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U.S. Public Diplomacy in a Post-9/11 World: From Messaging to Mutuality

By Kathy R. Fitzpatrick

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Kathy R. Fitzpatrick

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U.S. Public Diplomacy in a Post-9/11 World: From Messaging to Mutuality

Without developing its theoretical foundations, dialogue might easily become simply a rhetorical device shrouding the pursuit of power and state interests.¹

The 9/11 Commission charged by the U.S. Congress and president with investigating the “facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001” and making recommendations for “how [to] avoid such tragedy” in the future had little to say about failures related to the nation’s diplomatic preparedness to combat ideological threats. In fact, the Commission’s conclusions about pre-9/11 diplomacy were summed up in its final report in one sentence: “The diplomatic efforts of the Department of State were largely ineffective.”²

In the years since that report was issued, dozens of other reports, papers, articles and books have attempted to do what the Commission did not do, i.e., determine why American diplomacy—specifically public diplomacy, or diplomatic efforts aimed at foreign publics (as opposed to foreign leaders)—was ineffective.

To a large degree, that question has been answered. The marginalization of public diplomacy by U.S. officials after the Cold War, which led to the dissolution of the United States Information Agency in 1999, left a fractured and under-funded public diplomacy system incapable of serving as an effective first line of defense against foreign hostilities.³

The more important question of how public diplomacy can be made more effective going forward has not been so easily answered, although considerable energy has been expended trying. Since 9/11, seven (soon to be eight) undersecretaries of state for public diplomacy and public affairs have cycled in and out of the State Department, each offering fresh ideas for how America can “win the hearts and minds” of people abroad. Scholars and practitioners

of public diplomacy, as well as policy makers and other informed observers, also have suggested new directions for U.S. public diplomacy in the 21st century.⁴

Ten years after 9/11, however, no consensus has been reached on exactly what an effective public diplomacy should look like or what it should achieve. On one hand are those who believe that in order for public diplomacy to be more effective the United States must do a better job communicating its message to people abroad. This thinking, which was on view throughout the George W. Bush administration, reflects the counsel of the 9/11 Commission, which recommended a two-pronged public diplomacy strategy to “engage the struggle of ideas”: 1) “define what [America’s] message is, what it stands for” and 2) “defend [America’s] ideals abroad vigorously.”⁵ According to the Commission’s final report, in order to protect the nation in this new era, “[t]he United States must do more to communicate its message.”⁶

On the other hand are a growing number of public diplomacy scholars, practitioners and informed observers who believe that better messaging techniques are not the key to public diplomacy’s effectiveness in a world transformed by globalization and new technology. Rather, a “new” public diplomacy, which is “first of all about promoting and maintaining smooth international relationships,” is required for success in the new global environment.⁷ In order for public diplomacy to be effective, they contend, old forms of diplomatic monologue must be supplemented with (if not replaced by) new forms of diplomatic dialogue and collaboration.⁸ As Shaun Riordan argued, “[T]he new security agenda requires a more collaborative approach to foreign policy, which in return requires a new dialogue-based paradigm for public diplomacy.”⁹

What this means for U.S. public diplomacy is a shift from “telling America’s story to the world” as it did both during the Cold War and in the early post-9/11 period to “engaging with the world.” President Barack Obama signaled such a move soon after entering the White House. In his inaugural address, he emphasized principles

of mutuality in U.S. international relations, telling the Muslim world “we seek a new way forward based on mutual interest and mutual respect.”¹⁰ He later stressed the importance of dialogue and mutual understanding in his widely-quoted Cairo speech, in which he called for a sustained effort “to listen to each other; to learn from each other; to respect one another; to seek common ground.”¹¹

From such statements, it would appear that America has taken a decided turn away from a messaging approach to public diplomacy toward a relational approach perceived to be both more effective (and possibly more ethical) by U.S. officials. However, a closer look reveals that the Obama administration has not fully embraced the dialogic features of the new public diplomacy.

This paper applies dialogue theory to U.S. public diplomacy in an effort to assess progress made in building a model of U.S. public diplomacy that will protect and advance national and international interests in a post-9/11 world. The assumption behind the research is that a relational model of public diplomacy based on principles of dialogue and mutuality offers a promising framework for improving U.S. international relations.¹² Such a model reflects both intellectual trends in public diplomacy and the realities of an increasingly interdependent world in which cross-border networks of power have replaced traditional government structures and foreign publics have become more important to a nation’s ability to accomplish its foreign affairs objectives. A relational approach also speaks to the dual mandates of U.S. public diplomacy laid out by the U.S. Congress more than half a century ago: “To enable the Government of the United States to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries.”¹³

The work begins by reviewing the emerging conceptual framework of the new public diplomacy. It then examines the assumptions and requirements of dialogue—a foundational tenet of the new public diplomacy—in an attempt to develop a framework for a dialogic model of public diplomacy. The paper then analyzes

four key U.S. policy documents in which the Obama administration has presented its philosophy of global engagement and laid out its strategic plans for public diplomacy. The aim is to assess the congruency of U.S. public diplomacy today with the guiding principles of the new public diplomacy and a dialogic model of public diplomacy.

The study reveals that the Obama administration has made significant progress toward the adoption of a more relational approach to public diplomacy based on principles of dialogue and mutuality. At the same time, the administration's two-way model of "asymmetric engagement" in which dialogue is used as a strategic tool to advance U.S. interests does not meet the requirements of *genuine* dialogue, which calls for a two-way model of "symmetric engagement" in which both the nation and its foreign publics are subject to persuasion and dialogue is used to achieve mutual understanding and benefits. As such, the work exposes a gap in evolving public diplomacy theory and contemporary U.S. public diplomacy policies and practices.

In assessing U.S. public diplomacy's adherence to dialogic principles, this work also provides a framework that may be useful for better understanding and evaluating public diplomacy policies and practices throughout the world. The paper helps to clarify the concept of dialogue in public diplomacy and identifies the requirements for dialogic public diplomacy practices. In doing so, it also raises some important questions about the feasibility of *genuine* dialogue as a defining conceptual (and strategic) framework for public diplomacy in the United States and other parts of the world.

A "new" public diplomacy

Recognizing transformational changes in global society, public diplomacy scholars and practitioners and other informed observers have called for a new public diplomacy to meet the demands of a new time. Globalization, combined with technological innovations and new media, has created a new world order in which nation-

states have less control over traditional spheres of politics and governance and non-state actors have become more prominent and powerful in world affairs. As a result, nations must “engage with” rather than “communicate to” foreign publics in the pursuit of more collaborative relations.

