

The Public Diplomacy of Emerging Powers

Part 2: The Case of Indonesia

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ABSTRACT¹

Though public diplomacy, the involvement of publics at home and abroad on international policy-making and conduct, was forged in the West, it has found a comfortable home in the wide Asian region, including Southeast Asia. Within this region, Indonesia has charted its own course. It evolved from a developing authoritarian nation into a young democratic emerging power.

This article briefly introduces broader changes in the underlying patterns of public diplomacy, particularly those of emerging powers. From this it examines (1) the key features and recent developments of and (2) provides potential future paths for Indonesian public diplomacy. Public Diplomacy is still a major item the current president must—as promised—address in the years to come. These suggestions are relevant to Indonesia’s peers and others across the globe.

The article finds that as a relative newcomer to the field, Indonesia started off innovatively with its unique “intermestic” (a blend of domestic and international) and niche narrative public diplomacy. But it faces stagnation and isolation today.

Under the administration of current president Joko Widodo, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) seems to stress sovereignty and the economy over remaining consistent with former’s president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY, 2004-2015) mantra of “zero enemies, thousand friends.” A more “intermestic” and increased integrative approach to public diplomacy is needed for Indonesia to fulfil a credible role as a strong emerging power in the Asian region and beyond in the future.

Introduction

The Asian region (in this context referring to Southeast Asia) has leapt at the opportunity to enhance its (inter)national image and relations through public diplomacy. Though public diplomacy began in the West (i.e. the U.S. and the UK) during the Cold War era, it has attracted significant attention in Asia since the 1990s and even seems more attractive in this region today than in its place of origin.

Though Asian public diplomacy discourse derives from North American and European influences, it is not a mere reproduction. Some scholars have sought to delineate East Asian from Western public diplomacy along three major lines. First, contrary to the West, the perspective is more strategic. Second, there is more recognition of the value of a regional dimension of public diplomacy. Third, there has been a gradual acknowledgement of public diplomacy's domestic dimension.²

The increased interest in public diplomacy in Asia has also been criticized, especially by Australian scholars.³ They argue that the high cost of some countries' investments in it, such as China's, are not related to the effects, and that the "logic of appropriateness" (the conviction that it is appropriate to conduct public diplomacy simply because everyone else in the region does it) results in greater regional competition for public attention, deepening mistrust and increasing the potential for hard power conflict in the region.

Taking these pros and cons into consideration, and acknowledging the limitations of public diplomacy when only used as message-

sending or nation-branding and not as network relationship-building for international policy collaboration, Asian governments see a need in public diplomacy to get public support at home and abroad for empowering their international relations. After all, with global interconnectedness accelerating and an increasingly dynamic and plugged-in civil society involved in international relations, governments risk their own survival when they ignore their (inter) national publics. Involving domestic and foreign civil society actors contributes to greater public support for, and understanding of, international policy. It also adds to the (inter)national legitimacy and credibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the government, the country, and the region.

As is the case with other countries in the region, Indonesia has not been left untouched by the belief that public diplomacy can assist in establishing its position (inter)nationally. Indonesia deserves credit for its reputational turnaround. After having its international reputation gutted by the collapse of its ruling regime during the 1998 Asian financial crisis and being considered at risk of becoming a failed state, the country is now seen as a vibrant democracy with a strong economy which is a player and emerging power in the region and on the international stage, and continues to attract increased global attention.

This is, as former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY; 2004-2014) noted, “nothing short of remarkable,” given where the country stood just more than 15 years ago, with the array of challenges (financial crisis, political instability, separatism, ethnic conflicts, terrorism, and natural disasters) confronting it.⁴ After its successful, precarious transition to democracy in the post-1998 period, its economic growth rate has been speeding up at a time when major global powers have been struggling, especially in Europe and North America.⁵

Indonesia is also actively involved in the region, as illustrated by its role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).⁶ Independent international analysts have included Indonesia in various

acronyms such as the Next-11, CIVETS and EAGLE,⁷ which refer to emerging economies that will be relevant drivers of the regional and global economy in the coming years. In 2013, Indonesia also joined MIKTA, wherein attempts at collaborative regional public diplomacy strategies are developed. Additionally, there is considerable goodwill in the international community to accommodate Indonesia's rising status, as it is—generally considered to be benign.⁸

Despite its progress, Indonesia continues to face difficulties. Experts note that in the last decade it has not taken sufficient advantage of its economic tailwind to tackle manifold problems (e.g. infrastructure, corruption, and bureaucracy) that will curb future growth.⁹ Domestic politics and bureaucratic hurdles continue to influence Indonesia's international relations.

Regarding the latter, it is also argued that aside from Indonesia's strategic regional outlook through ASEAN, the country lacks any strategy beyond raising its international profile. Its main goal—to balance its relations between China and the United States—also creates tensions with fellow ASEAN member-states which are leaning towards the United States, thereby enlarging territorial disputes in the Southeast China Sea and East China Sea. Economic and socio-cultural constraints have also affected Indonesian-Australian relations and their strong security interdependencies.¹⁰

Much improvement is expected under the leadership of the seventh Indonesian president, Joko Widodo, a.k.a Jokowi, sworn in on October 20, 2014. Jokowi is the first president whose background is not from the military or political elite, but from a lower class. For many, though he faces criticism after a year and a half in office, he still symbolizes a break from the past; on Election Day, *The New York Times* even referred to him as the “Indonesian dream.”¹¹

Joko Widodo has generally been described as a “man of the people” with a personal “can-do” (punya gaye) style and who is approachable by Indonesian citizens. At first, expectations were high that he would continue with his bottom-up (Blusukan), people-

centered (or in other words, public diplomacy) approach and implement this attitude in his new government and policy-making process.¹² While public diplomacy is still on the policy agenda, Jokowi has moved into his second year without realizing many of the changes he promised.

Although he has faced setbacks during his first year in office, some argue that Jokowi was simply adapting to his new role. Now, during the remainder of his term, with this experience, they say, he is fully aware of the political challenges and barriers he faces, and will therefore be more successful in meeting the high expectations his country has placed on him, also with regard to public diplomacy.¹³

The latter is interwoven with Indonesia's (inter)national politics and relations and its decades-long regional and international rise. These changing circumstances have profound implications for Indonesia's engagement with civil societies at home and abroad. Indonesia in turn is also influenced by its own civil society to build the country's regional and international image and relations, its credibility and efficacy. As Rizal Sukma, Deputy Executive at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),¹⁴ argues: "Without sufficient public support (—including for the new president, who has fallen in popularity recently—) all of Indonesia's efforts to build its international reputation and relations can quickly evaporate into thin air."

This begs for reflection on past and present Indonesian public diplomacy efforts at home and abroad, and its future against the background of the latest developments in the field and that of emerging powers. This article starts with a brief conceptualization of public diplomacy, and particularly that of emerging powers, and builds upon this with a section examining the key features and recent public diplomacy developments of the Indonesian government, particularly the MFA, to assess and provide suggestions for its future. This article's analysis of the key features of Indonesia's public diplomacy approach, and the lessons drawn from its narrative,

structure and domestic dimension also deliver relevant insights and food for thought for peers in the region, and beyond.

Emerging Power Public Diplomacy¹⁵

Public diplomacy's underlying patterns have continued to evolve to better suit the vicissitudes of the time. In summary of the literature, while the international consensus has largely fallen on the side of public diplomacy practice having moved from "old" (government-centered informing) to "new" (multi-actor network, collaborative, relational informing) approaches,¹⁶ leading scholars increasingly stress a more integrative approach (thinking in terms of complementarities and continuity rather than compartments or categories) in today's limelight.

In short, the future of public diplomacy, wherever it is practiced, lies in the combining (1) of so-called "old" and "new" practices, (2) of the spheres of at home and abroad in public diplomacy, (3) of public diplomacy into broader (inter)national policy-making and conduct, and (4) of hard and soft power.

