APDS Blogger: Hend Alhinnawi

This attempt to garner longer-term soft power of being perceived positively globally and by African partners, however, may well contend with its harder and more short-term economic and domestic needs. China has an interest in some agreement, partly to vindicate criticisms levied against it at previous conferences but, at the same time, must pursue economic growth at home.

China as the dominant international economic and political force in Africa epitomizes the most dramatic shift in geopolitics since the Soviet Union collapsed. Yet the United States, Africa's traditional trading partner, seem incapable of responding to the challenge and retaking the initiative. Instead, its response has been to wring its hands in despair and make ineffectual noises about human rights and democracy.

When the United States Africa Command – AFRICOM – was created in 2007 and was formally activated the following year, many considered it to be the epitome of “smart power” – a carefully blended mix of hard and soft powder.  Like other U.S. military commands, it would possess formidable combat capability, but its signature ingredient was a soft power component. 

India’s trade with Africa was $45 billion in 2010. And while that’s up sharply from $11 billion in 2006, it still trails China’s $119 billion worth of trade with Africa, the country with a 20-year headstart in Africa. It has built highways and railways, bridges and airports and has been savvy at winning African friends through so-called soft power.

This was smart power. Genius, really. In 2007, 8 out of the 10 countries in the world that viewed the United States most fondly were African. And it can’t be a bad thing for America to have friends on a continent that is close to half Muslim and that, by 2025, will surpass China in population.

International paradigms, as realism and neoliberalism have historically defined the principles of international cooperation considering non-state actors as either negligent or influential. Hydro-politics, considers a new regime in which water can be considered by state and non-state actors as a new strategy to improve international cooperation. However, international law principles and the international water law framework seem to be working contradictory to the logics and schemes necessary for hydro-politics to become a successful platform for multilateral cooperation.