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The Cultural Awakening in Public Diplomacy

By R.S. Zaharna

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**THE CULTURAL AWAKENING
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R.S. Zaharna

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THE CULTURAL AWAKENING IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

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CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy

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The Cultural Awakening in Public Diplomacy

Part I

Culture—as an underlying force that shapes the public communication between nations and publics in the global political arena – has been curiously underexplored in public diplomacy. Yet culture infuses every aspect of public diplomacy, from policy, to practice, to scholarship. From the values and ideals buried in the political goals to the characteristic patterns of how a nation or political entity communicates with publics all reverberate with cultural tones. This paper explores the intersection of culture and public diplomacy, looking at where their paths cross and what can we learn while pausing at those intersections. The goal is to stimulate thinking on culture and create a cultural awakening in public diplomacy.

Part I focuses on the oversight of culture in public diplomacy, how it could occur as well as its repercussions and concludes with why culture will gain urgency in the near future. Part II brings culture back into public diplomacy, beginning with developing cultural awareness and knowledge and learning how to recognize culture’s eloquent signs in communication, perception, cognition, values, identity and power. The study ends with culture in public diplomacy scholarship and practice.

Overlooking Culture

Over the past decade there has been a surge of interest in public diplomacy. Around the globe, governments have developed new agencies and departments devoted to public diplomacy, initiated specialized training programs and reports, and launched broadcast media and other initiatives.¹ The proliferation of studies has give rise to what Bruce Gregory called the “sunrise” of an academic field.²

While the interest over the past decade may be new, the practice of one political entity trying to influence the public of another is not. In fact, public diplomacy may be as old *if not older* than traditional diplomacy. In ancient China, India, and pre-Islamic Arabia,

diplomacy was conducted in a public venue or in the presence of influential court elite and stressed oral speaking skills. As diplomatic scholars Hamilton and Langhorne observed, diplomacy in ancient Greece “was surprisingly” open and public.

Yesterday, like today, public diplomacy spans across cultural terrains as well as political borders. Culture intersects at nearly every juncture of public diplomacy, from vision, to policy, to practice. Communication scholars have argued that communication and culture are so intertwined they cannot be separated. As intercultural scholars John Condon and Fathi Yousef noted, “We cannot separate culture from communication, for as soon as we start to talk about one we are almost inevitably talking about the other, too.”³ Public diplomacy, as a communication as well as political phenomenon, is doubly influenced by culture. Scholars have long noted that nations have developed their own unique political cultures.⁴

The attention paid to culture lags well behind the exploration found in public diplomacy’s parent fields of communication and international relations (IR) studies. In the 1990s, IR studies scholars began exploring culture’s role in conflict resolution, security studies, and traditional diplomacy.⁵ The example of traditional diplomacy is illustrative. Originally, diplomatic scholars maintained that principles of negotiations were “universal.” Raymond Cohen’s landmark study, which was soon followed by others, found that culture does matter.⁶ He demonstrated, what seasoned diplomats instinctively knew, namely that Arab, Japanese and U.S. diplomats do not “negotiate” the same way or necessarily from the same premise. The distinctive styles were traceable to the differing cultural and intellectual heritages. The benefit of exploring culture ultimately led to diplomats being better able to “negotiate” across different contexts.

Similarly, in communication subfields, scholars are excavating cultural features buried in public relations, marketing and advertising practices and scholarship. It is not only a matter of what sells – a double-chocolate doughnut in Denver or the dried pork and seaweed doughnut in Shanghai – as Dunkin’ Donuts discovered, it matters

how they are sold. For health communicators, knowledge of cultural nuances can literally mean the difference between programs that falter and those that save lives.

To date, public diplomacy scholarship may have only skimmed the surface of the connection between culture and public diplomacy. Within the field, discussions of culture tend to fall under cultural diplomacy. Here culture is not only visible, but is viewed as a positive force in fostering mutual understanding. Culture is spoken of primarily as a product for export, a vehicle for understanding, or a tool for communicating with culturally diverse publics. These aspects of culture that people can observe, listen to, or talk openly about represent the explicit side of culture.

An awareness or mindfulness of culture can play a positive role in enhancing relations and communication between nations and people. This awareness may in part be the true strength of cultural diplomacy – culture’s power is very much acknowledged. However, there is also an implicit, unspoken side of culture that can sabotage even the best designed public diplomacy initiatives with culturally diverse publics. Not all cultural encounters are positive.⁷ And culture is not just something visible in the audience; from the audience’s perspective it’s the culture of the communicator that is most glaringly.

Public diplomacy is not “culture free.” ... When public diplomacy initiatives fail and even backfire, the reason may be the hidden side of culture, or the cultural underbelly of public diplomacy.

When public diplomacy initiatives fail and even backfire, the reason may be the hidden side of culture, or the cultural underbelly of public diplomacy. “What culture hides, it hides most effectively from its own members,” remarked Edward T. Hall.⁸ In public diplomacy, culture tends to hide in political, economic, and even bureaucratic factors. A critical step in exploring the cultural underbelly in public diplomacy is untangling the cultural from the political.

Harvard professor Akira Iriye helps sort the cultural from political in foreign affairs in his discussion of a nation's "cultural identity" and its "national interests." Iriye first explains the intangible and unique factors of cultural identity:

"... each country has its own cultural identity in that it is defined by people who share certain traditions, memories, and ways of life ... [this includes] intangible factors such as a nation's ideas, opinions, moods, and tastes. Symbols, words, and gestures that reflect its people's thought and behavior patterns comprise their cultural vocabulary in terms of which they relate themselves to other peoples."⁹

Because of culture, Iriye suggested that "all international relations are intercultural relations." However, understanding a nation in terms of its cultural identity and cultural outlook differs from an understanding of a country's national interests. As Iriye writes,

"This [cultural relations] is a different approach to the study of foreign affairs from the usual interpretations that stress military, security, trade, and other issues that affect a country's 'interests.' In terms of such factors, nations are more or less interchangeable. Balance-of-power considerations, for instance, have a logic of their own irrespective of the cultural identity of a given actor, as do commercial interests or national security arrangements."¹⁰

Viewing international relations through the lens of culture adds an important dimension to understanding the actions of nations, especially when the "logic" of the other factors fail.

Iriye's idea that "all international relations are intercultural relations," may be similar to the idea that all international communication is intercultural communication. In international communication, the communication technologies and media that nations use to communicate include tools such as television, radio, and now social media. What makes a nation's communication and public diplomacy culturally unique is how these tools are used and

content or programming they select to communicate with domestic and foreign publics.

In public diplomacy, separating the cultural from the political is important for understanding how culture may intervene in public diplomacy practice and scholarship. The tendency has been to favor explanations of public diplomacy approaches in terms of political, economic and other strategic goals over cultural heritages and assumptions.

Culture may have been a factor undermining the effectiveness of the “old” one-way public diplomacy and spawning the rise of the “new” public diplomacy. The “new” public diplomacy described recently in separate reports by Jan Melissen¹¹ and Kathy Fitzpatrick¹² suggests a more relational approach to public diplomacy. Coincidentally, however, limitations of the “old” public diplomacy based on one-way, messaging strategies occurred following an encounter with two new realities. The first reality was the culturally diverse and aware publics (U.S. public diplomacy in the Arab and Islamic world). A second reality was the entrance of major non-Western public diplomacy players, primarily in Asia, who appeared to have their own assumptions and approach to communication in the international political arena. Rather than being simply a shift from “old” to “new,” instead there may be the outlines of different, culturally-informed models of public diplomacy

Culture may also challenge conceptions of soft power. At present, culture is seen primarily as a feature of soft power. Yet, it may be that culture also shapes how soft power is perceived and used by different nations. Joseph Nye identified a nation’s culture as one of the three primary elements of its soft power resources that nations can wield to enhance their appeal or attraction. This perspective views soft power as primarily an individual attribute,

A multi-cultural perspective speaks to different ways of looking out at the world, and by extension, the role of public diplomacy.

a resource held by an individual political entity. Other conceptions of soft power may be external to the individual entity. In addition to being an individual attribute, soft power could be conceptualized in terms of “relational quality,”¹³ or emerge through relational dynamics. Thus, it may be that rather than culture falling under soft power’s umbrella that soft power falls under culture’s umbrella.

As yet, there are few culturally-informed analytical frameworks that can help us speak constructively about observable differences in public diplomacy and appreciate the significance of those differences for communicating in a multi-cultural global arena. Developing a multi-cultural perspective of public diplomacy differs from comparative public diplomacy. In comparative public diplomacy, the public diplomacy may “look different” compared to others. It is an externally-positioned analysis often using a single analytical lens. Several recent comparative studies, for example, use soft power as a lens to discuss public diplomacy.¹⁴ This is an internally-positioned analysis that helps create new analytical lenses.¹⁵

The addition of differing cultural lenses may provide fresh impetus for public diplomacy scholarship and practice. These lenses may be the key for developing theory, which as Eytan Gilboa argued, is the necessary leap that public diplomacy needs to transform an emerging field into a discipline in its own right.¹⁶

Why the Oversight?

The reasons why culture is often overlooked makes the need to explore it even more compelling.

In international studies, culture was seen as a “non-rational” element that, like religion and emotion, did not fit nicely in rational models. Without an understanding of culture, scholars were vulnerable to not only overlooking its significance, but over exaggerating its power. In 1993, Samuel Huntington’s influential piece the “Clash of Civilizations” sounded alarm bells about the inevitable consequences of cultural differences.¹⁷ Throughout the 1990s, there was a surge of interest in culture in the field of international relations.

After September 11, 2001, understanding culture including religion gained a sense of urgency, especially in security studies. That new research revealed that conflicts are more likely to stem from economic factors, particularly competition over scarce resources. Cultural contact has often led to cross-fertilization of cultural heritages and rejuvenation of civilizations.

Without an understanding of culture, scholars were vulnerable to not only overlooking its significance, but over exaggerating its power.

The polemic lens may highlight the battles of the Crusaders, yet the Islamic scholarship and innovations they brought back was the well spring of the European renaissance.

