First of all, after the end of the Cold war, public opinion research demonstrates that in both countries the perception of the other side as an enemy decreased; in the United States it remains pretty stable, and the majority of Americans do not perceive Russia as a Cold-war-style adversary.

But much has changed since the “soft power” strategy of covertly educating North Koreans began in earnest two decades ago. North Koreans are no longer completely in the dark. We can’t quantify the amount of information that has leaked into the country, because we can’t conduct public opinion surveys in North Korea.

When I hear from people about the relative advantages of cultural diplomacy, they often point to the apparent “neutrality” or “apolitical” basis of, say, cultural exchange. Coming from an anthropological background, this often advanced claim has always puzzled me.

By the advent of the Cold War, dancers were being sent abroad and used as cultural ambassadors around the world to promote American values. In 1941, the government...sent dancers around South America to counteract anti-American sentiment.

This connection between communication and organization pops up in Cold War thinking on writings on ‘public diplomacy’ notably in W. Philips Davison’s (1965) International Political Communication. Davison argues that the key role of communication should be to support the organization of pro-US political forces rather than attacking the communists.

The U.S. employed both the hard power of military and economic might as well as the soft power of ideology, diplomacy and culture. Resistance to post-war Americanization was crucial to the French and Italian communist parties.

From their inception, motion pictures have been offering audience escape, entertainment, uplift or instruction with the intent and skills of filmmakers. Still, during the Cold War, American films reflected the changing mood of the United States towards the USSR.