

Public Diplomacy of Multilateral Organizations: The Cases of NATO, EU, and ASEAN

By Zhikica Zach Pagovski

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Public Diplomacy of Multilateral Organizations: The Cases of NATO, EU, and ASEAN

Nowadays, multilateral institutions are increasing the use of public diplomacy and other communicational tools in order to promote better understanding and sustainable relationships with target audiences. For example, in 2004, the Committee for Public Diplomacy was created within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), succeeding the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations, which reflected the importance given to information and awareness-raising by NATO's founding members. The European Union (EU) Delegation to the U.S. established the Press and Public Diplomacy section to enhance awareness of the EU policies in the United States. With the launch of its first charter in 2008, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) declared that the organization would practice more public diplomacy, or as its leaders referred to it: "the people's diplomacy."¹

The phenomenon of the increased use of public diplomacy by multilateral institutions creates a puzzle. Even though scholars have mainly written about the successes, failures, and challenges, the question of how multilateral organizations conduct public diplomacy is not yet sufficiently explored. The issues of the motivations, means, target audiences, and goals of multilateral institutions in doing public diplomacy are also not explicitly clear.

This paper tries to answer these and other issues related to the conduct of multilateral organizations in the field of public diplomacy. The aim of this study is to explore what the means of engagement of multilateral organizations in public diplomacy are. In responding to this question, the paper addresses the very issues of whether multilateral institutions can conduct public diplomacy and whether they should be recognized as legitimate and powerful actors in the field. In a broader sense, this paper focuses on the process of multilateral organizations in conducting public diplomacy and provides a better understanding and framing of this concept.

To complete this task, the study examines the public diplomacy efforts of three multilateral organizations (NATO, the EU, and ASEAN). The public diplomacy activities of those organizations are assessed and revealed through a modified version of Cull's framework on public diplomacy approaches.² Then, the public diplomacy methods of those organizations are compared and contrasted in order to discover the main characteristics of the public diplomacy conduct of multilateral institutions. Finally, this paper argues that multilateral organizations are already established actors in the field of public diplomacy, they envision unique goals, standardize appropriate means, and influence both internal and external audiences.

Public Diplomacy and Multilateral Organizations

States are no longer the exclusive actors in public diplomacy. The development of new informational technologies and rapid globalization together with other factors such as the current economic/financial crisis, civil wars and revolutions, climate change, and terrorism brought a variety of sub-state and supra-state actors into the world of public diplomacy. Those dramatic changes significantly altered the main themes and methods of practicing public diplomacy. Regional organizations, such as NATO, the EU, and ASEAN were also influenced by those changes, and forced to implement better communication and information policies within their own structures. The discussion about the use of public diplomacy by multilateral organizations is scarce and not sufficiently explored. Nevertheless, the current debate on this topic revolves around several important questions:

1. Can multilateral organizations conduct public diplomacy activities?

Hocking et al. argue that the diplomatic environment of the 21st century is changing because of the expansion in the number and variety of international actors, the development of new international security agendas, and the resurgence of old geopolitical agendas.³ The new diplomacy would have the form of an “integrative diplomacy”

of a variety of actors, characterized by the growth of international policy networks.

Kelley examined the appearance of new actors into the world of diplomacy (NGOs, religious leaders, state intelligentsia, celebrities, and the private sector) recognizing the “formidable challenge” they pose to state primacy in the diplomatic world.⁴ Those non-state actors are entrepreneurial, epistemic, and nonofficial by nature, and they have the ability to (1) navigate the narrow straits between official and nonofficial worlds, (2) forge coalitions across borders, and (3) act when governments fail to act.⁵ For example, the emergence of those unofficial diplomats from epistemic communities and the civil sector in Southeast Asia such as the ASEAN’s Institutes of Strategic and International Studies, has “contributed to a more expansive understanding of diplomacy as a multi-tracked enterprise with governmental as well as non-governmental features.”⁶

Koschwitz notes that “actors in public diplomacy can no longer be confined to the profession of diplomats, but include various individuals, groups and institutions who engage in international and intercultural communication activities which do have a bearing on the political relationships between two or more countries.”⁷ In the same vein, Crocker Snow Jr. claims that public diplomacy that traditionally represents the actions of governments has expanded today to include new active participants, such as the media, multinational corporations, NGOs and faith-based organizations.⁸ Furthermore, Nye, Reinhard, and Mueller argue that those private actors (NGOs and foundations, businesses, citizens) have a great advantage in addressing certain public diplomacy challenges and can significantly supplement the public diplomacy efforts of their respective governments.^{9 10 11}

Nevertheless, new public diplomacy has not changed only in terms of the actors involved, but also in terms of the themes that states choose to present their stories.¹² National governments are more often departing from their state-centric public diplomacy narratives and instead are emphasizing common interests and

global public goods. This provides a solid basis for collaborative-beyond-the-state public diplomacy and creates different public diplomacy forms—one of which is public diplomacy collaboration in multilateral organizations.

Melissen was the first to define this phenomenon as “international organizations’ public diplomacy” and explains it as a “centrally directed communication effort” of foreign governments.¹³ Bui clarifies that “political organizations (e.g. the EU, ASEAN, etc.), whether they have specific strategies for public diplomacy, have been trying to promote better understanding and lasting relationships between them and their audiences” by conducting public diplomacy.¹⁴ Hence, the discussion above shows that in general, multilateral organizations offer a strong basis for intensifying their efforts and taking on a more prominent role in the world of public diplomacy.