More recently, knowledge of culture, as well as religion, is being used in diplomacy as a pivotal feature in reconciliation.¹⁸ While culture was initially seen as the inevitable cause of conflict, intensive research into culture has revealed that culture may also be a valuable tool for understanding and mitigating conflict.

The role of culture in public diplomacy has also been controversial, particularly as it relates to the assumption of universality. Culture has long been suspect in undermining U.S. public diplomacy initiatives in the Arab world. Other scholars have downplayed the primacy of culture and cultural differences. Kelton Rhoads made a compelling case that the cognitive processes that underlie persuasive strategies are universal.¹⁹ Therefore, the persuasive approach used in public diplomacy should be universal as well. However, international teams of researchers are questioning the assumption of universality about such cognitive processes²⁰ as well as associated persuasion theories.²¹ The University of Michigan has established a “Culture and Cognition Lab,” to study the interplay between cultural contexts and psychological processes.²²

The use of values in public diplomacy may be also controversial, albeit less explored. The appeal of using values in persuasive communication dates back to Aristotle and underlies a handful

of contemporary theories of persuasion. While a value may be “universal” in its appearance, the nature of its expression may vary considerably from culture to culture. Even values that on the surface may be considered basic or fundamental, such as “tolerance” or “harmony,” can be perceived quite differently. Differences in how values are understood and expressed may undermine a campaign’s effectiveness. Differences in value perceptions can inadvertently backfire if publics respond to a foreign value campaign by reaffirming their own value.

Ironically, cultural dominance may be another reason why culture has been overlooked. Although public diplomacy is a global phenomenon, much of the current writing is based on the U.S. experience²³ and uses U.S. public diplomacy as the model for other countries.²⁴ The term itself, as Nicholas Cull details, is traced back to 1965 in the United States.²⁵ Many of the early and prominent reports

At the time of this writing, the entry for “public diplomacy” in Wikipedia comes with an alert about the predominant U.S. focus and lack of worldwide view.

were produced by U.S and U.K. government agencies and private institution. Other prominent sources are also Western in origin, such as the Clingendael in the Netherlands. Recently there has also been a surge of interest in Asia, particularly, China, which is broadening the perspective.²⁶ Despite this global

interest, as Bruce Gregory noted, the overwhelming majority of public diplomacy research has been focused on the U.S. as either the sponsor or target of public diplomacy.²⁷

At the time of this writing, the entry for “public diplomacy” in Wikipedia comes with an alert about the predominant U.S. focus and lack of worldwide view. Wikipedia has flagged public diplomacy as part of its project to counter “systemic bias,” or “to control and (possibly) eliminate the cultural perspective gaps.”

The dominance of U.S. perspective in public diplomacy and the omission of culture in public diplomacy are noteworthy given the U.S. historical experience with culture. Intercultural scholars

long ago noted the peculiarity of Americans to view themselves as “culture free.”²⁸ As Edward Sapir observed back in 1934, there is a general tendency to see the behavior of others as “culture,” but to see our own behavior as evidence of “personality.”²⁹ Hence, the popular refrain, “Culture is something that members of *other* populations have, the lens that shapes the way *they* see the world.”³⁰ While there are numerous books about other cultures written in English as well as comparative cross-cultural and intercultural texts, Edward Stewart’s book is one of the few works devoted to “American Cultural Patterns.”³¹

Andrew Stewart, in a study on U.S. attitudes toward culture and U.S. foreign policy, reflected on the U.S. historical experience of needing to unify a young nation of immigrants:

“America faced the challenge of assimilating immigrants from nearly every culture in the world. In such an environment, any foreign culture is seen as a problem to overcome. U.S. success has come from blurring cultural differences and finding common ground among disparate peoples to produce a ‘new’ American identity. U.S. history is one of breaking down foreign cultures, the opposite of cultural savvy, which is to understand and work with other cultures.”³²

Stewart says this historical experience of blurring and assimilating cultural differences gave rise to a “New World Paradigm” that primed Americans to overlook culture, find universal commonalities, and work pragmatic solutions based on perceived “objective facts.”³³ The tendency to focus on “universals” found within the U.S.³⁴ can be source of consternation for others who may hold a more pluralistic view of behaviors, relations, and contexts.³⁵ Most Americans perhaps do not see the contradiction between American “exceptionalism,” and the suggestion that American values are “universal.”

Part of the breaking down of cultures was also through language. Until recently, most Americans tend to be monolingual and battles over “English Only” laws were as recent as the 1980s. The “New World” paradigm rejected the conflicts and traditions of the “Old World” paradigm, and embraced modernity and change.

Mary Douglas, speaking from the field of development economics, raises another interesting possibility of why culture has been overlooked by highlighting the assumption of individualism and culture as a group phenomenon that may limit or control individual self-interest. As Douglas noted, mainstream economic theories were based on rational models in which the individual would pursue self-interests: “Rational behavior is axiomatically self-interest.”³⁶

The observation of individualism is particularly significant. Individualism has been a defining U.S. feature from when Alex de Tocqueville first coined the term in his visit to early America in the 1830s.³⁷ Over a century later, Robert N. Bellah’s study of American society, *Habits of the Heart*, asserted that “Individualism lies at the very core of American culture”³⁸. Larry Samovar and his colleagues link individualism to survival in the founding and settling of the United States: “The more people were able to accomplish on their own, independent of others, the more able they were to survive the unsettled land... self-reliance was paramount.”³⁹ Despite the waves of new immigrants that have come to America’s shores, individualism continues to define the American persona. In a 2007 Pew Global Attitude survey, individualism stood out as the defining characteristic that distinguished Americans from the world.⁴⁰

The premium placed on individualism may overshadow relational and contextual perspectives. DeVita and Armstrong observed that Americans tend to view “their routine behaviors as their own individual choice rather than the produce of a tradition of similar choices.”⁴¹ Social problems “are people problems that must be addressed at the individual level,” observed Elder and Cobb, “The thought that problems might be structural or contextual is alien to the American political culture.”⁴² Condon and Yousef point to the sense of individualism symbolized on the individual stars on the U.S. flag, each independent and equal. “This fusion of individualism and equality is so valued and so basic,” said the scholars, “that many Americans find it most difficult to relate to contrasting values of other cultures [of] interdependence, complementary relationships and valued difference.”⁴³

The oversight of culture in public diplomacy is a feature shared by public diplomacy's associated fields of communication and international relations – both fields which the U.S. dominates as well. In international relations studies, surveys of scholarship from 1977 to the present reveal that U.S. scholarly output was and still is greater compared to the European production.⁴⁴ As Ole Wæver observed, international relations studies was not so international after all.⁴⁵ In one of the latest reviews, van den Assem and Volten noted that more than dominating in sheer numbers, the studies showed a U.S. preference for a rational choice approach: “In the United States, both academic discourse and political culture are framed by a material and individualistic approach of reality. Power, whether hard or soft, remains central to this mainstream thinking.”⁴⁶ The wave of interest in culture that occurred in the 1990s was partly in response to the recognition that culture had always been present but largely overlooked in Western scholarship. Lapid called it the “return of culture’s ship” to international relations studies.⁴⁷

In the field of communication, interest in culture’s impact gave birth to the separate subfield of intercultural communication in the 1970s.⁴⁸ The other communication subfields and practices remained largely culture free until fairly recently. Public relations, for example, as Kathy Fitzpatrick noted recently, was still U.S.-centric.⁴⁹ The early 1990s saw the emergence of international public relations, which basically consisted of comparative studies of public relations in different countries. The “excellence model,” developed by a leading U.S. public relations scholar, was used as the underlying model for the comparative studies.⁵⁰ Culture was seen as a component of public relations, but it did not play a central role.⁵¹ In the early 2000s, as more scholars began writing from their native perspectives, the role of culture became more pronounced.⁵² The first books on culture and public relations have only emerged in the past couple of years.⁵³

The field of international relations appears to share a similar pattern. In several of the IR studies fields the dominant paradigm was assumed to be “universal.” This was the case, as mentioned earlier, for negotiations and traditional diplomacy. A similar transition from

assumed universality to culture-specific observations emerged in conflict resolution.⁵⁴ Most recently, scholars have questioned the dominant theories of international relations and taken culture a step further by introducing non-Western perspectives of IR theory.⁵⁵

The pattern of development, particularly the emergence of culture, is significant for first exposing the possibility that models

This trend from culture blind “universal” assumptions to an “international” perspective involving comparative studies, to culture emerging as a pivotal feature of new models and perspectives may suggest public diplomacy’s future course.

developed by and on the U.S. experience are not universal or “culture free” after all, but are rather “culture bound.” This exposure helped usher in non-Western perspectives and paved the way for the developing new models based on the intellectual heritages found around the globe. This trend from culture blind “universal” assumptions to an “international” perspective

involving comparative studies, to culture emerging as a pivotal feature of new models and perspectives may suggest public diplomacy’s future course.

There are reasons to suggest that recent changes within and outside the United States may be sparking a shift in U.S. attitudes and awareness about culture. Within the United States, there has been a seismic demographic shift. Only a generation ago, American society, or “mainstream America” was characterized as WASP (White, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant). Recent U.S. census data reveals a major trend in the United States toward becoming more racially and ethnically diverse.⁵⁶ At present 35 percent of the U.S. population consists of ethnic “minorities,” while five states have already seen ethnic “minorities” become the new majority, according to the U.S. census. Globalization and internationalization of education, commerce, travel, and agriculture have increased the exposure and need to understand different cultures. Increased mobility and technological connectivity have similarly heightened intercultural interaction.

In response to the increased interaction with ethnically and culturally diverse publics, there has been a proliferation of “diversity training” across segments of the U.S. society, from public elementary schools to factories, to the U.S. military. The term and focus on “diversity” is in itself noteworthy, as Stewart noted, given the assumption of blurring cultural differences and focusing on commonality.⁵⁷ “Diversity training” focuses on strategies for recognizing and dealing with cultural differences. In other societies such as Singapore, where one may find a strong awareness of cultural identity and cultural distinctions, efforts tend to focus on “solidarity,” which highlights commonalities.