(1): The practice of public diplomacy should include various interconnected public involvement activities with different degrees of public participation, varying from governmental informing over consultation and information-gathering to more active forms of participation.¹⁷

(2): While public diplomacy has long been associated with only foreign publics, it should also include activities directed towards domestic citizens. Their understanding and support of a government's policy and their efforts to reach out to peers abroad are crucial to a country's (inter)national credibility and efficiency. In international policy-making and conduct nowadays, the "inter" matters as much as the "national," with the roles of domestic citizens being increasingly acknowledged.¹⁸

(3): An integrative approach transcends these categories within public diplomacy. Scholars¹⁹ thinking on the future of diplomacy and its corresponding adaptations to the requirements of a globalized world with international policy domesticated and domestic policy internationalized, argue that as it becomes more central, the practice of public diplomacy is also integrating into broader diplomatic practice and (inter)national policy-making. As engagements with local non-state actors in various sectors have grown in importance, the practice of public diplomacy in particular has become more mainstream at intradepartmental (in the MFA) and interdepartmental levels (other governmental departments, including those that were traditionally associated with domestic affairs). Public diplomacy is part of what has been labelled by Brian Hocking²⁰ as a whole-of-government “National Diplomatic System.”²¹

(4) An integrative approach to public diplomacy also transcends institutional levels, where the distinctions between soft and hard power intermingle. The old distinction made in Joseph Nye’s groundbreaking 2004 work *Soft Power*²² seems to have outlived its usefulness to a certain extent, in this world where both types of power are mutually dependent (e.g. military public diplomacy actions, economy as a major subject of public diplomacy narratives). This is an idea Nye attempts to modify later, where he explains that in the global information age, superpowers need a “smart power” strategy—the hard power of coercion and payment, plus the soft power of persuasion and attraction.²³ Seib notes that soft power advocates share some of the blame for this. He calls for “hardening” soft power by noting that the purpose of soft power, as with public diplomacy more broadly, is to advance the strategic interest and international policy goals of one’s country.²⁴ This is not only relevant to established but also to emerging powers.

Views on public diplomacy, especially on the integrative level, have recently also stretched beyond geographical and regional approaches, with insights from geographically disparate yet logical groupings of countries, such as the “emerging powers,” (a term

coined in 1980) which are bound by their economic status rather than geography.

Specific terms derived from finance and economics (e.g. Goldman Sachs analyst Jim O'Neil) are used to describe and group emerging powers with the intent of identifying and listing the most promising global investment markets. For example, Brazil, Russia, India, and China have been labeled the BRIC group. The next tier of large emerging economies is known as the MIST (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, and Turkey), the MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey) and the CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa), respectively.²⁵

These collective terms are quite vague and are as contested as the term "public diplomacy." For instance, stock market declines both reflect and perpetuate investors' abandonment of the BRIC thesis. Arguably, its death knell came with Goldman Sachs' closing of its own dedicated BRIC fund. O'Neill, a former currency economist who has moved on to become a minister in the British government, might feel somewhat crestfallen about this. In 2011, Albert Edwards, the perpetually gloomy strategist at Société Générale suggested that BRIC should stand for Bloody Ridiculous Investment Concept.²⁶ Despite the BRIC countries' diversity, one must not forget that the emergence of these countries marked a fundamental shift in the world order.

The term "emerging states," however, is mostly employed to refer to the acceptance of a nation's or a union of nations' rising economic, international and regional status. Yet becoming an emerging economy trumps gaining global influence. The latter is secondary as it indirectly implies additional and necessary criteria of state power (e.g. geography, population, economy, resources, military, diplomacy and national identity) which have traditionally only all been achieved by great powers or superpowers.²⁷

There are overlaps, but also differences between individual members in a particular group of emerging powers. It is tempting

to assert that the differences among emerging powers are more profound than their commonalities, and yet they share certain common features, such as their economic stature and the importance they place on their recognition as a rising power, along with the status this imparts, partly through the projection of soft power.²⁸

Emerging powers are most often classified on the basis of their economic performance (steady, rapid growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), increasing foreign direct investment and trade activities), the assertiveness of their international policies in regional and international affairs (sovereignty claims, pursuing regional or global leadership, fulfilling responsibilities in international affairs), and the stage of domestic political development (democratization, civil rights movements).²⁹

While the development of public diplomacy as an expression of international policy democratization would most logically be situated within this last criterion, within the group of emerging powers, the degree of economic power is not necessarily correlated with the degree of democracy (full, flawed, hybrid, or authoritarian regimes), public diplomacy and the role of civil society in it. Increased economic growth does not always lead to increased public diplomacy as an expression of democratization either. Flawed, hybrid, and particularly non-democracies (e.g. China), are fixated on maintaining a tight grip on the image they project abroad, but they lack credibility if they seek to convince foreigners of things even their domestic publics find difficult to swallow.

Yet there appears to be an arguably positive relationship between increasing economic performance and growing investments in public diplomacy. Several emerging powers will establish their public diplomacy institutions and increase activities as one of the conditions of achieving recognition, yet the degree of public participation and impact varies greatly between them (e.g. Indonesia's and South Africa's public international policy dialogues versus China's and Russia's highly-orchestrated Olympic Games).

Emerging powers are increasingly seeking a greater voice and engagement in international affairs, partly to support their economic relations with other countries, and public diplomacy can be seen as one of the tools for achieving this recognition. Thus, though the relation between economic and public diplomacy performance can be tenuous at times, it can also be used to buttress both.

Although many policymakers and scholars primarily associate public diplomacy with soft power (the power to persuade by attraction), its relevance to both soft and hard power is displayed through emerging powers' practices. Hard power (here: rising economic status as public diplomacy's major narrative) and the benefits that it brings can be part of a country's attractiveness.

The public diplomacy of emerging powers is somewhat different than that of established powers (which mainly refers to Western powers that have shaped the global political economy over the past two hundred years), which is quite logical when considering that both have been shaped and grown under different international systems (e.g. Cold War, Capitalism, Communism). Both are still faced with the present's dilemmas, however.

Emerging powers (most of which achieved independence in the second half of the 20th century) had the advantage of being able to learn from established powers' successes and failures and use best practices from the beginning. This is mirrored in their approaches to public diplomacy having been more integrative from the start. This is most obviously seen in the "intermestic" (a blend of international and domestic public diplomacy) nature, simultaneously directing public opinion at home and abroad. There remains additional potential to be distilled, such as "in putting a hard edge on soft power" and vice versa, as previously noted by Philip Seib. This can be seen in how emerging states prioritize their economic status as a major public diplomacy narrative.

Compared to established powers, some emerging powers are arguably in the lead in terms of establishing what is called an

integrative approach, but much remains to be learned from this approach. These “pioneers/newcomers” will need to be the first to deal with any consequences which derive from this integrative “experiment.” That is to say, they will no longer be able to look to others to manage any side effects produced by an integrative approach. For established powers, this provides an opportunity to both learn from and also undermine the growing power of emerging states.

It must be understood that in speaking of the relation between established and emerging powers, emerging powers are changing the international system’s power dynamics by seeking a greater voice in international institutions and building political bonds through regional organizations. This transition in the global order at a time when established powers are facing both economic and political challenges is of particular note. Will emerging powers argue for augmenting their political positions based on their economic clout, or are they also concerned about the impact that established powers’ decline will have on them? (For example, the priority placed on the Euro crisis at the 2012 G-20 meeting in Mexico).³⁰

One of the dilemmas faced by established powers in their relation with rising powers is normative in nature. How can negative domestic developments impact a country’s soft power? As emerging powers rise, will established powers remain silent on issues of democracy and human rights?³¹ If so, the attractiveness of the economic narrative of emerging powers may lead to a preference to avoid raising political criticisms. With this said, it is the persistence of uncertainty about rising states’ aims and intentions, rather than the rise of new and the decline of established powers, that is the core challenge to the international system.³²

Nevertheless, emerging powers’ strength must be found less in individual countries themselves than in the groups of emerging powers. Here is their challenge: if they work better together, they could usher in a new strain of geopolitics different from its traditional understanding within international relations, potentially encouraging

a rethinking and recalibration of the traditional view to improve its capacity to adjust to the vicissitudes of the early 21st century.