According to Jan Melissen, engaging with foreign societies today “requires a totally different mindset.”¹⁴ Diplomats must abandon “the illusion of near-complete control over one’s own initiatives,” he said, and develop “outreach techniques that were unknown to previous generations of practitioners.”¹⁵ What this means, Melissen explained, is that “[t]he new public diplomacy is no longer confined to messaging, promotion campaigns, or even direct governmental contacts with foreign publics serving foreign policy purposes. It is also about building relationships with civil society actors in other countries and about facilitating networks between non-governmental parties at home and abroad.”¹⁶

In this respect, the new public diplomacy rejects the traditional view that only governments “do” public diplomacy. As Nicholas Cull observed, “The relationships need not be between [a nation or other international actor] and a foreign audience but could usefully be between two audiences, foreign to each other, whose communication the actor wishes to facilitate.”¹⁷

As such, the new public diplomacy also contemplates the involvement of domestic publics in public diplomacy initiatives. For example, in discussing the requirements of effective public diplomacy on behalf of Western countries in the Middle East, Riordan noted that “the agents of dialogue must enjoy credibility and access.” Since neither Western governments nor their agents (i.e., diplomats) have either, he said, “[m]ore credible agents will need to be found among non-governmental agents in broader western civil society.” What this means is that “an effective overseas public diplomacy strategy may often have to be preceded by an equally effective domestic public diplomacy strategy.”¹⁸

Rhonda Zaharna also cited the importance of domestic publics in her study of U.S. public diplomacy, suggesting that the challenge “is how to bridge the inconsistencies between U.S. public diplomacy goals and U.S. domestic sentiment toward foreign publics.”¹⁹ Noting that communication parties tend to mirror their perceptions of each other, she said there is a need to “bridge the perceptual gaps between foreign and domestic publics and make them more mutually compatible.”²⁰

A defining feature of the new public diplomacy is that it is a “two-way street” through which public diplomacy programs are no longer “pushed out to target audiences.”²¹ Under the old public diplomacy paradigm, communication is asymmetric in the sense that it is designed to influence the attitudes and behaviors of foreign publics but not necessarily those of sponsoring nations or other international actors. According to Mohan J. Dutta-Bergman, “Central to [old] public diplomacy is the objective of influencing the receiver countries without being open to persuasion.”²² Under the new public diplomacy paradigm, the attitudes and behaviors of both foreign publics and sponsoring nations are subject to change.

In describing the old public diplomacy, Eytan Gilboa explained that it “seeks to create a favorable image for a country’s policies, actions, and political and economic system, assuming that if public opinion in the target society is persuaded to accept that image, it will exert pressure on its government to alter existing hostile attitudes and policy.”²³ According to Riordan, there is “no space” in such an approach for the engagement of foreign publics in genuine debate.²⁴ “Messages, in so far as they exist,” said Riordan, “are simply exercises in propaganda, designed to demonstrate the superiority of a given nation’s position.”²⁵

The new public diplomacy is not only about promoting policy but is also about involving and consulting other players in the policy development process.²⁶ According to Riordan, “Dialogue-based public diplomacy requires a more open decision-making process, in which broad policy objectives are set, but in which detailed policies

emerge as part of the dialogue process.”²⁷ As the USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School views it, the new public diplomacy “starts from the premise that dialogue, rather than a sales pitch, is often central to achieving the goals of foreign policy.”²⁸

Put another way, Mark Leonard viewed public diplomacy as “building relationships, starting from understanding other countries’ needs, cultures and peoples and then looking for areas to make common cause.”²⁹ Ali Fisher and Scott Lucas similarly addressed the importance of mutuality in a “networked” world. In *Trials of Engagement: The Future of U.S. Public Diplomacy*, they wrote that public diplomacy must provide more than a rhetorical nod to a “two-way” process. “Ultimately, a collaborative public diplomacy must be built on a broad understanding of those involved, the recognition of stakeholders as peers, and effective interaction with networks made up of traditional and new interlocutors.”³⁰

According to Riordan, “a successful public diplomacy must be based not on the assertions of values, but on engaging in a genuine dialogue.” At the same time, genuine dialogue does not require the abandonment of core values or that public diplomacy be “an altruistic affair.” As explained by Riordan,

[Genuine dialogue] requires a more open, and perhaps humble, approach, which recognizes that no one has a monopoly of truth or virtue, that other ideas may be valid and that the outcome may be different from the initial message being promoted. If the aim is to convince, rather than just win, and the process is to have credibility, the dialogue must be genuine. This does not amount to abandoning core values. The aim remains to convince other publics of these values. But the effort to convince is set in a context of listening. Just as no individual will long suffer, or be convinced by, an interlocutor who endlessly asserts his views while never listening to those of others, so other governments and societies will not engage in collaboration if they feel that their ideas and values are not taken seriously.”³¹

Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault viewed dialogue as one of three communication “tools,” also including monologue and collaboration.³² As they put it, “Nothing can match the poetry, clarity, emotional power, and memorability of a beautifully crafted speech of proclamation. Nothing helps build mutual understanding as well as a thoughtful dialogue. And nothing creates a sense of trust and mutual respect as fully as a meaningful collaboration.”³³ Dialogue is important, they argued, “both as a symbolic gesture that emphasizes that reasonable people can find reasonable ways to disagree and as a mechanism for overcoming stereotypes and forging relationships across social boundaries.”³⁴ Although dialogue may not lead to changed foreign policy positions or changed opinions about foreign policy positions, Cowan and Arsenault explained, “a willingness to listen and to show respect for thoughtful, alternate voices may help to ameliorate conflicts, or at least facilitate understanding of positions taken by helping participants to articulate their positions in more easily understandable terms.” According to these writers, “Dialogue should first and foremost be approached as a method for improving relationships and increasing understanding, not necessarily for reaching consensus or for winning an argument.”³⁵

Peter Krause and Stephen Van Evera similarly observed that “‘dialogue’ or ‘engagement’ implies equality among parties, respect for the opinions of both sides, a conversation instead of a monologue, and an effort to find solutions that serve the interests of both sides.”³⁶

Table 1. Characteristics of the “New” Public Diplomacy

1. The new public diplomacy anticipates a more collaborative approach to international relations.
2. The new public diplomacy contributes to mutual understanding among nations/international actors and foreign publics.
3. The new public diplomacy helps to build and sustain relationships between nations/international actors and foreign publics.

4. The new public diplomacy facilitates networks of relationships between organizations and people in both the public and private sectors.
5. The new public diplomacy involves both foreign and domestic publics.
6. The new public diplomacy includes foreign publics in policy processes.
7. The new public diplomacy is based on principles of dialogue and mutuality.
8. The new public diplomacy emphasizes two-way communication and interactions.
9. The new public diplomacy favors people-to-people interactions over mass messaging techniques.
10. The new public diplomacy has a primarily proactive, long-term focus on relationship-building.

