United States

Charles A. Minor became ambassador of Liberia to the United States in June 2004.

Ambassador Minor, 60, comes from an area of Liberia known as Sinoe. He studied economics and industrial relations at Michigan State University, and then returned to Liberia to teach at the University of Monrovia.

He eventually went into business, becoming acting manager of Liberian Produce Marketing Corp. (LPNC), which had exclusive rights to export all of Liberia's coffee, cocoa and palm oil products. After the country's president, William R. Tolbert Jr., was deposed in a military coup in 1980, Ambassador Minor became a consultant for Arthur D. Little and in 1993 joined an Amsterdam-based agency, African Management Services Co., which is responsible for training African managers. By the time he was appointed as ambassador in Washington a decade later, he had 120 clients in 25 African countries.

Ambassador Minor is married with three children.

### **Michael Parks**

Director

USC Annenberg School of Journalism

Michael Parks is a journalist and educator whose assignments have taken him around the globe, and whose "balanced and comprehensive"

coverage of the struggle against apartheid in South Africa earned him the 1987 Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting. From 1997–2000, Parks served as editor of the *Los Angeles Times*, a period during which the Times garnered four additional Pulitzer Prizes.

Parks joined the USC Annenberg faculty in Fall 2000. In Fall 2001, he became interim director of the School of Journalism. He was named director of the school in March 2002 and finished his term June 30, 2008.

From his first overseas assignment covering the war in Vietnam as the *Baltimore Sun's* Saigon correspondent, Parks has reported on major international news events from a variety of international capitals, including Beijing, Moscow, Hong Kong, Johannesburg, and Jerusalem. He joined the *Los Angeles Times* in 1980 and in 1995 was promoted to deputy foreign editor and later managing editor, before taking the helm as editor in 1997.

As editor of the *Los Angeles Times*, Parks was responsible for news coverage and editorial page positions of the largest metropolitan newspaper in the United States. He managed an editorial staff of 1,350 and a budget of more than \$120 million. Under his direction, the Times' circulation increased 16 percent to 1,170,000 and also developed an enhanced online news site, [www.latimes.com](http://www.latimes.com). With a sense of the educational and social responsibilities held by the newspaper, Parks helped launch "Reading by 9," a community program to ensure all 9-year-old children in Southern California would read at grade level by the end of the 3rd grade, as well as editorial advocacy for adoption of a new city charter for Los Angeles and education reform, including the election of a new school board.

### **Adam Clayton Powell, III**

Vice Provost for Globalization

University of Southern California

As vice provost for globalization since June 2007, Adam Clayton Powell III works with faculty and deans to advance USC's globalization initiative, which encompasses expanding the university's international presence, increasing USC's leadership role in the Association of Pacific Rim Universities and promoting the university throughout the world.

Powell previously served as director of the USC Integrated Media Systems Center, the National Science Foundation's Research Center for multimedia research. He is a senior fellow at the USC Center on Public Diplomacy, housed in the USC Annenberg School for Communication.

Prior to joining USC in 2003, Powell was general manager of Howard University's WHUT-TV, the first African American-owned public television station in the United States. Before 2001, he served as vice president/technology and programs for the Freedom Forum. During 15 years with the Freedom Forum, he developed and oversaw digital and new-media conferences and training programs for journalists, media managers, educators, policymakers and researchers in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the United States.

Powell also has served as an executive producer at Quincy Jones Entertainment, vice president for news and information programming at National Public Radio, and manager of network radio and television news for CBS News. As a consultant, he has worked on projects in South Africa for the Ford Foundation, and in Lagos, Nigeria, for the Nigerian Television Authority. He also helped create the annual Highway Africa conference in South Africa, which has become the largest communications and digital-media conference on the African continent.

Powell has written extensively about technology, media and international issues for publications ranging from *The New York Times* and *Wired* to USC's *Online Journalism Review*. He has won numerous awards, including the 1999 World Technology Award for Media and Journalism, sponsored by *The Economist*, and the Overseas Press Club Award for international reporting for a series of broadcasts he produced on Iran.

## **Philip Seib**

Professor

USC Annenberg School of Journalism

Philip Seib joined USC Annenberg from Marquette University in Milwaukee, Wis., where he was the Lucius W. Nieman Professor of Journalism. As holder of this endowed chair, Seib focused on international news coverage, media ethics and new technologies. He was also the director of Marquette's Nieman Symposia, examining current journalism issues.