2. What are the goals and targets of multilateral organizations in implementing public diplomacy strategies?

The issue of whether the main public diplomacy targets of multilateral organizations are internal audiences (populations within the member states), external audiences (foreign governments and populations), or both is contentious and raises further debates. Galvez argues that the public diplomacy goal of international organizations is to ensure a positive perception of their activities among domestic audiences within those organizations.¹⁵ Likewise, Chachavalpongpun looks at ASEAN’s public diplomacy, claiming that its “primary role may not be so much about forging international alliances but more about accomplishing political purposes at home.”¹⁶

Melissen claims that regional organizations, such as NATO and the EU, now perceive public diplomacy as an existential necessity and they focus efforts on both their public outreach and their external audiences.¹⁷ He explains that when national governments practice public diplomacy, they are mostly focused on their own national interest. However, when joint governments conduct public diplomacy, the broader interests of those states, regions, and the world

are emphasized. Melissen explains that with the “interconnected” realities of global relationships, it is hard to separate public affairs from public diplomacy. According to him, “engaging with one’s own domestic constituency with a view to foreign policy development and external identity-building has become part of the public diplomacy strategy of countries as diverse as Canada, Chile and Indonesia.”¹⁸

3. What are the means and methods of multilateral organizations in implementing public diplomacy?

Philip Seib argues that NATO must make its case through soft means in order to justify its hard power. He emphasizes today’s unprecedented access to information, claiming that in order for “NATO and other international organizations to fulfill their missions and retain their legitimacy, they must respect the altered balance of information-based influence.”¹⁹

De Gouveia and Plumridge provide a detailed account of the EU’s public diplomacy and emphasize the lack of a developed EU strategy, suggesting the creation of a “European Union Public Diplomacy Strategy Committee.” On the other hand, Anna Michalski argues that the EU already “possesses many of the required ingredients to mount a viable public diplomacy strategy.”²⁰ However, it is hard to claim that the EU conducts successful public diplomacy in a unified manner, since there is a lack of political consensus on the EU’s overall objectives and interests among its member states. Leonard explains that the focus for the EU’s public diplomacy has been mainly American, suggesting that the “American thinking and practice are (and should be) far removed from the EU.”^{21 22} Kenna examines the power of social media and recommends that the EU, through the European External Action Service (EEAS), should engage internal and external audiences with this new medium.²³

Chachavalpongpun explores the use of digital diplomacy (internet diplomacy) by ASEAN and claims that the ASEAN Secretariat has already started using digital media to strengthen its public diplomacy by reaching out to young ASEAN citizens in its cyberspace.²⁴ The

use of Twitter by the Secretariat and the increased use of Facebook by leaders of ASEAN's member states have facilitated ASEAN's communication with the public, and have successfully elaborated some organizational and state policies.

Framework of Analysis

This paper will assess and analyze the current practice of multilateral organizations in the field of public diplomacy through a modified framework that contains Cull's core public diplomacy approaches: listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange, and international broadcasting.²⁵ The framework in use is standardized to fit the settings of a multilateral organization (not a state). This framework also contains elements from Chachavalpongpun's approach of assessing ASEAN's digital diplomacy through the following key elements: (1) listening, (2) publishing, (3) engaging, (4) evaluating. Therefore, this study's assessment of the public diplomacy efforts of multilateral organizations will revolve around the following key approaches: (1) listening, (2) advocacy, (3) engagement, and (4) evaluation.

(1) *Listening* is the "attempt to manage the international environment by collecting and collating data about publics and their opinions overseas and using that data to redirect its policy or its wider public diplomacy approach accordingly."²⁶ This refers to the actor's capacity to access information about current discussions, attitudes, and perceptions and to carefully take into account those considerations in shaping the public diplomacy approach. In the more traditional sense of diplomacy, the process of listening was conducted either through the collecting of intelligence or through opinion polling. Some of the common listening activities may include (face-to-face) tours of officials, surveying and analyzing public trends, and reading blogs, forums, commentaries and other sources for public opinion expression. NATO's Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy Strategy Babst argues that listening must be genuine and must be a serious effort to understand the motives

and beliefs of the target audiences.²⁷ It is a precondition for effective public diplomacy and crucial in understanding the motives and beliefs of target audiences. In the new “digital era,” the process of listening requires adequate monitoring of online media and qualitative analysis of available data on the Internet.

(2) *Advocacy* explores the current capabilities of the organization in reaching out to internal and external audiences. According to Cull, advocacy is the “actor’s attempt to manage the international environment by undertaking an international communication activity to actively promote a particular policy, idea or ... [the] actor’s general interests in the minds of a foreign public.”²⁸ In the context of multilateral organizations, this may include press relations and informational work, such as pushing out messages in news, blogs, videos, pictures, publications, posters, advertisements etc. In addition, Babst claims that successful public diplomacy should also respond to the challenges of the web 2.0 using the entire communication toolbox, including social media.²⁹ For the purpose of this study, international broadcasting will be considered as an advocacy element, even though Cull recognizes it as a separate public diplomacy approach.

(3) *Engagement* relates to the instruments of multilateral organizations in bringing partners and other actors into public diplomacy and debates. Chachavalpongpun explains that this may require the organization to take part where the debate is happening by making partnerships with relevant actors. Even though Cull claims that the engagement element shall be present in all public diplomacy activities, there are some crucial activities that put engagement in a separate category. This category of engagement will include Cull’s public diplomacy approaches of cultural diplomacy and exchange activities. Some current engagement activities include leadership exchanges and fellowship programs, grant-making activities, organizing forums and seminars, offering building visits and tours, etc. The main goal of engagement activities is the process of relationship-building with influencers and target audiences that could result

in better understanding and support of the policies and ideals of the organization.³⁰

(4) *Evaluation* refers to the capabilities of organizations to assess their public diplomacy activities, and undertake the necessary measures for improvement or adjustment. This approach is important in providing an assessment of the organization's public diplomacy performance, and the revision/adjustment of its public diplomacy strategies and plans. Chachavalpongpun argues that it is important for an organization to explore how much it has achieved.³¹ An organizational public diplomacy strategy is necessary in determining the course of the organization's public diplomacy direction and for effective evaluation.

One additional factor is taken into consideration: the values and interests of an organization in conducting public diplomacy. This is worth examining in order to determine the organizational level and nature of engagement in public diplomacy.

The Cases of Multilateral Institutions and the Use of Public Diplomacy

An organization's goals, values, and activities could preclude its engagement in public diplomacy efforts. For example, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) aims not to conduct significant public diplomacy activities. As a firm supporter of the principles of confidentiality, discretion, and "quiet diplomacy" ("behind-the-scenes" negotiations), OSCE is reluctant to use public diplomacy in a more overt manner.³² The institution maintains that general missions "should keep a low public profile, because if they overly politicize or sensationalize the situation in their host countries they will not be able to carry out their mandates."³³

Other organizations, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), serve as a public diplomacy instrument of other actors. ARF has become an expedient public diplomacy instrument for ASEAN to draw their key partners into dialogues on multilateral security and

to portray ASEAN as an active political actor.³⁴ Nevertheless, most multilateral organizations intentionally engage in public diplomacy, and maintain and develop unique and somewhat independent public diplomacy programs.