Although there is broad agreement among public diplomacy scholars and practitioners that dialogue is (or should be) a defining characteristic of the new public diplomacy (see Table 1), neither the concept nor practical requirements of dialogue have been fully explicated. For example, some calls for a more dialogic approach to public diplomacy reflect a perceived need for a new strategic approach to public diplomacy that will be more effective in helping nations and other international actors wield power and influence in global affairs. Zaharna, for example, suggested that America could gain the “cooperative advantage” in global affairs by incorporating network communication and connective, relational strategies into its public diplomacy. “Those with the most extensive and strongest communication bridges will command power in the global communication era,” she said.³⁷

Other calls for a more dialogic approach to public diplomacy reflect a perceived need for a new public diplomacy worldview that is less about accruing power and more about enriching cross-border relationships for the accomplishment of shared goals. For example,

this author has argued elsewhere that “the problem with a power-based model of public diplomacy is that it fails to fully recognize the importance of mutuality and dialogue in which *both* parties are conducive to changes in attitudes and behavior and in which the achievement of mutual benefit is the desired outcome.”³⁸

These contrasting perspectives suggest that, in constructing a new public diplomacy based on principles of dialogue and mutuality, there is a need to clarify both the concept of dialogue and the criteria for dialogic practices. The following section examines the assumptions and requirements of dialogue in an effort to develop a framework for a dialogic model of public diplomacy.

The concept of dialogue

Although dialogue is a complex concept inviting diverse interpretations, scholars across disciplines tend to agree on its fundamental precepts. Dialogue is first and foremost about the quality of relationships between people.³⁹ Although some refer to dialogue as simply an interactive process of communication, dialogue implies more than just an exchange of messages. As Thomas Kelleher observed, although all dialogue might involve two-way communication, all two-way communication is not dialogue.⁴⁰

Kenneth N. Cissna and Rob Anderson defined dialogue as “both a quality of relationship that arises, however briefly, between two or more people and a way of thinking about human affairs that highlights their dialogic qualities.” According to these scholars, “Dialogue can identify the attitudes with which participants approach each other, the ways they talk and act, the consequences of their meeting, and the context within which they meet.”⁴¹

In other words, dialogue is more than a communication process or strategy. As Carl Botan suggested, “dialogue manifests itself more as a stance, orientation, or bearing in communication rather than as a specific method, technique, or format.”⁴²

As envisioned by Martin Buber, considered by many to be the father of the modern concept of dialogue, dialogue requires that participants have “in mind the other or others in their present and particular being and turn to them with the intention of establishing a living mutual relation between” themselves and others.⁴³ Buber distinguished relationship-building or “true” dialogue from “technical” dialogue involving an exchange of ideas and information. According to Maurice Friedman, the key to appreciating the benefits of dialogue is participation. “Central to dialogue is ‘turning toward’ or being present, as well as extending oneself to experience the other’s side,” he said.⁴⁴

In discussing the complexity of dialogue, Stanley Deetz observed that although different conceptions and practices of dialogue, as well as desired outcomes, may differ, the term “dialogue” “directs our attention to concerns with ‘mutual understanding’ and the presumed benefits from its accomplishment.”⁴⁵ A dialogic orientation, he said, is “toward mutual understanding and/or mutual decisions rather than strategic self-interest.” Accordingly, “little is fixed from the outset, as what is built together is prized over preexisting beliefs and attitudes.”⁴⁶

Deetz noted considerable agreement among scholars of dialogue on the “ideal conditions for dialogue to occur”:⁴⁷

- 1) reciprocity of opportunity for expression;
- 2) some equality in expression skills;
- 3) the setting aside of authority relations, organizational positions, and other external sources of power;
- 4) the open investigations of member positions and “wants” to more freely ascertain their interests; and
- 5) open sharing of information and transparency of decision processes; the opening of fact and knowledge claims to

redetermination based on contestation of claims and of advanced modes of knowledge creation.⁴⁸

In *The Reach of Dialogue*, Anderson, Cissna and Ronald C. Arnett synthesized traditions and conceptions of dialogue as described by Buber and other contributors to dialogic theory. They identified eight basic characteristics of dialogue:

- 1) Immediacy of presence, or being available and relatively uninterested in orchestrating specific outcomes or consequences;
- 2) Emergent unanticipated consequences that cannot fully be predicted;
- 3) Recognition of “strange otherness,” or acknowledgment by participants that they do not already know the thoughts, feelings, intentions, or best behaviors of the other;
- 4) Collaborative orientation characterized by high levels of concern for self (and one’s own position) as well as for the other (and for the position advanced by the other);
- 5) Vulnerability, or risk induced by exposing one’s ideas to the scrutiny of another and being open to the other’s ideas and the possibility of being changed;
- 6) Mutual implication, which involves incorporating the other into one’s own utterances;
- 7) Temporal flow, which presumes historical continuity and anticipates and prefigures an open future; and
- 8) Genuineness and authenticity, or the presumption of honesty on the part of the participants.⁴⁹

Others have attempted to define the fundamental precepts of dialogue in specific fields and contexts. For example, in an effort to

develop a dialogic approach to public relations, Michael Kent and Maureen Taylor traced the origins of dialogue through philosophy, psychology, relational communication and public relations, identifying five defining features of a dialogic orientation that “encompass the implicit and explicit assumptions that underlie the concept of dialogue”.⁵⁰

- 1) Mutuality, or an acknowledgment that organizations and publics are inextricably tied together; a collaborative orientation;
- 2) Propinquity, or an exchange in which publics are consulted in matters that influence them in the present—rather than after decisions have been made—and in which both parties are committed to participating and anticipate a shared future;
- 3) Empathy, or an atmosphere of support and trust; a communal orientation and confirmation or recognition of others;
- 4) Risk, or a willingness by parties to self-disclose and accept the uniqueness of others and to be open to the possibility of change; and
- 5) Commitment, or a promise to be honest and forthright with one another in a shared attempt to achieve mutual benefit and understanding and not to defeat the other or to exploit weaknesses; a willingness to continue the dialogue to reach mutually satisfying positions.⁵¹

The conditions, characteristics and features of dialogue reviewed here reflect *genuine* or “symmetrical dialogue” through which “the interests of both parties are represented in such a manner that can persuade and allow the other party to persuade.”⁵² This form of dialogue focuses on mutual understanding, collaboration and shared benefits. In symmetrical dialogue, the persuasion that occurs is “essentially about sense making where the parties come to understand the situation from each other’s perspective.”⁵³

The principles of genuine dialogue are reflected in what Jurgen Habermas called “communicative action,” or “that form of social interaction in which the plans of action of different actors are coordinated through the exchange of communicative acts, this is, through a use of language (or corresponding non-verbal expressions) oriented towards reaching understanding.”⁵⁴ According to David Foster and Jan Jonker, communicative action, which emphasizes shared understanding, “acknowledges the constitutive or sense-making aspects of human communications and the fact that the sender is not in total control of the communicative act.”⁵⁵ Such a process is most likely to lead to desired actions, they suggested, because “[c]laims that can be ‘warranted’ through discourse are more likely to achieve stakeholder support than those that are simply imposed... Indeed, as stakeholders of all types are no longer willing to accept manipulation or control, then this may be the only form of communication that will achieve acceptable outcomes for organizations.”⁵⁶

Another form of dialogue is “asymmetrical dialogue,” which uses two-way communication and interactions to persuade others to a particular point of view for the self-interest of the persuader.⁵⁷ Feedback is used to adjust messages and strategies to make communication more effective in accomplishing specific outcomes. Habermas called this process “strategic action,” which is measured by “the efficiency of influencing the decisions of rational opponents.”⁵⁸ In distinguishing strategic action from communicative action, Habermas contended that most organizations engage in strategic action, which is aimed at the achievement of predetermined ends, rather than shared understanding.