While there may be a rapid awakening to culture in the U.S. perspective, for many other countries culture has always played a central role. India is illustrative. “In the Indian society,” says Usha Vyasulu Reddi, “homogeneity is preminent by its absence.”⁵⁸ As Reddi explains:

“The culture remains for the Indian, all pervasive, a kind of ruling principle, an intangible order of values and relationships. It is a highly complex jigsaw puzzle of fourteen major languages, at least five major religions and races, different music and dance forms.”⁵⁹

What is interesting is that while U.S. approach to culture was assimilation, defined as a blending of differences into a commonality, for other societies such as India where there are many different perspectives, often contradictory, the tendency is toward pluralism. Diverse elements “are held together but not merged.” Reddi attributes Indian culture’s resilience and survival over the past 3,000 years of living tradition to the ability to accommodate differences and allow opposites to co-exist.⁶⁰

“The culture seems irrational and inconsistent, is slow to adapt and generally inefficient but it is resilient; thus it has survived in spite of continuous invasions and changes in the socio-political system.”

The view of multiple cultures interacting is captured in a quote by the late Indian leader, Mahatma Gandhi:

“I don’t want my home to be walled in on all sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want the cultures of all the lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible, but I refuse to be blown off my feet, by any.”

Repercussions of Overlooking Culture

Failure to give culture the same dues as political, economic and military factors may have several repercussions. First, not fully understanding others at a cultural level can result in costly mistakes. For public diplomacy this applies to both policy and specific initiatives. Scholars have identified several historical examples in which the U.S. tendency to overlook culture resulted in unexpected and unwanted “surprises,” including the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1946, the fall of the Shah of Iran, as well as the more recent 9/11 attacks.⁶¹ Even when events are monitored, culturally significant cues may be misunderstood. In intelligence assessments, the problem is often not a lack of information, but how the information is interpreted.⁶²

Several of the U.S. post 9/11 public diplomacy initiatives targeted toward the Arab and Islamic world appeared to falter because of lack of cultural understanding.⁶³ Michael Valhos observed, “America’s vision of the situation and cultural context was just plain wrong,” allowing “the enemy to turn our own work against us.”⁶⁴

Lack of awareness of unshared cultural assumptions can cause a public diplomacy initiative to fail, or worse, backfire. A public diplomacy initiative might be considered ineffective if it simply fails to resonate with a foreign public in the same way the planners hoped that it would. Ineffective initiatives are usually the result of a mismatch of cross-cultural communication styles of message content and delivery. Whereas ineffective initiatives involve cultural misunderstanding about communication patterns and styles, initiatives that backfire often involve issues tied to cultural identity.

Often when an audience reacts in a highly negative or even hostile manner to a communication, issues of cultural identity are involved.⁶⁵

Culture awareness is a two-sided equation in that it involves both the self and other. Without cultural self-awareness it is difficult to accurately perceive and understand the behavior of others.⁶⁶ Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright alludes to the failure to understand the responses of others to one's own action in her remarks at the opening of a conference on Culture and Diplomacy:

“...a successful US foreign policy requires an understanding of foreign cultures. Without that, we would fail to interpret correctly what others say, and fail to convey clearly to others what we intend. Our actions would prompt reactions we have not foreseen, and we would find ourselves constantly beset with problems to which we have no answers because we wouldn't even know the right question to ask.”⁶⁷

Often, without understanding of the culture of another, the tendency is to assume that others are like us. This would mean not only ascribing the same meaning to the behavior of others, but imagining the same behavioral intent or motivation. “The naïve but normal practice is to project one's own mindset onto other people,” cautioned Glenn Fisher.⁶⁸ Rather than seeing the behaviors neutrally, one would instead see projections.

Faith and religion in public-based diplomacy is illustrative.⁶⁹ Without awareness about the religious precepts of another, the default perspective of viewing another through one's own perspective may include heavy doses of stereotypical images and fears. Conversely, greater knowledge about another's religious beliefs helps dispel projections and opens up avenues for viewing impasses.

Lack of cultural knowledge and awareness can mean having to work within a limited range of policy options.

Australian scholar John Blaxland raises interesting observations about Burma, which has garnered increasing attention lately. He notes that the tendency has been to approach resistant regimes from the “outside” and attempt to impose change.⁷⁰ Blaxland suggests that policy options can be expanded from an “inside” perspective through greater cultural understanding.

Overlooking the cultural component may mean having a limited and potentially distorted understanding of others’ behaviors. Analyses that focus only on political, economic, or other traditionally observable factors may provide plausible explanations for the “logical” behaviors of others, but not for the seemingly “irrational” or “unexplained” motivations. To understand what on the surface may appear “irrational,” requires public diplomacy moving beyond listening to what Rentsch and her colleagues called “multi-cultural perspective taking.”⁷¹ Without an appreciation of the cultural factor, it is difficult to understand the depth of “cultural identity,” the challenge of “cultural insecurity,” or the implications of “cultural power.”

Failure to account for the role of culture can mean that other factors such as political or military aspects gain added weight and overshadow important cultural patterns. Difficulties in differentiating between what is cultural and what is political can obscure culturally-mediated perspectives of political relationships.

Dellios, for example, draws upon Indian and Chinese intellectual heritages to explain a mandala perspective of the complex interwoven pattern of relations found in Asia. Mandala, which comes from the Sanskrit name for circles, is a relational diagram that was originally proposed to avoid the use of the state-based “inter-national” system. Southeast Asian polities, as Dellois explains “did not conform to a territorially defined state with fixed borders and a bureaucratic apparatus, but they diverged considerably in the opposite direction: the polity was defined by its centre rather than its boundaries, and it could be composed of numerous other tributary polities without undergoing administrative integration.”⁷²

In speaking of Indonesia's IR approach, Sebastian and Lanti, used the term "inter-mandala relationships."

"Indonesia sees its own role to some extent in traditional terms reminiscent not of territorial nation-states with clearly demarcated borders, but of centers of foci which radiate power and prestige over larger or smaller regions from one period to another. Indonesia is perceived to stand at the centre"⁷³

The predominance of U.S. scholarship as a cultural force in public diplomacy cannot be underestimated. First, the U.S. perspective represents a mono-cultural perspective in what is undeniably a multicultural world of diverse publics and perspectives. Second, the U.S. model, with its buried assumptions, may not be the best fit for other countries that may have different political values or communication styles. Chinese

Professor Yiwei Wang, for example, noted that Chinese public diplomacy had used "U.S. public diplomacy as a major model," even though he believed the Chinese approach was closer to the cultural exchange/cultural diplomacy of the French than to "American-style media diplomacy."⁷⁴

Third, if the U.S. model is posed as the standard, approaches that reflect elements of other

cultural heritages may appear lacking rather than different. Prof. Wang described the Chinese culture as a "considerable obstacle to effective Chinese public diplomacy."⁷⁵ Finally, the dominance of one cultural perspective may overshadow the rich contributions that the intellectual heritages of other societies can offer to expand the vision of public diplomacy scholarship and practice. Without an understanding of the dynamics of culture's impact on the field itself, scholars may perpetuate cultural biases rather than gain insight from different cultural perspectives.

"Different cultural perspectives suggest that what public diplomacy is most lacking is culturally-informed models of public diplomacy... Without an understanding of the dynamics of culture's impact on the field itself, scholars may perpetuate cultural biases rather than gain insight from different cultural perspectives."

The need for cultural perspective is critical for developing a fuller spectrum of public diplomacy models. In much the same way Western scholars refer back to the Greek philosopher Aristotle's (384 BC – 322 BC) *Rhetoric*, scholars in Asia have turned to their religious and philosophical treatises to develop normative theories of communication. As Indian scholar D Sinha pointed argued back in 1965:

“Long before the advent of scientific psychology in the West, India, like most countries of the developing world, had its own religious and metaphysical systems that contained elaborate theories about human nature, actions, personalities, and interrelationships in the world ...”⁷⁶

This wealth of intellectual heritages around the world may prove to be the wellspring for new public diplomacy models and perspectives.

Cultural Hotspots in Public Diplomacy

The need for cultural knowledge and awareness take on greater urgency for public diplomacy given two trends that are likely to intensify.

Cultural Identity

The first trend that will require greater cultural knowledge is the growing salience of cultural identity in the public arena. As global

“For some, fears of cultural domination in an age of borderless communication technologies may appear exaggerated and perhaps unfounded. However, for nations who experienced the pain and humiliation of foreign colonial intrusion and domination of their internal affairs, public diplomacy may not be perceived as benign or welcomed.”

flows of people, products, and ideas erase national borders; culture becomes the new frontier for defining identities as well as allegiances. Public diplomacy, like other forms of communication, is inherently about identity and image in that it says something about

how each party sees itself (identity) and the other (image). Public diplomacy has focused primarily on one side of the equation; that of a sponsor protecting and promoting its own image. However, a public may also have a shared sense of collective or cultural identity. Public diplomacy shares with other forms of public communication a certain occupational hazard in that the mass media can not only distort but magnify images. The goal of public communication used to be how to reach the most people. Increasingly, because of cultural identity, that goal has been replaced by how to offend the least amount of people.

Communication that is perceived as challenging or violating a public's cultural identity can inadvertently trigger a backlash. Such incidents involving the mass media, because of its magnifying effect, can spiral out of the sponsor's control. The 2005 Danish caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad was a vivid example of perceived offenses related to cultural identity and how culturally significant icons of identity can inflame public sentiment. In order for public diplomats to avoid such cases in the future, they will require a sophisticated awareness of the cues and strategies for navigating the dynamics of cultural identities and representation in the international arena.

Related to the issue of cultural identity are perceptions of challenges to cultural sovereignty. For some, fears of cultural domination in an age of borderless communication technologies may appear exaggerated and perhaps unfounded. However, for nations who experienced the pain and humiliation of foreign colonial intrusion and domination of their internal affairs, public diplomacy may not be perceived as benign or welcomed. Today's advanced communication technologies and stealth persuasion strategies have the power to cross national borders with little public scrutiny and even less control by the government in power. If such an intervention was a visible, military assault calls to arms might be raised. In the battle for hearts and minds, such call to arms might be in the name of cultural identity.