The groups of emerging powers have the opportunity to truly put a collaborative public diplomacy into practice, as seen in other international organizations (but from another basic starting point: the economy; and with other liaisons). They have the potential to act strongly as one in pushing a certain vision of the international agenda, but are currently somewhat unwilling to make the necessary accommodations to find common ground with each other.

Yet being part of a non-geographical international cluster, such as the emerging powers, does not necessarily result in more strategic partnerships or increased public diplomacy between members. The heterogeneity of public diplomacy styles among a grouping of emerging powers does not, however, need to come at the expense of unified action, as demonstrated by the first joint integrative public diplomacy efforts (e.g. MIKTA) which have so far been attempted.

If such collaborative public diplomacy is merely an ideal rather than a gradual development, then being a member of such a cluster is no more than a personal label. Whether this is the case remains to be seen, but this paper is intended to help feed the growing debate about the future of public diplomacy in emerging countries.

The broader practice of public diplomacy in general, and of emerging powers in particular, is thus moving at full-tilt, as is Indonesia's, in conjunction with the profound changes which have occurred over the past decades. Against the background of these latest evolutions in the field, the following sections will investigate past and present key features of Indonesian public diplomacy and reflect upon its future.

Case: Indonesia

KEY FEATURES	FUTURE PATHS
International Policy Democratization as the major source of Public Diplomacy's Birth and Rise	More Homework: Reinforcing the Domestic Underpinnings of Public Diplomacy (Corruption, anti-foreign policy fatigue, nationalism)
The Niche Narrative: Coexistence of Islam, Democracy and Modern Society	Opening up the Narrative to Transversal (hard) Themes
Recent Developments within (Modest Modifications and Stagnation) and beyond the Public Diplomacy Division (Mainstreaming of Public Diplomacy Practices)	Moving the structure of the MFA's public diplomacy division forward with a National Diplomatic System of Public Involvement

Table 1: Overview of past, present and future of Indonesia's public diplomacy

Key Features

Indonesia's public diplomacy has been characterized by three features: its reciprocal relationship with international policy democratization, its niche narrative of the coexistence between Islam, democracy and modern society, and its "intermestic" approach.

International Policy Democratization: Public Diplomacy's Birth and Rise

Indonesia's public diplomacy is tightly wired **into the continuity of its international policy, and the change within it.**

In terms of **continuity**, various internal and external factors such as history, demographics, economy, security and national interest prompted Indonesia to adopt an international policy that is "bebas dan aktif," meaning "free" (away from external pressure or influence to chart its own course in world affairs) and "active"

(dedicated to being involved in constructive activities geared towards bringing about and supporting world peace). This basic international policy doctrine, which has influenced Indonesia public diplomacy's past and present shape, was espoused in Vice President Mohammad Hatta's address "Mendajung Antara Dua Karang,"³³ or "Rowing Between Two Reefs," at a session of the Central National Commission on September 2, 1948 at the height of the Indonesian War for Independence.³⁴

After more than 65 years of existence, Indonesia's basic "free and active" international policy doctrine has remained unchanged, though its articulation and implementation have evolved over the years.³⁵ In short, both Presidents Sukarno (August 18, 1945-March 12, 1967) and Suharto (March 12, 1967- May 21, 1998) employed this principle on antipodal agendas, wherein international policy was entangled in an West vs. East dialectic, particularly in relations with two superpowers, the U.S. and China.³⁶

Under Sukarno, the free and active principle was seen as standing against colonialism and imperialism and promoted post-colonial/socialist alliances to reshape the world. Indonesia became the founder and leading member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Sukarno's pursuit of a close relationship with China led to allegations from Suharto that the former was violating the free and active doctrine. Suharto's military-dominated New Order regime pursued economic development, froze relations with the Soviet Union and China, joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), developed closer relations with the U.S., and upheld a merely symbolic political commitment to third world solidarity through the NAM and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).³⁷

In the post-Suharto period, while predecessors gave the doctrine their own particular spin, Indonesia's former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono introduced his own metaphor of "navigating in a turbulent sea" in response to the transformations in Indonesia's strategic environment, such as the end of the Cold War. The free

and active principle was interpreted through the metaphor of a “new dynamic equilibrium.” The goal of being on good terms with all countries, and not giving preference to any, has been reflected in Indonesia’s international policy mantra of “a thousand friends—zero enemies.”³⁸ The free and active principle, and the means through which it was operationalized through setting international policy priorities, not only catalyzed the government’s attitude towards its own and others’ public diplomacy, but also influenced its narrative.

In terms of **change**, Indonesia’s public diplomacy direction has also been more directly impacted by profound transformations in the country’s international policy. In a time of economic crisis and internal turmoil, the “Reformasi” (“Reform,” 1998) period abolished Suharto’s 31-year long authoritarian regime.³⁹ Democratization processes initiated Indonesia’s public diplomacy and drove its rise. Indonesia’s public diplomacy is seen by the government as instrumental to its ongoing international policy democratization processes.

The origin of Indonesia’s Reformasi stemmed from a combination of factors. The Asian financial crisis proved to be a catalyst, but pressure from Indonesian civil society cannot be disregarded, as civil society leapt at the opportunity provided by the financial chaos.⁴⁰ In short, the government’s grip had begun to soften by the 1990s, providing the opportunity for certain civil society groups to more openly critique the corruption within it.

Increasing demands for the Reformasi and the then-leader of the large Islamic organization, Muhammadiyah’s, launching of the slogan “Abolish KKN (korupsi, kolusi, dan nepotisme; or corruption, collusion, nepotism)” grew into a university student-led, pro-democracy, anti-corruption movement which aimed to end the current regime and put a stop to public sector corruption. This resulted in the collapse of the Suharto regime in May, 1998. These anti-corruption civil society organizations, professionalized and consolidated over the years with the assistance of foreign donor

agencies, continue to be activists for government integrity through strategic and practical day-to-day action.⁴¹

As Danielle Lussier and Steven Fish noted, Indonesia's structural, cultural and historical conditions were not favorable for democratization in the post-Suharto period. Indonesia did benefit from a high degree of civic engagement, social interaction and solidarity, which sustained self-government by cultivating a sense of efficacy; by developing and transferring civic political involvement skills; and by creating recruitment opportunities for political participation. This has allowed Indonesia to seize advantages usually considered to flow from socioeconomic modernity.⁴²

Broadening the power centers in the Reformasi period pulled Indonesian international policy-making processes away from the sole authority of the executive into a triangle structure composed of the executive and parliamentary branches of the government (e.g. 6,9,10 Law No 37/1999 on Indonesia's Foreign Affairs),⁴³ the media (after the cessation of media censorship) and domestic civil society organizations.

The government's and the MFA's stimulation of international policy democratization was also reflected in the introduction, use and implementation of the (Western) concept of "total diplomacy." This essentially entails a diplomacy that approaches issues (cultural, economic, security) in a more comprehensive fashion, with greater civil society support and participation in the government's international policy-making and conduct.⁴⁴ It resembles the more recent notion of today's "integrative diplomacy," as described in this article's previous and following sections.

The government sought out civil society leaders from different sectors (academics, think tanks, religious groups, media representatives and NGOs), acknowledging that on its own it lacked the capacity and resources, credibility and insight to reach out to the broader public. It was believed that civil society's participation in the international policy decision making process and its reach

to the larger epistemic community could bring international policy issues which have a domestic impact, such as democracy, into public discourse.

Additionally, changing (international) policy democratization conditions forced Indonesia's governmental system to adjust, which included the organizational restructuring of the MFA and the creation of a public diplomacy division (*Diplomasi Publik*) in May, 2002. Indonesia's public diplomacy has thus not only been a consequence, but also an intrinsic condition of international policy democratization processes. It has been a means for the government to better communicate international policy to important civil society groups both at home and abroad in order to gain their understanding, support, and input.

When SBY assumed leadership in 2004, public diplomacy was viewed as an important instrument for improving the country's troubled image abroad.⁴⁵ Since then, the public diplomacy division has pursued a more active direction, with the number of programs, budget and intensity of high-level support peaking in 2008-2009. It grew from organizing pre-existing cultural events and scholarship programs to uncorking the international policy content bottle (such as through interfaith and democracy dialogues) and making it discussable with the broader public.