Anderson, Cissna and Arnett similarly observed that most people view dialogue from an asymmetrical or tactical perspective in terms of the results it can produce: “What most people probably mean when calling for more dialogue is that they want more understanding of the side of the issue they favor. They want better listening from the other person and more acceptance of their own arguments.”⁵⁹ Such a view is contrary to genuine dialogue, for which the results

are unpredictable, they explained, and which “keeps communicators more focused on mutuality and relationship than on self-interest, more concerned with discovering than with disclosing, more interested in access than in domination.”⁶⁰

According to W. Barnett Pearce, “one of the defining and most important characteristics of dialogue is that achieving resolution cannot be the primary purpose or highest context of the interaction.”⁶¹ The use of dialogue for achieving predetermined outcomes, he said, represents “counterfeits of dialogue,” which “poison the well” for genuine dialogue. At the same time, Barnett acknowledged the tensions between “standing your own ground and being profoundly open to the other.” The secret to dialogue, he said, is that “we are much more likely to achieve resolution when we give up trying for it; when we quit focusing on the issue and engage with the other person(s) as thou.”⁶²

Toward a dialogic model of public diplomacy

This review of the literature on dialogue helps to clarify the conceptual and practical requirements of a dialogic model of public diplomacy. Such a model, if based on principles of *genuine* dialogue, would incorporate the following eight criteria (see Table 2).

Mutuality

Mutuality requires reciprocity of parties and interests, as well as the opportunity for expression. Foreign publics are viewed by nations/international actors as equal participants in a relationship guided by mutual regard and not as objects or means to self-interested ends.

Presence

Presence requires that parties be available and open to each other and involved in matters that affect them “in the present.” Foreign publics are consulted before—not after—foreign policy decisions are made or actions taken.

Commitment

Commitment requires that parties be proactive in engaging with others and be willing to participate in efforts to reach mutually satisfying outcomes. Nations/international actors and foreign publics contemplate a shared future that will be acceptable to both.

Authenticity

Authenticity requires a presumption of honesty, transparency and genuineness by each party. Nations/international actors share information with foreign publics that is relevant to the relationship and/or needed for informed decision-making.

Trust

Trust requires that authority and power be set aside and that each party be empathetic to the other. Nations/international actors create trust through transparency of decision processes and confirmation that the views of foreign publics will be heard, respected and valued.

Respect

Respect requires parties to recognize and accept “strange otherness,”⁶³ or the unfamiliar views and unique traits of others. Nations/international actors are open to diverse perspectives of foreign publics such that they do not assume they know what people abroad think, believe or intend.

Collaboration

Collaboration requires sincere engagement between parties in which the relationship is not viewed in terms of winning or losing or as an attempt to defeat the other’s ideas. Collaboration recognizes that nations/international actors and foreign publics, respectively, will advocate on behalf of their own views and interests, but that

each party also sincerely cares about the welfare and future of the other. Collaboration presumes a shared interest in a joint creation rather than a predetermined outcome.

Risk

Risk requires that parties accept the uncertainty of dialogic outcomes. Nations/international actors are willing to subject their ideas and values to the scrutiny of foreign publics and be open to the possibility that their views may change as a result of the interaction.

Table 2. Criteria for a Dialogic Model of Public Diplomacy

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>Requirements</u>
1. Mutuality	Mutuality requires reciprocity of parties and interests, as well as the opportunity for expression.
2. Presence	Presence requires that parties be available and open to each other and involved in matters that affect them “in the present.”
3. Commitment	Commitment requires that parties be proactive in engaging with others and be willing to participate in efforts to reach mutually satisfying outcomes.
4. Authenticity	Authenticity requires a presumption of honesty, transparency and genuineness by each party.
5. Trust	Trust requires that authority and power be set aside and that each party be empathetic to the other.
6. Respect	Respect requires parties to recognize and accept “strange otherness,” or the unfamiliar views and unique traits of others.
7. Collaboration	Collaboration requires sincere engagement between parties in which the relationship is not viewed in terms of winning or losing or as an attempt to defeat the other’s ideas.
8. Risk	Risk requires that parties accept the uncertainty of dialogic outcomes.

From messaging to mutuality in U.S. public diplomacy

Former President George W. Bush set both the tone and approach that would define U.S. public diplomacy under his administration in his response to the terrorist attacks on 9/11. “I’m amazed that there is such misunderstanding of what our country is about, that people would hate us,” he said. “Like most Americans, I just can’t believe it. Because I know how good we are. We’ve got to do a better job of making our case.”⁶⁴

The administration’s subsequent attempts to “make America’s case” to people abroad—or “to make sure that our ideals prevail,” as one undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs put it⁶⁵—have been well-documented and widely criticized. As Kristin Lord and Marc Lynch observed, the administration’s efforts to win the “war of ideas” were “perceived by much of the world as too much lecturing and moralizing rhetoric, focused on message control and influencing target audiences, and too little consultation, listening and dialogue.”⁶⁶

The election of President Barack Obama signaled a new direction in U.S. public diplomacy. Both the new president and new Secretary of State Hilary Clinton quickly set a new tone in international relations and made great strides to “reset” America’s relationships with foreign nations and peoples. The guiding philosophy was global engagement and the guiding principles were mutual respect and understanding.

The new Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Judith McHale similarly indicated a new approach to U.S. public diplomacy in her confirmation hearings in which she spoke of “our nation’s renewed engagement with the people of the world.” The United States, she said, “must seek innovative ways to communicate and engage directly with foreign publics.”⁶⁷

In an effort to assess the congruency of U.S. public diplomacy with the dialogic principles called for in the new public diplomacy,

this section examines four policy documents in which the Obama administration has presented its philosophy of global engagement and laid out its plans for a new public diplomacy: the *National Security Strategy*, the *National Framework for Strategic Communication*, the *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* and the *Strategic Framework for Public Diplomacy*.