A second trend that is also likely to intensify and require greater cultural knowledge is the move within public diplomacy toward collaboration. Collaboration was the third layer, after monologue and dialogue, which has been overlooked in public diplomacy according to Cowan and Arsenault.⁷⁷ Although overlooked, the scholars suggest that collaboration “can sometimes be *the* most important form of public diplomacy” (emphasis theirs).⁷⁸ The trend toward collaboration may stem from the changing nature of problems in the global arena. As Lucian Hudson detailed in his recent study on

“Collaboration in public diplomacy may well become the strategic equivalent of negotiation in traditional diplomacy.”

collaboration for the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, governments increasingly have had to join hands with corporate and nongovernmental organizations to tackle complex or “wickedly complex” global problems.⁷⁹ Unlike “tame” problems that can be solved in a linear,

individual manner, in which, one proceeds to study the problem, gather information, develop and implement solutions; “wicked” problems are so intertwined that trying to solve one aspect of ‘a problem’ creates new problems.

Tackling “wicked” problems requires collaboration. The recent mantra of relationship-building, networking, alliances, partnership and engagement are all part of the vocabulary of collaboration. Collaboration in public diplomacy may well become the strategic equivalent of negotiation in traditional diplomacy.

At the heart of collaboration is the ability to bring people of diverse backgrounds together and get them to combine their efforts to achieve a unified goal. Research reveals that cultural and ethnic diversity are the biggest sources of friction – and synergy – in collaborative teams. The friction of working with others may be expected because of the differing perspectives and values, work styles, and so on. Professor Scott Page, a professor of complex systems, has pointed to the benefits of diversity, especially in problem-solving and innovation.⁸⁰ Groups with a shared or similar

perspective often tend to see and approach a problem in a similar way. It is easy to get stuck on a single solution, especially if it is perceived by everyone as 'obvious.' Cognitive diversity, or different ways of thinking, can help a group frame and interpret a problem from different vantage points. These differing problem-solving perspectives and strategies can enable a group to generate multiple solutions. Page found cultural diversity to have the most significant impact of problem solving.

For the public diplomat of the 21st century, working with diversity and culture represents a curse as well as blessing. A public diplomat's skills in invoking culture's curse or blessing will rest upon her cultural awareness and knowledge.

So long as culture remains an underexplored area of study, public diplomacy is vulnerable to its power. Conversely, with greater awareness and knowledge, public diplomats would be better able to harness the power of culture to enhance public diplomacy. Cynthia Schneider observed, "cultural knowledge and understanding are at the heart of every foreign policy challenge."⁸¹

Part II

Developing Cultural Awareness & Knowledge: *Other and Self*

Many of the problems and potential solutions referred to above rest on recognizing and then interpreting important cultural cues. In public diplomacy, culture's web of influence spans across policy, practice and research and encompasses both the sponsor and intended public. The problem is that much of culture's influence lays "out-of-awareness" for both the sponsor and the intended public in public diplomacy. One of the keys to effective public diplomacy is developing an "in-awareness" cultural approach to public diplomacy.

The idea of "in-awareness" comes from an anthropologist, Edward T. Hall. Some may recognize Hall as the founder of the field of intercultural communication. However, Hall's work began not in communication but in diplomacy at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) of the U.S. State Department. Following WWII, the State Department found that the effectiveness of its diplomats was hampered by lack of language and cultural knowledge. In 1949, the U.S Foreign Service Institute was established to train those diplomats in need of culture, in the newly established Foreign Service Institute. Hall was one of several anthropologists and linguists who joined the FSI.

Originally, Hall and the other anthropologist lectured on the broad, macro-level aspects of culture such as its political, economic, or religious systems. The diplomats, however, were concerned about what happens when two people from different cultures interact. Hall shifted his focus to applied culture. One of Hall's first tasks was to help the diplomats see culture's role in influencing people's behaviors and perceptions.

As Hall points out, because so much of communication is learned and performed out-of-awareness, people tend to take them for granted. Behaviors, such as how close to stand next to someone, how long to look at someone and even whether to look them in the eye, are often learned through "modeling" or imitating others.

Additionally, he explained that the brain operates on the principle of negative feedback when it comes to social behaviors. As long as things go smoothly the tendency is to overlook the routine. It was when things went wrong, the negative feedback, that people realized a mishap. Hall's goal of in-awareness was to get people to recognize, to stop and reflect on the possible cultural implications when they encountered negative feedback. What may be routine for one cultural setting may not be so for another.

Hall developed experiential techniques such as role playing and situational exercises to help bring "in-awareness" to the many aspects of culture that people take for granted. Bringing culture "in-awareness" applies not only to how one views others from different cultures. Gaining self-awareness about the influence of one's own culture is an important aspect of achieving a full picture of cultural in-awareness. Without a conscious awareness of how another culture differs from one's own, there is a tendency to see the differences of another through the prism of one's culture. Ethnocentricity occurs when one uses one's own cultural standards as a yardstick for measuring other cultures; inevitably the other culture comes up lacking.

Often, awareness and knowledge go hand-in-hand. Greater cultural awareness is key to building and refining one's trove of cultural knowledge. And, with greater knowledge comes an awareness of the nuances that expose cultural variations. Hall's discussion of high-context and low-context communication is illustrative. Low-context communicators tend to search for meaning in the code or message. High-context communicators search for meaning in the context, or setting, including relations.⁸² Other prominent cross-cultural patterns that highlight the message-relational focus include individualism-collectivism,⁸³ activity-orientation and being-orientation,⁸⁴ direct and indirect,⁸⁵ and oral and literate.⁸⁶ These patterns have been used to explain differences in cross-cultural styles found in marketing communication, advertising, web design as well as diplomatic negotiations and conflict management.

Awareness is also critical when one considers the dynamic nature of culture. Culture is a human-created and human-perpetuated organic phenomenon. Scholars caution about the tendency to reify culture as a static phenomenon that becomes a label for describing people.

Rather than viewing culture as a thing or noun, anthropologists have talked about the idea of culture as a verb.⁸⁷ Culture as a verb signifies the dynamic aspect of culture and our interactions with others. This dynamic view can help one distinguish between behaviors and features that are culturally-mediated or influenced by culture, which are socially-situated or prompted by the context, and which are idiosyncratic or unique to the person. One can think about someone dressed in black – at a funeral in the U.S. (as opposed to white in India), at a formal dinner, or as a color choice every day.

Culture’s Eloquent Signs: How and Where to Look

While Hall sought to bring culture’s eloquent signs through the process of in-awareness, he believed, that it is “doubtful that there is any part of culture which is really hidden once we know how to go about looking for the eloquent signs.”⁸⁸ Many of these “eloquent signs” Hall referred to have been well documented in intercultural communication and other fields.

As Hall has stated, part of finding culture’s eloquent signs includes knowledge on where and how to look. I choose to put the how before the where. In communication the tendency is to focus on speaking. However, in actuality, communication is listening – attuning to the other and the environment. In adopting a posture for how to look for culture’s signs one must take listening a step further. As mentioned before, when we listen, we tend to listen through listening filters.⁸⁹

Cultural expectations and assumptions can act as powerful filters in shaping what we focus attention on (selective attention) and how we interpret what we have paid attention to (selective perception). For example, if “respect” is an important component for me in

relationships, I will pay close attention to the other's behavior for signs of respect. The cultural expectations and assumptions I hold about respect will guide what I look or attend to and how I interpret the other's behavior. I might however place "individual freedom" as a higher priority in my relational dynamics than "respect." For me, being comfortable, relaxed, informal or not judged by the other may be important components I associate with "individual freedom." I will not exclude signs of "respect," but I may pay closer attention to signs of individual freedom than respect.⁹⁰

These differences in what people attend to and how they interpret are what make the need to go beyond listening to perspective taking so important. If I only listen, I may hear what I want to hear. And, I may interpret it the way that fits with my cultural expectations and assumptions. Perspective taking involves trying to suspend one's own list of priorities to attend to and see what others focus on and how they might be interpreting what they have focused on. Rentsh and her colleagues stress the importance of taking a multi-cultural perspective, noting "in order to treat someone with respect, it is necessary to understand how that individual understands respect, including behaviors, such as hand gestures, language, dress, facial expressions, behavior, and so on that signify respect."⁹¹

As to where to look, the intercultural communication scholarship provides a wealth of documentation. These studies tend to focus on factors related specifically to communication. Asian intercultural communication scholars have added additional factors, including stressing the need to give attention to historical context.⁹² If one looks at a cultural society using only a contemporary snapshot, without the benefit of history, the picture may be distorted or superficial. Having a historical perspective may be particularly important if there has been rapid change (economic growth) or if there was a period of dramatic upheaval (colonial domination by a foreign power).

In addition to areas highlighted in most intercultural communication studies, I have pulled out several inter-related areas that warrant special added attention in public diplomacy:

communication expression, perception and cognition, values, identity and power.

Communication Expression

Intercultural communication scholars have been instrumental in highlighting the pivotal link between communication and culture. In communication, culture influence is seen in three important dimensions – verbal behavior, nonverbal behavior and perception. Verbal behavior, of course, would be language. Linguistic skills can provide an invaluable window into culture’s eloquent signs. For a diplomat, language can provide entrée into the local society. However, the automatic link made between linguistic fluency and cultural fluency warrants a word of caution for public diplomacy. Language educators have increasingly highlighted need to study language in terms of its pragmatic or social and cultural application.⁹³ It is possible to be fluent in a language and yet have difficulty conversing with people. More important than knowing the grammar of the language is also knowing the grammar of the culture, such as social greetings and idiomatic responses that lubricate social interaction.

Nonverbal behavior, including eye contact, posture, touch as well as the use of space and time, are what Hall called “the silent language.” These behaviors are significant because while much of the information content is conveyed in spoken words (verbal behavior), the relational and emotional dimension is conveyed through nonverbal behaviors. The simple expression, “I want to talk to you,” for example, can take on a variety of meanings depending on tone of voice, how close the other is standing, or even whether their arms are crossed or open.

Culture influences rules for performing communication behaviors. Humans across the globe share anatomical features that make it possible to produce a “smile.” However the rules for when, why, where, and with whom to smile can vary. These rules become layered by the social context and individual idiosyncrasies.