Broader (public) diplomacy action on democracy has also been embarked upon by the Indonesian government in 2008 through the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) and the establishment of its implementation agency, the Institute for Peace and Democracy.

The first aims to bring international leaders and ministers together to share experiences and build cooperation on democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It deliberately avoids a (Western) "club of democracies" model and includes both democratic and non-democratic participants.⁴⁶ The BDF has also partially served as a springboard to inject democracy and human rights into regional platforms such as ASEAN,⁴⁷ which includes members who are

wary of the insertion of these values, but without much success, as the diluted ASEAN Charter for Human Rights demonstrated. The BDF has been critiqued by civil society as being a “talk shop” of and for governments.⁴⁸ Non-governmental participation needs to be increased, so that the forum can truly function as an exercise of Indonesian public diplomacy.

The second aims to “make peace and democracy function in practice” via several activities guided by the theme and priorities of the BDF and directed at government officials, civil society leaders, media and academics (e.g. through exchanges, training, joint missions, network and capacity building).⁴⁹ The Institute has come recently under fire, not so much on public diplomacy’s international side, but for insufficiently integrating its values of supporting home-grown democratic processes in Indonesia. Yet reports on the Institute’s activities reveal that while public diplomacy initiatives are not necessarily directed at Indonesian stakeholders primarily, they often include them as partners in fulfilling their goals.

Joko Widodo, a.k.a. Jokowi (2014-present), and his vice-president Jusuf Kalla will aim to combine both: continuity and change. Although with any new president, the (inter)national public and journalists tend to talk more about reform than continuity. The country’s international policy is expected to consistently follow its standard “free and active” policy, though it will inevitably evolve as Jokowi puts his mark on it during his tenure.⁵⁰

Indonesian policy is said to be crafted and focused on four main issues (maritime cooperation, Indonesia’s role as a middle power, regionalism beyond ASEAN that positions itself within the regional architecture of the Indo-Pacific region, and the enhancement of diplomatic resources). The protection of Indonesian workers abroad, public diplomacy, economic diplomacy and the Palestine issue are described as thematic fundamentals of Indonesia’s international policy and their execution aims to weave them together.⁵¹

Alternatively, the ASEAN community program, APEC, G20, World Trade Organisation and addressing climate change will move in accordance with the spirit of change that Jokowi has promised will be put into place. One of the transition team's deputy heads, Andi Widjajanto, claims that Jokowi's approach to international forums will be more direct than SBY's, but Indonesia's international policy will not change dramatically as the country will continue its adoption of the free and active principle.⁵²

Though Jokowi is typically seen as relying on his bottom-up (blusukan), people-centered approach, he couples it with another, direct business (blak-blakan) approach which is less typical of a culture which often sees a need to compromise and approach things indirectly. Jokowi has been quite direct in bilateral meetings with Chinese president Xi Jinping (to bolster economic ties with Chinese companies and in infrastructure development), U.S. President Barack Obama (to retain restrictions on palm oil entering the U.S. market), Japanese Minister Shinzo Abe and Russian President Vladimir Putin, for example.⁵³

The Niche Narrative: Coexistence of Islam, Democracy and Modern Society

Unlike several Western countries and regional peers, the Indonesian government and its MFA quickly found their niche narrative in public diplomacy, namely of explaining that Islam, democracy and modern society can coexist peacefully.⁵⁴ This has been important since before the first Gulf War, but especially in the post-9/11 period, during the "Arab Spring/Winter," and recent Islamic State acts of terror.

It must be noted that within this context, (political) Islam in international policy was received with suspicion under Sukarno and proscribed under Suharto.⁵⁵ While Muslim-based parties have declined over the years, Islam continues to be very important in Indonesia's day-to-day political life.⁵⁶

Indonesia sought to present an alternative face of Islam to Western countries. Given its particular situation, Indonesia was and is faced with the twin challenges of incorporating democracy and Islam into international policy in a manner which simultaneously upholds its official non-theocratic state identity (see the *Pancasila*: the official philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state) and preserves its international image as a moderate Muslim country in a way that does not raise eyebrows or opposition at home.⁵⁷ This particular image served to counter Western perceptions that, as the most populous Muslim country in the world, Indonesia is a threat or a breeding ground for extremism.⁵⁸

This internationally projected image of being a multi-religious and moderate Muslim society may however backfire, by leading to the perception in Middle Eastern Islamic regimes that Indonesia is insufficiently Muslim. Despite democracy's universal values, various leaders of Muslim and Arab countries consider emulation of Western style democracy in the Muslim World to be problematic.⁵⁹

Even though it has the largest Muslim population in the world, and economic (rather than religious) ties with Middle Eastern countries and is an Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) member, Indonesia lies at the wider Islamic Ummah's (nation/community's) periphery. This has curbed Indonesia's attempts at presenting itself as being a leader or alternate political model for Muslim societies.

At the same time, acts of religious intolerance, including terrorist violence directed at religious minorities, have undermined Indonesia's public diplomacy attempts to show that Islamic values and practices contribute to the consolidation of democracy and preservation of a tolerant pluralism. These issues undercut Indonesia's attempt to act as a bridge builder between the West and the Islamic world.

While not exclusively limited to interfaith dialogue, much of the Indonesian government's public diplomacy initiatives have been congregated in this interfaith sphere, such that they are sometimes seen as synonymous. The government's enthusiasm for interfaith

dialogue may also clash with the reality of unresolved domestic issues.⁶⁰ While the moderate Muslim community and its leaders have spoken out against violence, some experts argue that the government response has been lukewarm, such as during the Gereja Kristen Indonesia Taman Yasmin church incidents in Bogor (West Java).⁶¹

The credibility of the government's internal and external public diplomacy interfaith narrative has been buttressed by consultation and cooperation with its two largest non-political Muslim civil society organizations (each has more than 35 million members): the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), most strongly represented in the countryside, and the modernist Muhammadiyah, which is mainly concentrated in urban areas.⁶²

Both are bastions of moderation and hubs of a large, diverse domestic network of citizens and enterprises. Muhammadiyah, for instance, runs 14,000 schools, 169 institutions of higher learning, 400 microcredit institutions, and about 500 health centers including 171 hospitals and 700 orphanages. It seeks to better Indonesian society through the delivery of educational, socio-cultural and business activities. Its opinion leaders also act as representatives for Indonesia at interfaith public diplomacy dialogues in the Asian region, Europe and North America.

This shows that public diplomacy's international credibility is interrelated with levels of domestic grassroots support and exposure abroad, including recognizing internal problems and presenting potential solutions to them.

Under Jokowi, this will undoubtedly be a key narrative about which to continue reminding domestic and international audiences, although the man who is also called "the people's president" will also need to address more challenging issues (e.g. economic diplomacy, maritime cooperation) in public diplomacy. Nonetheless, interfaith and pluralism narratives will become neither less important, nor

competitive with, newer public diplomacy narratives, as they are equally important for Indonesia's image.

The “Intermestic” Nature: Interrelated International and Domestic Dimensions

Another key feature of Indonesia's public diplomacy is its intermestic (a blend of domestic-international) or “integrative” public diplomacy approach, which simultaneously directs domestic and international audiences to international policy.

Such an approach must be understood within its broader context. International policy is seen as an extension of domestic politics, and Indonesia's long-term relations with the world and public outreach operate in accordance with its own internal might. Its internal weakness has impacted its international standing. More inward-looking approaches flow from Indonesian leaders' failures to create a broadly acceptable and legitimate sense of what Indonesia means and stands for, both at home and abroad.⁶³

The changing nature of state identity resulting from domestic political dynamics is an important context through which to understand Indonesian policy-making and the actual conduct of its public diplomacy. Since its independence (on August 17, 1945), Indonesia's international policy has largely been driven by domestic imperatives, which resulted in radical changes under Sukarno and Suharto.

