University Diplomacy — U.S. : 0, Iran : 1

Ever since his rise to power in 2005 Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has enjoyed being in the spotlight of American attention. Not without the help of the news media and the White House’s preoccupation with his persona, the Iranian President successfully managed to turn many of his public appearances into public diplomacy triumphs. His musings on the Holocaust and the annihilation of Israel, and his defiance of the West over Iran’s nuclear program have been the subject of much debate granting him rock-star-like popularity on a par with Bruce Springsteen. While nothing more than the demagoguery of an unpopular leader, these same narratives were the word of the day once more during Ahmadinejad’s recent visit to the U.S. for the opening session of the United Nations General Assembly. Incessant rumblings and great anticipation preceded Ahmadinejad’s arrival, reaching a crescendo when Columbia University enlisted him as a speaker at its World Leaders Forum. Intended to meet “bad beliefs” with “better beliefs” and “hateful words” with “wiser words,” Columbia provided a prominent public diplomacy platform in the battle of ideas. Yet, neither the soft power advantage nor the publicity opportunity was successfully clinched for American   public diplomacy.

The centerpiece of Ahmadinejad’s visit to New York—his appearance at the UN—was largely overshadowed by Columbia’s invitation. Ahmadinejad’s speech was sponsored by Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs, which is launching a year-long series of lectures and events on the thirty years history of the Islamic Republic of Iran. News outlets were poised eagerly to cover the controversy as some condemned and others applauded the invitation. Fierce debate erupted over whether Ahmadinejad’s views deserved to be granted such a high podium and opinions were expounded on free speech, Iran and American democracy. Coverage of the Iranian President was predominantly negative and even those who supported his right to speak in New York expressed their condemnation of the President’s views and Iran’s human rights violations. However, Ahmadinejad still managed to pull off an extraordinary publicity coup. Despite the fact that Manhattan teemed with world leaders and important gatherings, he remained the media’s favorite celebrity. Aside from the Iraq war, Ahmadinejad’s visit was the most closely followed news story during the week. According to the Pew Research Center, 23% of the public followed the story very closely, and 14% listed it as the single news story they followed most closely. Ahmadinejad’s visit, and U.S.-Iranian relations in general, was the most heavily covered news story of the week. Fully 13% of the national newshole was devoted to this story. In an earlier poll, gauging news interest, Ahmadinejad ranked fifth in the list of people most often mentioned by American news outlets, preceded by O. J. Simpson, George Bush, Britney Spears and Hillary Clinton, and followed by General Petraeus.

As Americans were watching, so were the Iranians. The entirety of Ahmadinejad’s Columbia talk was broadcast on Iranian television the next day providing an unparalleled opportunity for American public diplomacy to communicate its message. Some argued that having Ahmadinejad speak would demonstrate clearly the fundamental pillars of American democracy — free speech and the right to protest. The example of how the United States handles criticism and how it treats even the most opposing views was expected to highlight its moral high ground over the regime in Tehran. The contrasts would hopefully not be lost on the Iranian people. President Bollinger stated that inviting Ahmadinejad to speak showcased America at its best: “to commit oneself to a life—and a civil society—prepared to examine critically all ideas arises from a deep faith in the myriad benefits of a long-term process of meeting bad beliefs with better beliefs and hateful words with wiser words. That faith in freedom has always been and remains today our nation’s most potent weapon against repressive regimes everywhere in the world”. Dean John Coatsworth added that, “opportunities to hear, challenge, and learn from controversial speakers of different views are central to the education and training of students for citizenship in a shrinking and still dangerous world.”

Not only was this seen as an excellent occasion for a real world demonstration of American values and democratic practices at work, it could also be perceived as a valuable opportunity to directly confront the Iranian President on his controversial remarks and hold him accountable for the accusations that the U.S. has been leveling against him and his country. Iran has been accused by President Bush of seeking nuclear weapons and was named the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism. As opposed to the straight speech which Ahmadinejad was scheduled to deliver at the UN, a “robust” debate could serve to lay bare the bankruptcy of human rights in Iran and challenge the rationale of its policies in Iraq and the wider Middle East.

Yet, Columbia was not praised for this laudable public diplomacy endeavor. Democratic Presidential candidates expressed at best a lukewarm support for the University with Senators Clinton and Obama noting that they wouldn’t have invited Ahmadinejad if they were Columbia’s President. John Edwards cautioned against allowing leaders like Ahmadinejad to score propaganda points. However, it is not so much Columbia’s invitation, as the current administration’s personalization of Iranian politics through Ahmadinejad’s figure and the news media’s subsequent focus on the President that continues to enhance his popularity both at home and abroad. Nevertheless, Republican Presidential candidates went even further in criticizing the University. Senator Thompson stated he would not have allowed Ahmadinejad into the country if he were President. California Rep. Duncan Hunter went as far as to threaten that “if President Bollinger follows through with this hosting of the leader of Iran, I will move in Congress to cut off every single type of federal funding to Columbia University.” So much for the hope of showcasing American freedom and democracy.

As events unfolded on the day of Ahmadinejad’s talk, those who looked to Columbia for an exhibition of the country’s openness to dialogue and receptivity to criticism, might have been disheartened. In welcoming his guest, President Bollinger called him a “petty and cruel dictator” and “either brazenly provocative or astonishingly uneducated.” Whether the result of threats of sanctions, political or media pressure, or simply a miscalculation, Bollinger’s “tough line” with the Iranian President caused an uproar in the U.S. and abroad. Abraham H. Foxman, national director of the Anti-Defamation League, described Bollinger’s speech as culturally insensitive and counterproductive. “If you invite someone, you have to be polite,” he said. “Ahmadinejad scored points, especially in their culture. If you permit an enemy to come into your home, you still treat him with dignity and respect. Therefore, we lost.”

