For those who like to see things in Manichean terms the brief but vicious conflict between Georgia and Russia last August was a frontline of a new global ideological battleground.
Sarah Palin condemned Barack Obama's failure to offer immediate and unconditional support to Georgia's President Mikheil Saakashvili at the US Republican convention the following month. David Cameron called for Russian shoppers to be barred from Selfridges shopping store while David Miliband surprised his Nato partners by declaring that a meeting had given the go-ahead for Georgia to be brought into membership, although everyone else in attendance said that no such thing had occurred.
It is now clear, however, that some western politicians were far too credulous in accepting Georgia's account of the immediate circumstances that led to the conflict, damaging their own credibility in the process. The full-scale assault by Georgian forces on South Ossetia's capital, Tskhinvali, on the night of 7 August, was not provoked by Ossetian military action. Saakashvili's claim that his forces were responding to a Russian "invasion" is also contradicted by satellite imagery. His forces appear to have instead initiated what can only have been justified as a "pre-emptive strike", which involved indiscriminate fire from Grad rockets that killed over 100 South Ossetian civilians.
The presence of 130 American military advisers in the Georgian army, who must have known about and reported on the plans for the assault, also raises the question of why the US government allowed it to go ahead. Were they, as Donal Rayfield suggests in an Open Democracy article, simply "cynically curious" to see how the Russians would respond or, worse, did the Bush administration hope that the war might boost John McCain's election chances?
While these questions demand answers they should not obscure the deeper culpability of the Russian government which has encouraged and supported the South Ossetian and Abkhazian breakaway separatist forces since 1992, for quite cynical reasons of its own. Russia's "humanitarian intervention" involved the widespread destruction of economic infrastructure deep inside Georgian territory, while areas immediately bordering the two contested areas were subjected to a campaign of looting, rape, murder and intimidation with the express aim of "ethnically cleansing" civilians from their homes.
Russian forces had clearly extensive preparations for the conflict and it is probable that their South Ossetian proxies did set out to provoke it with Saakashvili playing straight into their hands with his ill-thought out assault.
I am writing this piece from Mtsekheta, a few miles south of what is now effectively a new international frontier, where I am running some training courses for the European Union's observers on international human rights law. Although no one but Daniel Ortega's Nicaragua and a leader of Hamas have joined Russia to recognise the fiction of South Ossetia's independence the repeated claims by Georgian politicians that they will "meet next year in Tshkhinvali" have finally turned to ashes. Georgia has probably lost the two territories for good and is now more vulnerable than ever to the bullying whims of its northern neighbour.
The economic destruction that Georgia has suffered will be compensated by a quite staggeringly large western aid programme, but the aftermath of the conflict will scare off private investors. This is likely to have a particularly negative impact on plans to upgrade its railway links and oil pipelines – both of which could be vulnerable to future attack.
Georgia is also facing a bleaker international climate. Its plans for future Nato membership are now more or less on hold, Miliband's claims notwithstanding. Russia's effective annexation of South Ossetia, meanwhile, could negatively impact on an increasingly serious conflict that is developing between Ossetians and neighbouring Ingusetia.
In Georgia itself, meanwhile, discontent is continuing to grow against Saakashvili's authoritarian rule. The International Crisis Group has noted that there has still been little movement on reforms such as easing restrictions on freedom of expression, building an independent judiciary and tackling corruption. While Saakashvili continues to benefit from splits within the opposition and nationalist indignation against Russia, his violent political impulsiveness has clearly caused considerable damage to his country.
Georgia's best long-term prospects now, more clearly than ever, lie with a closer rapport with the European Union (EU). The EU's observers are currently the most visible guarantor of the shaky cease-fire, although they are still being restricted from access to many areas by Russian forces. The EU will also play a crucial role in ensuring that the massive western aid programme is disbursed in a transparent manner that strengthens political reform and democracy.
The prospect of eventual EU membership may also help convince the Georgian authorities, and their immediate neighbours, that they have more to gain through cooperation than conflict. While the August conflict undoubtedly dealt such hopes a severe blow, they may also have helped to concentrate minds on bad the alternatives really are. If the EU can use its "soft power" wisely, it could lay the basis for a far more constructive approach to what remains one of the most volatile and explosive regions in the world today.
Conor Foley is conducting training for the EU Observer mission to Georgia on behalf of the Council of Europe. He writes in a personal capacity.