Under the 1957-1966 regime, the avoidance of a religious dimension in the state's international policy identity also assisted Indonesia in projecting its image abroad as a champion of the Third World and as a force standing against imperialism, rather than as a vanguard of the Muslim world's interests. While the New World Order government (1966-1998) retained its identity as a member of the NAM, Indonesia was more committed to projecting its image and identity as a natural leader of Southeast Asia, a provider of regional

stability, and a member of the developing world that was on good terms with the West.⁶⁴

Building and projecting the identity of a democratic, modern, moderate Muslim-majority country through international policy-making and conduct has been crucial in the post-authoritarian period. As the country continues to build its internal strength, Indonesia is adopting a more outward-looking view of its place in the world. It increasingly presents itself as an emerging power, a leader in ASEAN, a bridge-builder, and an intermediary between developing and advanced economies as a member of the G20.⁶⁵ Altering its national identity means Indonesia must balance its international policy conduct in a manner satisfactory to international and domestic audiences alike.⁶⁶

Including a domestic dimension in public diplomacy is a labyrinthine exercise, as dealing with identity pluralism and diversity governance lies at the core of this ambition. This is especially the case for Indonesia, as a country with a high degree of societal and religious heterogeneity, with nearly 250 million people, over 300 ethnic groups and 18,000 islands.

Within an “intermestic” affairs and associated public diplomacy approach, domestic factors (such as international conflicts, political stability, security, prosperity, the socio-cultural constellation, Islam, radicalization, cultural diversity and multiculturalism) determine Indonesia’s pursued role as a global and regional power.⁶⁷

An “intermestic approach” drives the MFA to pull Indonesia’s international policy into line with domestic shifts. The pressure to simultaneously possess a regional and national vision has intensified, especially at the multilateral level. Within the ASEAN context, for instance, Indonesia’s democracy and participatory notions were challenged by established powers after they entered the regional discourse in 2003.

Indonesia's traditional and more recent public diplomacy activities provide examples of their intermestic approach. One of many examples is the Cultural and Art Scholarship Program established in 2003. Remarkably, the Indonesian adaptation distinguishes itself from most Western variants in that in addition to foreign students, Indonesians can also apply. Indonesian awardees are seen as an additional way for foreign recipients to get to know Indonesia, and conversely, Indonesian participants not only get to discover other cultures within their own country but can also learn about other countries through their foreign counterparts.⁶⁸

Jokowi aims to continue on this path to direct people at home and abroad. He aims to formulate a fresh international policy with greater public attention to stimulate national pride as well as to help protect Indonesians overseas, in keeping with his vision and objectives for the people of Indonesia.⁶⁹ Jokowi's vision is somewhat of an alternative view to what he calls, or is generally understood as, "people based," or public diplomacy. As Rizal Sukma, executive director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), head of Jokowi's and Jusuf Kalla's transition team's Defense and Foreign Affairs Working Group, explains, "Jokowi wants to capitalize on Indonesia's identity for the sake of the people."⁷⁰

For example, he linked the "maritime axis" doctrine with a development agenda which benefits the people, echoing Indonesia's maritime declaration, which emphasizes Indonesia's sovereignty and autonomy, not only in its own territory, but also in terms of its alliance with the archipelagic states to come together and talk about a new maritime order. He can revamp President Sukarno's idea by putting it into a more contemporary format, such as by introducing an equivalent to the Conference of the New Emerging Forces (CONEFO) and MIKTA.⁷¹ For years, Indonesia's huge maritime potential has merely been discussed, but Jokowi hopes to link this view to the welfare of the Indonesian people. Rizal suggests that Jokowi is looking to take full advantage of the country's international status to benefit its citizens.⁷² This not only has to do with an idea of

sovereignty but could also better position Indonesia as an emerging power.

This president, who at first did not seem particularly interested in international affairs, may find himself buried under so many domestic issues that international policy may at the same time offer him a means of addressing domestic concerns, such as Indonesia's economy, infrastructure, climate problems.

Recent Developments Within and Beyond the Public Diplomacy Division

More than ten years since the inception of a dedicated division within the MFA, Indonesia's public diplomacy appears to have moved past its zenith. Some activities stagnate in the add-on project phase or decrease in scope and support. Yet modest efforts have been made to adjust pre-existing public diplomacy projects to Indonesia's changing course, climate and growing position. More important is the tendency of broader public diplomacy practice becoming progressively—and unintentionally—mainstreamed in the ministry and beyond.

A decade after their launch, several public diplomacy projects continue to this day but have been slightly modified to Indonesia's rapidly evolving political, socio-cultural situation and associated international policy priorities. For instance, there has been a push to direct the interfaith dialogue towards less moderate countries and to more prominently include issues surrounding radicalism, terrorism, religious intolerance and Islamophobia. Exchanges of international (religious, political and other) opinion leaders in Indonesia, and vice versa, and grassroots discussion at home remain key to the program's effectiveness.

Newer, and until recently untapped, resources and topics reflecting Indonesia's changing context are also lightly touched upon in its public diplomacy. Aside from the regular Art and

Scholarship program, a special program entitled “Indonesian Studies for Indonesian Diaspora” has been launched, aiming to connect the younger diaspora generation (Indonesian descendents from abroad) with today’s Indonesia over the course of a three-month stay. This fits within broader governmental policies and projects (e.g. annual Indonesian diaspora conferences in Jakarta since 2012) aiming to engage the Indonesian diaspora in Indonesia’s international relations and image-building.⁷³

Tentative and modest steps have also been made towards the inclusion of an economic dimension in public diplomacy. This has been achieved by bringing representatives of the country’s regions’ economic potential (local governments and trade representatives for business people) to Jakarta to meet with international business people and embassies’ trade officers, and by inviting international investors to particular provinces’ regional offices.

Despite these initiatives, the public diplomacy division has stagnated over the past few years, suffering from budget cuts affecting the entire ministry. It is also less engaged in activities directed at the broader public. For instance, the intensity of consultation and the priority given to the Foreign Policy Breakfast Forum,⁷⁴ a variant of globally popular speakers programs where the foreign minister and other high-level officials discuss various topics with civil society across the country, decreased over the past years. This is a program Jokowi could re-energize. The MFA will need to once again become more open and inclusive with the public. In doing so, Jokowi can give the program his own personal spin.

However, most of the stagnation in Indonesia’s public diplomacy derives from the discrepancy between how the MFA interprets public diplomacy (as add-on activities of the dedicated division) and how it is actually put into practice (as a broader practice of public diplomacy beyond the division). Public diplomacy practice, particularly towards domestic publics, goes well beyond a single dedicated division. In fact, it has been mainstreamed into several of

the MFA's directorate-generals (DG) and sub-directions. Examples are abundant.

For instance, subdivisions of the DG of American and European Affairs organize joint-commission workshops with stakeholders, including local governments to reach policy positions, and events such as the annual Indonesia Trade Expo. The Bureau of the Minister is in charge of the Foreign Policy Breakfast Forum and its Centre for Education and Training at times provides universities training on diplomacy. The Analysis and Development Agency's Centre for the Asia Pacific and Africa Regions organizes joint research and seminars with universities and think tanks, and calls for papers on international policy to be published in international policy journals. The Asia Pacific and African Affairs DG disseminates information to the general public and gathers input from stakeholders. It tries to persuade youth of the value of moderate Islam through scholarship, and brings international business people to Indonesia for economic cooperation/investment. The DG of Legal Affairs and International Treaties cooperates through focus groups with NGOs, and other governmental departments. One of the more comprehensive examples is the DG of ASEAN Cooperation initiating several initiatives, including high-school projects and student essay competitions on ASEAN to public and governmental stakeholder consultations, and monthly press updates. The ASEAN Dialogue Partners Youth Program (talks at schools) spans the country, paying particular attention to specific regions' interests and needs.

This pattern of mainstreaming and conducting public diplomacy practice—though under different labels—not only occurs within the MFA but is even more present within other governmental departments increasingly involved in Indonesia's international relations, such as the Education, Cultural and Tourism Excellence Scholarship Program, and trade diplomacy (by using its regional offices, organizing events, and reaching out to mass media).