National Security Strategy

The *National Security Strategy* (NSS) defines engagement as “the active participation of the United States in relationships beyond our borders. It is, quite simply, the opposite of a self-imposed isolation that denies us the ability to shape outcomes.”⁶⁸ The rationale for U.S. engagement is described as “enlightened self interest” or “the belief that our own interests are bound to the interests of those beyond our borders will continue to guide our engagement with nations and peoples.”⁶⁹ According to the NSS, U.S. engagement “will pursue an international order that recognizes the rights and responsibilities of all nations. As we did after World War II, we must pursue a rules-based international system that can advance our own interests by serving mutual interests.”⁷⁰

The two goals of the *National Security Strategy* are renewing America’s leadership in the world and shaping an international system that can resolve challenges in the new era.⁷¹ Recognizing that “[i]n the past, the United States has thrived when both our nation and our national security policy have adapted to shape change instead of being shaped by it,” the Security Strategy states that “we must once again position the United States to champion mutual interests among nations and peoples.”⁷² The document recognizes both a need for international cooperation to solve today’s challenges and that America’s “moral leadership is grounded principally on the power of our example—not through an effort to impose our system on other peoples.”⁷³ According to the NSS, U.S. engagement will be based on “mutual interests and mutual respect.”⁷⁴

With respect to U.S. engagement with foreign publics, the Security Strategy says:

The United States will make a sustained effort to engage civil society and citizens and facilitate increased connections among the American people and peoples around the world—through efforts ranging from public service and educational exchanges, to increased commerce and private sector partnerships. In many instances, these modes of engagement have a powerful and enduring impact beyond our borders, and are a cost-effective way of projecting a positive vision of American leadership. Time and again, we have seen that the best ambassadors for American values and interests are the American people—our businesses, nongovernmental organizations, scientists, athletes, artists, military service members, and students.⁷⁵

The benefits of international engagement “outside government” are described as helping to “prepare our country to thrive in a global economy, while building the goodwill and relationships that are invaluable to sustaining American leadership” and to “leverage strengths that are unique to America—our diversity and diaspora populations, our openness and creativity, and the values that our people embody in their own lives.”⁷⁶

Recognizing “the increasing influence of individuals in today’s world,” the document states that “[t]here must be opportunities for individuals and the private sector to play a major role in addressing common challenges.”⁷⁷

In describing a “whole of government approach” to “strengthening national capacity,” the document points to a need for expanded capabilities in diplomacy:

Our diplomats are the first line of engagement, listening to our partners, learning from them, building respect for one another, and seeking common ground. Diplomats, development experts, and others in the United States Government must be able to work side by side to support a common agenda. New skills

are needed to foster effective interaction to convene, connect, and mobilize not only other governments and international organizations, but also nonstate actors such as corporations, foundations, nongovernmental organizations, universities, think tanks, and faith-based organizations, all of whom increasingly have a distinct role to play on both diplomatic and development issues.⁷⁸

“Strategic communication,” which is addressed separately from diplomacy in the Security Strategy, is described as “essential to sustaining global legitimacy and supporting our policy aims. Aligning our actions with our words is a shared responsibility that must be fostered by a culture of communication throughout government.” The document says the nation “must be more effective in our deliberative communication and engagement and do a better job understanding the attitudes, opinions, grievances, and concerns of people—not just elites—around the world.” The purpose? “Doing so allows us to convey credible, consistent messages and to develop effective plans, while better understanding how our actions will be perceived.”⁷⁹

According to the NSS, the United States will pursue and promote worldwide “certain values” believed to be “universal”: an individual’s freedom to speak their mind; assemble without fear; worship as they please; choose their own leaders; dignity, tolerance, and equality among all people; and the fair and equitable administration of justice. Noting that “democratic development has stalled in recent years,” the document states that the United States will “continue to engage nations, institutions and peoples in pursuit of these values abroad.” Recognizing that “different cultures and traditions give life to these values in distinct ways,” the document states that “America will not impose any system of government on another country, but our long-term security and prosperity depends on our steady support for universal values,” which will be pursued “by speaking out for universal rights, supporting fragile democracies and civil society, and supporting the dignity that comes with development.”⁸⁰

National Framework for Strategic Communication

The *National Framework for Strategic Communication* (“NFSC” or “National Framework”), described by President Obama as “my Administration’s comprehensive interagency strategy for public diplomacy and strategic communication,” emphasizes that “[a]cross all of our efforts, effective strategic communications are essential to sustaining global legitimacy and supporting our policy aims.”⁸¹ The National Framework quotes the Security Strategy in calling for the development of a “culture of communication” throughout government, recognizing that the nation must be “more effective in our deliberate communication and engagement, and do a better job understanding the attitudes, opinions, grievances, and concerns of people—not just elites—around the world” so that it can “convey credible, consistent messages, develop effective plans and to better understand how our actions will be perceived.”⁸²

This document focuses primarily on describing interagency processes involving government communications and the roles and responsibilities of the various entities and positions responsible for the government’s strategic communication and on ongoing efforts to improve efficiency and effectiveness in this area. “Strategic communication” is described as encompassing “the synchronization of words and deeds and how they will be perceived by selected audiences” and “programs and activities deliberately aimed at communicating and engaging with intended audiences, including those implemented by public affairs, public diplomacy, and information operations.”⁸³

According to the National Framework, synchronization is “a shared responsibility that begins with senior leaders” who “must foster a ‘culture of communication’ that recognizes and incentivizes the importance of identifying, evaluating and coordinating the communicative value of actions as a proactive and organic part of planning and decision-making at all levels.”⁸⁴ The document states that “deliberate communication and engagement” should be “strategic and long-term, not just reactive and tactical, [and] focus

on articulating what the United States is for, not just what we are against.”⁸⁵

The goals of U.S. “deliberate communication and engagement,” which are described as “elements of national power,” are to support policy goals and to achieve the following “specific effects”:

- Foreign audiences recognize areas of mutual interest with the United States;
- Foreign audiences believe the United States plays a constructive role in global affairs; and
- Foreign audiences see the United States as a respectful partner in efforts to meet complex global challenges.⁸⁶

Noting the importance of feedback in “establishing the strategic messages against which our actions are often judged by the public,” the National Framework says “[i]t is vital that the United States is not focused solely on one-way communication, which is why we have consciously emphasized the importance of ‘engagement’—connecting with, listening to, and building long-term relationships with key stakeholders.”⁸⁷

The document goes on, however, to distinguish the “positive” efforts of the government’s communication and engagement, which “should emphasize mutual respect and mutual interest,” from efforts aimed at combating terrorism. “The United States should articulate a positive vision, identifying what we are for, whenever possible, and engage foreign audiences on positive terms. At the same time, our countering violent extremism efforts should focus more directly on discrediting, denigrating, and delegitimizing al-Qa’ida and violent extremist ideology.”⁸⁸

Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review

The *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (“QDDR” or “Review”) identifies public diplomacy as “a core diplomatic mission” that will include “building regional media hubs staffed by skilled communicators to ensure that we can participate in public debates anywhere and anytime; pioneering community diplomacy to build networks that share our interests; and expanding people-to-people relationships.”⁸⁹