Most importantly, President Bollinger’s disrespectful attitude towards an elected head-of-state alienated and shocked Iranians who perceived it as an offense to their nation. The chancellors of seven Iranian universities issued a letter to Bollinger saying his “insult, in a scholarly atmosphere, to the president of a country with a population of 72 million and a recorded history of 7,000 years of civilization and culture is deeply shameful.” In response, Iranian academics asked ten questions of President Bollinger pointing out America’s 1953 overthrow of Iran’s national government, U.S. support for Saddam Hussein during the 1980-88 Iraq-Iran war, and U.S. support for undemocratic regimes in the Middle East. As evidenced by this response, the episode at Columbia exacerbated Iranian feelings of humiliation and frustration with the West. It contradicted the very goals of public diplomacy which views academic leadership as a primary stakeholder and gatekeeper in relaying political and cultural texts to the broader public sphere, a strategy President Ahmadinejad is well versed in.

While the Iranian President ingeniously complements each of his UN visits with hosting a carefully targeted stylish dinner with American journalists and academics, the Bush administration is quick to dismiss invitations by Iranian Universities such as the one extended on October 1 by Ferdowsi University, one of Iran’s oldest academic institutions located in Iran’s second largest city of Mashhad. The justifications presented—Iran’s undemocratic society, nuclear ambitions and threats against Israel, make such a visit all the more imperative. Before leaving for New York Ahmadinejad stated that “the American people in the past years have been denied correct and clear information about global developments and are eager to hear different opinions.” Arguably, Iranians have fared much worse in terms of access to information. However, as Ahmadinejad strives to provide “a different voice” and the “correct and clear information” to Americans, Iranians have not been engaged in a similar exchange of opinions. Rather, President Bush’s rejection of Ferdowsi University’s invitation compounded the hostile welcome and mistreatment accorded to Ahmadinejad at Columbia, fueling Iranian perceptions of the U.S. as an arrogant superpower. Some commentators drew comparisons between U.S. policies toward the “Evil Empire” of the Soviet Union and Iran of the “Axis of Evil.” Despite the deep antagonism, American presidents did not ignore or insult their Soviet counterparts. Today, dialogue has been scrapped and to many Iranians it seems that U.S. policies are increasingly advanced through bullying while Americans “act like cowboys and nothing more.”

As a result, events at Columbia and the developments they triggered helped rather than hurt Ahmadinejad’s standing in Iran and the broader Middle East. Just as his failed economic policies and provocative posturing over the nuclear program were drawing intense criticism among Iranians, this hostile reception came to justify his defiance and intransigence and confirmed Iranian officials’ claims of an unjust attitude toward Iran in America. It further provided Ahmadinejad with an opportunity to posit himself as the true public diplomat who “created a new room for making direct contacts with the U.S. and international public opinions” only to be snubbed by his uncooperative hosts. For Iranian critics and supporters alike he appeared to have taken the high road. “Our president appeared as a gentleman. He remained polite against those who could not remain polite,” said Ahmad Masoudi, a customer at a grocery store who had watched state television’s recorded version of the event. The demonizing and mistreatment of the Iranian President enhanced his image of resistance to the U.S. in the eyes of much of the Middle East, an image that he endeavors to encourage among Iran’s Arab neighbors. According to Ahmad Bakhshayesh, a professor of politics in Tehran’s Allameh University, “the protests by Israel’s supporters against Ahmadinejad outside the university also helped him to appear as a hero for people of the Middle East.”

Ironically, Iran and the broader Middle East rather than Western publics are Ahmadinejad’s target public diplomacy audience and many of his statements are framed for domestic and regional consumption, although delivered in an international context. Some have described his strategy as a charm offensive in gearing up for the upcoming presidential elections. Others have pointed to his attempt to garner popular support in the Middle East by using the pan-Arab appeal of the Palestinian question.

U.S. demonizing of the Iranian president, however, does more than boost his domestic and regional popularity. It also bolsters his persona which does not enjoy a place of real power in Iran. Often depicted as George Bush’s prime antagonist, Ahmadinejad has become the definitive cultural stereotype of a powerful and radical Islamic leader with his finger on the nuclear button. The abundant coverage that he regularly receives is likely to lead publics in the U.S. to form their opinion of Iran and Iranian policy largely based upon their evaluation of the President. However, greater attention to the actual power nexus of Iranian politics might redefine Americans’ perceived threat from Tehran, as the President’s quirky personality and combative populism are hardly a serious concern for foreign policy. Although a master of inflammatory rhetoric, President Ahmadinejad does not wield much power or influence and does not have decision making authority over the nuclear briefcase or Iran’s military. Basing U.S. policy and attitudes toward Iran on the President’s rhetoric thus increases the risk of exaggerated threat assessments much to the detriment of conflict resolution with Iran.

Ultimately, events around Ahmadinejad’s visit served to increase rather than alleviate tension between the U.S. and Iran and multiple public diplomacy opportunities were wasted. Considering the amount of media attention showered on the visit, such a platform could have been used to raise ideas and propositions on an unofficial level that would have undoubtedly reached the mass audiences in the Middle East and generated a certain amount of goodwill. On the contrary, the attempt to deny Ahmadinejad a public diplomacy coup only contributed to his popularity at home and in the broader Middle East, while the disrespectful treatment he received further alienated Iranian public opinion and played into the hands of critics of American policy. Thus, the opportunities provided by Columbia’s public diplomacy forum were squandered.

The following is an aggregation of articles, commentary and public opinion polls on the public diplomacy implications of Ahmadinejad’s visit to the U.S. and their significance in the broader U.S.-Iranian relations.