Seib's research interests include the effects of news coverage on foreign policy, political journalism, and media convergence. He is author or editor of 17 books, including: *Headline Diplomacy: How News Coverage Affects Foreign Policy*; *The Global Journalist: News and Conscience in a World of Conflict*; *Broadcasts from the Blitz: How Edward R. Murrow Helped Lead America into War*; and *Beyond the Front Lines: How the News Media Cover a World Shaped by War*. His

most recent book, *New Media and the Middle East*, was published in September 2007, and his next book, *The Al Jazeera Effect*, was published in 2008. He is also the series editor of the Palgrave Macmillan Series in International Political Communication and is co-editor of the journal *Media, War, and Conflict*, published by Sage.

Prior to teaching at Marquette, Seib was a professor in the Department of Journalism at Southern Methodist University from 1982 to 1999. During this time he also served as a political analyst for WFAA Television in Dallas and as a columnist for the Dallas Morning News.

As a professor at USC Annenberg, Seib concentrates on the linkages between media, war and terrorism, in addition to public diplomacy issues.

### **Dr. Abiodun Williams**

Associate Dean

Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Abiodun Williams was appointed Associate Dean of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies in November 2007. From 2001 to 2007, he served as Director of the Strategic Planning Unit in the Executive Office of the UN Secretary General. In that capacity, he advised Secretaries-General Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-moon on a full range of strategic issues including UN reform, international migration, and peacebuilding. He also had lead responsibility for the UN's international research and training institutes. He had three peacekeeping assignments as Special Assistant to the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1999–2000.); Special Assistant to the Representative of the Secretary-General in Haiti (1998–2000); and Political and Humanitarian Affairs Officer, UN Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia (1994–1998).

Dr. Williams also possesses experience with private foundations, having served as the founding Director of the Ford Foundation International Fellowships Program at the Institute of International Education from 2000 to 2001.

His previous academic appointments include: Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University (1988–1994); Visiting Assistant Professor in the Political Science Department and the Frederick Douglass Institute for African and African-American Studies, University of Rochester (1987–1988); Teaching Assistant and Lecturer at Tufts University (1984–1987).

Dr. Williams is Vice-Chair of the Academic Council on the UN System, Member of the Editorial Board of *Global Governance*, Honorary Fellow of the Foreign Policy Association, and Advisor to the *Club of The Hague* on the future of Refugee and Migration Policy. He has served on the International Board of Directors of the United World Colleges, the Board of Trustees of Lester B. Pearson College of the Pacific, the Board of Directors of Jesuit International Volunteers, and the Advisory Board of QSI International School of Skopje. He has published widely on conflict prevention, peacekeeping operations and multilateral negotiations. His publications include *Preventing War: The United Nations and Macedonia* (2000), and *Many Voices: Multilateral Negotiations in the World Arena* (1992).

In 1990, Dr. Williams was awarded a Pew Faculty Fellowship in International Affairs by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, and the Constantine E. McGuire Medal by Georgetown University in 1991. He won the School of Foreign Service's Outstanding Teaching Award in 1992. Dr. Williams holds an M.A. (Honors) in English Language and Literature from Edinburgh University, an M.A. in Law and Diplomacy and a Ph.D. from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

**Addendum:** Dr. Williams has since taken over as Vice President of the Centre for Conflict Analysis and Prevention at the United States Institute of Peace, based in Washington, D.C.

### **Ernest J. Wilson, III, Ph.D.**

Dean

USC Annenberg School for Communication

Ernest J. Wilson, III, is Walter Annenberg Chair in Communication and dean of the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California.

He is also a senior fellow at the USC Center on Public Diplomacy, a joint project of USC Annenberg and the USC College's School of International Relations, and an adjunct fellow at the Pacific Council on International Policy.

Dr. Wilson's scholarship focuses on the convergence of communication and information technology, public policy and the public interest. He is also a student of the "information champions," who are leaders of the information revolution around the world. His current work concentrates on the politics of global sustainable innovation in high-

technology industries; on China-Africa relations; and the role of culture in U.S. national security policy.

In addition to his most recent books—*The Information Revolution in Developing Countries* and *Negotiating the Net in Africa*—Dr. Wilson co-edits the MIT Press series *The Information Revolution and Global Politics* and an MIT journal, *Information Technologies and International Development*.

Nominated by President Bill Clinton, Dr. Wilson is the ranking senior member of the board of directors of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. He was reappointed to the CPB board by President Bush in 2004.

Prior to his appointment at USC Annenberg, Dr. Wilson was a senior research scholar at the University of Maryland, College Park, holding a joint appointment as professor in the Department of Government & Politics and in the Department of African-American Studies. From 1995 to 2002, Dr. Wilson was director of the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the university, and he remains a senior fellow of the Center.