To mention one of several examples of public diplomacy's mainstreaming, the Ministry of Education and Culture, similar to

the MFA's Culture and Art scholarship, has organized a scholarship program since 1974 for foreign students to learn the Indonesian language (Bahasa Indonesia) in the field.⁷⁵ Intradepartmental and interdepartmental cooperation with the MFA's public diplomacy division however mostly occurs on an ad-hoc, activity-related basis. But the overlaps in practices require more systematic cooperation around the widespread practice of public diplomacy within and outside the ministry.

This is an opportunity Jokowi and his administration must not let slip away during his tenure, however, it is quite possible that the expectations then (and now) are simply too great for one man to accomplish. A major reason for Jokowi's success is that he was seen as "an honest man in a landscape of cheats" battling a government overflowing with red tape, where officials earn more money from bribes than their wages. It now seems that the battle against corruption and re-organizing the MFA is more challenging than originally presumed, and several moves have been successfully taken to weaken his popularity.

His minority government, for instance, is propped up with a coalition of members of the old guard, which has limited Jokowi's ability to tackle political corruption. Over the last year the president has tried to address corruption—not always in subtle ways (think of the police chief appointed by Jokowi who was immediately subjected to corruption charges; the alliance with the Indonesian army in the hope of finding allies to counter the police who are seeking to weaken his power; the internationally decried execution of international drug smugglers).

In April, 2015, Jokowi was forced to sit by and watch as members of his own party tore him to pieces. Over his first ten months in office, the Indonesian parliament only passed three laws. Furthermore, Jokowi almost committed political suicide by cutting back on fuel subsidies (in Indonesia, these subsidies are considered so important that cutting them could potentially spark a revolution) to free up billions for healthcare, education, and infrastructure spending. With

this said, recent cabinet moves, such as the promotion of an anti-corruption campaigner to Chief of Staff, may be a sign that this is but the beginning of a reduction in Indonesia's bureaucratic hurdles.⁷⁶

Reform will thus be derived from improving the quality of Indonesia's diplomatic human resources. A Foreign Service law outlining procedural mechanisms for diplomatic positions is long overdue. For example, an Ambassadorship is a state-appointed position which has yet to be legally regulated. Ambassadorial appointments require greater transparency, accountability, and should operate to professional standards. The selection of Ambassadors, therefore, should not be solely swayed by political considerations and require that competency and merit are transparently taken into account. Assignments for all future diplomatic tiers during Jokowi's mandate should be transparent, should he wish for his goals to crystallize; something which will be facilitated by a scheduled open selection policy as well as an upcoming internal audit.⁷⁷ It is quite likely that this will be insufficient to fully reform the organization of the MFA, with its infrastructure still needing to be upgraded.

Future Paths

Despite the critiques during the first year of his administration, his second year may hold more promise for this president's personal style of public outreach, and who alluded to involving the public in international policy-making and the conduct of public diplomacy through a reorganization of the MFA. The promises he made regarding public diplomacy cannot be put on the backburner, especially not if Jokowi wishes to keep his moniker of being "the people's president." Insights for Indonesia's future can be deduced from that which was described above, and can be of value to the new government and its president, but also more widely.

In particular, Western countries and other emerging powers face similar problems in opening up their public diplomacy structure to more whole-of-government approaches, their narratives to more transversal and "hard" themes and in reinforcing public diplomacy's

domestic underpinnings. Similar to Indonesia, they are generally struggling to transform their public diplomacy into an integrative public diplomacy, which these 21st century developments require.

The Narrative: Opening up to Other Transversal Themes

One of the major strengths of Indonesia's public diplomacy narrative is that it rapidly found its niche. This contrasts with other countries in the region and the West that have struggled in this regard. The latter have thrown several types of relatively successful, yet costly, nation (re)branding efforts into the battle. East Asian countries, such as China, have invested aggressively in a branding approach to public diplomacy, but are nevertheless still struggling with their image.⁷⁸

Indonesia can instead build upon its pre-existing public diplomacy narratives and expand upon them. It must thereby build momentum in its niche narrative of the coexistence of democracy, modernity and Islam, while paying increased attention to other pertinent themes, such as the improvement of its economic status and the country's ensuing transformation, where it can also share its experiences without excluding others.

Explaining that Islam, democracy and modernity can co-exist remains relevant, especially internationally to the West, but also to Arab countries that have experienced years of turmoil and which have lately been facing upheaval due in part to the rise of the Islamic State. Yet the narrative of Islam, democracy and modernity does not comprise the entirety of Indonesia's international policy today.

Indonesia's repositioning and evolving regional and global roles could be more heavily integrated in its public diplomacy narrative to allow it to better evolve with its time. Though some efforts have been made to add an economic dimension to its public diplomacy narrative, Indonesia's thriving economy and emerging power are yet to be fully exploited. While there is no room for economic complacency and

still more space for structural reforms and improvement of foreign direct investment, Indonesia is has been seen as an extra ‘I’ in the BRIC group of large, fast-growing emerging markets with sturdy structures.⁷⁹

The experiences of having advanced to such an extent since the Asian financial crisis (1998) and of having gradually progressed into being an emerging power, including the shortcomings and the stumbling blocks the country faced, are to be more deeply integrated into Indonesia’s public diplomacy narrative. These economic topics may initially be perceived as “hard power,” but including them in the public diplomacy narrative fits well with Indonesia’s initially used term of “total” diplomacy (described as working comprehensively on different issues, with civil society participation) and with putting 21st century integrative diplomacy into practice. It also adds a “hard” edge to soft power.

Whether focused on economic diplomacy, the maritime axis, or the larger role of Indonesia as emerging state, these issues are expected to reverberate through Indonesia’s future public diplomacy narratives. From one perspective, achievement of this goal will be one of Jokowi’s most significant hurdles. Changes in economic diplomacy are already in progress and are addressing the question of institutional cooperation (it is expected that there will be significant governmental pushback) to vitalize and make Indonesian cooperation more efficient. The country’s ambassadors have all been directed to actively engage in foreign economic diplomacy negotiations.⁸⁰

The President briefed his country’s top diplomats on his pro-people diplomatic platform, indicating a significant change from that of his predecessor SBY, which stressed an internationalist approach to foreign affairs over his 10-year mandate. In Jokowi’s address to 132 Indonesian ambassadors, consul generals, consuls and permanent overseas representatives participating in a four-day working meeting put on by the Foreign Ministry, the President emphasized the importance of focusing on economic diplomacy. The President noted that: “Based on my experiences as a governor

and mayor for almost nine years and now as the President, I received foreign envoys and nearly 90 percent of them spoke about economics.” He further stressed that his diplomats were expected to push for economic diplomacy so as to benefit the Indonesian people. He stated, “The roles of our diplomats are crucial in the efforts to turn our negative trade balance into a surplus one. Ambassadors must be able to promote our products.” Jokowi indicated that envoys would be expected to attract investment, stating, “Envoys must have sharp instincts to identify the economic potentials in their host countries.”⁸¹

As a high-level government official close to the President who was interviewed by the author noted: “In Indonesian public diplomacy, addressing traditional international policy issues of Islam and democratization is not that difficult. What is more difficult to explain and consult upon are real economic, trade and investment issues, the future bread and butter of public diplomacy as their domestic effects are not confined to one ministry and as the government lacks the capacity to deal with such themes.”

This is where the new president and his entourage will most likely face the greatest resistance. A whole-of-government approach (see later: structure) may be attempted and tested here, but it will doubtlessly be very risky to do so in the current situation. The president may at first prefer to invest more in upgrading his own credibility through public diplomacy at home via discussing various issues with the people. This can be accomplished through various channels, such as within the context of a program like the Foreign Policy Breakfast or a variation thereof.

Climate change and sustainability is another potential “transversal” area, outside of Indonesia’s traditional themes, upon which a public diplomacy narrative can be built. Scholars have praised Indonesia for its leadership on the debate and at the global level, such as at UN climate change conferences, and for pioneering the implementation of strategies for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD-initiative), considered a valuable model both for other developing countries and future

international partnerships to combat climate change.⁸² Similar to interfaith dialogue, the climate change issue has not been sufficiently taken up by the government.