NATO

NATO openly refers to its communication and information programs as public diplomacy activities and uses public diplomacy to build a better image of the organization. NATO's main goal in conducting public diplomacy is "raising levels of awareness and understanding about NATO, promoting its policies and activities, and thereby fostering support for, trust and confidence in the Alliance."³⁵

To do this, NATO takes part in a wide range of activities (smart defense, countering terrorism, cyber security, and the missions in Afghanistan and Libya) which deviate from its initial purpose and regional borders. This makes it hard for the organization to frame a concise and comprehensive public diplomacy narrative. According to Stefanie Babst, NATO aims to create a unique "brand" of a "strong, committed and competent transatlantic community of like-minded democracies that preserves peace and security for its members and, wherever possible, seeks to contribute to stability and security in the entire Euro-Atlantic region."³⁶ NATO's public diplomacy strategy aims to fight some of the organization's image problems, such as the perception of NATO as a "global policeman," "a tool of the U.S. to achieve its end," and "an unnecessary post-Cold war leftover."

NATO has understood the importance of effective communication and informing the public since its beginning. The institution's public diplomacy activities began in 1950 with the establishment of the NATO Information Service.³⁷ The initial role of the Service was to communicate NATO's policies to the general public. The Working Group on Information Policy and the Working Group on Social and Cultural Cooperation were merged into the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations (CICR). With the end of the Cold War and the need for a new public diplomacy approach, the

public diplomacy apparatus of the organization was restructured in 2004, when CICR changed its name to the Committee on Public Diplomacy (CPD) and the Office of Information and Press became the Public Diplomacy Division (PDD).

NATO aims to implement its public diplomacy in a formal, written, and documented manner. The organization issues an annual Public Diplomacy Strategy.³⁸ In addition, CPD examines and approves an annual Public Diplomacy Action Plan, which assists in the implementation of the annual Public Diplomacy Strategy.³⁹ CPD also produces supplementary reports, recommendations, and plans to North Atlantic Council (NAC) as necessary. For the first time in the Alliance's history, public diplomacy was officially mentioned in the *Declaration of the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008*. Member states reinforced their commitment to communicating with internal and external audiences in an "appropriate, timely, accurate and responsive" manner.⁴⁰

CPD acts as an advisory committee to NAC on communication and information issues. It is in charge of planning, implementing, and assessing NATO's public diplomacy strategy while PDD coordinates all strategic communication activities across all NATO civilian and military bodies and oversees the public diplomacy activities of other NATO divisions.⁴¹ CPD is comprised of one representative from each member state, while the Assistant Secretary-General for Public Diplomacy, together with international staff, leads the PDD. The NATO Multimedia Library, Co-sponsorship Grants, the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv, the NATO Information Office in Moscow, and the NATO Contact Point Embassies in partner countries are internal sections of the PDD. NATO also maintains a separate division for strategic communications that deals with military public affairs.

The EU

Even though the EU aims at developing a formalized public diplomacy capability, most of its outreach activities are not officially

referred to as “public diplomacy,” but described as information, communication, education, and cultural campaigns and programs. However, the EU Delegation to the U.S. is the first EU institution that introduced the word “public diplomacy” in its work by establishing the Press and Public Diplomacy Section. The European Commission refrains from describing EU information efforts as public diplomacy, as it is commonly mistaken for propaganda.⁴² Other explanations for the reluctance of the Union to use the term “public diplomacy” could be the reluctance of member states to have a centrally coordinated public diplomacy body that could reinforce the supranational character of the Union.

The EU’s goal in conducting public diplomacy is to promote EU interests through understanding, informing, and influencing. It explains the “EU’s goals, policies and activities and fostering understanding of these goals through dialogue with individual citizens, groups, institutions and the media.”⁴³ The EU’s public diplomacy efforts work to combat some of the main stereotypes that present the Union as an “artificial construct,” or as an organization ruled only by its most powerful member states.

Since its establishment, the EU has tried to present itself as a “peace project” that saved Europe from the danger of future wars and instabilities. EU public diplomacy strives to portray the Union as a unique model to be followed by other states and regional organizations. However, this narrative is slightly aggressive, outdated, and not appealing for the new generations who do not completely understand the historical and political instances of the EU integration process. Therefore, the Union is pursuing a more appealing and comprehensive narrative. Nowadays, EU presents itself as (1) a land of 50 years of peace, stability, and prosperity, (2) a guardian of the principles of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance, (3) a firm believer in multilateralism and partnership, and (4) a protector of the cultural diversity of its nations.⁴⁴ The EU Delegation to the U.S. has an adjusted narrative for the U.S. public, depicting the Union as “Transatlantic Partner, Global Actor” on its promotional material.

The public diplomacy apparatus in the Union has developed gradually, throughout the process of the EU's integration and institutional development. The establishment of public diplomacy mechanisms and structures in the Union is related to the development of the EU Common Foreign and Security policy. The creation of the European Commission in 1958 and especially the DG for Communication, and the launch of the EU External Action Service (EEAS) in 2010 have provided a more formal framework for the practice of public diplomacy by the Union.

The EU does not have a developed public diplomacy strategic plan or approved legislative acts on the Union's public diplomacy structure. However, in 2005, the Commission adopted an "Action Plan to Improve Communicating Europe."⁴⁵ In 2006, the Commission also developed a *White Paper on a European Communication Policy*. In 2007 and 2008, the Commission produced strategic and informative documents on engaging EU citizens through the Internet and forging partnerships within the Union. In 2010, the European Council passed a resolution for establishing EEAS that stipulated the creation of a department for information and public diplomacy.⁴⁶ Later, the European Council decided not to establish this department, but to continue relying on the Directorate-General (DG) for Communication's efforts in informing target audiences.

The EU practices public diplomacy through a diffused, decentralized, and multilayered framework of departments, policies, and programs. The EU Commission is the main actor in the public diplomacy efforts of the organization through its DGs. The DG for Communication maintains the leading advocacy role in the Union's public diplomacy efforts, as it is in "charge of informing and communicating about the policies of the European Union with the public at large."⁴⁷ DGs for Enlargement, Culture & Education, and EuroAid (Development & Cooperation) also have a supportive role in the process. EEAS acts as the foreign ministry for the Union, maintaining EU delegations all around the world that have a similar function to those of an embassy. EEAS is led by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security

Policy and maintains a strategic communications department. The EU enlargement and neighborhood policies contain a strong public diplomacy component, which aim to construct positive perception of the EU by its potential members and immediate neighbors. For example, the *Union of the Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighborhood Policies* could be considered a public diplomacy mechanism of the Union. The EU Political and Stability Committee engages in strategic communication activities in order to influence public opinion of the EU's involvement in military and security operations. The HR, together with the EU Special Representatives in different regions, play an important role in promoting the Union's policies and interests in different regions and countries.⁴⁸ Currently, there are several committees within the Union that aim to coordinate the work between various public diplomacy activities.