Knowing culture's potential influence on communication behavior for public diplomacy is important for the individual diplomat on several levels. In nonverbal communication, the margin of error cuts across multiple levels that range from direct, interpersonal interaction, to media interviews, to public appearances and functions.

Culture's impact on visual communication represents a growing field. Elizabeth Würtz, for example, discusses cultural variations in design elements of websites.⁹⁴ Anyone who has browsed the web may be struck by the simplicity of websites with lot of white space and a website screen filled with flashing animation and multiple fonts and colors. These variations in part relate back to culture's influence on visual communication.

Culture may also influence preference for communication tools or mediums. In some settings mass media may be the medium of choice because it is information efficient. It can deliver vast amounts of information to many people quickly. In other settings, the mass media may not be a trusted medium. Interpersonal communication may be less efficient in terms of the quantity of information, but more effective in terms of quality of information delivered. This distinction between interpersonal and mass communication channels may hold the world over; people tend to prefer and trust interpersonal over mediated forms of communication. However, cultural background may influence what campaign designers may habitually reach for when they design campaigns or what they focus on when they analyze campaigns.

The uprising in the Egypt during the Arab Spring is an apt illustration. Much has been made of the role of social media in the Western media. For the Western media these tools may have been the main communication media for learning and following the uprising. However, Egyptian leaders involved in the movement also credit the spread of news to a well-known interpersonal network of public communication – the Cairo taxi drivers.⁹⁵

It is not only which tools may be used that is important but also how the tools are viewed and used.

Perception

The other side of the communication coin is perception. Culture influences not only how communication is performed, but how it is perceived. As Glen Fisher advocates in his discussion of the role of culture and perceptions in international relations, one can get a strong baseline in perception by studying the cultural values, history and traditions of a people.⁹⁶ This knowledge helps define what people are mostly likely to pay attention and what meaning they are likely to give to it.

Within the intercultural communication literature, discussions of perception often revolve around world views. The cultural continuum mentioned earlier provides insight into different ways for viewing and understanding the world. Often because of the Cartesian dualism, the tendency is to view contrasting pairs as opposites. An either/or approach to any cultural phenomenon can be deceiving, given the multiple levels that cultural opposite may possess. A more helpful approach is the schema as continuums, or variations in a long range of possible perceptions. The skilled communicator is not only familiar with the perceptual spectrum but creatively accommodates that spectrum.

Familiar continuums include the individualism-collectivism, high-context/low-context, and power distance. Referring back to Hall's low- and high-context, continuum lays a spectrum where meaning resides. Low-context perspective tends to give little weight to the context and focus on the message. High-context perspective derives meaning mainly from the context or setting, who, what, when, where something said. Knowing this variation might mean analyzing a speech not only in terms of language (low-context) but also its contextual features.

The useful aspect of these cultural frameworks is that they help expose the wide variations in viewing similar phenomena

from completely different perspectives. The cultural continuums and worldviews lose their usefulness when they are seen as static structures that categorize publics or even nations. The danger is when this range of possibilities becomes a label of absolutes. Whatever the dominant perspective may be, there are often multiple layers and variations within a culture. Also, while cultural schemas may be neatly categorical, cultures are often filled with contradictions and paradoxes that defy those very categories. Finally, worldviews often reflect the cultural ideal of what ought to be instead of what is.

Cognition

Most intercultural communication analyses of perception stop at the level of worldviews or cultural continuum. I highlight cognition in order to shift attention about perception from the socio-cultural level of worldviews to the socio-psychological level of cognition. Cognition is related to affect perception, attribution, reasoning and other processes. Culture's influence on cognition would have significant potential impact on several public diplomacy aspects, including perceptions of credibility, ethics, and persuasion.

The association between culture and cognition is controversial and the subject of on-going debate among researchers in social psychology.⁹⁷ The dominant view upholds the assumption of universality of cognition. Writings from British philosophers in the 18th and 19th century to mainstream psychology in the 20th century have embraced the assumption that "basic" cognitive processes for adult humans are universal.⁹⁸

The assumption of universality however has long been challenged by non-Western scholars who argued that Western theories were not adequate and in some cases inapplicable.⁹⁹ Recent research appears to also challenge the assumption of universality. Nisbett, Peng, Choi, and Norenzayan identified distinctive features of "holistic" and "analytic" cognitive processes.

Nisbett and his colleagues explain the significance of these basic cognitive differences using Levi-Strauss' metaphor of the handyman

using his cognitive tools to solve problems of daily life. As Nisbett et al. point out, even if people around the world possess the same tools, they habitually reach for different tools and use them in different ways:

“... we may say that even if all cultures possessed essentially the same basic cognitive processes as their tools, the tools of choice for the same problem may habitually be very different. People may differ markedly in their beliefs about whether a problem is one requiring use of a wrench or pliers, in their skill in using the two types of tools, and in the local of particular tools at the top or the bottom of the tool kit. Moreover, members of different cultures may not see the same stimulus situation as a problem in need of repair.”¹⁰⁰

Assumptions about cognitive processes underlie many well known persuasion theories.¹⁰¹ These theories are used to design and assess persuasive campaigns, including those for public diplomacy. If researchers can show that understandings about cognition is not universal, this would mean that persuasion techniques and theories may not be universal or equally effective with culturally diverse publics. This knowledge could help explain why some persuasion strategies fail as well as stimulate the need to explore alternate persuasion strategies.

Values

Values are another area that would normally fall under perceptions. I have separated the two because values are increasingly and deliberately being used in public diplomacy. Part of this may be due to Nye’s highlighting of values as a component of soft power. U.S. public diplomacy post 9/11 emphasized values as a pivotal feature.

The appeal of using values, especially within Western persuasion strategies, dates back to Aristotle. Numerous contemporary persuasion theories revolve around the analysis, positioning and framing of values for targeted audiences. The association of values with attitudes and behaviors as well as their abstract nature provides

both advantages and disadvantages. What is noteworthy about contemporary persuasion theories is that they were developed and employed based on Western values and with Western audiences. In other words, the use of values in persuasion assumes a mono-cultural environment.

The use of culture-specific value-based campaigns with culturally-diverse audiences may be problematic. The reason relates back to the problem of what audiences focus on, or what warrants their attention (selective attention) and what meaning they give (selective perception). Although a campaign may think that it is highlighting a particular value, it is quite possible for the audience to focus on a value that has greater significance. Even if a campaign is capable of focusing audience attention on the intended value, that value may be perceived

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differently because of different cultural associations.

A ready example comes from Chinese public diplomacy and its emphasis on the value “harmony.” Gou-ming Chen described “harmony” as a cardinal value in Chinese philosophy.¹⁰² While harmony stands out as a dominant value in Eastern cultures, in non-Eastern cultures there appears to be different understandings of the value. From the view of the autonomous individual, harmony tends to imply conformity; how can there be harmony unless everyone conforms.¹⁰³ In Confucianism, harmony is associated with diversity.¹⁰⁴ As stated in Confucius’ the *Analects*: “Gentlemen seek harmony but not conformity, small men seek conformity but not harmony.”¹⁰⁵

Harmony is also questioned sometimes by non-Eastern observers because of the assumption of duality and natural conflict

between separate entities. Robert Koehane suggested harmony was not possible, at best there would be coordination.¹⁰⁶ To which Qin Yaqing answered, “In a holist world view, it [harmony] is not only possible, it is inevitable, for the seemingly opposite elements always complement each other.¹⁰⁷ In a system of inter-connected, inter-penetrating elements in which, all are linked together, as Shi-xu added, one is compelled to harmony.¹⁰⁸

Given these assumptions associated with the inter-connectedness of relations, harmony would appear to be as logical and desirable from the Asian perspective as “independence and freedom” would be from the perspective of the autonomous individual. Not surprisingly, the notion of harmony is a prominent, recurring theme expressed by Asian nations for the diplomatic relations. Writing several decades ago, former Vietnamese diplomat Tran van Dinh included harmony as one of the fundamental goals that diplomat wants to convey to other governments and their publics.¹⁰⁹ “Harmony with the international community” was the key phrase for Japanese diplomacy as it sought to stem Western fears of its growing economic power was in from the late 1980s to early 1990s.¹¹⁰ Not surprisingly, perhaps China also adopted “harmonious world” as a diplomatic goal.¹¹¹

Interestingly, while a value may be “universal” in its presence across human societies, its significance, expression, and meaning may be culturally mediated. Here an apt example is found in a book review was written by an American and Asian of Marie-Anne Slaughter’s book, *The Idea that is America: Keeping Faith with Our Values in a Dangerous World*. The reviewers discussed idea of universal understandings of values and used as an example the value of “tolerance.” In the American perspective tolerance was expressed through speech and action. From the Asian perspective they found tolerance was expressed through listening. In their back and forth exchange, the reviewers concluded that “Although the values that Slaughter has chosen may be universal, they may be approached differently within distinct cultural contexts.” They suggested that integrating different perspectives was the route to attain higher values on a global level.¹¹²

The true paradox of values is that while values are hard to accurately express in a campaign because of selective attention and selective perception, it is hard for a public diplomacy campaign not to be perceived as an expression of the country's values.

Identity

The importance of identity to public diplomacy is evident on several levels. Traditionally, identity has been linked to the nation-state, i.e. "national identity."¹¹³ Yet, as Richard Davies observed, the dynamics of identity are "played out both above and below, as well as at the level of the state."¹¹⁴ Jill Krause and Niel Renwick contend that "Globalization has disrupted the links between identity and the territorially based nation-state."¹¹⁵

All communication is inherently about identity.¹¹⁶ The selection, organization and presentation of verbal, nonverbal, visual, or audio elements as well as the communication medium all says something about how one party sees itself (own identity) and the other (other's identity) and the relationship between the parties. Discrepancies between identity and image are often the impetus behind national branding campaigns as nations seek to close the gap between how they perceive themselves and how they are perceived in foreign opinion polls. The refrain of Americans after the attacks of September 11, "Why do they hate us?" was illustrative of the identity-image dynamic.