This is unfortunate; Indonesian civil society organizations are actively involved as well, including the country's largest Muslim organizations, through designing and making policy and performing concrete actions on environmental issues.⁸³ The government (including the MFA and other ministries such as Forestry) would also benefit greatly from a more worldwide showcasing of these deeds of non-state actors in its public diplomacy narrative.⁸⁴

The country's real challenge, as it is in other countries as well, is to find the right balance between old and new narratives, rather than pitting them against each other. The need to integrate more cross-sectoral themes into Indonesia's narrative raises, as indicated above, another dilemma: the structure through which Indonesian public diplomacy derives its shape.

The Structure: Moving Forward with a National Diplomatic System of Public Involvement

Regarding public diplomacy structures, the MFA's public diplomacy division is mainly responsible for its development. Over the course of a decade, the division had successfully built a strong foundation and its public diplomacy progressed consistently. While modest efforts have recently been exerted to include the Indonesian diaspora and business people, the public diplomacy division's scope largely remains confined to democracy, interfaith dialogue and culture.

Moreover, while the previous sections showed a more widespread practice, public diplomacy appears relegated to being an add-on program within a dedicated division rather than being perceived as a means of working within and beyond the MFA. In this sense, Indonesia's public diplomacy resembles patterns more traditionally

associated with the West, where many countries are currently dealing with similar structural delineations.

Nevertheless, the Indonesian MFA's public diplomacy division pursues coordination meetings with the Ministry of Religious, Women, Educational and Cultural Affairs to acquire input on content and potential participants, but in an ad-hoc and activities-based fashion. The public diplomacy division also does not currently have the experience, capacity or legitimacy within the MFA and the government as a whole to coordinate the wider swath of public diplomacy practices. Ongoing government belt-tightening and spotty high-level support of the past years have exacerbated this situation.

More profoundly, Indonesia still ranks below average in terms of government effectiveness and it must therefore continue its bureaucratic reform and professionalization of its public service. The implementation of the Report to the Government on Bureaucratic Reform will aid in transforming outdated governmental structures, which are hampering further growth and development. The Indonesian government's bureaucratic silo mentality and the recent transparency and ongoing corruption scandals have also reigned in more innovative approaches to involving Indonesian and foreign publics.

At the same time, in the age of integrative diplomacy these innovations are more essential than ever before. They encompass whole-of-government approaches to public diplomacy, especially if transversal issues are seen as becoming more closely entwined in the public diplomacy narrative. Given that the Indonesian and other governments are faced with balancing fragmentation and aligning public diplomacy's practices, it would arguably be better to rise to the coordination challenge than to continue with the current project-based approach.

At the intradepartmental level, coordination begins with identifying widespread public involvement practices within the MFA and determining how to focus and better align them. It also includes

the public and other divisions having a reflex to communicate and cooperate with one another once it concerns a form of public involvement. It implies balancing the MFA's geography-centric structure in favor of one which is more topical and cross-regional.

A blueprint on public involvement, including an overall strategy with prioritized goals, topics, publics, stakeholders, means of collaboration and an associated annual plan would empower divisions to work from a shared strategic vision and avoid duplication. Such a blueprint could be intended to function as a guide but must leave the respective divisions sufficient flexibility to operationalize and customize it to specific target groups and topics. It could also include identification of activities that require other ministries' or local governments' engagement so that the MFA's vision is shared across different levels and reaches Indonesia's grassroots.

Public diplomacy practices of Indonesia, and other countries more generally, have also become more central to, and are conducted by, other national governmental departments. There is thus a need to shape public diplomacy beyond the MFA. This questions the relevance of the MFA's presumed coordination role of international policy and associated public diplomacy activities at home and abroad. Leading diplomatic scholars⁸⁵ argue that due to the breakdown of the distinction between domestic and international policy, this role is no longer the sole responsibility of the MFA, but of the "National Diplomatic System," as explained in this article's first section.

In these scholars' views, MFAs' key functions in the twenty-first century will not include coordination, but management of the delivery network, knowledge and skills from within and outside the MFA, including non-state actors. They contend that while MFAs will allege that their knowledge and experience of the "foreign" makes them ideally well-positioned to take on the coordination role, this role will move either up or down the decision-making chain. For minor issues, the coordination role will move down to embassies, overseas missions and local governments, while for controversial issues it will move up to prime ministers' offices and chancelleries.⁸⁶

Taking these evolutions into account is relevant to various countries around the globe, including Indonesia.

In Indonesia, it could be addressed within the current yet slow-to-be-implemented bureaucratic reform focusing on the restructuring of departments, overseas representations, and the diplomatic profession, namely the introduction of the MFA's 2001 internal reform, which fits within the broader objective of national bureaucratic reform as stated in the Grand Design of Bureaucratic Reform 2010-2015. As noted above, this is one of the most difficult challenges yet. It would help Jokowi and his administration to remind the opposition and even members of his own party that his cabinet will lead the way on coordinating priority issues.

The thought of moving the coordination role up or down the decision-making chain is not entirely new to Indonesia. The office of the (vice-) president has already fulfilled a coordination role in prominent dossiers through special interdepartmental task forces and has removed bottlenecks in the flow of information from across different ministries to the broader public. The approach is also embodied by the interfaith dialogues, which can offer inspiration when tackling other pertinent "whole-of-government" policy issues, such as economic dialogues.

Following the reasoning that international policy-making and outreach will move not only up but also down the decision-making chain, local governments' role in, and cooperation with, the central government's public diplomacy is—similar to other Asian and Western countries—a crucial point of attention for Indonesia's public diplomacy future as well. To confer about the role of local governments in Indonesia's public diplomacy is especially pertinent given the local and bottom-up pro-democracy pressure exerted by civil society and given that the post-Suharto years included a far-reaching decentralization project. In short, a decentralization policy was initiated to ensure more balanced relations between the central government and the region, and to deal with regional grievances and desires for independence (e.g. East Timor).⁸⁷

In 2001, the two provinces with the strongest claims to statehood (Papua and Aceh) were granted enhanced autonomy and the long-running war of secession in Aceh was ended by the first SBY administration. How Indonesian authorities will cope with Papua and Aceh in the future will color the way in which the country and its international role are perceived by the global community.⁸⁸ Aceh's case was often referenced by president SBY as a successful example of the employment of public diplomacy, embodied in the importance of dialogue in conflict resolution.⁸⁹

This is also partly why, as part of the larger DG for Information and Public Diplomacy, the Directorate of Diplomatic Security Issues is responsible for engaging local governments in discussions on development, security and policy issues in general, and explaining the central government's development process to Papuan communities in particular. The Directorate also offers input to the public diplomacy division on the domestic situation and informs missions abroad about Indonesia's security situation.

In a similar vein, the central government also transferred resources and responsibilities to sub-national levels—primarily provinces and districts (*kabupaten*)—which became responsible for public services. The particular role provincial governments are playing remains murky, squashed between moneyed central governments and powerless district and municipal administrations. Yet European and North American countries have shown that sub-national governments, especially in federal states (e.g. Belgium-Flanders, Spain-Catalonia, Canada-Québec), can both reinforce the central government's public diplomacy through cooperation as well as hamper it through competition.

This can also already be seen in Indonesia. For example, the central government's efforts to wrest control from local authorities has led to resentment, which boiled to the surface over deforestation, a large contributor to global greenhouse gas emissions. So, while Indonesia appeared to be gaining some environmental credit within the international community, it simultaneously also became the

subject of international criticism portraying it as a despoiler of the planet.⁹⁰ Jokowi, the former mayor of the city of Surakarta (Solo, 2005-2012) and governor of Jakarta (2012-2014), was credited for how he addressed longstanding issues (corruption, minority rights), and his outreach to other non-central governments should follow a similar course.

It can be expected that Indonesia's public diplomacy both above and below the level of the MFA will grow through trial and error. A fundamental Indonesian value is to unite diverse groups, which could be advantageous in envisioning this type of inter-level public diplomacy approach. Such an approach, intrinsically related to Indonesian society, brings the domestic primacy in Indonesia's public diplomacy into the light.