The guiding policies of the Review are to restore and sustain America’s leadership and to build a new global architecture of cooperation. Stressing “civilian power” and recognizing “the power of the public”—including “NGOs, corporations, civil society groups, and individuals around the world who share our goals and interests”—the Review emphasizes partnerships that can help “advance America’s security, prosperity and values around the world.”⁹⁰ According to the QDDR, “We will build a network of alliances and partnerships, regional organizations and global institutions that is durable and dynamic enough to help us meet today’s challenges, adapt to threats that lie ahead, and seize new opportunities.”⁹¹ As an example, the report cites a new Global Partnership Initiative Office that was established to help build and sustain private sector partnerships, which are described as adding “value to our mission through their resources, their capacity to establish presence in places we cannot, through the technologies, networks, and contacts they can tap, and through their specialized expertise or knowledge.”⁹²

The document also announces plans for “Strategic Dialogues” with “emerging centers of influence” overseas. “These dialogues are sustainable structures that provide a framework for cooperation on the full range of issues and across a wide array of agencies, and establish a context within which we can manage differences.”⁹³ The document quotes Secretary Clinton in recognizing that although the Strategic Dialogues do not guarantee results, “they set in motion processes and relationships that will widen our avenues of cooperation and narrow the areas of disagreement without illusion. We know that

progress will not likely come quickly, or without bumps in the road, but we are determined to begin and stay on this path.”⁹⁴ Over time, the Review states, the capacity of the program “to produce tangible results” will be strengthened⁹⁵ and “[u]ltimately Strategic Dialogues will be judged on the results they deliver; by deepening relationships with emerging powers, we lay the critical diplomatic groundwork to help deliver the results we need.”⁹⁶

The document stresses efforts to improve regional engagement through expanded programs, such as “embassy circuit riders” who travel across a country engaging with people on specific issues, strengthening ties with regional institutions and creating regional hubs to support local initiatives. Another program, entitled “Strategic Dialogues with Civil Society,” was designed “to advance initiatives across a range of issues on which the United States and civil society share objectives.”⁹⁷ Along with the appointment of a new senior advisor for civil society and emerging democracies, this new initiative is described as “part of a broader commitment to make engagement beyond the state a defining feature of U.S. foreign policy.”⁹⁸

The Review stresses a “whole of government” approach to engagement that recognizes a new diplomatic operating environment in which collaboration and cooperation will be key to advancing American interests and values. “Our diplomacy must build partnerships and networks, implement programs, and engage with citizens, groups and organizations.”⁹⁹ According to the document, “Working with civil society is not just a matter of good global citizenship, but also a more effective and efficient path to advancing key foreign policy objectives.”¹⁰⁰

The document introduces “community diplomacy” as “a new approach to identifying and developing networks of contacts through specific on-the-ground projects, programs, or events and then helping those networks evolve into consistent centers of action on areas of common interest.”¹⁰¹ The two purposes of community diplomacy are “building networks of contacts that can operate on

their own to advance objectives consistent with our interests” and “showcasing through particular events our commitment to common interests and universal values.”¹⁰²

Finally, the QDDR adopts the recommendations presented in the *Strategic Framework for Public Diplomacy*, which is reviewed next.

Strategic Framework for Public Diplomacy

The *Strategic Framework for Public Diplomacy* (“SFPD” or “Strategic Framework”) is described as a “roadmap for public diplomacy” that will advance a mission “to support the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national security by informing and influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening the relationship between the people and government of the United States and citizens of the world.”¹⁰³

The framework identifies a need for “complex, multi-dimensional public engagement strategies to forge partnerships, mobilize broad coalitions, and galvanize public opinion across all sectors of society: activists and academics, business and civil society leaders, faith communities and NGOs.”¹⁰⁴ Five “strategic imperatives” for an effective public diplomacy and accompanying rationale for each are outlined:

- 1) Shape the narrative – develop proactive outreach strategies to inform, inspire, and persuade - “We have been misrepresented—or not represented at all—in too many global conversations.”
- 2) Expand and strengthen people-to-people relationships – build mutual trust and respect through expanded public diplomacy programs and platforms – “A foundation of trust opens ears and minds.”
- 3) Combat violent extremist – counter violent extremist voices, discredit and delegitimize al Qaeda, and empower credible

local voices – “The voices of violent extremists must not go unchallenged.”

- 4) Better inform policy-making– ensure foreign policy is informed upfront by an understanding of attitudes and opinions of foreign publics – “If we fly blind, expect to crash.”
- 5) Deploy resources in line with current priorities – strengthen structures and processes to ensure coordinated and effective public diplomacy – “We can do this better... and we have to.”¹⁰⁵

Although the tactics identified for accomplishing these strategic imperatives are vague, they provide some insight into U.S. public diplomacy officials’ view of U.S. global engagement. “Shaping the narrative,” for example, focuses primarily on “media engagement,” or strengthening U.S. ability to frame media messages, developing research-based public diplomacy programming and employing new media tools. According to the Strategic Framework, these efforts will allow U.S. officials to counter inaccurate information and engage with international media to shape global dialogue and provide U.S. perspectives.

The focus of people-to-people relationships is on expanding the reach of public diplomacy programs, leveraging new media tools, increasing educational opportunities for people abroad, creating opportunities for interactions of U.S. and foreign citizens through educational and cultural programs and building relationships with future foreign leaders. These programs are intended to “advance U.S. national interests and develop desired skills that provide opportunity and alternatives to extremism” for people abroad.¹⁰⁶

Efforts to “combat violent extremism” focus on countering misinformation about America in foreign societies and empowering more “credible voices within societies to undermine violent extremists’ messages.”¹⁰⁷

Efforts to “better inform policy making” are intended to bolster public diplomacy’s integration with and role in formulating foreign policy and to ensure that market research becomes a critical component of public diplomacy strategy. The aim here is “to ensure that chosen methods for engagement and communication reflect a nuanced understanding of host society opinions, norms, and modes of communication and achieve maximum impact.”¹⁰⁸

Analysis of U.S. public diplomacy

This review of U.S. policy documents provides considerable support for Riordan’s prediction that “[i]ncreasingly, in the twenty-first century, diplomacy will be public diplomacy.”¹⁰⁹ The philosophy of global engagement stressed in all four documents reflects the Obama administration’s view that in this new era the nation must “reach beyond government” to “engage directly” with people abroad. According to the *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, the administration is committed to making “engagement beyond the state a defining feature of U.S. foreign policy.”¹¹⁰

The review also shows that U.S. public diplomacy under the Obama administration incorporates many of the characteristics of the new public diplomacy. An increased emphasis on collaborations and relationship-building with public and private sector partners mirrors new public diplomacy thinking, as does the idea that public diplomats today must be equipped to facilitate networks of non-governmental organizations and peoples who share common interests. Notably, expanding and strengthening people-to-people relationships is identified as a “strategic imperative” of U.S. public diplomacy.