ASEAN

ASEAN, unlike NATO and the EU, has not yet used the term “public diplomacy” in its practices and does not have a specialized division for this purpose. However, different institutional layers in the organization have implemented a variety of public diplomacy activities.

ASEAN works to successfully manage information in order to create a sense of belonging and mutual understanding among its member states.⁴⁹ The organization accelerated its use of public diplomacy in order to meet its goal of establishing of an “ASEAN Community” by 2015.⁵⁰ Its public diplomacy efforts aim “to help ASEAN bring understanding about its policies and activities to regional and international community” and to “get its people involved into regional issues and the community-building process.”⁵¹ With its public diplomacy activities, ASEAN tries to fight the common misperception of the organization as a weak and insignificant regional and global actor.

The Secretariat of ASEAN declared “One Vision, One Identity, One Community” as the organization's official motto. This motto

is closely related to the public diplomacy narrative that ASEAN presents to its citizens and the world: a “concert of Southeast Asian nations, outward looking, and living in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies.”⁵²

ASEAN developed its public diplomacy mechanism mainly after the Cold War, and especially since the addition of ten new members in 1999. Since 1989, the conference of ASEAN Ministers Responsible for Information (AMRI) has met each year, acknowledging the need to disseminate information about ASEAN to member states’ borders and to international audiences. This conference played a leading role in the development of many mechanisms and institutional structures for conducting public diplomacy such as the ASEAN Web Portal, ASEAN’s website on Culture and Information, and member states’ communication plans. With the launch of its first charter in 2008, ASEAN declared that the organization would practice more public diplomacy, or as its leaders referred to it, “the people’s diplomacy.”⁵³

The adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 is considered a legal turning point of ASEAN’s history.⁵⁴ The Charter can be seen as an important public diplomacy mechanism, signaling the unity, power, and cohesion of the organization to external audiences. The Charter established the ASEAN Foundation, similar to a public diplomacy body, with the main goal of supporting ASEAN community-building by promoting greater awareness of the ASEAN identity, people-to-people interaction, and close collaboration among different stakeholders within the region. By signing the Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015, ASEAN committed to further improving its public diplomacy efforts by engaging and better communicating with its member states. In light of this Declaration, ASEAN also adopted the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) Plan of Action in order to enhance public awareness, shape perceptions, and amplify participation.⁵⁵ Also, in 2010, the organization developed the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC). Some actions envisioned in this plan included an organized public outreach, advocacy activities,

and creating partnerships at the regional and national levels.⁵⁶ In addition, in 2012, communication and information representatives from the Ministries of Information of ASEAN member states met to discuss the creation of a communication plan to effectively promote building an ASEAN Community by 2015.⁵⁷

ASEAN, like the EU, conducts public diplomacy activities through a diffused, decentralized, and more informal framework of departments, policies, and programs. The ASEAN Secretariat and its supporting bodies have an important role in disseminating information and activities about ASEAN. AMRI conferences have more decision-making power in encouraging the organization to improve its information dissemination and communication mechanisms. The ASEAN web portal, ASEAN's website on Culture and Information, and member states' communication plans also support the organization's public diplomacy.

Assessment and Comparison

1. Listening

The process of listening requires an organizational ability to collect data about external perception, analyze this data, identify its problems, and take action to improve/adjust its policies. Effective listening could be performed through effective research, analysis, and engagement with external audiences. The planning and execution of some of those activities are performed internally, without much knowledge for external publics of how the organization listens to its target audiences. Hence, it is hard to assess the listening capabilities of multilateral organizations. However, from the research on the public diplomacy activities of NATO, the EU, and ASEAN, it is obvious that some organizations take this process seriously.

Former NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary-General for Public Diplomacy Babst claims that "successful public diplomacy does not begin with talking, but with listening." She explains that the process of listening is important for NATO for two reasons: (1) collecting and analyzing target group opinions and (2) understanding their

motives and beliefs.⁵⁸ NATO does not conduct exclusive surveys about publics' perceptions of the organization. However, it does implement research and analytical activities to determine its external image. The organization monitors national and international surveys to better understand its global picture.⁵⁹ For example, NATO seriously considers the Transatlantic Trends survey of the German Marshall Fund of the United States that measures public perceptions about transatlantic cooperation, including some measurements on perceptions of NATO.

Also, NATO utilizes some existing online communities and blogs, such as www.atlantic-community.org, to examine public opinion on topics related to the organization. The organization has arranged online chats and discussions on the NATO's New Strategic Concept and NATO's role in Afghanistan.

Like Babst, the former EU Commissioner Margot Wallstrom, talking about the public diplomacy efforts of the Commission, stated that "communication is more than information: it establishes a relationship and initiates a dialogue with European citizens, it listens carefully and it connects to people."⁶⁰ This statement shows that the EU Commission considers the listening approach as an important component of its outreach activities. This is also evident in the Commission's *Action Plan to Improve Communicating Europe* that dedicates a whole section to the importance of effective listening and reporting. This plan presents two important steps for successful listening: "(1) identifying target audiences and (2) understanding the foreign country through direct contacts with national, regional and local decision-makers and authorities, through regular media monitoring, and through public opinion polls."⁶¹ The plan requires the EU delegation to report to headquarters and to conduct research on public perceptions of specific issues.

Furthermore, the EU maintains an entire Public Opinion Analysis Section that monitors the evolution of public opinion in EU member states and candidates. This Section assists the Union in the preparation of texts, decision-making, and evaluation. For the

purpose of effective examination and listening to public opinion, this section implements the EU Barometer survey on topics such as EU enlargement, social situation, health, culture, information technology, environment, the Euro, and the EU defense.⁶²

In contrast, ASEAN lacks an official mechanism for listening to target audiences. However, the organization uses its conferences, summits, and events to collect information about the perceptions of internal and external political figures, experts, and civil societies. ASEAN also uses its dialogues (e.g. ARF, East Asia Forum, etc.) with audiences from non-ASEAN countries for exchanging ideas and information. These dialogues help ASEAN to better understand the perception of its activities and goals.⁶³

From the examination of the listening approaches to public diplomacy of NATO, the EU, and ASEAN, it is evident that all three organizations are performing activities to better understand their target audiences' perceptions. However, the nature, intensity, and methodology of those activities are entirely different. While the EU maintains an entire Public Opinion Analysis Section and a specialized EU Barometer survey, NATO mostly relies on external surveys on public perceptions (Transatlantic Trends) and blogs (Atlantic Community). On the other hand, ASEAN uses more informal means (e.g. conferences, summits, dialogues, etc.) to better understand the perceptions of its target audience.