Because identity is so important, people tend to be highly selective in the behavioral 'cues' they use to communicate their identity. However, the problem in cross-cultural or intercultural settings is that the cues people use to signal aspects of their identity tend to be derived from their native cultural environment. Such culture-bound cues do not necessarily hold the same significance or meaning in other cultural environments. What might readily signal 'bold' or 'assertive' in one cultural context, and thus enable the individual to project one identity, might be perceived as 'arrogant' or 'aggressive' in another cultural context. Similarly, what may be signal 'modest' or

‘humility’ in one context, might be perceived as ‘weak’ or ‘passive’ in another cultural context. As a result of different associative cues for communicating identity, identity cues can be misinterpreted, distorted, or missed entirely. Unfortunately, because of the out-of-awareness process with which this all occurs, cultural distortions in communication can result in perceived distortions of identity.

The identity function of communication is also readily apparent at the international level in both traditional and public diplomacy. Costas M. Constantinou, in *On the Way to Diplomacy*, writes “diplomacy’s raison d’être is therefore established only with there are boundaries for identity and when those boundaries of identity are crossed.”¹¹⁷ In public diplomacy, the construction, maintenance and representation of identities can be vastly more complex with far more serious repercussions than representations within the relatively confidential and confined sphere of traditional diplomacy.

In the multicultural *public* settings in which public diplomacy operates, the cues people and nations use to communicate and even negotiate identities are not shared. Different cultural milieus have different and even opposite interpretations. Public diplomacy’s representations of identities have the potential to spark highly charged public reactions. Often times when an audience’s reaction is unexpectedly intense or appears “disproportionate” to the communication, identity issues are involved.¹¹⁸

While lack of awareness and knowledge of cultural identity can inadvertently spark tensions, increased knowledge can help public diplomats learn how to diffuse tensions. There are several recent examples of how public diplomats are deliberately focusing on cultural identity and using innovative approaches to diffuse tensions. The Japan Foundation and the Goethe- Institut, for example, have identified graduated strategies to help traumatized populations in post-conflict settings regain a sense of cultural pride and acceptance through cultural programs.¹¹⁹

Power

Power is another basic concept that may be influenced by culture that may have significant implications for public diplomacy. The need to highlight power may seem ironic to international relations and political science scholars. Power is the core concept of political theory and a central feature in contemporary international relations. However, in communication the concept of power may be less salient and at times appear contradictory.¹²⁰ Added to this mix is culture's influence.

Across the literature one finds different conceptions, definitions and perceptions of power. While there is a vigorous and open discussion of power and seemingly broad array of views, they share a recurring theme of control and dominance. The idea of "power over" is control or dominance to get another to do what one wants. Balance of power is seeking parity between dominance. Empowerment is giving power to another.

A perhaps unspoken assumption underlying the discussion of power is the presumption of an individual autonomous entity. Power is an individual attribute implies that one is free to possess, exchange, give, take or build power. Power is linked to individual agency and motivated primarily by self interest. As an autonomous entity, the individual can take these actions based on his/her self-interests. If one is unconnected to others, power over, power to, power through as well as inequality, imbalance, competition, and so on, are prime concerns. In the absence of parity (equality), dominance is the logical preference. Being in a state of constant competition would also appear likely. Another entity could move to restrict one's autonomy (or power).

Nye's concept of soft power assumes the individual perspective and soft power is an individual attribute. "Soft power is the ability to obtain what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments."¹²¹ It arises due to the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies of a nation. As an individual attribute, one also sees the competitive view of soft power; countries can compete to make their soft power greater than the other.

Geert Hofstede's measure of "power distance," which he devised to study power in different cultures also assumes an individual perspective in which power is an attribute. It also focuses on the "inequality" between the less powerful members and more powerful members. Hofstede defines power distance as "the extent to which the less powerful members expect and accept that power is distributed unequally."¹²²

Some conceptions of power stress relational and social dynamics over domination and control. Yet, even in conceptions of power that highlight relations-based interdependence or envision "power to" (empowerment), such those found in feminist perspective of power, again one gets the sense of an autonomous individual and power as an individual attribute.¹²³ Power is an attribute/thing that can be given by some individuals to other individuals or entities. Albeit in a relational dynamic, the individual retains choice and agency. One sees individual agency in other prominent perspectives that have challenged the narrow power-over conception Stephen Luke's work¹²⁴ or Peter van Ham's conception of "social power."¹²⁵

In more recent works one also sees cooperative views of power, perhaps characterized as 'power through others.' Rather than narrowly defined self-interests, one works towards the interests of the other.) Both Ali Fisher's conception of "collaborative public diplomacy"¹²⁶ and Anne-Marie Slaughter's "collaborative power" are based on the notion of power sharing.¹²⁷ While "cooperative power" stresses links to and working through others, there appears to be the presumption of individual choice and agency. Further, the motivation for that individual choice and agency appears to stem primarily from self-interests. The individual can selectively attain or exercise social power by deciding to join with others. Rianne van Doeveren succinctly captures the rational in her conception of "social diplomacy:" the "assumption goes that acting beyond (not against) the narrow national interest of a common good, or shared interest, will indirectly serve a country's national interest better through the good will that it creates."¹²⁸

Perhaps nothing epitomizes the view of power from the autonomous individual perspective more than the idea of “win-lose.” One party wins power, the other party loses power. The win-lose scenario is a viable option for an autonomous entity concerned primarily or even exclusively with self-interest. Even win-win scenarios similarly appear motivated by individual choice and agency.

Whereas win-lose may be an option for the autonomous individual, such a scenario loses its appeal if all parties are not autonomous, but rather linked, inter-connected and even inter-penetrating. When relations are not a choice, but rather a given condition, win-win would be the more expected norm. Additionally, salient concerns would focus predominantly on relational dynamics with others, rather than narrow self-interests.¹²⁹ Thus, individual concerns about inequity, imbalance, competition, etc, may still be present, but may be overshadowed by relational concerns about reciprocity, responsibility, moral obligations, ethics, etc. Given such a relational dynamic, one may find the call such as Chinese writer Zhao for a “higher sense of responsibility rather than a stronger sense of power and hegemony.”¹³⁰

A similar emphasis on responsibility and relational obligation is found in the Islamic Quran where power imbalances are assumed, like the fingers on the hand, each is different. With Allah as the absolute power, each has a duty and those with greater resources have a great obligation and responsibility. Difference in understanding of “power” shed light on why external efforts to unseat rulers may fail (or require substantial use of hard power) while internal uprisings may succeed with rapid speed.

Jan Melissen observed that East Asian public diplomacy appears based on a concept of soft power that is relational.¹³¹ It may not be only the conception of soft power, but the expression of soft power. Power viewed from an inter-connected, inter-penetrating perspective not only places a high premium on relational dynamics but as such would seek to downplay overt competition. Instead, of employing

direct assertive strategies, a more sophisticated strategy would entail creating and moving within relational sphere to higher or inner circles.¹³²

The complex or interwoven nature of power in the relationship patterns and relational spheres is again seen in the mandala formation of polities in Asia. Dellios described political mandalas as the “quintessentially ‘soft power’ formations in that it was the charismatic centre that exercised power rather than the enactment of force. Dellios and her colleague applied the mandala



to study the possibilities of a new mandala of cooperative power in the geopolitics of India and China.¹³³

To understand how power operates in interwoven relational structures requires different analytical lenses. The visual of a mandala is illustrative.¹³⁴ Unlike the network diagrams that feature straight lines connecting individual nodes, the mandala formation is represented by intricate interwoven circles. Different culturally-mediated views and assumptions about relationships and power may extend beyond duplicating relational structures such as networks. The network paradigm has gained increasing attention in public diplomacy.¹³⁵ However, recent research has revealed that culture appears to shape behavior and power within networks.¹³⁶

Culture in Public Diplomacy Scholarship and Practice

Over the years public diplomacy scholars and practitioners have lamented and sometimes with consternation, that public diplomacy scholarship seems surprisingly repetitive. The absence of culture from public diplomacy is course may be partly to blame. Although public diplomacy has been viewed from a variety of

“If public diplomacy scholarship has suffered by overlooking culture, culture may now be the source of much fruitful and invigorating exploration in both scholarship and practice.”

subfields in communication and international relations, these areas have been dominated by a Western, and largely U.S. perspective. If public diplomacy scholarship has suffered by overlooking culture, culture may now be

the source of much fruitful and invigorating exploration in both scholarship and practice.

Public Diplomacy Scholarship

While culture may invigorate public diplomacy scholarship it is also likely to be a challenging venture. Often the dominance of one perspective overshadows and obscures others. Gaining or adding perspectives may involve several phases as those experienced in other fields. Comparative studies may be an initial pre-requisite in identifying differences in public diplomacy practices. Sook and Melissen’s collection from Asia and Hayden’s study of Japan, Venezuela, China and U.S. public diplomacy are pioneering steps.¹³⁷ To move from comparative studies that expose differences to studies that help explain differences – beyond the logic of political, economic and other tangible factors – will require a more concentrated focus on culture and cultural identity. Again, this was the intervening step in the other disciplines that made the leap from comparative studies employing a single analytical lens to developing new analytical lens entirely.

For example, one of the first discrepancies to emerge from comparative public diplomacy studies was assumptions about who the “public” was in public diplomacy.¹³⁸ Who was the “public” in public diplomacy? U.S. and Western European models of public diplomacy appear to take for granted that the public meant foreign public.¹³⁹ Communication directed toward the domestic public was something else, such as public affairs. However, public diplomacy of other countries in Africa, Asia and the greater Middle East often

deliberately focus on the domestic public first, and then foreign publics.¹⁴⁰ Diaspora publics appeared to be both a target public as well as messenger in a public diplomacy. Culture may play a role in these different assumptions about the public. Whereas the Anglo-American scholarship is predicated on the separate and autonomous individual, literature from other heritages tends to stress relations and relational structures. The concept of “relational spheres,” is one example of a culturally-informed analytical lens that highlights the privileged position of domestic and diaspora publics the public diplomacy in various countries.

