This funereal op-ed is so fundamentally flawed that it is more like a drive-by shooting. Shooting USIA in the back is an unfortunate metaphor for the context of public diplomacy since many of us who engage in public diplomacy think of it in terms of ballots over bullets and swords into ploughshares. Even those who don’t like this tender-hearted approach view it in the tougher-minded context of political campaign strategies.

As the United States debates its role in the ongoing turmoil in Syria, we might do well to remember our initial foray into the region nearly a century ago. The very first American intelligence officer dispatched to that region was a 29 year-old man named William Yale. Until the United States entered World War I in April 1917, he had been living in Ottoman-controlled Syria as a local agent for the Standard Oil Company of New York.

So is America "war-weary"? Commentators beyond counting assure us that is the case. But who is war-weary, and precisely what does that mean? A little precision in our use of words goes a long way. Let's ask that notable gentleman from Prussia, Carl von Clausewitz.

Commenting in January on his country’s blacklisting of America as a destination for Russian child adoptees, Alexey Pushkov cited the deaths of nineteen children and the U.S. legal system’s “very laxative decisions” concerning the fate of the adoptive parents. When Mr. Pushkov is not tweeting about American exceptionalism, he is on state television spreading the pro-Putin and anti-American propaganda which is the staple of his TV Tsentr program “Post Scriptum.”

The sycamore trees that line the northern stretches of Vali Asr Avenue in Tehran arch overhead like a canopy. In the winter, their snowy branches frame a view of the Alborz Mountains where Tehranis escape to hike or ski. On a summer day, the leaves filter the sun and smog in the affluent northern neighborhoods, and you can watch the temperature rise by ten degrees as you inch your way southward in the city's infamous traffic toward the heart of old Tehran.

On March 24, 1999, former President Bill Clinton explained the rationale for air strikes in Kosovo from the Oval Office: “'Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative,” he said. “Our children need and deserve a peaceful, stable, free Europe.” Within minutes, NATO forces began pounding Serbia with cruise missiles and bombs, the start of what would become the largest military assault on Europe since World War II.

In a 1958 article in The Atlantic, the Sinologist George E. Taylor considered this Moscow-Beijing alliance in an article entitled "Why We Do Not Recognize Red China." Aside from the era-appropriate use of the term "red"—scholars then distinguished between the Communist-led Chinese government on the mainland and the Nationalist-led one in Taiwan—Taylor's essay argues that the United States shouldn't recognize the Communist government ruling Beijing.

Why do they hate America? What can we do to make them like us? There has been much talk about the promise and limits of U.S. public diplomacy in the Islamic world ever since the 9/11 terrorist attacks and an assumption that our efforts need to be adapted from the Cold War. But many of these discussions ignore that the robust, global system of public diplomacy funded by the State Department from the 1920s until the 1990s pre-dates the Cold War.