2. Advocacy

The advocacy approach is a “one-way channel” for communicating with external audiences through press relations and informational work. This process has a limited objective and therefore it requires a careful selection of target audiences and utilization of digital and media technologies by multilateral organizations.

NATO performs intensive and up-to-date advocacy activities in order to present itself as a transparent and interactive entity. Besides its well-developed press and public relations channels, the organization successfully uses social media and communication

tools. The organizational website www.nato.int is well organized, very informative, always updated, and user-friendly. It contains a newsroom with press releases, news, speeches of NATO officials, and an audio-visual library. Furthermore, the website offers a free e-mail newsletter. In addition to its informational work, NATO performs some broadcasting activities through its NATOnchannel.tv.

NATO dedicates enormous effort to social media and new digital technologies. It maintains a Facebook page, Twitter account, YouTube channel, Google+, Flickr, and RSS feed with press statements, news, photos, videos, and other multimedia features. NATO also offers a digital application for iPad. NATO even provides some of those social media in languages other than English and French, like Russian and Ukrainian. Moreover, NATO's public officials, such as Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Assistant Secretary-General for Public Diplomacy Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic use their own social media to closer tie with target audiences. In order to stay consistent with its policies, NATO collaborated on a digital strategy with specific social media guidelines for both the official and personal use of social media and other Internet activities for all NATO employees.⁶⁴

The EU conducts various advocacy activities, from press and public relations to extensive use of social media and new digital tools. To enhance the outcome of its advocacy, the Union conducts its communication activities around annual themes (e.g. climate change) that are promoted both in Brussels and in the delegations worldwide.

The official EU website on press and public relations, called the Newsroom, provides a comprehensive overview of news, highlights, press releases, press contacts and facilities, audiovisual material, and a calendar of EU events.⁶⁵ The Newsroom is also available as a smartphone application that allows users to watch live events such as press briefing, news, and updates on EU affairs. In addition to that, EU delegation websites maintain their own public affairs news sections with information relevant to the country of residence. In order to improve coordination between the central communication activities

in Brussels and in other countries, the Press and Information Unit has created a mechanism to monitor the activities of EU delegations through regular reporting.⁶⁶

Furthermore, the EU is engaged in several broadcasting activities. The EU Commission maintains an audiovisual news agency called Europe by Satellite. This service is mainly targeted to media professionals and provides TV and radio channels with EU-related topics in 23 languages. The Commission also partially funds the Euronews channel, a broadcasting service that covers world news through a pan-European perspective. This channel has acquired an important role, providing information about EU affairs to around 151 million households in seven languages.⁶⁷

During its 50th anniversary public diplomacy campaign, the EU co-funded and co-produced documentaries and radio shows, placed advertisements in the written press, produced TV spots and co-financed press supplements covering most of the countries in the world.⁶⁸ One of the conclusions of the Union was that local and regional media should be targeted more, since in many countries “local press, television and radio may be more appropriate to reach certain audiences such as young people, for example, than the national press.”⁶⁹

The EU has a long list of social media accounts: Facebook, MySpace, Hyves, LinkedIn, Twitter, Blip, Flickr, Picasa, Daily Motion, YouTube and Vimeo. Different EU institutions, commissioners, officials, delegations, policies, and projects are promoted using separate social media accounts, which makes the overall approach disconnected.⁷⁰ However, the use of social media directly by EU officials has proven to be very effective. For example, EU High Representative Ashton’s and EU Commissioner on Enlargement Füle’s personal Twitter accounts showed effective advocacy of EU policies and better engagement with target audiences.

ASEAN dramatically improved its press and public relations efforts since the Cold War ended, the accession of ten new members,

and the approval of the ASEAN Charter. Before that, ASEAN practiced more elite and secret diplomacy that was not accessible to the media. Since ASEAN was founded on the basis of an elite rule, the organization is still mostly “communicating through elites’ speeches, joint statements after meetings, and publications.”⁷¹

The launch of the ASEAN website (<http://www.asean.org/>) in 1995 helped to consolidate the organization’s advocacy efforts. This website contains a news section featuring updates about the organization and statements and communiqués from its leadership. The website stores relevant documents and publications, a media gallery, and a calendar of events. It is now updated more often than it was in the past. The website has succeeded in attracting different target audiences: researchers (80% of all visitors), businesses (15% of all visitors) and international organizations and private individuals (5% of all visitors).⁷² In addition to the main webpage, ASEAN used to run two public diplomacy-related websites: the ASEAN Culture & Information Portal and the ASEAN Media Portal. After problems in attracting visitors to these websites, regularly updating their content, and integrating them with the social media, the organization decided to consolidate both websites and to better incorporate new digital technologies. Currently, the new consolidated website is still not available on the Internet.

Even though ASEAN does not own any broadcasting activities, some of its member states aim to promote the organization through their national media outlets. For example, Thailand broadcasts the 24 Thai-ASEAN News Network (featuring news and entertainment in English) and ASEAN TV (providing programs on economic, political, societal, cultural, and entertainment issues in English). So far, ASEAN TV has not reached a wide audience within the ASEAN region, but it acts as a link between citizens from 120 countries across four continents, with the goal of promoting collaboration among ASEAN countries and improving cooperation among ASEAN members.⁷³

The Joint Media Statement for the Eleventh Conference of the ASEAN Ministers Responsible for Information in March 2012 stated that “ASEAN should leverage on the popularity of social media that would keep it current and relevant as a disseminator of information” especially to the younger generation.⁷⁴ Since then, ASEAN has significantly increased its use of social media. ASEAN maintains a Facebook page and posts short messages, news, videos, photos, and information about events on a daily basis. The ASEAN Secretariat’s Twitter “brings diplomacy into the digital age ... to reach out to citizens, companies and other non-state actors.”⁷⁵ The organization’s YouTube channel provides videos about various diplomatic, cultural, and economic activities, mainly by promoting the ASEAN 2015 Community efforts. In addition to those social media, ASEAN has accounts on Flickr and Scribd (a depository of ASEAN’s publications and documents).