Relational Dynamics and Rapport

Given the challenges facing public diplomacy – both the rise of cultural identity and collaborative public diplomacy – relational dynamics is and will be a growing concern. Managing relationship expectations and assumptions are difficult within relations uncomplicated by cultural differences. When culture is added to the mix, the potential for relational conflict appear almost inevitable. Relational dynamics include being able to pick up on relational cues such as relational affinity, stress, or tension. Relational strain, perceived and unperceived, can cause relational conflict. Yet managing relational conflict may be complicated by differing leadership styles as well as perceptions of trust, commitment or appropriate levels of intervention.¹⁴¹

While the need is great, there is surprisingly little information that talks about intercultural differences in building and maintaining relational rapport.¹⁴² The intercultural communication literature focuses predominantly on individual behaviors and perceptions and scholars noted the oversight of “relational approaches” in intercultural competences. Relationship dynamics and relationship management are central features of interpersonal communication and public relations, respectively. However, as mentioned earlier, culture has only recently been added to the research equation. Public diplomacy research in this area could be a major contribution to other communication-based fields.

Public Diplomacy Models

One of the most pressing items on public diplomacy research agenda is the need for multiple models of public diplomacy. It is perhaps because culture has not been part of the public diplomacy analysis that different public diplomacy approaches have been talked about as “old” and “new.” The “old” approach, which is tied to the Cold War era, is primarily one-way, message-based strategies that rely on mass media.

What is interesting is that these “old” and “new” public diplomacy approaches parallel the dominant cultural visions of communication. The “old” information approach and the “new” relational perspective paralleled features in the cultural schemas (e.g., low-context/high-context; individualism/collectivism; or information transfer/ritual communication) developed by Western scholars.¹⁴³ More recently, in a survey of intellectual heritages around the world, the relational perspective now emerging in Western communication-related studies are not so new for many non-Western societies. Rather than proceeding from the premise of individualism (or even individuality), the assumption of “relationality” is made.¹⁴⁴

The need for cultural perspective is critical for developing a fuller spectrum of public diplomacy models. While the U.S. model is good for analyzing messages, it is not as good for analyzing relational dynamics. The associative perspective is a better lens for appreciating graduated differences of sophistication in relation-based public diplomacy initiatives. These graduated levels include level of participation (individuals, institutions, or community), degree of coordination (limited, shared, or negotiated), and scope (single-issue or multi-faceted, and time duration).

The addition of culture through the wealth of intellectual heritages around the world can greatly advance the vision of public diplomacy. In this respect, public diplomacy scholarship and its implications for practice may have only just begun.

Implications for Public Diplomacy Practice

There are several implications for adding culture to the mix of public diplomacy practice. These include implications that specifically impact public diplomats, the design of public diplomacy initiatives, and the evaluation of public diplomacy initiatives.

Public Diplomacy Practitioners

Greater cultural awareness, knowledge and skills for the public diplomat begin with training. Language training cannot substitute for intercultural communication training. And, in the absence of linguistic fluency one can strive for cultural fluency, learning the grammar of society. As mentioned earlier, knowing how to use the language can be more important than how to speak the language.

In traditional and public diplomacy, diplomats have been described as “boundary spanners”.¹⁴⁵ As boundary spanners, public diplomats need healthy doses of cultural awareness, knowledge and skills for both their home culture and host culture. Again, the tendency is to focus on the other’s culture. However, communication as a double-side equation requires both other-awareness and self awareness. Increasing cultural self-awareness might entail an introspective self-evaluation of one’s own behavior, attitudes and beliefs in terms of dominant or common cultural patterns. To learn about the other, one must begin by being an avid and active consumer of the host culture.

Public Diplomacy Programs

Culture is also important for designing and implementing public diplomacy initiatives. Mohen Dutta, who was one of the first to write about culture in public diplomacy, raised the importance of a “culture-centered” approach.¹⁴⁶ He distinguishes between being “culture sensitive” and “culture-centered.”¹⁴⁷ Culture sensitive is a top-down approach. Campaign planners use their knowledge of the other’s culture to incorporate cultural features that will resonate positively with the audience’s culture. This is the approach that is usually taken in

most international public communication campaigns. Unfortunately, no matter how well intended and researched the campaigns are, they often fail. Rather than a culture sensitive approach, Dutta suggests a culture-centered approach. This approach incorporates working with others from the culture to build the initiative.

In public diplomacy, the distinction between culture-sensitive and culture-centered is important. However, given the international exposure of public diplomacy initiatives (even those designed for local audiences) as well as the idea of public diplomats as boundary spanners, public diplomacy may need to move to a third level. This third level is that of a multicultural approach that spans across cultural zones. Developing a multicultural approach is the most challenging because it requires that communication planners step outside of an either/or communication perspective and skillfully blend multiple perspectives. One must not only be cognizant of one's own culture and other cultures, but be able to blend them in such a way as to positively resonate across cultures. A culture-diverse approach to public diplomacy may well be the equivalent of the masterful art of "constructive ambiguity" found in traditional diplomacy.

Finally, there is the need to incorporate culture into approaches for assessing and measuring public initiatives. Inserting culture into the public diplomacy equation may be controversial but warranted if public diplomacy is to move to new levels of understanding how culturally diverse audiences perceive and respond to public diplomacy initiatives.

At present, public diplomacy reports tend to reference national public opinion polls as prime indicators of the effectiveness of a country's public diplomacy. There are several reasons why using national polls may not be effective. First, most countries have a variety of public diplomacy initiatives. Measurements taken at the national level may not provide a clear picture of which initiatives may be most culturally attuned and favored by the audience. Ideally, all assessment should be at the program level rather than the combined national level.

Second, quantitative research methods may not be the best approach for understanding how culturally diverse audiences perceive and value a public diplomacy initiative. In fact, they may reinforce misconceptions rather than provide new insight. The most significant errors in surveys are not in the statistical analysis of the respondents' answers, but hidden biases in the survey questions. Research used to design and evaluate public diplomacy campaigns are vulnerable to cultural filters. While researchers may go to great lengths to ensure correct translation of survey questions, the problem is not in the language but the differing cultural perspectives used to gather and interpret the information.

Additionally, although public opinion polls are valuable research tools used extensively to design U.S. domestic campaigns, public opinion polling does not have as strong a tradition in other parts of the world.¹⁴⁸ Both the theories of attitude change and the tools to measure attitude change (opinion polls) grew out of an intensive period of communication research in the United States after World War II.¹⁴⁹ Asian scholars have been particularly critical of quantitative methodologies, particularly the survey methodology. Surveys and resulting "public opinion" polls are highly individual-based, representing an aggregate of individual opinions rather than group arrived at consensus.¹⁵⁰

What is needed, not only for public diplomacy but for social sciences in general, are more relationally-based research and evaluation methods. To this end, social network analysis may offer insights in to relational dynamics.

Conclusion

This study has been a preliminary venture to explore the cultural underbelly of public diplomacy. One of the goals of the paper was to spark a cultural awakening in public diplomacy. In a multi-cultural world, effective public diplomacy requires developing an “in-awareness” cultural approach to public diplomacy. With greater cultural awareness, one can more readily identify the cultural ideals that motivate policy, such as the advocacy of democracy or individual empowerment. One can see the assumptions that ritualize practice, such as a preference for written material over oral delivery. Or one may note the intellectual heritage that directs research attention and public diplomacy analysis – such as the preference for quantitative metrics over intuitive insights.

Another goal of this paper was to prod the thinking about different perspectives and models of public diplomacy. There is a distinction between “global public diplomacy” viewed through one analytical lens and having multiple lenses that provides a fuller picture of what public diplomacy looks like globally. That is the future challenge in exploring the cultural underbelly of public diplomacy.

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97. Richard E. Nisbett and Ara Norenzayan, “Culture and Cognition,” in D.L. Medin (Ed.) Stevens’ *Handbook of Experimental Psychology/3e*. 2002.; Hazel Markus and Sinobu Kitayama, “Culture and Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion and Motivation,” *Psychology Review*, vol. 98, 224-253.

98. R.E. Nisbett, K. Peng, I. Choi, and A. Norenzayan, "Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic," *Psychology Review*, vol. 108, no. 2, 2001, 291
99. Jai B. P. Sinha, "Factors Facilitating and Impeding Growth of Psychology in South Asia with Special Reference to India," *International Journal of Psychology* 30, no. 6 (1995): 695.
100. *Ibid.*, 306.
101. See, Kim, *Non-Western Perspectives of Communication*, for research on how different cultural perspectives are undermining dominant persuasion theories.
102. Gou-ming Chen, "A Harmony Theory of Chinese Communication," in Virginia H. Milhouse, Molefi Kete Asante, and Peter O. Nwosu (Eds.), *Transcultural Realities: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Cross-Cultural Relations*, (Sage Publications, Inc, 2001).
103. Researchers found that in independent cultural the term "unique" whereas in interdependent the term 'conformity' has positive connotations of connectedness and harmony in East Asian cultural contexts Kim and Markus (1999), cited in S-M Kim, *Non-Western Perspectives of Communication*, 36.
104. Hui Leng, *A Study of Intercultural Discourse Between Mainland Chinese Speakers of English and Anglo-Australians* (Liaoning Normal University Press: Liaoning Normal University Press, 2007); Gou-ming Chen, "Toward an I Ching Model of Communication," *China Media Research* vol. 5, no. 3, 2009: 72–81; Wenzhong Hu, *Aspections of Intercultural Communication, Proceedings of China's 2nd Conference on Intercultural Communication* (Shanghai: Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press, 1999); Steve Kulich and Michael Prosser, *Intercultural Perspective on Chinese Communication* (Shanghai: Shanghai Foreign Language Education Press, 2007).
105. (君子和而不同小人同而不和), *junzi he er bu tong xiaoren tong er bu he*, *Analects* XIII:23
106. Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, (Princeton University Press, 1984).
107. Yaqing Qin, "Why Is There No Chinese International Relations Theory," in Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (Eds.) *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 36.