Additionally, an increased role for public diplomacy in policy processes is addressed in both the ideas and architecture of the new U.S. public diplomacy. There is also considerable evidence that two-way communication and long-term relational strategies are viewed as critical to U.S. public diplomacy’s success. Finally, the important role of domestic publics in U.S. public diplomacy is

recognized, albeit on a limited basis as informal “ambassadors” of public diplomacy efforts directed at people abroad.

These are welcome developments in U.S. public diplomacy. A shift from the messaging approach of the previous administration to a relational approach more geared toward “listening” than “telling” indicates significant progress toward a more effective U.S. public diplomacy. At the same time, however, these policy documents reveal inconsistencies in how U.S. “global engagement” is talked about and how it is practiced. While advocating dialogue and mutuality as guiding principles of U.S. international relations, the documents also show a public diplomacy strategy that seeks to serve and preserve *self* interests, as reflected in the guiding philosophy of “enlightened self interest.”

Congruency with dialogic principles

The Obama administration has embraced principles of dialogue and mutuality in its official statements regarding America’s engagement with world citizens. However, the documents reviewed suggest a more superficial than substantive adoption of dialogic principles in practice. In other words, while there is considerable evidence of a more interactive view of U.S. international relations, the administration has not fully embraced the requirements of *genuine* dialogue in its international strategic communication and public diplomacy.

For example, although the *National Security Strategy* states that U.S. engagement will be based on “mutual interests and mutual respect,” it also states that the reason for engaging in relationships beyond U.S. borders is to ensure that the nation is not denied the “ability to shape outcomes.” This idea also is advanced in the *Strategic Framework for Public Diplomacy*, in which relationship-building is presented as a means for sustaining U.S. global legitimacy and achieving “specific effects” that advance national interests and security. The QDDR, which is guided by the need “to restore and sustain America’s leadership,” similarly indicates that a

“new global architecture of cooperation” will “advance America’s security, prosperity and values.” *The Strategic Framework for Public Diplomacy* also makes clear that the mission of U.S. public diplomacy is “to advance national interests.”

Of course, it would be surprising if these documents were not about advancing and protecting U.S. interests. However, genuine dialogue requires nation states to go beyond national interests and to also consider the interests of their foreign publics. Thus, the focus on self-interest raises questions regarding the degree of mutuality in U.S. public diplomacy. For example, are foreign publics viewed as equal participants in U.S. international relations—or rather as means to self-interested ends? How are “mutual interests” defined?

A related issue deals with the presence of foreign publics in U.S. foreign policy making. For example, the *Strategic Framework for Public Diplomacy* cites the importance of ensuring “that foreign policy is informed upfront by an understanding of attitudes and opinions of foreign publics.” The stated purpose, however, is “to ensure that chosen methods for engagement and communications reflect a nuanced understanding of host society opinions, norms, and modes of communication and *achieve maximum impact* [emphasis added].” Such statements, which reflect a strategic view of dialogue, indicate that foreign publics may not be viewed as legitimate stakeholders in U.S. foreign policy. For example, how much say do people abroad actually have in U.S. foreign policy matters that affect them? Are their voices heard and taken into account before policies are decided and implemented—or are their views used simply to develop more palatable messages about unwelcome policies?

The documents reviewed suggest a significant commitment on the part of the U.S. government to be proactive in engaging with foreign publics. *The National Security Strategy*, for example, recognizes that U.S. interests “are bound to the interests of those beyond our borders.” This document also stresses the need to position “the United States to champion mutual interests among nations and people.”

The *Strategic Framework for Public Diplomacy* similarly identifies a need to “forge partnerships, mobilize broad coalitions, and galvanize public opinion across all sectors of society.” What’s missing, however, is any serious attention to *mutual* understanding among American and world citizens. The involvement of domestic citizens in U.S. global engagement is discussed only in terms of how U.S. citizens can help to advance public diplomacy goals abroad, raising questions about the sincerity of the U.S. government’s commitment to a “shared future.” There is nothing in these documents to suggest that true “mutual understanding” or efforts to enhance *Americans’* understanding of other nations and peoples will be a priority going forward.

The *National Security Strategy’s* aim of “aligning our actions with our words” provides some evidence of the Obama administration’s desire for authenticity in its international relations. The official rhetoric suggests an honest and forthright approach to America’s interactions with people abroad that mirrors the “warts and all” truth-telling philosophy of an earlier generation of U.S. public diplomats. Of course, it is difficult to discern from documents alone whether people abroad are provided the information they need to make informed decisions that affect their lives and their relationships with the United States.

The *Strategic Framework for Public Diplomacy* acknowledges the importance of trust and respect among parties for effective international relationship-building. However, both this document and the *National Framework for Strategic Communication* make clear that not all views and voices will be heard, respected and valued. Rather, the U.S. government will focus on “discrediting, denigrating, and delegitimizing” “extremist” views. Although such policies are understandable—and widely supported—in the long wake of 9/11, they illustrate the difficulties associated with the use of genuine dialogue in negotiating seemingly incompatible moral values between nations and peoples, or, as Lyn Boyd-Judson put it, “understanding the enemy’s moral universe.”¹¹¹

Collaboration is a key concept in all of the documents reviewed. However, as noted above, these documents also show that engagement with people abroad is aimed at the achievement of specific goals and objectives, or predetermined outcomes. According to the *National Framework for Strategic Communication*, for example, the aim of America’s dialogue with people abroad is “to convey credible, consistent messages, develop effective plans and to better understand how our actions will be perceived.” Such statements do not appear to reflect an interest on the part of U.S. officials in “joint creations.”

Additionally, there is little in these documents to suggest that U.S. officials are willing to accept the risk of uncertain outcomes or to engage in dialogue with people abroad solely for the purpose of increased mutual understanding. Although the documents recognize both a need for “international cooperation to solve today’s challenges” and that relationship-building “will widen our avenues of cooperation and narrow the areas of disagreement,” the ultimate aim of U.S. dialogue with foreign publics is “to produce tangible results.”

The idea—and ideal—of dialogue

This study shows that the Obama administration has adopted a two-way public diplomacy model of “asymmetric engagement” in which dialogue is used as a strategic tool to advance U.S. interests. Such a model does not meet the requirements of genuine dialogue, which calls for a two-way model of “symmetric engagement” in which both the nation and its foreign publics are subject to persuasion, and dialogue is used to achieve mutual understanding and benefits.