This assessment of their advocacy efforts shows that all three organizations have well-developed communication and outreach programs. NATO, the EU, and ASEAN maintain modern websites with centralized and developed news sections that provide press releases, statements of officials, audiovisuals, and calendar of events. All three organizations are involved in broadcasting activities through their own channels, or their own program on external media outlets. All of the organizations recognize the importance of social media, and maintain accounts on the most popular social media channels. Many NATO and EU officials maintain personal social media accounts that succeed in attracting a wide range of target audiences. The main problem of the EU’s social media usage is that almost every EU institution, delegation, program, project, and public figure maintains a separate account in almost all of the top social media. Most of those accounts are not integrated and are therefore redundant, repeating the same messages several times. This leaves users unsatisfied and confused. On the other hand, ASEAN is increasing its use of new media technologies, but faces problems of a limited audience that follows its social media accounts.

3. Engagement

Effective engagement is an important public diplomacy approach in bringing relevant actors and general publics into the debates and the affairs of the organization. The process of engagement represents a “two-way channel” of communicating with external targets. The engagement approach of multilateral organizations in this study is assessed by the activities performed by target audiences and groups.

NATO implements a variety of activities to engage external audiences. For example, NATO’s PDD organized more than 140 outreach activities in the New Strategic Concept in member countries.⁷⁶ Former Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy Strategy Babst explained that

PDD’s activities are intended to have long-term effects. They are designed to: build both relationships and networks with opinion-formers and journalists; facilitate dialogue among security experts, policy-makers and NGO representatives; generate interest in transatlantic issues among larger segments of the population, in particular the successor generation.⁷⁷

NATO aims to make the organization more accessible to average citizens. NATO Headquarters in Brussels accept thousand of visitors every year, and some of them are directly involved in meetings with NATO officials and discussions on NATO issues. NATO’s Multimedia Library holds over 18,000 books and subscribes to 155 journals is open to visitors, and offers a newsletter about new publications.⁷⁸

NATO regularly organizes web chats and open discussions on social media channels. NATO officials often post questions and engage citizens through their social media accounts. For example, Ambassador Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic (Assistant Secretary General for NATO’s Public Diplomacy), and Veronika Wand-Danielsson (Swedish Ambassador to NATO) organized a virtual discussion on International Women’s Day on March 8, 2012 by collecting questions via Twitter.⁷⁹

In order to better engage directly with “netizens” around the globe in an open and transparent way, NATO opened an interactive platform called “WE-NATO.” After getting criticism that this platform was redundant and didn’t offer “two-way communication,” WE-NATO was taken down.⁸⁰

The Alliance aims to bring younger generations into the discussion. For this purpose, NATO organizes and funds many fellowship programs, summer schools, seminars, workshops, and essay competitions for students and young professionals. An example of such a program is the Summer School for Young Professionals of the Center for European and North Atlantic Affairs, organized in Slovakia and Ukraine, that brings students and young leaders to discuss NATO-related issues.⁸¹

In addition, NATO organizes events and conference to engage experts, decision-makers, and other types of specific audiences by discussing the role of the Alliance and its public diplomacy activities. For instance, in 2012 in Brussels, NATO organized a workshop titled “The Power of Soft Power—NATO’s Public Diplomacy,” featuring leading minds on new media who exchanged views on the benefits of new technology to NATO’s public diplomacy efforts. The workshop examined the following two questions: (1) what is NATO’s place and voice in a global communications environment? and (2) how can NATO connect to others worldwide to work jointly on key issues?⁸²

In order to better integrate experts from various fields, the Alliance launched the online magazine *NATO Review*. This magazine “looks at key security issues [relevant to NATO] through the eyes of the experts.”⁸³ The aim of this magazine is to provide a platform where experts come to talk and examine transatlantic security matters through articles, videos, pictures, etc. *NATO Review* is open for submissions (analysis articles, book reviews, history pieces, military matters pieces, and opinion pieces) that follow strict guidelines. The platform is optimized for use on smartphones and personal digital assistants (PDAs), and is accessible through an online subscription.

NATO engages NGOs, universities, think tanks and other civil society organizations through grant co-sponsorship.⁸⁴ PDD offers co-sponsorship for conferences, seminars, workshops, and other public diplomacy activities on topics relevant to NATO's agenda.

Moreover, NATO has tested and implemented several cultural diplomacy activities. NATO's half-marathons in Hungary attracted thousands of participants and broad media coverage.⁸⁵ Also, NATO implemented image-building activities such as NATO exhibitions, contests, etc.

In the same vein, the EU is also actively involved in ensuring active engagement with its target audiences. Its engagement activities are related to specific target audiences, but generally, Brussels and the delegations engage important discourse shapers (journalists, NGOs, and academics) through the organization's different activities (visits, grant-makings, conferences, seminars, exchange programs, etc.).⁸⁶

The European Union Visitors Program, which has operated since 1974, allows young leaders from countries outside of the Union to visit Europe to "gain a first-hand appreciation of the EU's goals, policies and peoples and to increase mutual understanding between professionals from non-EU countries and their EU counterparts."⁸⁷ Participants in this program have the opportunity to meet with EU officials in Brussels, Strasbourg, and Luxemburg, and to discuss topics of mutual interest.

Engaging with different stakeholders is an important component of EU public diplomacy. For this purpose, the EU provides funding to EU and non-EU NGOs and projects that further the EU's interests and values.⁸⁸ It also makes grants to youth, researchers, farmers, and small businesses from EU members, candidate, and non-member countries.⁸⁹

Because EU officials aim to better engage target audiences through cyberspace, many EU commissioners and EU senior staff maintain their own blogs, which provide an insider's view on EU affairs.⁹⁰

The EU also engages in developing countries by providing international development assistance. The Union is the world's largest donor of development assistance, providing 55% of global official development assistance on poverty and humanitarian relief.⁹¹ The EU's institutions repeatedly emphasize this in most of their public diplomacy efforts.

The Commission's DG for Education and Culture implements various exchange activities that boost the EU's public diplomacy goals via stimulating student and scholar exchanges between member and non-member states. For instance, the EU's Erasmus Mundus program "aims to enhance the quality of European higher education and to promote dialogue and understanding between people and cultures through cooperation with third countries."⁹² This program has been successful in promoting EU higher education around the world, building partnerships between EU and non-EU institutions for higher education, and building a positive image of the Union among students and in academia.