108. Shi-xu, "Reconstructing Eastern paradigms of discourse studies," *Journal of Multicultural Discourses* 4, no. 1, 2009, 36.
109. As van Dinh noted: "a diplomat always tries to convey to his/her interlocutor and/or the public of the country he/she is accredited to, an image of his/her country and governments' stability, tranquility and harmony." Tran van Dinh, *Communication and Diplomacy in a Changing World* (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1987), 7.
110. Tadashi Ogawa, "Origin and Development of Japan's Public Diplomacy," in *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy in N. Snow and P. Taylor (eds.)* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 276.
111. In 2005, at the United Nations' 60th anniversary summit China's president, Hu Jintao defined the concept of "harmonious world" as a combination of multilateralism, cooperation and "a spirit of inclusiveness where all civilizations coexist harmoniously and accommodate each other."
112. Erika Graffunder and Allen Lai, "A review of Anne-Marie Slaughter's The Idea that is America: Keeping Faith with Our Values in a Dangerous World." *Asian Journal of Public Affairs*, vol. 1, no. 2, 2007, 37-39, 38.
113. For historical, pre-state system, see, Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach, "The Past as Prelude to the Future? Identities and Loyalties in Global Politics," in Y. Lapid and F. Kratochwil (Eds.) *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 21-44.
114. Richard Davies, "Ethnicity: Inside Out or Outside In?" in Jill Krause and Neil Renwick (eds) *Identities in International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).
115. Jill Krause and Neil Renwick (eds) *Identities in International Relations* (NY: St Martin's Press, 1996), xii.
116. R.S. Zaharna, "Self-Shock: The Double-Binding Challenge of Identity," *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* vol. 13, 1989, 501-525.
117. Costas M. Constantinou, *On the Way to Diplomacy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 113.
118. Zaharna, *Battles to Bridges*, pp.

119. Japan Foundation, "Fostering Peace through Cultural Initiatives: Perspectives from Japan & Germany" International Symposium Report, June 2009. www.jpf.go.jp/e/intel/report/img/12/program_e0515.pdf
120. Early communication studies based on rhetoric and debate, then cybernetics and persuasion theory (including propaganda) are very much about "control and influence." Human communication, including interpersonal communication and intercultural communication, has focused primarily on "understanding." Cultural studies puts power and hegemony of cultural groups center its communication analysis. Public relations, a sister field of public diplomacy, covers the spectrum from power as a central features in cultural hegemony, to framing contests for narrative dominance, to the negation of power as the antithesis of relational trust and relationship-building.
121. Joseph S. Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990),188.
122. Geert Hostede, *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind*. (New York: McGrawHill 1991/1997), 23-47, 28.
123. Conceptions of power beyond the domination focus are particularly strong in feminist perspectives. For recent review, see, Amy Allen, "Feminist Perspectives on Power", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/feminist-power/>.
124. Stephen Luke, *Power: A Radical View*, 2/e (London: Macmillan, 2005).
125. Peter van Ham, *Social Power* (New York: Routledge, 2011).
126. Ali Fisher, "Mapping the Playbook: To Facilitate a More Collaborative Public Diplomacy," The CPD Blog, January 13, 2011. http://usepublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/newswire/cpdblog_detail/mapping_the_playbook_to_facilitate_a_more_collaborative_public_diploma/
127. Anne-Marie Slaughter, "A New Theory for the Foreign Policy Frontier: Collaborative Power," *The Atlantic*, November 30, 2011.
128. Rianne van Doeveren, "Engaging the Arab World through Social Diplomacy." Clingendael Paper, no. 4, October 2011.
129. See, e.g., Yong Deng, "Power, Perception, and the Cultural Lens." *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, vol. 28 , no. 3, 2001, 155,-159.

130. Tong Shijun, Chinese Thought and Dialogical Universalism, Shanghai, November 17, 2005, www.escsass.org.cn/adm/UploadFiles/200611693147377.doc
131. Melissen new pd 2011, p. 23
132. Chaio speaks of such strategies that indirectly manipulate relations rather than confront individuals. Chien Chiao, "Chinese Strategies Behavior: Some General Principles in Ralph Bolton (Ed.) The Content of Culture: Constants and Variants (New Haven: HRAF, 1989) 525-537.
133. Rostia Dellios and R. James Ferguson, Sino-Indian Soft Power in a Regional Context, Cultural Mandala: Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, vol. 9, no. 2, (2011), 15-34.
134. This mandala is from Right sign on the facade of the Mausoleum of Ak-Astana-baba (Surkhandarya viloyat, Uzbekistan). Featured on Uzbekistan Prof. Shamsiddin Kamoliddin(Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences, Tashkent) "On the Religion of the Samanid Ancestors," *Transoxiana, Journal Libre de Estudios. Orientales*, July 2006. <http://www.transoxiana.org/11/kamoliddin-samanids.html>
135. See, e.g., Robin Brown, "Public Diplomacy and Social Networks," Paper prepared for the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 2011; Ali Fisher, "Mapping the Great Beyond; Identifying Meaningful Networks in Public Diplomacy", CPD Perspectives in Public Diplomacy, Paper 2, 2010; and R.S. Zaharna, "The Network Paradigm of Strategic Public Diplomacy," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, Policy Brief, Vol. 10, No. 1, April 2005.
136. These different culturally-mediated views and assumptions about relationships and power extend beyond duplicating relational structures such as networks. Ali Fisher drew my attention to recent research that suggests culture appears to shape behavior and power within networks. In Western studies, power is associated with those who serve as bridges or links between structural holes. In a study of Asian networks, researchers found that closure was more prevalent than structural holes. Sun-Ki Chia and Mooweon Rhee, Confucian Capitalism and the Paradox of Closure and Structural Holes in East Asian Firms," *Management and Organizational Review*, vol. 6, no. 1, 2010, 5-29. See also, Mark A. Pachucki and Ronald L. Breiger, "Cultural Holes: Beyond Relationality in Social Networks and Culture," *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 36, 2010, 205-224.

137. See, e.g., Sook and Melissen, *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia*; and Craig Hayden, *The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts* (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2011). Also see, Simon Mark, A Comparative Study of the Cultural Diplomacy of Canada, New Zealand and India, Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The University of Auckland, 2008, <https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/handle/2292/2943>
138. Ellen Huijgh (Clingendael, the Netherlands) raised this issues and organized as research panel during the International Studies Association convention, Montreal, March 2011.
139. Kathy Fitzpatrick highlighted the oversight of the domestic public in assumptions of public diplomacy in her CPD study, *U.S. Public Diplomacy's Neglected Mandate*, CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy (Los Angeles: Figueroa Press, 2010).
140. R.S. Zaharna, Relational Spheres and the Primacy of Domestic and Diaspora Publics in Global Public Diplomacy, International Studies Association, Montreal, March 16, 2011.
141. See, e.g., David Augsburg, *Conflict Mediation across Cultures: Pathways and Patterns*, (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1992); Stella Ting-Toomey and John Oetzel, *Managing Intercultural Conflict Effectively*, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001).
142. A notable exception is H. Spencer-Oatey and Peter Franklin, *Intercultural Interaction* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009), Chapter 5 "Promoting Rapport in Intercultural Interaction," 101-128.
143. R.S. Zaharna, "Technology in Assertive & Associative Paradigms of Strategic Public Diplomacy", in Nabil Ayad and Daryl Copeland (Eds.), *Transformational Public Diplomacy : Shaping the Future of International Relations* (London: Diplomatic Academy of London, Westminster University, 2009), 112-124; and R.S. Zaharna, "Information and Relational Communication Frameworks of Strategic Public Diplomacy," in N. Snow and P. M. Taylor (Eds.) *The Public Diplomacy Handbook* (London: Routledge, 2008), 86-100.
144. Zaharna, "Relational Spheres and the Primacy of Domestic and Diaspora Publics in Global Public Diplomacy."
145. "Boundary spanners" first used by Brian Hocking in his discussions of "catalytic diplomacy." See, B. Hocking, "Catalytic Diplomacy," in J. Melissen (Ed.), *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice* (London: Macmillan, 1999), 21-42, also, B. Hocking, "Introduction: Gatekeepers and

- Boundary Spanners: Thinking about Foreign Ministries in the European Union,” in B. Hocking and David Spence (Eds.) *Foreign Ministries in the European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003), 1-17. I thank B. Gregory for this reminder. More recently, Jan Melissen has emphasized the idea of boundary spanners in public diplomacy. Melissen, “Beyond the New Public Diplomacy,” 15.
146. Mohan J. Dutta-Bergman, “U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East: A Critical Cultural Approach,” *Journal of Communication Inquiry*, vol. 30, no. 2, April 2006.
 147. See, for more detailed description of distinctions between culture-sensitive and culture-centered approaches. M. J. Dutta, “Communicating about Culture and Health: Theorizing Culture-centered and Cultural Sensitivity Approaches,” *Communication Theory*, vol. 17, no. 3, 2007, 304-328.
 148. U.S. domestic campaigns, public opinion polling does not have as strong a tradition in other parts of the world. See, Uma Narula and W. Barnett Pearce, *Cultures, Politics and Research Programs: An International Assessment of Practical Problems in Field Research* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1990).
 149. Christopher Simpson, *Power of Coercion*, (New York: Oxford University, 1996).
 150. See, e.g., Satoshi Ishii, “Complementing Contemporary Intercultural Communication Research with East Asian Sociocultural Perspectives and Practices,” *China Media Research*, vol. 2, no. 1, 2006, 13-20; Wilma Dissanayake, “The production of Asian theories of communication: contexts and challenges. *Asian Journal of Communication*, vol. 19, no. 4, 2009, 453-468.

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R.S. Zaharna is an associate professor in the School of Communication and affiliate associate professor in the School of International Service at American University in Washington, D.C. She specializes in intercultural and international strategic communication. Her public diplomacy research interests are in culture and relational approaches (networks and collaboration). In addition to more than twenty years of teaching strategic communication, she has advised on communication projects for multinational corporations, governments, and international organizations, including the United Nations, World Bank, and NATO. Since 9/11 she has testified on several occasions before the US Congress and has addressed diplomatic audiences and military personnel in the United States and Europe on strategic communication and public diplomacy. She has authored numerous articles and more than a dozen book chapters, including three for major handbooks: *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (2008), *The Global Public Relations Handbook: Theory, Research, and Practice*, (Routledge, 2009), and *Sage Handbook on Intercultural Communication Competence* (2009). Her recent book, *Battles to Bridges: U.S. Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy after 9/11*, discusses the United States communication efforts aimed at winning hearts and minds in the Arab and Islamic publics.

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