More Homework: Reinforcing the Domestic Underpinnings of Public Diplomacy

Indonesia's public diplomacy benefits as well as suffers in situations where domestic and international concerns are intertwined and combined through the intermestic lens. If public diplomacy starts at home, then international expectations need to correlate with national aspirations, and the rhetoric of a country's projected image must correspond to its actual identity.

Indonesian scholars argue that it would therefore be more appropriate for Indonesia to rise to the domestic challenge and straddle the gap between what it wishes to achieve and its capacity to do so before serving as a source of inspiration for others.⁹¹ Indonesia's future public diplomacy, though, should not be reduced to "good news" stories (a trap into which other governments have fallen) at the expense of public credibility. It can thus be of equal value for others to learn from the hurdles Indonesia has overcome on its path to achieving its aspirations of becoming an emerging power.

There's more homework still to be done, though. Specifically, a growing national attitude against, or fatigue of, foreign affairs could potentially undermine public support and engagement, the very foundations upon which Indonesia's public diplomacy has been built. Briefly, the 1998 Reformasi, and the press freedom which came with it, also resulted in attention moving to more "pressing" domestic issues and away from foreign affairs.

As the Editors-in-chief of national and local newspapers, such as the *Jakarta Post* and *Tempo Magazine*, and the deputy chair of the Indonesia Press Council have pointed out to the author, Indonesia became more inward-looking, with greater public and media attention paid to political and economic issues, to violent events in East Timor and Papua New Guinea, ethnic cleansing campaigns, terrorist attacks, the 2008 economic crisis and the tsunami disaster. In short, despite an active international policy, people were more fixated on close-to-home over distant issues, and the media responded accordingly. The drop in public interest may have also been influenced by Indonesians' reflexive association of public diplomacy with their traditional narratives.

Despite the initiatives (e.g. training journalists; announcements through the MFA's official website; annual press briefings for (inter) national journalists; specific seminars; the Global Inter-media Dialogue), participation in past elections, and a slight increase in reporting on international policy during the election period, international policy is generally seen to be of little importance. The MFA's modest efforts will remain a thin gruel without support from the highest level.

However, as mentioned above, while President Jokowi may not have expressed a concrete vision on international policy, there are indications he will lean towards the practice of public diplomacy. For example, he pleaded in favor of involving people's participation in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy in his vision-mission paper on the General Elections Commission's website. A part of the mission is the enhancement of the diplomatic

infrastructure of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, such as reducing bureaucratic red tape; the challenge of expanding internal research capacity through rearrangement of priorities and organizational structure; and enhancing public diplomacy, especially so as to widen public participation in foreign affairs.⁹² All these initiatives, though in their infancy, fit well within the future paths suggested in this text regarding the narrative, the structure and the domestic backbone of public diplomacy.

As this article noted, while Jokowi did not initially show much interest in international affairs, he may find himself so consumed with domestic issues that international policy could provide a means for him to address certain domestic concerns, such as Indonesia's economy, infrastructure and climate problems, by seeking revenues internationally that could be invested domestically. This could also help to reduce anti-foreign and nationalist attitudes.

To reach this goal of bringing international policy back to the people, the core endeavor for the entire government's and its new president's future domestic public diplomacy is to draw greater attention to the impact domestic issues can have on international relations, and vice versa. While traditional themes should not be thrown overboard, newer themes which are part of Indonesia's changing regional and global position, such as environmental sustainability and the economy, are so relevant to Indonesians' daily lives that they can convert people and media who are looking inward to looking outward (more internationally), so as allow for the government to look forward. These themes, that are both relevant at home and abroad, have the potential to easily improve the broader public's and the media's interest.

Conclusions

Indonesia's international standing has risen. It can be seen as a democratic bastion against extremism, as an ally to great powers such as the U.S., China, and the European Union, and as a regional hub which has always played a leading role in ASEAN. Indonesia

has become more assertive in speaking up about the importance of democracy and human rights within the broad East Asian region in a group that is often prepared to soft-pedal these issues.

This article has demonstrated that Indonesia's public diplomacy is affected by basic principles and norms. Its "free and active" principle and its quest for national unity, for instance, have driven Indonesia's international policy since the country's independence in 1945, but have been implemented differently over the years. The government's public diplomacy springs from the international policy democratization processes of the 1998 Reformasi Period, wherein involving both publics at home and abroad in international policy became a condition as well as an instrument for reaching and consolidating democracy in Indonesia's pluralistic society.

In the little more than a decade since the inception of a public diplomacy division within its MFA, Indonesia's public diplomacy has logged significant progress. The country may be relatively new to the field, but it has adapted and built upon the strengths and weaknesses of its eastern as well as western predecessors, and turned their experiences to its advantage to such an extent that, as according to Jan Melissen,⁹³ Indonesia's "drawing board approach" holds lessons for other countries. Indonesia has managed to distinguish its public diplomacy, developed as both an intrinsic condition and a means of international policy democratization, from that of others, especially through its intermestic nature, its reaching out to both citizens at home and abroad from the beginning, and its niche narrative of Islam, democracy and modern society living in peace together.

From an international perspective, Indonesia's public diplomacy appears to have surpassed others to a certain extent by putting what has recently been referred to as integrative or twenty-first century diplomacy partially into practice. Indonesia could serve as a useful source of inspiration for governments continuing to wrestle with public diplomacy's domestic and intermestic dimensions. In addition, while profound challenges remain, concrete Indonesian integrative

practices tend to have moved beyond an intermestic approach and are gradually aiming to include the integration of hard and soft power (including transversal issues). Contrary to other cases, the expansion of Indonesia's economic power does not appear to have put its public diplomacy at risk so far. It instead provides additional ground on which a future integrative public diplomacy can be built and put into practice.

It will not all be smooth sailing, however. Indonesia has not sufficiently seized on the opportunities flowing from public diplomacy's broader practice within the Indonesian government. The biggest challenge may be drawing public diplomacy practice out of its bureaucratic isolation, and pulling the MFA and broader government culture out of its habit of red tape. The reform challenge may not be solvable over a single presidential term and its future remains murky. The core challenge will be to balance continuity and change, which cannot be done without support from the highest level. Despite even the man at the highest level learning over the course of his first year that breaking with tradition and leading Indonesia into the 21st century, including in the field of public diplomacy, is easier said than done, it will be accomplished more easily with, rather than without, sufficient public support.

Endnotes

1. The author wishes to thank the more than 25 high-level interviewees in the Indonesian government, the Advisory Council of the President of Indonesia, academia, media, civil society, and the 28 Indonesian diplomats working in various MFA divisions who participated in focus groups for providing greater insight into this topic and for their feedback on the research results. The author is especially indebted to former Foreign Minister Mr. Hassan Wirajuda, Ms. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Mr. Rizal Sukma, Mr. Abdul Mu'ti, Mr. Endy Bayuni, Mr. Harimuti Bambang for generously dedicating their time to share insights on this topic, and to Mr. Umar Hadi for his invaluable assistance. A particular thanks goes to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies

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16. These categories enlighten the reworking of traditional views of public diplomacy's core components in reaction to a changing environment. Briefly, one can see changes in public diplomacy's (1) goals: from static message design and delivery to dynamic message exchange; (2) actors: from nation states to additional actors, such as supra- and sub-states, and non-state actors; (3) public: from international opinion leaders to the public at large; (4) means: from information dissemination to relationship-building activities. In essence, a modern image of public diplomacy prefers "public networking" over "government informing."
17. The public involvement continuum in public diplomacy consists of different stages. The first stage is informational or educational (the government communicates), with little public involvement or impact. The aim is to provide the public with information to increase overall visibility and also to assist publics in understanding policy positions and choices. Examples are: the creation of fact sheets, brochures, websites, open houses and the organization of cultural events. The second stage consists of consultation and information-gathering (the government listens). The goal is mainly to obtain public feedback on decisions and plans. Examples are: public comments, organization, surveys, focus groups and sensitization campaigns. The last stage includes more active participation by both the government and the public. It includes discussion intended to exchange views and knowledge. Illustrations can be found in the organization of speaker programs, conferences and workshops, policy e-discussions, and other forms of digital outreach. It can also entail partnering with the goal of international policy cooperation and networking.
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