The Union is also engaged in cultural diplomacy through its DG for Education and Culture and its delegations abroad. Its cultural activities aim to promote both the EU member states and the Union as a whole. EU delegations abroad organize a variety of cultural events in order to build a strong image of the Union and its members. During its 50th Anniversary public diplomacy campaign, the EU organized 106 cultural events (concerts and musical events, film festivals, dance, and theater) around the world. In addition to that, the EU implemented 62 exhibitions and stands at fairs, 73 events specifically for young people, 48 competitions and quizzes, and 19 sporting events.⁹³ It is interesting to note that the EU brand name was able to attract sponsorships and support from the private sector around the world during this campaign, since the companies wanted to be involved with public events organized by the Union.⁹⁴

ASEAN also aims to encourage engagement activities between itself and various target audiences. ASEAN has promoted informal dialogues (summits, conferences, workshops) as a way of engagement

among the member state's leaders and the outside world. ASEAN's summits have become an "important instrument of public diplomacy rather than as a substantive political process."⁹⁵ Those summits allowed the internal and external elites to build strong professional relationship and to successfully address complicated issues.

ASEAN is famous for paying special attention to engaging the experts' community in its decision-making processes. The ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (with branches in each member state) was created to involve academics, intellectuals, journalists, business elites, and officials in research activities. Those activities are conducted in the form of analysis and publications, while the experts' community have had the chance to participate in various conferences, seminars, workshops, and summits. ASEAN's effort to promote research activities has been an important vehicle for building constructive relationships between experts and scholars within and outside of the borders of the organization.⁹⁶

ASEAN dedicates special attention to the involvement of the civil sectors. The organization has formalized a process for official registration of organizations associated with ASEAN. However, these efforts to support civil sectors are mostly conducted inside its regional borders. Nevertheless, ASEAN has supported and carried out some international projects involving civil society around the world.

ASEAN is increasing its efforts to promote cultural diplomacy and youth exchanges. The organization has developed two interactive online games ("Next Top Chef" and "The Legend of the Golden Talisman") with the goal of raising awareness about the organization, its place, and member states' cultures. The "ASEAN Quiz Program" aims to enhance knowledge and increase awareness of ASEAN among younger generations.⁹⁷ Also, Singapore has established a university exchange program called ASEAN Scholarship that intends "to provide opportunities to the young people of ASEAN to develop their potential and equip them with important skills for the 21st century."⁹⁸

This examination of their engagement activities confirms that NATO, the EU, and ASEAN actively interact with different target audiences. NATO and the EU have developed mechanisms for open engagement with all types of target audiences, from the average person to the high elite. ASEAN is trying to increase its engagement activities to transition from an elitist to a more citizen-centered public diplomacy approach. All three organizations have organized engagement activities comparable to those that a country with a developed public diplomacy apparatus (U.S., UK) would organize. NATO, the EU, and ASEAN are all successful in integrating the experts' community and the civil sector in their organization's debates. They all try to reach out to younger audiences such as students and young professionals through various exchange programs, summer schools, and competitions. The organizations also run visitors programs, blogs, and other platforms to increase their ties with citizens. NATO, the EU, and ASEAN have gone even further by initiating cultural diplomacy activities around the world.

4. Evaluation

The process of evaluation requires an assessment of each organization's public diplomacy efforts. Effective evaluation requires a concise public diplomacy strategy against which one could assess the public diplomacy efforts of the entity.

Every year, NATO's CPD produces a public diplomacy strategy for the organization. This strategic plan examines the public environment through a SWOT analysis. It sets up goals and priorities for the organization and spells out the tools and approaches for conducting public diplomacy. The evaluation mechanism is specified in its public diplomacy strategy. This strategy explains that NATO evaluates its public diplomacy through: "application of lessons learned reports; analysis of data collected from visitors; ...; systematic analysis of media and press coverage; ...; regular assessment of statistics on the use of the NATO website; analysis of CPE activity reports and regular assessment of e-publications; ..., information and press officers and other means."⁹⁹

The Strategic Communications Policy Board is the organizational entity that evaluates the performance of NATO's communication activities. Also, in 2013, NATO PDD together with the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre prepared a "Framework for the Strategic Planning and Evaluation of Public Diplomacy." This framework was developed to better evaluate and enhance the impact of NATO's public diplomacy activities. It contains parameters and worksheets for effective public diplomacy, strategic planning, and evaluation that could be used not only for NATO, but also for the public diplomacy efforts of other entities and organizations.¹⁰⁰

Even though different EU institutions and sectors have prepared various communication and outreach strategies, the EU, unlike NATO, lacks a comprehensive public diplomacy strategic plan that will take into account all EU public diplomacy efforts. The DG for Communication has created several strategic documents on improving and coordinating the communication activities of the Union. However, these documents fail to present clear indicators for success.

Additionally, the EU does not have a research and analysis unit to "evaluate the efficiency of EU programmes."¹⁰¹ However, regardless of the absence of a clear strategic plan and a mechanism for public diplomacy evaluation, the EU tries to consider other methods to assess its performance. For example, the EU published a report on its 50th Anniversary Public Diplomacy campaign that evaluates the success of its activities. The report claims that the variety of events organized allowed politicians, academics, civil society, and other groups to "evaluate the EU and its achievements and set out the kind of relationships they want it to develop with its partner countries around the world."¹⁰² This report presents quantitative measures for success (e.g. number of events organized, number of target audience covered, etc.) and outlines a number of factors that could ensure high participation (e.g. clear messages, early preparation and publicity, cooperation with member states, cooperation with the appropriate national and local authorities and groups).

Unlike the previous two, ASEAN does not have a formal strategy, or an evaluation mechanism for public diplomacy. However, in the interest of achieving the ASEAN Community 2015, the organization produced several important strategic documents that could substitute for a comprehensive public diplomacy strategy. *ASEAN Tourism Strategic Plan 2011–2015* was designed to emphasize “tourism as an important element of the community” and to attract foreigners to visit the region and acquire positive attitudes about member countries.¹⁰³ Also, ASEAN produced a *5-year Work Plan on Education (2011–2015)* “that clarifies ASEAN’s role as a regional partner in the education sector and supports ASEAN programmes that raise awareness of regional identity; ... regional mobility programmes for students, teachers, and faculty and strategies for internationalisation of education.”¹⁰⁴

Even though ASEAN lacks a formal evaluation mechanism, many of the ASEAN Secretariat’s units monitor the implementation of many public diplomacy activities, and produce analysis and progress reports. For example, Lim Chze Cheen, Assistant Director and Head of ASEAN Connectivity Division, presented a report that evaluates the organization’s efforts in achieving the objective of the ASEAN Community 2015 in which people-to-people communication is an integral part. ASEAN also aims to assess its communication and information successes/failures during the AMRI conferences, where the Ministers Responsible for Information review and evaluate the results of the member states’ communication plans.