This finding is not surprising given that state-centered realist perspectives have long dominated U.S. international relations. In fact, some may find it inconceivable that *genuine* dialogue could be either possible or desirable in U.S. public diplomacy. For example, in exploring dialogue in international relations, Lynch asked, “Does [the] expectation of a power-free dialogue based on mutual respect relegate international deliberation to an unrealistic utopian ideal

type?"¹¹² Even if genuine dialogue were possible, why a nation would invest in such an "ambivalent objective" as fostering mutual understanding without advancing acceptance of the government's point of view.¹¹³

Public diplomacy scholars have only begun to address such questions. Manuel Castells, for example, argued for a more "public" public diplomacy that should not be viewed as "government public diplomacy." Rather, he said, public diplomacy is "the diplomacy of the public." As such, "[t]he implicit project behind the idea of public diplomacy is not to assert the power of a state or of a social actor in the form of 'soft power.' It is, instead, to harness the dialogue between different social collectives and their cultures in the hope of sharing meaning and understanding." If public diplomacy is understood as "networked communication and shared meaning," Castells argued, then it "becomes a decisive tool for the attainment of a sustainable world order."¹¹⁴

Fisher and Lucas similarly called for a collaborative public diplomacy that "understands the international environment [as] a network of interconnected communities and interests."¹¹⁵ In order to engage effectively in such an environment, they contended, "public diplomats will have to shed the idea of a network centered around them and recognize that they are only one group in a network of influence."¹¹⁶ According to Fisher and Lucas, a new dimension in public diplomacy is emerging that rests on the view that global communities are "'participants' and potential collaborators with whom to cooperate and create." The future of public diplomacy, they said, "is to find effective ways of working collaboratively for collective benefit within the ecosphere of the network society."¹¹⁷

Such views anticipate both an expanded role for public diplomacy in global society and an increased emphasis on dialogic practices. Exactly what this might mean, however, is unclear. This study has illustrated both the complexity of dialogue as a concept and challenges related to a dialogic model of public diplomacy in practice. Many questions remain unanswered. For example, if a dialogic model of

public diplomacy is “ideal” in contemporary global society—as the new public diplomacy literature suggests—then how can (should) a dialogic model be structured and operationalized? Does a more dialogic public diplomacy mean simply the expanded use of two-way interactive relationship-building strategies (in conjunction with more traditional one-way messaging strategies) or does it mean a new worldview reflecting how public diplomacy should be thought about and practiced?

Here, it is worth noting that many elements of the new public diplomacy are not all that “new” with respect to U.S. public diplomacy. For example, in *America’s Dialogue with the World*, Editor William P. Kiehl explained, “It will surprise many that there are a number of successful ways to bring about a dialogue between America and the world and these methods have been in use for more than sixty years.”¹¹⁸ Those on the front lines of U.S. public diplomacy during the Cold War, he said, recognized the importance of dialogue, which “requires that we listen to what others are saying in the context of their own society, draft our own messages in a context understandable to each audience, and build relationships with citizens and institutions of other nations so that our mutual understanding will survive the inevitable differences that arise among individuals and nation-states.”¹¹⁹ So, then, does (how does) dialogue as envisioned by scholars and practitioners today differ from dialogue as envisioned and practiced by U.S. public diplomats generations ago?

Other questions relate to the special interests of international actors and their foreign publics. For example, how can (should) *mutual* interests be defined—and who defines them? How can (should) the sometimes competing interests of nations or other international actors and their foreign publics be balanced? How can dialogue between different social collectives and cultures be “harnessed” to create shared meaning and understanding? How can international dialogue facilitated by public diplomacy help global communities work collaboratively for collective benefit? Does collaborative public diplomacy require *genuine* dialogue?

As scholars and practitioners contemplate the meaning of dialogue in public diplomacy, other matters warrant attention as well. For example, the analysis of U.S. public diplomacy illustrates the potential impact of context on the use and value of dialogue in public diplomacy. Distinctions in how the United States “engages” with ordinary people abroad and people perceived to hold “extremist” views, respectively, reveal possible limitations.

A few scholars have begun to explore possibilities for dialogue among international actors with seemingly entrenched competing views and interests. Lynch, for example, proposed that the terrorist attacks against the United States may have created the potential for “a new kind of dialogue” in the Middle East “by initiating a virtually unprecedented issue-specific global public sphere focused on the question of the relations between Islam and the West.”¹²⁰ Recognizing that “some conflicts and hatreds are real and cannot be talked away,” Lynch said, “others are not and dialogues might be helpful to determine which are which—an important service in the age of terror, where frightened populations might incline towards assuming the worst about the other. Actors insulated from engagement with others generally have little idea of how others view them.”¹²¹ Future studies should explore both the potential for and limitations of dialogue in public diplomacy.

Another issue related to dialogue involves the domestic dimensions of public diplomacy. If—as both the new public diplomacy literature and U.S. policy suggest—the facilitation of cross-border civil society links is part of public diplomacy’s “core business,”¹²² then greater attention to the domestic aspects of public diplomacy is needed both in public diplomacy scholarship and in public diplomacy practices. Traditionally, domestic citizens have been viewed as “multipliers” of public diplomacy efforts directed at people abroad. In this era of blurred borders and global interdependence, such views are outdated. In efforts to facilitate international dialogue, domestic citizens must be viewed and engaged as strategic “publics.”¹²³ Future research could help define the conceptual and practical dimensions of “domestic engagement.”

Other questions raised by a discussion of public diplomacy and dialogue relate to power. For example, “soft power”¹²⁴ as a conceptual foundation for public diplomacy has contributed significantly to public diplomacy’s rise in foreign affairs. Yet, links between power and public diplomacy remain ill-defined, particularly in the context of the new public diplomacy, which calls for a more symmetrical, dialogic approach to international relations. One question ripe for exploration is whether power-free dialogue is possible. If not, then how can (should) power imbalances be addressed in a dialogic model of public diplomacy? Future studies investigating the relationship between public diplomacy and power also might consider whether associations between public diplomacy and “soft power”¹²⁵ and/or “social power”¹²⁶ define—or perhaps mask—public diplomacy’s purpose and value to nations and other international actors, as well as to global society.

Finally, discussions of dialogue and public diplomacy involve issues of ethics. Dialogue pertains to both *why* and *how* a nation or other international actor engages with people abroad. While strategic—as opposed to communicative—dialogue is not inherently unethical; neither have the ethical boundaries of dialogic public diplomacy practices have been drawn, nor have the ethical foundations of a dialogic model of public diplomacy been explored. For example, a question raised by this study of U.S. public diplomacy is whether “enlightened self-interest” is an acceptable ethical baseline for public diplomacy. Future studies could help define the parameters of ethical public diplomacy policies and practices.

Conclusion

This study, which outlines criteria for a dialogic model of public diplomacy, provides a framework that may be useful for better understanding and evaluating public diplomacy policies and practices throughout the world. In clarifying the principles of genuine dialogue and identifying the requirements for dialogic public diplomacy practices, it takes a first step toward the development of a dialogic theory of public diplomacy. In assessing the congruency of U.S. public diplomacy with a dialogic model of public diplomacy, the work illustrates both possibilities for and potential difficulties with dialogue as a guiding philosophy.

Finally, in contemplating the meaning of dialogue in public diplomacy, the work evokes the idea of a more “social” public diplomacy with relevance and impact beyond its organizational function. As scholars and practitioners continue to wrestle with how to build a more effective public diplomacy in a post-9/11 world, it is worth asking whether that world calls for a more socially-conscious public diplomacy.

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