Before joining the University of Maryland faculty in 1992, Dr. Wilson served with distinction on the faculties of the University of Michigan and the University of Pennsylvania. At the University of Michigan, he was director of the Center for Research on Economic Development and an associate research scientist at the Institute for Public Policy Studies.

Dr. Wilson has served in several senior policy positions in the public and private sector. He was director of International Programs and Resources on the National Security Council at the White House (1993–1994); director of the Policy and Planning Unit, Office of the Director, U.S. Information Agency (1994); and deputy director of the Global Information Infrastructure Commission (1994–1995).

Dr. Wilson is the recipient of numerous research fellowships and awards, including an international affairs fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations and a postdoctoral fellowship at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

### **Geoffrey Wiseman**

Director

USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School

Dr. Geoffrey Wiseman is Director of the USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School and Professor of the Practice of International Relations and Public Diplomacy at the University of Southern California.

From February 2006 to May 2007, he served in the Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General, working on the non-proliferation and disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. Dr. Wiseman is a former Australian diplomat, serving in three diplomatic postings (Stockholm, Hanoi, and Brussels) and as private secretary to Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. From 1992–95, he was the Ford Foundation’s program officer for international peace and security, based in New York City. He received his doctorate in International Relations from Oxford University. His publications include *Concepts of Non-Provocative Defence: Ideas and Practices in International Security*. He has also written on Asia-Pacific regional security and diplomatic culture. His latest publication, co-edited with Paul Sharp, is titled *The Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of International Society* (recently released by Palgrave Macmillan).

### **About the USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School**

The USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School was established in August 2003 as a partnership between the USC Annenberg School for Communication and USC College of Letters, Arts & Sciences’ School of International Relations at the University of Southern California. It is a joint research and professional training organization dedicated to furthering the study and practice of public diplomacy as it is practiced internationally.

Since its inception, the Center has become an ambitious and productive leader in the public diplomacy research and scholarship community. The Center has benefited from unique international, interdepartmental, bipartisan support from the academic, corporate, governmental and public policy communities. And it has become the definitive go-to destination for practitioners and international leaders in public diplomacy, while pursuing an innovative and cutting-edge research agenda.

In 2008, USC received one of four inaugural Benjamin Franklin Awards for Public Diplomacy from the U.S. State Department in recognition of the university’s teaching, training and research in public diplomacy.

For more information, go to [www.uscpublicdiplomacy.org](http://www.uscpublicdiplomacy.org)

### **About the USC Annenberg School for Communication**

The Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California was founded in 1971 with generous support from Ambassador



Walter H. Annenberg. Its strategic location in Los Angeles at USC enables it to foster dynamic synergies and multidisciplinary approaches to the study of communication and journalism through unparalleled access to the nation's and the world's entertainment, media and technology industries.

In 1994, two of USC's related academic departments—Communication Arts & Sciences and Journalism—merged with the Annenberg School, creating two distinct academic units within USC Annenberg: the School of Communication and the School of Journalism.

While the faculty and research programs were expanded and strengthened as a result of the merger, Ambassador Annenberg's mission statement remains the central focus of the School:

Every human advancement or reversal can be understood through communication. The right to free communication carries with it the responsibility to respect the dignity of others, and this must be recognized as irreversible. Educating students to communicate this message effectively and to be of service to all people is the enduring mission of this school.

Today, with more than 70 full-time faculty members, more than 1,900 undergraduate and graduate students, and dozens of research and public interest projects and programs, including the Norman Lear Center and the Knight Digital Media Center, USC Annenberg has become a center for discussion among scholars and professionals in journalism, communication, public policy, media, and education.

Multidisciplinary and international in scope, focused and practical in application, USC Annenberg scholars, both students and faculty, are defining these fields for the 21st century and beyond.

### **About the Center for International Studies**

The Center for International Studies (CIS) promotes advanced research and critical debate of theoretical and policy issues in world affairs. The Center supports the research of faculty and students; hosts scholars from the United States and abroad; organizes public seminars, workshops and conferences; promotes collaborative research projects; and contributes to public understanding of international affairs.

Originally founded as the research unit of the USC College of Letters, Arts and Sciences' School of International Relations, CIS now brings together faculty from around the university to focus on one of the

primary areas of academic enquiry for the 21st century: the economic, social, psychological, political, historical and geographic causes and effects of increased flows of goods, money, services, ideas, and culture across international borders. Over the last 16 years, CIS has expanded its activities and membership and annually supports over 30 USC faculty and graduate students in addition to several Visiting and Affiliated Scholars.