This assessment of the strategic planning and evaluation activities of NATO, the EU, and ASEAN reveals that NATO is well equipped with both an annual public diplomacy strategy and a standardized framework for the evaluation of public diplomacy. The EU lacks a comprehensive public diplomacy strategy, but relies on the strategic plans of different DGs and other units. The Union does not have an institutionalized mechanism for evaluation of public diplomacy, but considers other options for assessment through progress reports, internal meetings, etc. It is hard to talk about a formal strategic planning and evaluation mechanism of ASEAN’s public diplomacy

since the organization does not state that it even conducts public diplomacy. As ASEAN's public diplomacy efforts are decentralized, the organization does not have a comprehensive public diplomacy strategy, but strategic plans for different public diplomacy elements (education, culture, tourism). Once again, ASEAN uses the meetings of its Ministers for Information, dialogues, and forums to evaluate the success of its public diplomacy. Also, different units within the ASEAN Secretariat perform some sort of evaluation activities (progress reports).

Values & Interests of Multilateral Organizations and Public Diplomacy

The values and interests of multilateral organizations predetermine their practice of public diplomacy. The explanation of the fact that some organizations officially declare and label their activities as “public diplomacy” rests in the close correlation between the concept of sovereignty and use of public diplomacy. NATO's idea of “collective defense” and their struggle to project soft power to the world explain why the organization is eager to openly associate itself with the practice of public diplomacy. The constant struggle between the EU supra-nationalist and inter-governmentalist forces clarifies why the EU is still reluctant to fully adopt the use of the term “public diplomacy.”¹⁰⁵ The strong norm within the ASEAN community for “respect for sovereignty” and “non-interference” in other states' affairs explains why the organization has never referred to its outreach and information activities as public diplomacy.¹⁰⁶ Generally, ASEAN member states are willing to compromise their domestic public diplomacy strategies for the sake of presenting a common supranational public diplomacy approach.

Effective public diplomacy/strategic communications is essential in explaining military actions undertaken by a certain actor in creating a good image and persuading foreign audiences of the legitimacy of the intervention. The military interventions in Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), and Libya (2011) required an effort from NATO to convince the international community about the

legitimacy of those hard security activities.¹⁰⁷ As Howorth argues, the transformation of the EU from a civilian power into a new type of crisis management actor required successful communications and image creation of the Union in the international community.¹⁰⁸ In contrast, Asian multilateral institutions refrain from participating in international intervention activities and are strongly against this practice. This explains why an intensive public diplomacy approach is not ASEAN's top priority—there is no need for the organization to explain and support any international intervention activities.¹⁰⁹ On the other hand, NATO and the EU depend on the effective use of public diplomacy in order to justify their military activities and improve their images.¹¹⁰

The fundamental difference between Europe's hard and Asia's soft institutionalism explains why NATO created more centralized, hierarchical, and structural apparatuses for public diplomacy, while ASEAN refused to formally institutionalize public diplomacy practices. Since NATO's functional focus is limited to political and security issues and its institutional structure is adaptable to changes, it is easier for the organization to adopt a more centralized and defined apparatus for public diplomacy. The EU is a bureaucratic organization focused on hundreds of issue areas that make it hard to have a more centralized, coordinated, and compact public diplomacy structure. In general, Asian multilateral organizations are more informal, decentralized, and bottom-up-oriented, which explains why ASEAN lack a special institutional structure, such as a department/committee for public diplomacy.¹¹¹

Conclusion

This assessment of the public diplomacy activities of NATO, the EU, and ASEAN reveals that all three organizations recognize the importance of effective communication and engagement with target audiences, and have started to build institutional capacities to address this issue. All three organizations strive to include the public diplomacy concept in their organizational documents, strategies, and other documents. While NATO creates a specialized annual public

diplomacy strategy, the EU and ASEAN aim to incorporate different public diplomacy elements in various organizational strategic documents and plans.

The values and interests of multilateral organizations predetermine the level and nature of their public diplomacy involvement. The Asian norm of “soft institutionalism” clarifies why ASEAN’s public diplomacy apparatus is less formal, decentralized, and non-hierarchical. The EU’s complicated bureaucratic structure explains why the Union practices public diplomacy through a diffused, decentralized, and a multilayered framework of departments, policies and programs. NATO’s specific institutional focus and history of strong institutional apparatuses explain the organization’s specialized, centralized, and hierarchical public diplomacy capacities. Regardless of the structure—centralized, decentralized, or informal—all three organizations have built instructional capacities according to their internal settings that could appropriately conduct public diplomacy.

All three organizations direct their public diplomacy efforts to both internal (within the organization) and external (outside of the organization) target audiences. NATO, the EU, and ASEAN depend on the member states that created them, and therefore aim to build a positive image in front of those member states’ citizens. This trend reaffirms the departure from the traditional theoretical assumption that public diplomacy should target only foreign audiences. It is important to mention that NATO, the EU, and ASEAN aim to engage more with average citizens and youth than previously.

This study also reveals that the new public diplomacy requires an active engagement of the public officials and their strong connection to the citizens. The assessment shows that some personalities, such as former NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary-General for Public Diplomacy Babst shaped the public diplomacy discourse and successfully represented the organizational ideals by giving speeches, presentations, and people-to-people contact. The officials’ personal social media accounts and blogs proved to be an attractive

method of engaging with the public audiences, both internal and external.

The active participation of NATO, the EU, and ASEAN in all four public diplomacy elements (listening, advocacy, engagement, and evaluation) reaffirms the claim that multilateral organizations indeed conduct public diplomacy better than states, in some cases. While NATO implements public diplomacy elements in a more formalized and centralized manner and EU through a decentralized structure, ASEAN conducts public diplomacy in a more informal way. Therefore, multilateral organizations should certainly be considered legitimate and powerful public diplomacy actors and treated as such.

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